

The Gattiluso Lordships and the Aegean World
1355–1462

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The Gattilusio Lordships and the Aegean World 1355–1462

By
Christopher Wright



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Periodicals

AALSL	Atti dell'Accademia Ligure di Scienze e Lettere
ABSA	Annual of the British School at Athens
ASLSP	Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria
BF	Byzantinische Forschungen
BZ	Byzantinische Zeitschrift
DOP	Dumbarton Oaks Papers
REB	Revue des Etudes Byzantines
SG	La Storia dei Genovesi
n.s.	new series

Series

AA	Archives de l'Athos
CFHB	Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae
CSHB	Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae
CICO	Pontifica Commissio ad Redigendum Codicem Iuris Canonici Orientalis, Fontes, 3rd series
RIS	Rerum Italicarum Scriptores

Archives

ADCO	Archives Départementales de la Côte d'Or
ADN	Archives Départementales du Nord
AOM	Archives of the Order of Malta (National Library of Malta)
ASG	Archivio di Stato di Genova
ASV	Archivio di Stato di Venezia
ASVat	Archivio Segreto Vaticano

Archival Collections

AC	Antico Comune
AS	Archivio Segreto


CAOS	Camera Apostolica Obligationes et Solutiones
CM	Compere e Mutui
DC	Duca di Candia
NA	Notai Antichi
NCan	Notai di Candia
NCol	Notatorio del Collegio
NI	Notai Ignoti
RL	Registri Laterani
RV	Registri Vaticani
SGCanc	Archivio di San Giorgio, Cancelleria
SGCol	Archivio di San Giorgio, Colonne
SGGab	Archivio di San Giorgio, Gabelle
SMar	Senato Mar
SMisti	Senato Misti
SS	Senato Secreta

MAPS*




Map 1 The Aegean


* Maps created by Erik Goosmann.




Map 2 Lesbos




Map 3 Lesbos: Fortifications





Map 5 The Smaller Gattilusio Islands

FAMILY TREE OF THE GATTILUSIO LORDS



INTRODUCTION

This book aims to provide a thorough analytical account of the history of the lordships in the north-eastern Aegean, centred on the island of Lesbos, which were ruled by the Genoese Gattilusio family between 1355 and 1462, and to explore the implications of that history for the wider development of the Aegean world during the era of division between 1204 and 1453. It proposes that this regime, in the diversity of the influences which shaped it, was particularly characteristic of the distinctive qualities of this region and period, in which an exceptionally variegated array of networks of power and influence overlapped and interacted in an environment of fragmentation and flux. It examines these lordships from a number of perspectives: those of the influence upon them of each of the larger entities most important to their development, of their own dynamics as a more modest political and economic network, and of the interactions between their rulers and the population under their authority and between the different cultural and religious strands within that population. The goal of the work is to offer an interpretation of the Gattilusio lordships as an entity in themselves, and through them to illuminate both the nature of the individual networks that shaped them and the character of the region as a whole.

These wider aspirations must be set in the context of the particular historiographical challenges presented by the world in which the lordships existed. The fall of the Byzantine capital Constantinople to the Fourth Crusade in 1204 precipitated the political fragmentation of the Aegean basin, a region which had been dominated by a single authority since the days of the Roman Republic. Over the following decades Muslims and Latin Christians, who had from time to time entered the lands around the Aegean as traders, mercenaries, pilgrims or transient invaders, came to rule much of the region, establishing their own realms and competing for land with the old Byzantine masters and their former Balkan subjects and satellites. This situation would endure for two and a half centuries, until the fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks heralded the consolidation of a new imperial order. The combination of political fragmentation and instability with cross-cultural interaction gave rise to a remarkable diversity of regimes. Rulers from a range of religious and cultural backgrounds, established under widely varying circumstances on different

institutional bases, created their own systems to hold, exploit and perhaps expand their fragment of the Byzantine inheritance. This plurality was offset by structures of far-flung interconnection. The fracturing of the Byzantine Empire had loosened the bonds that incorporated the inhabitants of the Aegean region into a unit focused on Constantinople, but introduced or strengthened other connections that linked them to other parts of the wider Mediterranean world and especially to the Latin West. Fragmentation and instability restricted the scope for political and military self-sufficiency available to many of the region's rulers, obliging them to draw strength from one another and from allies outside the region, creating overlapping webs of dependency.

The particular interest of this region in this period derives from the extraordinary diversity of the polities and societies which interacted and interpenetrated in close proximity, in an environment where no one power enjoyed the kind of lasting hegemony which would turn its own norms into organising principles for the area as a whole. Thus the widely differing social, economic, political, cultural and religious currents which flowed together there were each able to express their distinctive qualities in competition or combination with one another without being cast into a particular role by their relationship with a prevailing mainstream. The number and variety of polities that formed in the region over the course of the period and the tendency of these to incorporate communities from markedly differing backgrounds offer the opportunity to observe and compare the operation of a similar range of social ingredients in a profusion of different combinations within the same overarching context.

These same qualities ensure that the subject presents particularly formidable historiographical problems, its variety defying any attempt at synthesis. The lack of any predominant political power or unifying social or ideological complex deprives the historian of a framework through which to structure a general analysis of the region's development, of the sort provided by the empires of Byzantium in the preceding centuries and of the Ottomans in those that followed. The local variations imparted by the many forms of society which came together here also obstruct thematic analysis. Most of the wide-ranging monographic treatments of the region's history are dedicated to one or other of the major powers operating within it.¹ The variegated nature of its social and political formations

¹ E.g. Donald M. Nicol, *The Last Centuries of Byzantium 1261–1453* (London 1972); Michel Balard, *La Romanie Génoise (XI^e–début du XV^e siècle)*, (Rome 1978); Freddy Thiriet,

is more clearly reflected in works examining the multifarious Latin groups operating in the Aegean or the eastern Mediterranean more widely, but still focused on that cultural and religious community.² The authored work that perhaps most widely spans the region's range of societies has a different geographical scope and therefore illuminates somewhat different patterns of overall development.³ Edited works of general history similarly organise their treatment of the region around its individual societies or alignments.⁴ Owing to the immense difficulty for any one scholar of acquiring a sufficiently detailed understanding of so many social formations and organising a unified analysis of its history, transcendence of the region's divides tends to be most fully expressed in edited collections of articles. These enable specialists to focus on particular areas of individual inquiry, but are guided by deliberate selection and coordination with the goal of furthering inquiry into overarching thematic questions. However, they bear the inevitable limitations of any such work in terms of synthesis and selectivity of coverage.⁵

The networks of power under consideration generally had their basis in a political structure with a readily identifiable central institution. Among the larger entities at work in the region, some of the most important were based within the basin around the Aegean and the Sea of Marmara. This

La Romanie Vénitienne au Moyen Age: le développement et l'exploitation du domaine colonial vénitien (XII^e–XV^e siècles) (Paris 1959); Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire 1300–1481* (Istanbul 1990); Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300–1600*, tr. Norman Itkowitz and Colin Imber (London 1973).

² E.g. Peter Lock, *The Franks in the Aegean 1204–1500* (London 1995); Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204–1571)*, 4 vols. (Philadelphia 1976–84); William Miller, *The Latins in the Levant* (London 1908).

³ John Fine, *The Late Medieval Balkans: a critical survey from the late twelfth century to the Ottoman conquest* (Ann Arbor 1987).

⁴ E.g. David Jacoby, 'The Latin empire of Constantinople and the Frankish states in Greece', *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, ed. Paul Fouracre, Rosamond McKitterick, Timothy Reuter, David Luscombe, Jonathan Riley-Smith, David Abulafia, Michael Jones and Christopher Allmand, 7 vols. (Cambridge 1995–2005), vol. 5, pp. 525–42; Michael Angold, 'Byzantium in exile', *ibid.*, vol. 5, pp. 543–68; Michel Balard, 'Latins in the Aegean and the Balkans in the fourteenth century', *ibid.*, vol. 6, pp. 825–38; I. Metin Kunt, 'The rise of the Ottomans', *ibid.*, vol. 6, pp. 839–63; Peter Edbury, 'Christians and Muslims in the eastern Mediterranean', *ibid.*, vol. 6, pp. 864–84; Anthony Bryer, 'Byzantium: the Roman Orthodox world, 1393–1492', *ibid.*, vol. 7, pp. 771–95; Anthony Luttrell, 'The Latin east', *ibid.*, vol. 7, pp. 796–811; Elizabeth Zachariadou, 'The Ottoman world', *ibid.*, vol. 7, pp. 812–30.

⁵ E.g. Benjamin Arbel, Bernard Hamilton and David Jacoby (eds.), *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204* (London 1989); Judith Herrin and Guillaume Saint-Guillain (eds.), *Identities and Allegiances in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204* (Farnham 2011); Catherine Holmes, Kate Fleet and Jonathan Harris (eds.), *Byzantines, Latins and Turks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1150* (Oxford 2012).

group was weighted towards the north-east of the region, with centres close to the strategic focal point of the straits and in or near the traditional imperial capital. The Latin Empire of Constantinople, the Empire of Nicaea and its continuation in the Byzantine Empire restored to Constantinople, and the Ottoman state, with its successive capitals at Bursa, Adrianople and Constantinople itself, all fit this pattern. Others had their centres of gravity beyond the watershed in the northern or western Balkans: the Serbian and Bulgarian empires and the Byzantine successor state in Epiros, which at its height shifted its centre of government to Thessalonike. These were enduring forces in regional politics, but made challenges for dominance within the Aegean basin proper which were relatively short-lived, and played only a secondary role in shaping its economic, religious or cultural dynamics. A third group, more far-flung but exerting lasting influence along the sea-lanes on many aspects of life in the Aegean, were based in western Europe, for the most part in Italy: the maritime republics of Venice and Genoa, the Angevin monarchy in Naples and the Church of Rome. The Catalan community under the crown of Aragon was another significant force, while the distant French monarchy also at times wielded considerable influence in the region. With the exception of the dramatic but brief subjection of Anatolia by the Central Asian conqueror Timur, no polity or group based further east acquired a position of importance in the Aegean basin itself: the great powers of the Black Sea and the south-eastern Mediterranean, Mongols and Mamluks, made occasional military incursions but never extended their effective authority closer than the northern Balkans and central Anatolia.

However, the organisational model of power radiating from centre to periphery offers only a partial guide to the alignments of individuals, groups and lesser polities in the fragmented Aegean. The capacity of governmental structures to act as forces for the integration of these networks was often weak, while commercial connections, religious loyalties, cultural affinities and familial relationships could be of fundamental importance in binding together networks exceeding the reach of such institutions, in which power was often diffusely distributed. The positions of lesser territorial authorities in relation to major concentrations of power and authority lay on a spectrum extending from direct administration and exploitation, through a variety of looser forms of subordination manifested in titular sovereignty, dynastic seniority or obligations of a feudal, tributary or leasehold character, to free association on the basis of common interests and common identities. The agglomerations that were formed often depended as much on self-contained local networks and on

associative bonds between fellow members of a group as on incorporation into a system arrayed around a single centre. In this context, the scope for smaller bodies to be integrated into a number of different networks was considerable, underpinned by the combination of compartmentalisation and easy interconnection inherent in the region's geography.⁶

For smaller participants, subordination to a higher authority might bring them the right to control territories and their revenues, or gain prestige and legitimation of their own existing territorial power, while opening up opportunities to influence policy. Conversely, by drawing in adherents a larger power might extract revenues and services and boost its own standing, as well as denying such opportunities to its rivals. For all its constituents, association in a network could offer collective protection against common enemies, deflect elsewhere the aggressive attentions of that network's own rulers or adherents, give privileged access to commercial opportunities or advance shared ideological goals. Such incentives were offset by the risk of being drawn into conflicts by the quarrels of other members, attracting reprisals for their misdemeanours, or suffering a damaged reputation through association with ideological foes. For lesser participants, constraints on freedom of action and fiscal or service obligations could be onerous; for an overarching power there were the costs of protecting or administering dependencies. At all scales of political power there was the risk of economic exploitation by more commercially adept associates. Such considerations of material interest were entwined with the influence of religious, political, communal and personal loyalties and antipathies. In the face of such conflicting pressures, to the extent that they enjoyed some freedom of choice all actors had to gauge the degree to which they wished to become committed to one network or another, or to admit others to one to which they belonged, assessing the risks to be run and the price to be paid amid the constantly shifting circumstances of a highly volatile environment.

Given that the prevailing quality of the Aegean in this period was the interplay between widely differing social and cultural formations in a fragmented and unstable political environment without a predominant mainstream, examination from the perspective of any one of its great networks of power cannot effectively convey the nature of the region as a whole. The distinctive norms of the network in question will inevitably

⁶ Cf. Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, *The Corrupting Sea: a study of Mediterranean history* (Oxford and Malden, Massachusetts 2000), pp. 77–80, 123–43, 224–30.

shape such an analysis while those of other groups and powers feature only tangentially. This book seeks to illustrate the character of the region by focusing not on one of its major components but on a smaller one, which is however large enough to have a discernible distinct character as a network in its own right. It supposes that such a study offers particular opportunities for insight into that wider context. Lesser political entities were more inclined to lie where the overlapping fields of influence at work in the Aegean intersected rather than at the centre of a single such field. As such their development is more reflective of the overall balance of forces at work in the region. The Gattilusio lordships offer a particularly rewarding subject for such inquiry because of the especially wide range of networks into which they were to some significant degree integrated. The influences on them thus provide a more than usually representative sample of the different types of structure at work in the Aegean and the variety of ways in which they shaped smaller entities. Similarly, in their own social and political composition the Gattilusio lordships were both unusual and unusually expressive of the kind of cross-cultural societies that developed in the region, in the extent to which inhabitants from both sides of the confessional divide between Catholic and Orthodox Christians exercised prominent roles within them.

The chronological range occupied by the history of the lordships also corresponds closely to a major subdivision of the history of the region. The development of the Aegean basin and adjoining areas between 1204 and 1453 falls into two broad sections. During the first period a series of Christian powers, Latin, Byzantine and Slavic, sought without success to restore unity to much or all of the former Byzantine world under their own leadership. Each of these transient challenges to fragmentation foundered in the face of powerful individual rivals, of combinations of enemies united by the common threat of the would-be hegemon, or of an inherent lack of stability and organisational strength. The cumulative effects of these failures increased fragmentation still further. The second period saw the rise of an Islamic challenger which overcame the kind of limiting factors which had thwarted these precursors and created a new empire encompassing both Anatolia and the Balkans, restoring lasting unity to the region. The dividing line between these phases of the era of fragmentation lay in the middle of the fourteenth century and more particularly in the years 1354–5. The first of these years saw the establishment of a convenient corridor for the Turks to enter Europe through the fall of Gallipoli, setting in motion the process which transformed the fortunes of the Ottomans; the second brought the death of the Serbian Emperor

Stefan Dušan, triggering the disintegration of his empire and the end of last of the ephemeral bids for supremacy by Christian powers.⁷ In the wake of this breakdown the political fragmentation of the region reached its greatest extreme before the advent of renewed consolidation driven by Ottoman conquest.⁸ It was at this very moment of transition that the Gattilusio regime was established. At the other end of the chronological range, the regime's downfall occurred in the course of the decade following the fall of Constantinople, for reasons closely entwined with that transformative event. Thus the changing situation of the Gattilusio lordships through their lifespan traces the transition from the variegated world from which they emerged to a very different new reality. The marked differences between the forces shaping their relationship with the Ottomans and those applying to their interactions with other networks of power cast into sharp relief the contrast between the norms of the fragmented Aegean and the character of its incipient future.

Sources

The available source material is reflective of the character of these lordships as a meeting point for a variety of networks of influence: it is not dominated by any one source or collection, but illumination comes from

⁷ Cf. Donald M. Nicol, 'A.D. 1354—*annus fatalis* for the Byzantine Empire', *Geschichte und Kultur der Palaiologenzeit*, ed. Werner Seibt (Vienna 1996), pp. 163–8.

⁸ While the Ottoman conquests themselves were overwhelmingly preponderant in this re-integration, from the late fourteenth century a disparate secondary process of consolidation, on a much smaller scale and in a much more haphazard fashion, is also discernible on the European perimeter of the region. It was manifested in Venetian expansion, in a Byzantine recovery in the Peloponnese, in the rise of Lazar and his son Stefan Lazarević in the Serbian lands and of the Italian Tocco dynasty on the coasts of the Ionian Sea, and in the union of the Albanians under Skanderbeg. This was in large part driven, particularly in the case of the Venetian gains and the banding together of the Albanian tribes, by the imperative of protection against the Ottomans; conversely, Stefan Lazarević's successes were facilitated by Ottoman patronage (Fine, pp. 384–9, 418–22, 425–34, 488–95, 509–24, 538–46, 556–8). It may be observed that this was the zone in which Ottoman pressure on unconquered neighbours was the most enduring reality. In the eastern Balkans and much of northern Anatolia, Ottoman conquest was early, swift and permanent, allowing little time for such reactive developments. In western Anatolia a very swift conquest was first reversed and then quite speedily repeated, while the south-east was already largely united under the Karamans. In the islands the threat of the Ottomans was for decades kept at a relatively low level by their weakness at sea, followed by an abrupt escalation under Mehmed II which rapidly consumed the northern Aegean; in the south a more gradual and limited consolidation through the deepening of Venetian hegemony is observable from the rolling back of the Byzantine offensive of the late thirteenth century onwards.

many different types of material. The written evidence produced within and focusing on the lordships themselves is limited in comparison with some polities of the period, though by no means insignificant. No normative sources exist to cast light on the lordships' institutional and legal structures in the manner in which the Assizes of Romania illuminate the Latin domains established in the wake of the Fourth Crusade. Nor are there the collections of official administrative documentation which survive from the likes of Venetian Crete or Hospitaller Rhodes. No monastic archives from the lordships survive, while the documentary holdings of Mount Athos cast little light on their principal territories. Consequently the information available on the everyday life of the society which the Gattilusio ruled is relatively meagre, deriving chiefly from a published collection of 67 notarial acts preserved in the state archives of Genoa. These acts, including contracts, wills and other legal and commercial transactions, were concluded at Mytilene, capital of Lesbos and centre of the principal Gattilusio lordship, during the final years of the regime.⁹ This corpus is dwarfed by the surviving notarial collections pertaining to Chios or to Crete.

With regard to narrative texts, the Gattilusio lordships naturally did not attract the kind of widespread historiographical attention accorded to the venerable empire of Byzantium or the rising might of the Ottomans. They also failed to acquire a local historian of their own to give an account of their affairs in detail and colour, in contrast to some other regimes of the Latin East. There is no equivalent here to the Chronicle of the Morea, the Chronicle of Tocco or Machairas's verse chronicle of Cyprus. As a result of this, and of the survival of only a small number of their own letters, concerned largely with public affairs, the Gattilusio lords remain remote as personalities. However, a short chronicle of the dynasty was composed by an unknown author, giving basic but clear biographical information about the first two generations of Gattilusio lords which is of fundamental importance in underpinning the chronological framework for their reigns. A more vivid and detailed treatment written by a person intimately connected with the regime is provided by the Greek historian Doukas, who worked for the Gattilusio lord of Mytilene in the 1450s. His work gives an important though perhaps embellished account of the regime's origins and a detailed narrative of the family's troubles in the wake of the fall of

⁹ Ausilia Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene, 1454–60', *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: atti rogati a Pera e Mitilene* (Genoa 1982), II.

Constantinople, although he otherwise offers only a few brief allusions to their affairs, in a work largely concerned with the downfall of Byzantium and the rise of the Ottomans. The evidence of these texts is supplemented by a few brief family chronicles produced by subjects of the lordships.

The humanist Leonardo of Chios composed a number of works during his tenure as Archbishop of Mytilene, some of which refer to notable inhabitants of the Gattilusio lordships. Most important for the purposes of this book is his *De Statu Hominis*, a tract in the form of a dialogue whose participants, including the author himself, travel around the south-eastern portion of Lesbos in the course of their discussions. The description of the real environment in which this fictitious scenario is set offers glimpses of the landscape and life of the principal Gattilusio territory. The literary production of the lordships is otherwise scanty, but includes a tract by John Kanavoutzes dedicated to one of the Gattilusio lords.

The limitations of the sources produced within or focusing on the Gattilusio lordships are in part remedied by written materials touching upon them from a wide variety of different directions. The beginnings of the lordship of Mytilene are described in the histories of Nikephoros Gregoras and John Kantakouzenos, whose works, ending in the mid-fourteenth century, form the end of the centuries-long succession of Byzantine classicising histories. The narrative works with most to offer besides that of Doukas are those of the other Greek writers who in the years after 1453 were impelled by the demise of Byzantium and the Ottoman triumph to produce histories illuminating these momentous events: the Athenian Laonikos Chalkokondyles, Michael Kritovoulos of Imbros and the Byzantine courtier George Sphrantzes. The last two had personal dealings with the Gattilusio lords. A range of other Greek, Slavic, Latin and Turkish historians contribute occasional references to them. As in the case of Doukas, it is the establishment of the Gattilusio lordships and still more their downfall, in particular the fall of Mytilene in 1462, which attracted by far the greatest attention from such observers.

More fortuitously selected notices from outsiders regarding the affairs of the Gattilusio lordships, in this case almost invariably from the perspective of the Latin West, come from the writings of a series of travellers who passed through the Aegean during this period and gave accounts of their observations. These included Ruy Gonzales de Clavijo, a Castilian ambassador to the court of Timur in the 1400s and another Spaniard, Pero Tafur, who passed through some three decades later. In 1420 the Italian Cristoforo Buondelmonti produced a description of the islands of the Aegean based on his own observations, accompanied by maps. Particularly significant

are the letters and diaries of Ciriaco of Ancona, a humanist and antiquarian who travelled extensively in the eastern Mediterranean in the mid-fifteenth century examining and recording the region's classical remains and making innumerable distinguished contacts among its intellectual and political elite.

The most variegated sources of information, and the ones offering the greatest scope for fresh discoveries, are the surviving archives of powers which had political or economic connections with the lordships. In accordance with the pattern generally discernible in this region and period, whereas the available narrative material is weighted towards Greek sources the vast majority of the pertinent documentary sources emanate from the Latin world.

The most important repository for documentary material relating to the Gattilusio lordships is the state archives of their home city of Genoa. Within this corpus, the state papers of the *Archivio Segreto* form the principal collection illuminating the political and diplomatic affairs of the Genoese commune, including state letters, instructions to diplomats or military commanders and the decrees of governing councils. This collection has been well studied and most of its documents relating to the Gattilusio lordships have been selectively published, chiefly in a nineteenth-century survey dedicated to this purpose.¹⁰ However, a number of relevant documents remain unpublished, some identified here for the first time. The collection of the *Antico Comune* contains administrative records of the commune, particularly concerning revenues and expenditures, which in general remain unpublished. Its principal identified sources of information regarding the Gattilusio are the registers of tax assessments, whose contribution to this subject has been noted before but is systematically examined for the first time here.

A still more significant body of unpublished financial documentation, which has similarly been consulted for information relating to the Gattilusio lordships before but only to a very limited extent, is that concerning investments in the public debt. These records are found in two distinct deposits: the *Compere e Mutui*, whose series concern the numerous different holdings of debt incurred by the commune at times of need, and the archives of the *Casa di San Giorgio*, the great financial institution

¹⁰ A. Luxuro and G. Pinelli-Gentile, 'Documenti riguardanti alcuni dinasti dell'Arcipelago, pubblicati per saggio di studi paleografici', *Giornale Ligustico di archeologia, storia e belle arti* 1 (1874), pp. 84–90, 217–221, vol. 2 (1875), pp. 86–93, 292–7, vol. 3 (1876), pp. 313–6, vol. 5 (1878), pp. 345–70.

originally created through the amalgamation of a number of these *compere* in 1407. These series of documents, particularly the annual cartularies recording the details of each individual account, offer extensive evidence of the financial affairs and family connections of the Gattilusio lords and their relatives, now given their first extensive examination for this purpose.

During the fifteenth century the *Casa di San Giorgio* acquired many different functions and took over an expanding range of communal prerogatives, including for a time the administration of most of the Genoese colonies in the eastern Mediterranean. Consequently, another branch of its archival holdings contains what little survives of the records of the colonial administrations in Caffa, Pera and Famagusta, including records of government expenditure and inquests into the conduct of officials. Surviving acts of the metropolitan institutions responsible for the affairs of Genoa's possessions in the East are also found here. These collections contain miscellaneous materials relating to the Gattilusio lordships, which have in general been identified before, while significant portions have been published.¹¹

The most extensive and diverse series of relevant documentation are the *Notai Antichi* and other collections of acts solemnised by Genoese notaries in the metropolis or in its colonial territories and commercial settlements. The acts of a considerable number of notaries based overseas have been published wholesale, primarily through the *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare* series.¹² However, some of the most fruitful with regard to the Gattilusio lordships have not, while the majority of the immense mass of notarial documentation produced in Genoa itself remains to be investigated for this purpose.

Apart from the Genoese holdings, the most significant source of new documentation regarding the lordships is the state archives of Venice. These contain a number of series recording the deliberations of the Senate, whose considerations of diplomatic and military affairs contain many references to the Gattilusio. An extensively studied source, the senatorial resolutions are among a large body of Venetian archival material which

¹¹ E.g. L. T. Belgrano, 'Prima serie di documenti riguardanti la Colonia di Pera', *ASLSP* 13 (1877–84), pp. 97–336; *idem*, 'Seconda serie di documenti riguardanti la Colonia di Pera', *ibid.*, pp. 931–1003; Laura Balletto, *Liber Officii Provisionis Romanie (Genova, 1424–1428)* (Genoa 2000).

¹² E.g. Michel Balard, *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: atti rogati a Chio da Donato di Chiavari (17 febbraio–12 novembre 1394)* (Genoa 1988); Paola Piena Toniolo, *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: atti rogati a Chio da Gregorio Panissario (1403–1405)* (Genoa 1995).

has lately been made available online, and their coverage of eastern affairs has been extensively calendared.¹³ A significant portion of them have also been published.¹⁴

Less heavily explored to date, the archival collections originating in the Venetian colony of Crete include the *Duca di Candia*, a composite holding containing surviving fragments of a number of different series of governmental records. A portion of these have been published; the remainder include a considerable number of documents revealing shipping movements and commercial transactions involving the Gattilusio lordships, examined on this subject for the first time here.¹⁵ This information is supplemented by notarial acts of similar import from the *Notai di Candia*.

The National Library of Malta holds the archives of the Knights of St. John, rulers of Rhodes during this period. These offer miscellaneous documents bearing on the subject from the *Libri Bullarum*, a series comprising the variegated range of acts that received the seal of the Order. Some have been published; others are noted for the first time here.¹⁶ The Vatican archives contain a considerable number of pertinent letters relating to ecclesiastical affairs and military cooperation in the various series of registers of papal correspondence. Some pertaining to this subject have been published in the selections of the *Pontifica Commissio ad Redigendum Codicem Iuris Canonici Orientalis*.¹⁷ Others have been partially calendared but remain unpublished.¹⁸ Occasional items of information regarding the lordships are also to be found in other archival collections, including the financial records of the Duchy of Burgundy, now in the local

¹³ Freddy Thiriet, *Régestes des délibérations du Sénat de Venise concernant la Romanie*, 3 vols. (Paris 1958–61).

¹⁴ E.g. Josephi Valentini, *Acta Albaniae Veneta: saeculorum XIV et XV*, 25 vols. (Rome 1967–79).

¹⁵ E.g. Paola Ratti Vidulich, *Duca di Candia: Quaternus Consiliorum (1340–1350)* (Venice 1965); Freddy Thiriet, *Duca di Candia: Ducali e Lettere Ricevute (1358–1360, 1401–1405)* (Venice 1978).

¹⁶ E.g. Zacharias Tsirpanlis, *Ανέκδοτα Εγγράφα για τη Ρόδο και τις Νότιες Σποράδες από το Αρχείο των Ιωαννιτών Ιπποτών 1421–1453* (Rhodes 1995); Anthony Luttrell and Elizabeth Zachariadou, *Sources for Turkish History from the Hospitallers' Rhodian Archive/Πηγές για την Τουρκική Ιστορία στα Αρχεία των Ιπποτών της Ρόδου* (Athens 2008).

¹⁷ E.g. Aloysius L. Tautu, *Acta Innocentii PP. VI (1352–1362) e Regestis Vaticanis aliisque fontibus collegit* (Rome 1961), *Pontifica Commissio ad Redigendum Codicem Iuris Canonici Orientalis, Fontes*, 3rd series 10.

¹⁸ E.g. Guillaume Mollat, *Lettres secrètes et curiales du pape Grégoire XI intéressant les pays autres que la France*, 3 vols. (Paris 1962–65); Matteo Sciambra, Giuseppe Valentini and Perrino Ignazio, *Il 'Liber Brevium' di Callisto III. La Crociata, l'Albania e Skanderbeg* (Palermo 1968).

governmental archives of Lille and Dijon, and the state papers of the Republic of Ragusa in the state archives of Dubrovnik, for each of which significant calendars of documents are also available.¹⁹

Far less extensive than the Latin archives, the surviving documentary collections of Byzantine ecclesiastical institutions have been much more comprehensively edited. The surviving registers of the official letters of the Patriarchs of Constantinople and acts of the patriarchal synod have for the most part been published and offer some glimpses of Orthodox ecclesiastical affairs within the lordships.²⁰ A little can also be gleaned from documents, mostly relating to landholdings, preserved in the archives of the monasteries of Mount Athos, which have also been systematically published through the *Archives de l'Athos* series.²¹ Relations with Byzantium and religious and cultural affairs also receive some illumination from the letters of Byzantine intellectuals. The most significant individual in this regard, Demetrios Kydones, also offers in his references to his friend Francesco I Gattilusio the best glimpse we have of the character of any of the Gattilusio lords.

In contrast to the scale and variety of the evidence derived from Christian societies, very little written material produced among the Anatolian Turks survives from the period before the middle of the fifteenth century, and the evidence on the Gattilusio lordships from this viewpoint is limited to Ottoman historians' accounts of their destruction. However, Ottoman fiscal surveys from the following decades offer statistical information from which inferences can be drawn about the period of Gattilusio rule.

Besides the written sources, the Gattilusio regime's visual presentation of itself is well attested by a substantial array of coins issued by various lords and carved stone plaques incorporated into their constructions, sometimes accompanied by inscriptions. Other visual art attributable to the lordships is generally lacking. There are a considerable number of

¹⁹ E.g. M. A. le Glay, M. A. Desplanque and M. Dehaisnes, *Inventaire-sommaire des Archives Départementales antérieures à 1790: Nord, Serie B: Archives Civiles, Chambre des Comptes de Lille*, 4 vols. (Lille 1863–81); Bariša Krekić, *Dubrovnik (Raguse) et le Levant au Moyen Age* (Paris 1961).

²⁰ Herbert Hunger and Otto Kresten, *Das Register des Patriarchats von Konstantinopel*, 3 vols. (Vienna 1981–2001), *Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae* 19; Franz Miklosich and Joseph Müller, *Acta et Diplomata Graeca Medii Aevi: Sacra et Profana, Collecta et Edit*, 6 vols. (Vienna 1968).

²¹ E.g. Paul Lemerle, André Guillou, Denise Papachrysanthou and Nicolas Svoronos, *Actes de Lavra*, 4 vols (Paris 1970–82), *Archives de l'Athos* 5, 8, 10, 11; Jacques Bompiaire, Jacques Lefort, Vassiliki Kravari, Christophe Giros and Kostis Smyrlis, *Actes de Vatopedi*, 2 vols. (Paris 2001–6), *Archives de l'Athos* 21–2.

surviving fortifications which were built or enhanced during this period to defend the family's territories. Only a small handful of medieval churches are still standing in their territories, together with a number of ruins, none of which are securely datable to the years of Gattilusio rule, a deficiency matched in the field of non-military secular architecture.²² Archaeological research into the medieval northern Aegean has to date been very limited, in some contrast to areas further south, and hence only a few insights are currently available from the wider remains of material culture.

The current landscape of the areas once ruled by the Gattilusio also offers only limited insight into conditions in their time, beyond the basic physical topography. Most notably, Lesbos itself has been transformed by changes in agriculture which have left the cultivated area of the island chiefly devoted to growing olives, a minor crop there before modern times.²³ Surviving surface mine workings may well be relics of the lordships' most prominent export business, the extraction of the industrial mineral alum, although these traces have not been dated.

The Geographical Setting

The territories ruled at one time or another by the Gattilusio family all lay in the north-eastern quadrant of the Aegean, straddling the divide between the coasts of Anatolia and those of the northern Balkans. Despite their proximity to one another, these territories were marked by considerable variations in relief, fertility, mineral resources, and accessibility from the sea, while their position brought further disparities, between islands and continental enclaves and between places more closely linked to the European shore and its routes and those more tied to Asia. All of these contributed to divergent patterns of development. Among the qualities which were reasonably consistent across the region were the climate, which in the northern Aegean conforms to a relatively cool and moist form of the typical Mediterranean pattern of hot dry summers and mild wet winters, enlivened by considerable short-term fluctuations.²⁴ Seismic conditions were also a common factor: though no longer possessing active volcanoes,

²² S. Charitonidis, 'Βυζαντινὰ ἐκκλησίαι τῆς Λέσβου', *Χαριστήριον εἰς Ἀναστάσιον Κ. Ὀρλάνδου*, 4 vols. (Athens 1965–8), vol. 2, pp. 72–7.

²³ Kimon Louizidis, *Η Βυζαντινὴ Λέσβος (330–1355)* (PhD thesis, Ioannina 2003), pp. 166–71.

²⁴ Alfred Philippson, *Die griechischen Landschaften: eine Landeskunde*, 4 vols. (Frankfurt 1950–8), vol. 4, pp. 28–36.

the whole region is marked by tectonic faults and prone to earthquakes, which have been a significant destructive force here throughout history and had a notable impact on the events of this period on more than one occasion.

Their concentration in the north-eastern Aegean placed Gattilusio territories in significant proximity to the strategic linchpin and traffic nexus of the straits. This gave at least the potential to play an important part in the region's maritime communications, enhanced by natural conditions impeding those approaching the channel. While across the Aegean the prevailing winds are northerly, those of the far north incline somewhat more to the easterly, increasing the difficulty of approaching the straits under sail from any quarter.²⁵ This enhanced the importance of anchorages where ships travelling towards Constantinople and the Black Sea could shelter, the more so since, especially in summer, the strength of the current flowing into the Aegean through the straits called for the help of a favourable wind to make the passage.²⁶ The currents of the northern Aegean move in a broadly anti-clockwise circuit, favouring movement along the eastern shore for ships heading north and a more westerly course for those going south, while combined with the prevailing winds they made westward movement easier than eastward along the northern shore.²⁷

Lesbos, the principal territory of the Gattilusio lordships, is at 1614 km² one of the largest islands of the Aegean, surpassed only by Crete and Euboea. From the Troad to the north to the peninsula of Erythrai to the south, the Anatolian coast wraps around its eastern half, only 10km away at its nearest point to the north of Lesbos and almost as close to the east.²⁸ This curve of continental coast features the mouths of the major rivers Kaikos (Bakir) and Hermos (Gediz) and its significant ports included Assos, Adramyttion, Old and New Phokaia and Smyrna, as well as Pergamon some way up the navigable course of the Kaikos. Lesbos lies at the northern

²⁵ Philippon, p. 35.

²⁶ Jean-Claude Hocquet, 'I meccanismi dei traffici', *Storia di Venezia dalle origini alla caduta della Serenissima*, 11 vols. (Rome 1991–8), vol. 3, ed. Girolamo Airal di, Giorgio Cracco, Alberto Tenenti, pp. 529–616 at p. 587.

²⁷ Despoina K. Papageorgiou, 'Ρεύματα και άνεμοι στο βόρειο Αιγαίο', *Η Πολιόχνη και η Πρώιμη Εποχή του Χαλκού στο Βόρειο Αιγαίο: Διεθνές Συνέδριο Αθήνα, 22–25 Απριλίου 1996/Poliochni e l'antica Età del Bronzo nell'Egeo settentrionale: Convegno Internazionale Atene, 22–25 Aprile 1996*, ed. Chr. G. Doumas and V. La Rosa (Athens 1997), pp. 424–42.

²⁸ Guy Labarre, *Les Cités de Lesbos aux Epoques Hellénistique et Impériale* (Lyon 1996), p. 191.

end of the chain of islands which offered shelter to ships travelling along the Anatolian littoral. The island is divided into two lobes by the Gulf of Kallone which intrudes from the south, while the eastern lobe is itself penetrated by the smaller Gulf of Gera, producing a peninsula on whose eastern shore Mytilene is located. Both gulfs are shallow, while the mouth of the smaller is only about 200 m across at its narrowest.²⁹ Though less precipitous than some Aegean islands, the interior is rugged, with three main mountainous massifs, rising to the peaks of Olympos (967 m) in the south-east, Lepetymnos (968 m) in the north and a group of lesser summits in the west. Together with the lower ridge connecting Olympos and Lepetymnos, these form a girdle surrounding the Gulf of Kallone, with a south-eastern spur wrapping around that of Gera.³⁰ The principal areas of lowland, overlaid by alluvial sediments, lie around the two gulfs, especially to their north, though other small plains exist on the outer shore, the largest being at the south-western corner of the eastern lobe and others at various points in the west. The island's underlying geology is divided down the middle between metamorphic rocks including schist, marble and serpentine in the east and volcanic tufa and lavas in the west, a divide roughly mirrored by a stark ecological contrast between the lush vegetation of the east and a semi-desert landscape in the west, relieved only by the fertility of alluvial pockets around the coast and the occasional valley inland.³¹ Pastoralism has naturally tended to play a greater part in the exploitation of the west, arable farming in the east.³² Lesbos is strongly affected by northerly winds in winter and receives substantial rainfall, and is quite well-provided with streams as a result.³³ The volcanic rocks of the centre and west hold the alum deposits exploited during this period.³⁴

²⁹ Labarre, p. 192; Philippson, pp. 234–5.

³⁰ Labarre, pp. 192–3.

³¹ Michael D. Higgins, *A Geological Companion to Greece and the Aegean* (London 1996), pp. 132–4; Elisabeth Malamut, *Les Iles de l'Empire Byzantin*, 2 vols. (Paris 1988), vol. 1, pp. 274–7; Labarre, p. 193; Philippson, pp. 237–41.

³² Dimitris N. Karydis and Machiel Kiel, *Μυτιλήνης Αστυγραφία και Λέσβου Χωρογραφία (15^{ος}–19^{ος} αι.)* (Athens 2000), pp. 90–1, 138, 146–50; Louizidis, pp. 165–73; Thanasis Kizos and Maria Koulouri, 'Agricultural landscape dynamics in the Mediterranean: Lesbos (Greece) case study using evidence from the last three centuries', *Environmental Science and Policy* 9 (2006), pp. 330–42 at pp. 333–5. The proportion of the eastern part of Lesbos under cultivation in recent times is exceptionally high by Aegean island standards. Malamut, *Iles*, vol. 2, p. 624.

³³ I. D. Kontis, *Λέσβος και η Μικρασιατική της Περιοχή* (Athens 1978), *Αρχαίες Έλληνικές Πόλεις/Ancient Greek Cities* 24, pp. 19–22.

³⁴ See below, pp. 178–80.

Current tectonic activity makes Lesbos exceptionally rich in hot springs, which have long been frequented for medicinal purposes.³⁵

Here, as was generally the case with substantial Aegean islands close to the mainland, the principal settlement was on the coast facing the near continent, a configuration that was favoured both by ease of travel to and from that shore and usefulness for coastwise shipping along it. Its convenient location for communications and the productivity of the eastern part of the island helped ancient Mytilene to acquire the most extensive continental territory, or *peraia*, of any island *polis*, extending at its height from the coast opposite the city to the east as far north as the entrance of the Dardanelles. This reflects Mytilene's primacy over the other cities of the island, none of which had their own mainland possessions in recorded history.³⁶ However, this preeminence was offset by the fact that Lesbos remained politically divided throughout antiquity until assimilation into the Roman Empire. Local conflict, earthquake and Roman reprisals gradually reduced its original set of at least six *poleis*, but three endured: Methymna in the far north and Eressos in the south-west besides Mytilene.³⁷ Mytilene's continuing failure to eclipse its rivals in later centuries is reflected in its Church organisation, since the see of Methymna was raised, probably in the seventh century, to the status of an autocephalous archbishopric and then, in the eleventh, to that of the island's second metropolitan see.³⁸ This enduring division may be connected with the fragmentation of the island by its angular outer coastline, its gulfs and mountains and the unprepossessing interior of the west, as well as its size.³⁹ While the island was politically united during the medieval period, its geographical compartmentalisation and the multi-centric society accompanying it increased the island's defensibility, rendering it less vulnerable to a *coup de main* against the capital than other Aegean islands. Both Turks in the eleventh century and Latins in the fourteenth succeeded in capturing Mytilene, but Byzantine forces retained control of

³⁵ Higgins, p. 134.

³⁶ Kontis, pp. 58–63, 76–100, fig. 4; Christy Constantakopoulou, *The Dance of the Islands: insularity, networks, the Athenian Empire and the Aegean world* (Oxford 2007), pp. 232–3, 240–1; Labarre, pp. 201–4.

³⁷ Labarre, pp. 16, 81–2, 194–201; Kontis, pp. 126–8, 136–201, 267–73, 303–6, 319–24, 342–46.

³⁸ Malamut, *Iles*, vol. 1, pp. 338, 343–5, 356; Louizidis, pp. 148–62.

³⁹ Cf. Gary Reger, 'Islands with one *polis* versus islands with several *poleis*', *The Polis as an Urban Centre and as a Political Community: Symposium August 29–31 1996*, ed. Mogens H. Hansen (Stuttgart 1997), pp. 450–92.

other parts of the island including Methymna, buying time for the arrival of reinforcements and providing them with a strong base for a counter-offensive.⁴⁰

Of all the other territories which were later acquired by the Gattilusio, Thasos is the most remote from Lesbos, but in various ways the most similar. It shares with Lesbos its close proximity to the mainland, in this case that of Europe. It is separated from western Thrace by a shallow channel 6–7 km wide, at the eastern end of whose continental shore is the mouth of the River Nestos. The island's communications with the mainland were facilitated by the availability of conveniently-placed natural harbours on the shore directly opposite and around the Gulf of Kavalla immediately to the west, and the access offered to the hinterland by the proximity of the navigable Nestos.⁴¹ As in the case of Lesbos, this close connection with the continent and the island's wealth were reflected in the great extent of the *peraia* colonised and dominated by the ancient *polis* of Thasos, which encompassed the whole coastal area between the mouths of the Nestos and the Strymon.⁴² A political entity on similar geographical lines briefly recurred in the fourteenth century.⁴³ Here too the principal city of the island was located on a harbour facing the near continent, at Limenas in the north-east. Thasos was the closest of the Aegean islands to Mount Athos, a significant fact given the importance of the monasteries of the Holy Mountain in the late medieval period. The roughly circular island, 398 km² in extent, is indented by numerous small bays, especially in the south and east. It is dominated by a high mountain ridge forming an arc around the northern side of the island, peaking in the east at a height of 1,208 m. Valleys separated by lesser ridges descend from its eastern portion to a narrow coastal plain in the south-west; a similar strip occupies the north-western coast, while the east and north-east are partitioned by mountain spurs into three small coastal plains.⁴⁴ Largely made up of metamorphic rocks, the island's geology made an important contribution

⁴⁰ Anna Komnene, *Alexiade (régne de l'Empereur Alexis I Comnène 1081–1118)*, ed. Bernard Leib, 4 vols. (Paris 1943–76), vol. 2, pp. 110–1, 116, 158–62; below, p. 37. Conversely, in 1464 the Venetians seized two other towns from the Ottomans but were thwarted by the resistance of Mytilene. See below, pp. 249–50.

⁴¹ Jan de Boer, 'River trade in eastern and central Thrace from the Bronze Age until the Hellenistic era', *Eirene* 46 (2010), pp. 176–89 at pp. 176–7.

⁴² D. Lazaridis, *Thasos and its Peraia* (Athens 1971), *Αρχαίες Έλληνικές Πόλεις/Ancient Greek Cities* 5, pp. 36–7, 55–8, fig. 30; Constantakopoulou, pp. 232–3, 235–7.

⁴³ See below, pp. 89–90.

⁴⁴ Lazaridis, *Thasos*, p. 4, fig. 14.

to its history: while its core is composed of gneiss and schist, the bedrock of most of its coastal regions is white marble, which was highly prized and extensively exported in antiquity. Many of the ancient quarries are now submerged due to a rise in sea-level.⁴⁵ Thasos also benefited from rich deposits of metals, including gold, silver, lead, iron and copper.⁴⁶ The alluvium of the small coastal plains of the north and the river valleys of the south offers fertile ground for cultivation. The island is unusually well-watered by Aegean standards and the interior has probably always been heavily wooded.⁴⁷

To the east of Thasos and further removed from the Thracian mainland, Samothrake is the smallest of the family's islands, at 182 km². Its oval coastline slopes shallowly, except in the south-east, with unusually extensive beaches for an Aegean island. However, its largely unindented outline offers little shelter to shipping, with the single exception of the not especially protective harbour of Kamariotissa in the north-west. This unwelcoming environment for maritime communications is compounded by the fact that throughout its pre-modern history its principal port town was located some distance to the east of the natural anchorage, at Palaïopolis.⁴⁸ The resulting tendency to isolation probably helps account for the fact that of all the sometime possessions of the Gattilusio it is the one least often mentioned in the written sources of the period. However, in spite of this limitation it was able to acquire a substantial Thracian *peraia* in antiquity.⁴⁹ The stark simplicity of the coastline is echoed in its relief, which rises abruptly to a single steep ridge, peaking in the very centre of the island at 1,664 m, the highest point in any of the Aegean islands except Crete and Euboia. In the south-east the mountains extend all the way to the sea, with thin coastal strips of lowland to the north and south-west and a broader plain in the west. In a defensible location in the heights above this plain is the town of Chora, the modern capital.⁵⁰ The central massif is comprised of granite and metamorphic gabbro and slate, with occasional deposits of marble, while sedimentary and volcanic

⁴⁵ Higgins, pp. 118–21.

⁴⁶ Higgins, pp. 118–20; Günther A. Wagner and Gerd Welsgerber (eds.), *Antike Edel- und Buntmetallgewinnung auf Thasos* (Bochum 1988), *Der Anschnitt*, suppl. 6.

⁴⁷ Lazaridis, *Thasos*, pp. 8–11.

⁴⁸ D. Lazaridis, *Σαμοθράκη και η Περάια της* (Athens 1971), *Αρχαίες Έλληνικές Πόλεις/Ancient Greek Cities* 7, pp. 6, 59–61, fig. 23; Philippon, p. 215.

⁴⁹ Lazaridis, *Σαμοθράκη*, pp. 17–20; Constantakopoulou, pp. 237–8.

⁵⁰ Lazaridis, *Σαμοθράκη*, p. 5, fig 7; Philippon, pp. 215–6. On Chora, see below, pp. 203–4.

rocks occupy the low-lying areas.⁵¹ Though receiving less rainfall than Thasos, it is subject to heavy rain and snowfall in winter and the north of the island in particular supports many streams; it too has extensive and long-standing tree cover.⁵²

Imbros is the closest of the Aegean islands to the mouth of the Dardanelles, at about 15 km. However, it is only marginally nearer than Tenedos to the south, and as it lies somewhat to the north-west it was not as suitable an anchorage for ships waiting for a favourable wind to pass through the straits. The ideal south-westerly wind would be on the starboard quarter of a ship sailing from Imbros, whereas one leaving Tenedos would have it partially astern. Its position is also less favourable for the approach in relation to the currents, since these assisted a ship approaching the straits from the south but obstructed approach from the west.⁵³ The roughly rectangular island is 285 km² in extent and its northern side is rugged and relatively high, though less so than the other northern Aegean islands besides Lemnos, while the south is lower but still hilly. It is underlain by a mixture of volcanic and sedimentary rocks. Much of its circumference is edged by cliffs, especially to the south, but there are small coastal plains, chiefly in the north-east where the island's principal river reaches the sea. This is also where the most useful harbour was located and the site of the ancient *polis* and main medieval port of Kastro (Kaleköy). A second important medieval settlement, Palaiokastros (Dereköy), was located in a more defensible location in the west-central part of the interior.⁵⁴

Among the islands of the northern Aegean, Lemnos is the most distant from any continental landfall, lying roughly equidistant between the peninsula of Mount Athos in the west and the Gallipoli peninsula and the Anatolian Troad in the east. It thus forms the geographical hub of the northern Aegean, a position whose potential significance for communications was enhanced by the fact that it placed the island at the heart of the region's system of currents, facilitating travel in all directions. Though further from the mouth of the Dardanelles than Imbros or even Samothrace, it was more conveniently disposed for following a wind suitable for traversing the straits, while in the winter months the approach

⁵¹ Higgins, pp. 121–2; Lazaridis, *Σαμοθράκη*, pp. 7–9.

⁵² Lazaridis, *Σαμοθράκη*, pp. 9–11.

⁵³ Papageorgiou, pp. 427–33.

⁵⁴ Dimitris Matsas, 'Imbros', *Archaeology: Aegean Islands*, ed. Andreas G. Vlachopoulos (Athens 2006), pp. 100–3; Philippson, pp. 221–3.

would also be supported by the currents.⁵⁵ Its proximity to Athos, only slightly less than that of Thasos, was reflected in this period in particularly strong connections with the monasteries there.⁵⁶ At 477 km² it is the sixth largest of the Aegean islands, surpassed by Chios and Rhodes as well as Lesbos, Euboia and Crete. Roughly square in overall outline, it is almost completely bisected by two converging arms of the sea, the Gulf of Moudros to the south and the Gulf of Pournia to the north.⁵⁷ Given its relative remoteness from the mainland and equidistance from different shores it does not correspond to the pattern of islands being dominated by a consistent chief port facing the continent. The principal town has tended to be Palaioakastro (Myrina) in the south-west, but in Poliochni in the south-east it had one of Europe's first urban settlements, while for much of antiquity the preeminent position was held by Hephaistia on the Gulf of Pournia, to the north-east of medieval Kotzinos.⁵⁸ It is exceptional among the Aegean islands in being largely low-lying, though more rugged in the west, and in the north-west especially. Partly as a result of this, it receives less rainfall than other islands in the northern Aegean. It shares with Lesbos an ecological divide between a barren west with extensive volcanic deposits and a more fertile east. The topography, largely sedimentary geology and climate of the latter region make it more suitable than most Aegean islands for cereal cultivation.⁵⁹

Besides their islands, the Gattilusio gained control of two continental ports. One of these, Ainos (Enez), is located on the coast of eastern Thrace, north-east of Samothrake. It lies almost due north of the entrance of the Dardanelles, and was the closest port to the straits on the European coast of the Aegean. The medieval town, on the site of an ancient Greek colony, stood on a promontory in the centre of a lagoon on the southern edge of the marshy delta of the River Maritza (Evros), whose deposits of silt have caused significant changes to its configuration over the centuries.⁶⁰ Ready access to the principal river of Thrace, then navigable along much of its length, was of

⁵⁵ Papageorgiou, pp. 432–7.

⁵⁶ See below, pp. 298–9.

⁵⁷ Philippon, pp. 224–6.

⁵⁸ Dimitris Matsas, 'Lemnos', *Archaeology: Aegean Islands*, ed. Andreas G. Vlachopoulos (Athens 2006), pp. 106–14 at pp. 106–9.

⁵⁹ Philippon, pp. 226–7; Higgins, pp. 123–4.

⁶⁰ F. W. Hasluck, 'Monuments of the Gattalusi', *Archive of the British School of Archaeology* 15 (1908–9), pp. 248–69 at pp. 249–50; Johannes Koder, *Aigaion Pelagos (die nördliche Ägäis)* (Vienna 1998), *Tabula Imperii Byzantini* 10, pp. 170–2.

fundamental significance to the town's development.⁶¹ The delta also offered a productive environment for the extraction of salt.⁶² The surrounding land is low-lying, dominated geologically by the alluvial plain of the Maritza, but with volcanic deposits exposed to the south-east.⁶³

The other continental enclave, Old Phokaia (Eski Foça), occupied the site of an important ancient *polis*, standing on a small promontory that protrudes from the western tip of a stubby mountainous peninsula on the Anatolian coast to the south-east of Lesbos. This and neighbouring promontories divided the large surrounding harbour into multiple anchorages, sheltered by a number of small islands just offshore. Its route to the open sea is channeled by Lesbos to the north and by Chios and the peninsula of Erythrai to the south. Old Phokaia overlooks the entrance to the long Gulf of Smyrna which bends around the peninsula to the south and west, with the port of Smyrna at its eastern end. To the north lies a shorter gulf, towards the eastern end of which is the port of New Phokaia (Yeni Foça) on the northern coast of the peninsula. The surrounding area is underlain by volcanic rock, which as on Lesbos offered important alum deposits.⁶⁴ Formerly much narrower, the peninsula has been dramatically widened on its southern side over the last few millennia by the sediments deposited by the River Hermos, increasing the fertility of the area.⁶⁵ The resulting delta begins a short distance south of the town and the river offered a commercial conduit into the Anatolian interior.

Secondary Literature

The existing secondary literature on the Gattilusio lordships is largely specialised. Owing to the difficulty of accommodating them within wider categories, and the scarcity of evidence regarding internal social developments, they have received only brief attention in studies of larger elements of the Aegean world to which they belonged. After almost a century, the bedrock of the specialised literature remains William Miller's 1913 article 'The Gattilusj of Lesbos (1355–1462)', which thoroughly superseded the

⁶¹ De Boer, p. 177.

⁶² See below, pp. 207–8.

⁶³ Higgins, p. 115.

⁶⁴ On the location of Old Phokaia and of the alum deposits, see below, p. 407.

⁶⁵ Higgins, pp. 139–40.

previous general treatment by Giannis Delis.⁶⁶ Miller's narrative account, founded on a comprehensive study of the source material known at that time, has been extensively supplemented but very seldom contradicted by subsequent source discoveries and analyses.

A large proportion of the subsequent secondary publications on the subject have focused their attention on a particular source or set of sources, often newly identified, publishing texts or images and descriptions of these with assessments of their implications for the history of the lordships and the world around them. These include examinations of the fortifications built or modified by the Gattilusio lords;⁶⁷ coins issued by them;⁶⁸ inscriptions and symbolic plaques set up in their territories;⁶⁹ and documents uncovered in the Genoese state archives.⁷⁰ In this last category, particular attention has been accorded to the most important documentary discovery of recent decades on this subject, the collection

⁶⁶ William Miller, 'The Gattilusj of Lesbos (1355–1462)', *BZ* 22 (1913), pp. 406–47, reprinted in *Essays on the Latin Orient* (Cambridge 1921, reprinted Amsterdam 1964), pp. 313–53; Giannis N. Delis, *Οι Γατελούζοι εν Λέσβω, 1355–1462* (Athens 1901).

⁶⁷ E.g. S. I. Charitonidis, 'Οικοδομικὲς φάσεις τοῦ κάστρου τῆς Μυτιλήνης', *ibid.*, pp. 69–75; E. Patsourakos, 'Τρεῖς πύργοι των Γατελούζων', *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οι Γατελούζοι της Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 17–34; Hector Williams, 'The castle of the Gattelusi at Mytilene', *ibid.*, pp. 49–58; Andreas Mazarakis, 'Το Μελανούδη', *ibid.*, pp. 93–116.

⁶⁸ E.g. Antonio M. de Guadan, 'El escudo personal de los Paléologos y la amonedación de los Gattilusio de Metelin en los siglos XIV y XV', *Acta Numismatica* 5 (1975), pp. 137–49; Giorgio Giacosa, 'Un gigliato inedito di Grancesco I Gattilusio, signore di Lesbo', *Numismatica e Antichità Classiche (Quaderni Ticinesi)* 19 (1990), pp. 337–44; Savvas Kofopoulos and Andreas Mazarakis, 'I Gattilusio: Revisioni genealogiche e numismatiche', *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οι Γατελούζοι της Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 399–436 at pp. 405–36; Andreas Mazarakis, 'An unpublished ducat of Dorino Gattilusio, Lord of Mytilene (1428–1455)', *Νομισμὰτικά Χρόνικα* 22 (2003); Ernest Oberländer-Târnoveanu, "Immo verius sub ducati Venetiarum communis proprio stigmatate" La question des émissions d'or de Francesco I^{er} Gattilusio, seigneur de Metelino (1355–1384)', *Revue Numismatique* 160 (2004), pp. 223–40.

⁶⁹ E.g. Catherine Asdracha and Charalambos Bakirtzis, 'Inscriptions byzantines de Thrace (VIII^e–XV^e siècles): édition et commentaire historique', *Αρχαιολογικόν Δελτίον* 35/1 (1980), pp. 241–82; Catherine Asdracha, 'Inscriptions de la Thrace orientale et de l'île d'Imbros (XII^e–XV^es.)', *Αρχαιολογικόν Δελτίον* 43/1 (1988), pp. 251–86; Eric A. Ivson, 'Funerary monuments of the Gattalusio at Mytilene', *ABSA* 87 (1992), pp. 423–37.

⁷⁰ E.g. Andreas Mazarakis, 'Ο ταβουλάριος παπα-Μανόλης Σκληρός σ'ένα σημείωμα της εποχής των Γατελούζων', *Λεσβιακά* 17 (1998), pp. 155–62; Enrico Basso, 'Note su tre documenti inediti e una presunta lettera di Niccolò I Gattilusio, signore di Enos', *Λεσβιακά* 20 (2004), pp. 338–53; *idem*, 'I Gattilusio tra Genova e Bisanzio. Nuovi documenti d'archivio', *Chemins d'outre-mer: études d'histoire sur la Méditerranée médiévale offertes à Michel Balard*, ed. Damien Coulon, Catherine Otten-Froux, Paule Pagès and Dominique Valérian (Paris 2004), pp. 62–73.

of notarial acts from Mytilene.⁷¹ The other written texts whose contributions have been analysed in detail are chiefly short chronicles and family records from Gattilusio territory.⁷² The most important of these is George Dennis's examination of the aforementioned chronicle outlining the succession of the early Gattilusio lords, in an article which also addresses the significance of the letters of Demetrios Kydones for the history of the Gattilusio lordships.⁷³

Other articles have examined specific aspects of the lordships' development, with certain themes receiving particular attention, chiefly the genealogy and marital connections of the Gattilusio lords;⁷⁴ the iconography used by them;⁷⁵ the alum industry;⁷⁶ the buildings and layout of the city of Mytilene;⁷⁷ and the activities of the notorious pirates Giuliano Gattilusio and Pedro de Larraondo.⁷⁸ Another article of particular importance on a

⁷¹ E.g. T. Papoutsanis, 'Πληροφορίες για την διοίκηση, κοινωνία, οικονομία, και την τοπογραφία της Μυτιλήνης στα τελευταία χρόνια των Γατελούζων', *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οι Γατελούζοι της Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 35–48; Andreas Mazarakis, 'Παραχωρητήριο της Domina Orietta Gattilusio και των δύο θυγατέρων της' *Λεσβιακά* 19 (2002), pp. 58–61.

⁷² E.g. Savvas Kofopoulos, 'Ένα βραχύ χρονικό από τη Μυτιλήνη της εποχής των Γατελούζων', *Λεσβιακά* 16 (1996), pp. 305–9; Stefanos Efthymiadis and Andreas Mazarakis, 'La chronique familiale du 'Parisinus Gr. 1601 et l'identité de son rédacteur', *BZ* 102 (2009), pp. 615–24.

⁷³ George T. Dennis (ed.), 'The short chronicle of Lesbos 1355–1428', *Λεσβιακά* 5 (1965), pp. 3–22, reprinted in *Byzantium and the Franks 1350–1420* (London 1982), I.

⁷⁴ E.g. Anthony E. Luttrell, 'John V's daughters: a Palaiologan puzzle', *DOP* 40 (1986), pp. 103–12; Kofopoulos and Mazarakis, pp. 399–405; Thierry Ganchou, 'Hélène Notara Gatelousaina d'Ainos et le Sankt Peterburg Bibl. Pub. Gr. 243', *REB* 56 (1998), pp. 141–68; *idem*, 'Valentina Doria, épouse de Francesco II Gattilusio seigneur de l'île de Mytilène (1384–1403), et sa parenté. Le *Lesbian puzzle* resolu', *Nuova Rivista Storica* 88 (2004), pp. 619–86; Andreas Mazarakis, 'Παραχωρητήριο της Domina Orietta Gattilusio και των δύο θυγατέρων της' *Λεσβιακά* 19 (2002), pp. 58–61.

⁷⁵ E.g. De Guadan, pp. 137–49; Catherine Asdracha, 'Les prétensions politiques de Palamède Gattilusio (1409–55), seigneur d'Ainos, d'Imbros et de Samothrace', *Oriente e Occidente tra Medioevo ed Eta Moderna: studi in onore di Geo Pistarino*, ed. Laura Balletto, (Genoa 1997), pp. 41–5; Andreas Mazarakis, 'Συμβολή στην εραλδική των αναμνηστικών και επιτάφιων πλακών της περιόδου των Γατελούζων στη Μυτιλήνη', *Αρχαιολογικών Δελτίων* 53 (1998), pp. 361–86.

⁷⁶ E.g. Giustina Olgiati 'Il commercio dell'allume nei domini dei Gattilusio nel XV secolo', *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οι Γατελούζοι της Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 373–98; Vasilis Koumarelas, 'Περί της λεσβιακής στυπτηρίας, τα ορυκεία στύψις στα χρόνια των Γατελούζων', *Λεσβιακά* 17 (1998), pp. 109–31.

⁷⁷ E.g. Makis Axiotis, 'Η loggia της Μυτιλήνης', *Λεσβιακά* 16 (1996), pp. 71–6; Andreas Mazarakis, 'Το προάστιο της Μυτιλήνης στα μέσα του 15ου αιώνα', *Ιστοριογεωγραφικά* 9 (2002), pp. 381–98.

⁷⁸ E.g. Geo Pistarino, 'Giuliano Gattilusio corsaro e pirata greco-genovese del secolo XV', *Miscellanea Storica*, ed. Maria de Bernardis (Pietrabissara 1992), *Biblioteca dell'Accademia Olubrense* 12, pp. 63–77; Enrico Basso, 'Pirati e pirateria nel Mediterraneo medievale: Il caso di Giuliano Gattilusio', *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οι Γατελούζοι της Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 342–72; Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol,

specific aspect of the lordships' history is Alfonso Assini's detailed examination of the provisions made by the Genoese commune for the defence of the lordship of Mytilene during its last years.⁷⁹

Articles taking a more wide-ranging approach to the history of the lordships have tended to approach them chiefly from the perspective of their affiliation either with Byzantium or with Genoa, dividing broadly along national and disciplinary lines. Works in this broad vein produced by Genoese historians including Geo Pistarino, Laura Balletto and Giustina Olgiati have indeed stressed the Gattilusio lords' scrupulous adherence to Byzantine sovereignty and the congenial relations with the Greek populations under their rule which this made possible, and have suggested a significant degree of acculturation over time. Nevertheless, their analyses have largely focused on, and affirmed the central importance of, the commercial, familial and sentimental bonds tying the lordships to Genoa, and have discerned a consciously crafted role for them in a Genoese economic and strategic system. In their use of sources these articles have concentrated primarily on documents from the Genoese archives, supplemented by other materials such as the accounts of western travellers who visited the Gattilusio territories.⁸⁰ The scope of articles, general and specific, produced from this perspective has often been defined genealogically, hence embracing members of the Gattilusio family or relatives by marriage with little connection to the Aegean lordships.

Conversely, the Greek historiography of the lordships, in which the most important contributions of recent years have been made by Andreas Mazarakis, has been inclined more towards the use of Greek and Latin literary sources, numismatic evidence and the array of buildings, inscriptions and carved symbols left behind by the Gattilusio. It has given greater attention to the internal management of the lordships and the society they ruled, and its analytical thrust underlines the importance of the

'Una flotta catalana contro i corsari nel Levante (1406–1409)', *Oriente e Occidente tra Medioevo ed Eta Moderna: studi in onore di Geo Pistarino*, ed. Laura Balletto (Genoa 1997), pp. 325–55; *idem*, 'Pedro de Larraondo, un corsario Vizcaíno en el Mediterráneo oriental (1405–11)', *Corsarios Castellanos y Vascos en el Mediterráneo Medieval* (Barcelona 2000), pp. 243–331.

⁷⁹ Alfonso Assini, 'La "compera Metilini" e la difesa genovese del Gattilusio dopo la caduta di Costantinopoli', *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οι Γατελούζοι της Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 223–80.

⁸⁰ E.g. Laura Balletto, 'I Gattilusio fra economia e politica', *AALSL* 54 (1997), pp. 449–64; Giustina Olgiati, 'I Gattilusio', *Dibattito su famiglie nobili del mondo coloniale genovese nel Levante: Atti del Convegno Montoggio, 23 ottobre 1993*, ed. Geo Pistarino (Genoa 1994), pp. 85–99; Geo Pistarino, 'I Gattilusio di Lesbo e d'Enos signori nell'Egeo', *Genovesi d'Oriente* (Genoa 1990), pp. 383–420.

Byzantine foundations and ideological underpinning of the Gattilusio regime. The most wide-ranging and important publication on the lordships produced in the last decade offers an analysis of the dynastic and governmental organisation of the lordships, recognising significant western influences but chiefly emphasising institutional continuity from the Byzantine inheritance.⁸¹ In contrast to the genealogical frame of reference of much of the work produced by historians of Genoa, most notably Thierry Ganchou, the scope of publications in Greek has frequently been defined geographically: limited by the bounds of one or more of the Gattilusio territories, usually Lesbos, but tying the Gattilusio era into the context of other periods in the history of these places. Exemplary of this territorial focus is the short monograph of Panagiotis Paraskevaidis on the society of Lesbos under the Gattilusio, addressing a variety of social and cultural questions.⁸²

In historiography as in source material, views of the Gattilusio lordships have tended to be conditioned by a focus on one or other of the wider networks of which they formed a part. The most complete exception to this is an analysis by Geo Pistarino, originally presented at the conference held in Mytilene in 1994, an event of central importance to the modern study of the lordships. This article emphasises the diplomatic complexities of the lordships' position between the various influences of Byzantium, Genoa and the Ottomans and the ambiguities of its relationship with each. Turning inwards, it addresses the unsystematic quality of the network of power assembled by the Gattilusio lords and the interaction and interpenetration of different elements in the society under their rule.⁸³ This approach constitutes the closest precedent for what this book seeks to accomplish on a larger scale.

Structure

The structure of this book is determined by its aim of building up a comprehensive picture of the Gattilusio lordships as a point of intersection between overlapping influences, and as a political structure and a

⁸¹ Andreas Mazarakis, 'Il contesto istituzionale della dominazione e l'amministrazione dei Gattilusio a Mitilene (1355–1462)', *Cercetari Numismatice* 12–13 (2006–7), pp. 249–69.

⁸² Panagiotis Paraskevaidis, *Η Μυτιλήνη επί Γατελούζων* (Mytilene 1970).

⁸³ Geo Pistarino, 'Il secolo dei Gattilusio, signori dell'Egeo', *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οι Γατελούζοι της Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 281–306.

synthesis of social and cultural elements in themselves. Chapter 1 provides a chronological framework for what follows, outlining the development over time of the Gattilusio lordships in the context of the larger events surrounding them. Chapters 2 and 3 examine their foundations and development through the two networks which formed the basis of the lordships and set the parameters for the evolution of the society under their rule. Byzantium established the lordships and supplied the basis of their political authority, while as their predecessor in the administration of the territories they acquired and as the society in which the bulk of the lordships' population originated, its inheritance determined the context in which they would govern. Conversely, Genoa was the society of origin both for the Gattilusio lords themselves and for the predominant element of the migrant Latin community which took shape around them, while the earlier collaborations and conflicts between Byzantium and the Genoese among the islands and ports of the Anatolian littoral formed the background for the initial establishment of Gattilusio rule. Thus between them these two entities set the context and provided the ingredients for the political and social entity which the lordships comprised in themselves, which forms the focus of Chapters 4 and 5. The former chapter assesses the lordships as a network within the Aegean, examining the bonds between individual territorial components, the variations in the different lordships' connections in the region and their inhabitants' economic interactions with the world beyond their shores. The following chapter looks within the Gattilusio territories at the populations who inhabited them, the relations between the different communities of inhabitants and the manner in which the lordships governed these populations and responded to sectarian division. Finally, Chapters 6 and 7 turn outwards to address the course charted by the Gattilusio lordships through the contest between encroaching Muslim forces, whose rise was the preeminent political dynamic of the Aegean during the lifetime of the lordships, and the counterpoised efforts to unite Christian powers in ecclesiastical harmony and military cooperation against the Turks. Thus the investigation proceeds from the forces whose interaction gave rise to the lordships to those which would determine their fate and that of the world which had shaped them.

CHAPTER ONE

POLITICAL CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT

Background

The Gattilusio lordships in the Aegean had their origin in the events of November 1354, when the Genoese pirate Francesco Gattilusio was enlisted by the Byzantine Emperor John V Palaiologos (1341–91) to help him seize Constantinople from his father-in-law, co-emperor and rival John VI Kantakouzenos (1347–54). The ensuing coup d'état was a success, and having taken control of the imperial capital John V honoured his ally with marriage to his sister and possession of the island of Lesbos, commonly known by the name of its chief city Mytilene.¹

The change of regime in Constantinople was the decisive blow in a long power-struggle which had robbed the Byzantine Empire of most of its remaining strength. On the death of the Emperor Andronikos III Palaiologos (1328–41) Byzantium, though greatly diminished in size and institutional strength from its heyday, or even from the time of Michael VIII (1259–82), remained a significant regional power. Its position in Europe and the Aegean had lately rebounded somewhat from earlier losses. This compensated to some extent for the disasters of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, which had seen the loss of virtually all the Byzantine territories in Asia, and the empire retained the scope for further modest recovery. It still possessed a degree of military and diplomatic clout and held a continuous block of Balkan territory stretching from the Bosphorus to the Adriatic and the Gulf of Corinth, as well as the islands of the northern Aegean, some residual minor footholds in Anatolia and the south-eastern portion of the Peloponnese, then commonly known as the Morea.² All

¹ Doukas, *Ducas Istoria Turco-Bizantina (1341–1462)*, ed. Vasile Grecu (Bucharest 1958), pp. 65–9, 71–3; Giorgio and Giovanni Stella, *Annales Genuenses*, ed. Giovanna Petti Balbi (Bologna 1975), *RIS* n.s. 17/2, p. 154; Matteo Villani, *Cronica*, ed. Giuseppe Porta, 2 vols. (Parma 1995), vol. 1, pp. 540–1; Nikephoros Gregoras, *Nicephori Gregorae Historiae Byzantinae*, ed. Immanuel Bekker and Ludwig Schopen, 3 vols. (Bonn 1829–55), *CSHB* 12, 14, 15, vol. 3, p. 554; George T. Dennis, 'The short chronicle of Lesbos 1355–1428', *Λεσβιακά* 5 (1965), pp. 3–22, reprinted in *Byzantium and the Franks 1350–1420* (London 1982), I, p. 5; Donald M. Nicol, 'The abdication of John VI Cantacuzene', *BF* 2 (1967), pp. 269–83 at pp. 275–8.

² Donald M. Nicol, *The Last Centuries of Byzantium 1261–1453* (Cambridge 1972, 2nd ed. 1993), pp. 168–82; *idem*, *The Despotate of Epiros 1267–1479: a contribution to the history of*

this was upturned by the civil war which erupted in 1341 over control of the regency for the new child-emperor John V, pitting Andronikos's chief minister John Kantakouzenos against an alliance between the dowager Empress Anna of Savoy, the Patriarch of Constantinople and the *megas doux* (grand admiral) Alexios Apokaukos.³

The first and most devastating phase of war lasted until 1347, when John Kantakouzenos, who had been proclaimed emperor early in the war, finally entered Constantinople to reign jointly with John V, who was married to his daughter.⁴ This war had scarcely ended when the general cataclysm of the Black Death swept across the empire, initiating the era of recurrent plague outbreaks that would blight the following decades.⁵ While Byzantium was prostrated by internal strife, about half its remaining territory was conquered by the Serbian King Stefan Uroš IV Dušan (1331–55), who had himself proclaimed emperor in 1345. Albania, Epiros, Thessaly and most of Macedonia passed permanently from Byzantine control, leaving only the war-ravaged province of Thrace and an enclave around Thessalonike in addition to the islands, the Morea and the last scraps of Byzantine Asia.⁶

The most far-reaching consequence of the civil war only became apparent in the years that followed. The competing Byzantine factions had enlisted the military help of the various Turkish emirates which had already effectively completed the conquest of the empire's Asiatic provinces. While many of the Turks who had crossed over into Europe to serve in the civil wars or against the Serbs had returned home with their pay and plunder, some had remained at large in Thrace, turning to pillage on

Greece in the middle ages (Cambridge 1984), pp. 107–22; John Fine, *The Late Medieval Balkans: a critical survey from the late twelfth century to the Ottoman conquest* (Ann Arbor 1987), pp. 252–5, 292–3.

³ Gregoras, vol. 2, pp. 576–616; John Kantakouzenos, *Ioannis Cantacuzeni Imperatoris Historiarum Libri IV*, ed. Ludwig Schopen, 3 vols. (Bonn 1828–32), CSHB 7, 8, 9, vol. 2, pp. 11–173; Donald M. Nicol, *The Reluctant Emperor: a biography of John Cantacuzene, Byzantine Emperor and monk, c. 1295–1383* (Cambridge 1996), pp. 45–61.

⁴ Gregoras, vol. 2, pp. 616–779; Kantakouzenos, vol. 2, pp. 173–615; Nicol, *Last Centuries*, pp. 191–208.

⁵ Gregoras, vol. 2, pp. 797–8; Kantakouzenos, vol. 3, pp. 49–52; Nicol, *Last Centuries*, pp. 217–8; Marie-Hélène Congourdeau, 'Pour une étude de la Peste Noire à Byzance', *Εὐψυχία: Mélanges offertes à Hélène Ahrweiler*, 2 vols. (Paris 1998), vol. 1, pp. 149–63; Kostis P. Kostis, *Στον καίρο της πάνολης εικόνες από τις κοινωνίες της ελληνικής χερσονήσου* (Iraklion 1995), pp. 303–39.

⁶ Gregoras, vol. 2, pp. 746–7, 795; Kantakouzenos, vol. 2, pp. 546–51, vol. 3, pp. 30–2, 109–66; Nicol, *Despotate*, pp. 128–30; *idem*, *Reluctant Emperor*, pp. 115–28; Fine, pp. 300–14, 320–1.

their own account.⁷ In March 1354 an earthquake devastated the Gallipoli peninsula on the European side of the Dardanelles, toppling the walls of the town of Gallipoli. The Turks operating in the area swiftly seized the port, holding it under the command of Suleiman, son of the Ottoman emir Orhan (1326–62) who ruled on the Asian side of the straits.⁸ With an effective means of access to Europe now under their control, growing numbers of Turks began to cross the Dardanelles in pursuit of the material and spiritual rewards to be gained by preying on the debilitated empire and its neighbours. The process by which the Turks under Ottoman leadership subjugated the Christian Balkans, while the Ottoman dynasty capitalised on their achievements in Europe to subdue the other Turkish emirates and become masters of Anatolia, was underway.⁹

Before the conquest of Gallipoli, the Turkish threat to the Christian regimes in the Aegean had been expressed chiefly through seaborne raids, directed primarily against the islands. While all the emirates along the Aegean littoral engaged in such attacks, their most prominent exponent was Umur, ruler of the emirate of Aydin, the principal base for whose depredations was the port of Smyrna.¹⁰ The pillaging of Latin territories and enslavement of their inhabitants by the Turks provoked a response from western Europe expressed through the medium of the crusade, which from the 1330s began to treat the Anatolian Turks as a significant target. A series of crusading leagues assembled fleets to wage war against the

⁷ Gregoras, vol. 2, pp. 648–52, 659, 664–5, 670–3, 692–4, 726–9, 741–3, 762–5, 834–9, 842, 865–7, vol. 3, pp. 162, 171, 179–81, 196–203, 218; Kantakouzenos, vol. 2, pp. 344–7, 357, 383–440, 467–8, 478, 488–9, 498–502, 507, 529–35, 546–56, 585–96, vol. 3, pp. 32, 62–8, 111–6, 148, 162–6, 228–9, 242–50, 266–9; Nicol, *Last Centuries*, pp. 198–206, 218–9, 229–30, 236, 238, 241; Fine, pp. 295, 302–8, 322, 325–6; Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire 1300–1481* (Istanbul 1990), pp. 22–4.

⁸ Gregoras, vol. 3, pp. 220–2; Kantakouzenos, vol. 3, pp. 276–81; Peter Schreiner, *Die Byzantinischen Kleinchroniken*, 3 vols. (Vienna 1975–9), *CFHB* 12, vol. 1, p. 66 (no. 7/13); Halil Inalcik, 'The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades, 1329–1451', *A History of the Crusades*, ed. Kenneth M. Setton, 6 vols. (Madison, Wisconsin 1969–90), vol. 6, pp. 222–76 at pp. 233–7; Imber, *Ottoman Empire 1300–1481*, pp. 24–5.

⁹ I. Metin Kunt, 'The rise of the Ottomans', *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, ed. Paul Fouracre, Rosamond McKitterick, Timothy Reuter, David Luscombe, Jonathan Riley-Smith, David Abulafia, Michael Jones and Christopher Allmand, 7 vols. (Cambridge 1995–2005), vol. 6, pp. 839–63 at pp. 847–63.

¹⁰ Halil Inalcik, 'The rise of the Turcoman maritime principalities in Anatolia, Byzantium and the Crusades', *BF* 9 (1985), pp. 179–217; Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, 'Holy War in the Aegean during the fourteenth century', *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204*, ed. Benjamin Arbel, Bernard Hamilton and David Jacoby (London 1989), pp. 212–25; Paul Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin, Byzance et l'Occident: recherches sur 'La geste de Umur Pacha'* (Paris 1957), pp. 40–88, 102–43.

raiders, the most lasting achievement of which was the capture of the harbour of Smyrna in 1344, although the upper city remained in Turkish hands.¹¹ Holding this precarious and embattled enclave would be a pre-occupation of papal crusade policy in the region for the rest of the fourteenth century.¹² Such efforts to hold off the attacks of a dangerous Muslim enemy in the Aegean helped to bring an end to the period of crusading against Byzantium which had begun with the Fourth Crusade. In 1332 Andronikos III was invited to participate in the first anti-Turkish league, and although subsequent coalitions excluded Byzantium, the empire was increasingly regarded as a potential ally rather than a potential target of crusading.¹³ Full entitlement to the solidarity of Latin Christendom would however continue to depend on the resolution of the long-standing religious schism between East and West. As Ottoman expansion into Europe placed the empire in increasing need of outside help, the possibility of conceding papal demands over Church Union for the sake of Latin support against the Turks became a dominant theme of Byzantine politics.

While the Ottomans were taking hold of the corridor which the straits offered for movement between the land-masses of Anatolia and the Balkans, another struggle was underway for domination of the conduit they afforded for traffic between the Aegean and Black Seas. The two pre-eminent maritime powers of the Mediterranean, the Italian city-states of Venice and Genoa, had long been embroiled in recurrently violent rivalry over commercial opportunities in the eastern Mediterranean. In 1350 their competing interests in the Aegean and above all in the Black Sea led to war between the two republics. The Black Sea had become a prime focus for Italian trade in the later thirteenth century, due to the opening up of

¹¹ Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204–1571)*, 4 vols. (Philadelphia 1976–84), vol. 1, pp. 177–223; Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade: Venetian Crete and the emirates of Menteshe and Aydin (1300–1415)* (Venice 1983), pp. 21–62; Peter Edbury, 'Christians and Muslims in the eastern Mediterranean', *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, ed. Paul Fouracre, Rosamond McKitterick, Timothy Reuter, David Luscombe, Jonathan Riley-Smith, David Abulafia, Michael Jones and Christopher Allmand, 7 vols. (Cambridge 1995–2005), vol. 6, pp. 864–84 at pp. 868–9, 873–4; Norman Housley, *The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades, 1305–1378* (Oxford 1986), pp. 25–36, 117–22, 146–9, 250–8; Angeliki E. Laiou, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello, Byzantium and the Turks: the background to the anti-Turkish league of 1332–1334', *Speculum* 45 (1970), pp. 374–92; Inalcik, 'Maritime principalities', pp. 192–203; Lemerle, *Emirat*, pp. 89–101, 180–203.

¹² Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 1, pp. 227, 229–30, 234–40, 247, 286, 328; Housley, *Avignon*, pp. 36–9, 47–8, 290–2, 303–9.

¹³ Deno J. Geanakoplos, 'Byzantium and the Crusades, 1261–1354', *A History of the Crusades*, ed. Kenneth M. Setton, 6 vols. (Madison, Wisconsin 1969–90), vol. 3, pp. 27–68 at pp. 48–57.

new land routes to the Far East by the Mongol conquests, coupled with the extinction of the crusader states in the Holy Land and a papal embargo on trade with Egypt. From about the 1340s this very long-distance trade in spices and other high-value commodities went into severe decline, due to conflicts among the Mongol rulers of the steppe and between Mongols and Italians on the shores of the Black Sea, coupled with a revival of activity along the older channels of trade through the Middle East. However, it did not entirely cease, while the trade in lower-value, larger-volume commodities originating close to the shores of the Black Sea, notably grain and slaves, continued to flourish.¹⁴ The control of access to this trade and of the passage through the straits on which it depended proved an enduring source of friction between the Venetians and Genoese.¹⁵ The war which began in 1350, known as the War of the Straits, continued until 1355, embroiling Byzantium and Aragon in the process. Like other conflicts between the two city-states it was hard-fought but inconclusive, and left ample scope for a renewal of the struggle at some point in the future.¹⁶

Of greater lasting importance were the gains which the Genoese had made in the Aegean a few years earlier. These acquisitions, which had helped provoke the clash with Venice, were made at the expense of Byzantium, the Genoese profiting like the Serbs and the Turks from the weakening of the empire by civil war. This was the most recent turn in a complex and fractious relationship. Over the centuries the Italian

¹⁴ Jacques Heers, *Gênes au XV^e Siècle: activité économique et problèmes sociaux* (Paris 1961), pp. 364–72; Michel Balard, *La Romanie Génoise (XI^e–début du XV^e siècle)* (Rome 1978), pp. 150–62, 456–61, 683–7, 701–3, 705–11, 719–41, 752–68, 775–7, 783–96, 826–8, 849–62; *idem* 'Gênes et la mer Noire (XIII^e–XV^e siècles)', *Revue Historique* 270 (1983), pp. 31–54, reprinted in *La mer Noire et la Romanie génoise (XIII^e–XV^e siècles)* (London 1989), V; Sergei P. Karpov, 'Black Sea and the crisis of the mid XIVth century: an underestimated turning point', *Θησαυρίσματα* 27 (1997), pp. 65–78; Wilhelm Heyd, *Histoire du Commerce du Levant au Moyen-Age*, 2 vols. (Leipzig 1923), vol. 2, pp. 64–73, 92–140, 156–253; Geo Pistarino, 'Da Genova alla Cina nel tempo del Gran Khan', *Genovesi d'Oriente* (Genoa 1990), pp. 143–242 at pp. 177–230.

¹⁵ Ovidiu Cristea, 'Genoa's struggle for hegemony in the Black Sea (thirteenth-fourteenth centuries)', *Historical Yearbook* 2 (2005), pp. 117–32 at pp. 123–9; Michel Balard, 'La lotta contro Genova', *Storia di Venezia dalle origini alla caduta della Serenissima*, 11 vols. (Rome 1991–8), vol. 3, ed. Girolamo Airal di, Giorgio Cracco and Alberto Tenenti, pp. 87–126 at pp. 88–91, 116–7.

¹⁶ Gregoras, vol. 3, pp. 46–51, 77–92, 106–7; Kantakouzenos, vol. 3, pp. 185–200, 209–37; Stella, pp. 150–4; Michel Balard, 'A propos de la bataille du Bosphore: l'expédition génoise de Paganino Doria à Constantinople (1351–1352)', *Travaux et Mémoires du Centre de Recherche d'Histoire et Civilisation Byzantines* 4 (1970), pp. 431–69, reprinted in *La mer Noire et la Romanie génoise (XIII^e–XV^e siècles)* (London 1989), II; Frederic C. Lane, *Venice: a maritime republic* (Baltimore and London 1973), pp. 174–9; Steven A. Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese 958–1528* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina and London 1996), pp. 219–21.

mercantile communities had gradually established a position of ascendancy in the empire's long-distance trade. In this they were aided by the extensive privileges granted to them by the imperial government and enhanced over the centuries, which included tax exemptions, extraterritorial rights of justice over their own citizens in the empire and the provision of special commercial quarters in Byzantine ports. As its own maritime resources dwindled Byzantium also became increasingly reliant on the Italians for naval support.¹⁷ After the Fourth Crusade this mercantile and maritime preponderance deepened, and was supplemented and reinforced by the acquisition of territorial networks of islands and ports.¹⁸

The Venetians had abruptly seized a colonial empire from Byzantium by force as a result of the Fourth Crusade. This brought about a partition of Byzantine territory between Venice, the other participants in the expedition and the new Latin Empire of Constantinople, while Venetian individuals seized territories in the Aegean for themselves, under the auspices of the Latin Empire.¹⁹ By contrast, the Genoese territorial presence in the region had developed later, more gradually and by a more complex mixture of consent and coercion. It had its origins in the Treaty of Nymphaion of March 1261, by which the Genoese commune formed an alliance with Michael VIII, receiving a major expansion of its privileges in return for helping the emperor retake Constantinople from the Latin

¹⁷ Donald M. Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice: a study in diplomatic and cultural relations* (Cambridge 1988), pp. 59–64, 75–6, 88–96, 108–23; Sandra Origone, *Bisanzio e Genova* (Genoa 1992, 2nd ed. 1997), pp. 35–44, 85–105; Gerald W. Day, *Genoa's Response to Byzantium 1155–1204: commercial expansion and factionalism in a medieval city* (Chicago 1988), pp. 2–36, 161–74.

¹⁸ Freddy Thiriet, *La Romanie Vénitienne au Moyen Age: le développement et l'exploitation du domaine colonial vénitien (XII^e–XV^e siècles)* (Paris 1959), pp. 35–64, 147–68; Angeliki E. Laiou, 'Observations on the results of the Fourth Crusade: Greeks and Latins in port and market', *Medievalia et Humanistica: studies in medieval and Renaissance culture* n.s. 12 (1984), pp. 47–60; *eadem*, 'The Byzantine economy in the Mediterranean trade system; thirteenth-fifteenth centuries', *DOP* 34–5 (1980–1), pp. 177–222 at pp. 187–212; David Jacoby, 'From Byzantium to Latin Romania: continuity and change', *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204*, ed. Benjamin Arbel, Bernard Hamilton and David Jacoby (London 1989), pp. 1–44 at pp. 28–32; *idem*, 'Italian migration and settlement in Latin Greece: the impact on the economy', *Die Kreuzfahrerstaaten als multikulturelle Gesellschaft: Einwanderer und Minderheiten im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert*, ed. Hans Eberhard Mayer and Elisabeth Müller-Luckner (Munich 1997), pp. 97–127 at pp. 100–3, 118–21.

¹⁹ Thiriet, *Romanie*, pp. 63–104; Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice*, pp. 141–2, 148–61; Guillaume Saint-Guillain, 'Les conquérants de l'archipel: l'Empire latin de Constantinople, Venise et les premiers seigneurs des Cyclades', *Quarta crociata: Venezia-Bisanzio-Impero Latino*, ed. Gherardo Ortalli, Giorgio Ravegnani and Peter Schreiner (Venice 2006), pp. 125–237.

Empire and its Venetian protectors.²⁰ In the event, the recovery of the city in August 1261 was actually accomplished without Genoese help.²¹ Subsequent relations between Genoa and the empire were turbulent, but the new Byzantine concessions and the end of Venetian dominance on the Bosphorus facilitated a general expansion of Genoese activities in the Aegean and the Black Sea, and the benefits accrued came to include territorial acquisitions.²² In 1267 what had formerly been the Genoese commercial quarter in Constantinople was reestablished at Pera, on the opposite shore of the Golden Horn from the capital itself. This settlement in time developed into a fortified city in its own right, effectively independent of Byzantine authority, and drew away to itself a large proportion of Constantinople's trade.²³ The establishment of closer ties and the expansion of their community's influence in the empire, and the declining strength of its beleaguered rulers' bargaining position, offered fresh opportunities to Genoese individuals interested in advancing themselves by offering their services to Byzantium. Such engagement was further encouraged by recurrent cooperation against Venetian or Catalan common enemies. The decades after 1261 saw a variety of Genoese individuals, some of them in Byzantine naval service, granted authority by the empire over islands and enclaves in the eastern Aegean.²⁴

The most significant of these were the Zaccaria family, to whom Michael VIII granted the port of Phokaia. They were attracted to it by the abundant high-quality deposits of alum accessible for mining in the vicinity.²⁵ This mineral was in widespread demand on a large scale as a

²⁰ Dino Puncuh, Antonella Rovere, Sabina Dellacasa, Elisabetta Madia, Maria Bibolini and Eleonora Pallavicini, *I Libri Iurium della Repubblica di Genova*, 8 vols. (Rome 1992–2002), vol. 4, pp. 271–85 (no. 749); Deno J. Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West 1258–1282: a study in Byzantine-Latin relations* (Cambridge, Massachusetts 1959), pp. 81–91; Origone, *Bisanzio*, pp. 113–22.

²¹ George Akropolites, *Χρονική Συγγραφή*, ed. Antonios D. Panagiotou (Athens 2003), pp. 292–7; George Pachymeres, *Georges Pachymérés Relations Historiques*, ed. Albert Failler, 5 vols. (Paris 1984–2000), *CFHB* 24, vol. 1, pp. 191–203; Geanakoplos, *Michael*, pp. 92–11.

²² Geanakoplos, *Michael*, pp. 147–54, 161–71, 206–15, 245–52, 357–9; Nicol, *Last Centuries*, pp. 43, 60–1, 108, 110–3, 131–3, 160–1, 171–5, 220–7, 235–7; Angeliki E. Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins: the foreign policy of Andronicus II, 1282–1328* (Cambridge, Massachusetts 1972), pp. 68–74, 101–13, 147–57, 171–5, 183–5, 204–8, 260–72.

²³ Pachymeres, vol. 1, pp. 225–7, vol. 3, pp. 262–71, vol. 4, pp. 492–3, 534–7, 540–3; Gregoras, vol. 2, pp. 841–2; Balard, *Romanie*, pp. 179–98, 359–68; Origone, *Bisanzio*, pp. 197–201, 205–9; Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins*, pp. 69, 104–5, 113, 149–51.

²⁴ See below, p. 88.

²⁵ Marino Sanudo Torsello, 'Istoria del Regno di Romania', ed. Carl Hopf, *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes inédites ou peu connues* (Berlin 1873), pp. 99–170 at p. 146; Pachymeres, vol. 2, p. 535; Roberto S. Lopez, *Benedetto Zaccaria: ammiraglio e mercante nella Genova del*

key ingredient for a variety of industrial processes. Its most important function was as a fixative in the dyeing of cloth but it was also employed for other purposes in textile production, as well as in industries including tanning, glass-making, and the manufacture of paints, cosmetics and medicines.²⁶ Beginning in the later thirteenth century the Genoese developed an increasingly dominant position in production, which in the first half of the fifteenth century became overwhelming, as they came to monopolise the extensive deposits of Anatolia and the Aegean, while the previously significant Egyptian alum industry declined into inactivity. Under the management of the Zaccaria Phokaia became the most prominent of the extraction sites controlled by the Genoese, albeit not necessarily the most productive.²⁷

In 1305 the Zaccaria also gained control of the island of Chios from Byzantium, amidst the disintegration of imperial rule in Anatolia. Having approached the Emperor Andronikos II (1282–1328) with a proposal to take over the island and defend it against pressing Catalan and Turkish threats, they pre-empted his decision by occupying Chios regardless. Andronikos legitimised the *fait accompli*, though only conceding control initially for ten years, later renewed at five-year intervals.²⁸ The Zaccaria subsequently conferred Phokaia on members of another Genoese family, the Cattaneo della Volta.²⁹ By 1329 relations between Byzantium and the then lord of

Duecento (Messina and Milan 1933, 3rd ed. Genoa 2004), pp. 48–91; Enrico Basso, 'Gli Zaccaria', *Dibattito su famiglie nobili del mondo coloniale genovese nel Levante—Atti del Convegno Montoggio, 23 ottobre 1993*, ed. Geo Pistarino (Genoa 1994), pp. 46–71 at pp. 48–51.

²⁶ Léone Liagre-de Sturler, 'Le commerce de l'alun en Flandre au Moyen Age', *Le Moyen Age: revue d'histoire et de philologie* 61 (1955), pp. 177–206 at pp. 177–9; Charles J. Singer, *The Earliest Chemical Industry: an essay in the historical relations of economics and technology illustrated from the alum trade* (London 1948), pp. 66–9, 72–5.

²⁷ Doukas, pp. 205–7; Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, *La Pratica della Mercatura*, ed. Allan Evans (Cambridge, Massachusetts 1936), pp. 369–70; David Jacoby, 'Production et commerce de l'alun oriental en Méditerranée, XI^e–XV^e siècles', *L'alun de Méditerranée*, ed. Philippe Borgard, Jean-Pierre Brun and Maurice Picon (Naples and Aix-en-Provence 2005), pp. 219–67 at pp. 233–54; Marie-Louise Heers, 'Les Génois et le commerce de l'alun à la fin du Moyen Age', *Revue d'Histoire Economique et Sociale* 32 (1954), pp. 31–53; Kate Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade in the Early Islamic State: the merchants of Genoa and Turkey* (Cambridge 1999), pp. 80–94; Enrico Basso, 'Genovesi e Turchi nell'Egeo medievale: Murad II e la "Societas Folie Nove"', *Quaderni Medievale* 36 (1993), pp. 31–52, reprinted in *Genova: un impero sul mare*, (Cagliari 1994), pp. 63–84; Heers, *Gênes*, pp. 394–8.

²⁸ Pachymeres, vol. 2, p. 535; Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins*, pp. 152–3; Basso, 'Zaccaria', pp. 54–5; Philip Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese and their Administration of the Island 1346–1566: described in contemporary documents and official dispatches*, 3 vols. (Cambridge 1958), vol. 1, pp. 54–5; Nicol, *Last Centuries*, p. 113.

²⁹ Kantakouzenos, vol. 1, pp. 388–9; Doukas, p. 207; Argenti, vol. 1, pp. 56–7; Andreas Mazarakis, *Zaccaria e Della Volta nell'Egeo Orientale, 1268–1329* (Athens 2006), pp. 37–40, 60–4.

Chios Martino Zaccaria had broken down and in that year Andronikos III mounted a successful invasion of Chios. With the support of the island's rebellious Greek inhabitants and Martino's disaffected brother Benedetto he restored direct imperial rule.³⁰ Disappointed in his hopes of replacing his brother as ruler of Chios, Benedetto Zaccaria tried to take the island by force in 1335 but was repulsed.³¹

To facilitate the alum industry of Phokaia the Genoese had established a second port, known as New Phokaia, a few miles away at the base of the peninsula at whose tip the existing town stood. This location was closer to the main alum deposits, providing advantages in terms of both practical convenience and the protection of the workforce from Turkish raids.³² The original settlement was thereafter known as Old Phokaia. In 1329, following the conquest of Chios, Andronikos III received the submission of the Cattaneo but allowed them to remain in control of New Phokaia, now directly under imperial overlordship.³³ However, in 1335 Domenico Cattaneo invaded Lesbos, with the help of the Venetian Duke of the Archipelago, chief among the Latin lords of the Cyclades, and the Knights of the Order of St. John, who ruled Rhodes and the nearby islands. He took the capital Mytilene but was expelled by imperial forces the following year.³⁴ In 1340 the Greek population of New Phokaia rose in revolt against their Genoese rulers and restored Byzantine rule.³⁵

This reassertion of imperial authority in the eastern Aegean at the expense of wayward Genoese protégés was an expression of the modest revival of Byzantine power underway in the reign of Andronikos III, and it did not survive the shipwreck of that recovery in the civil war that followed his death. In 1346 an expedition from Genoa led by Simone Vignoso conquered Chios and the two Phokaia. A proposal to move on

³⁰ Gregoras, vol. 1, pp. 438–9; Kantakouzenos, vol. 1, pp. 370–88; Vincenzo Promis (ed.), 'Continuazione della Cronica di Jacopo da Varagine dal MCCXCVII al MCCCXXXII', *ASLSP* 10 (1874), pp. 493–511 at p. 510; Argenti, vol. 1, pp. 60–8; Basso, 'Zaccaria', pp. 58–60; Balard, *Romanie*, pp. 69–72.

³¹ Kantakouzenos, vol. 1, pp. 390–1; Argenti, vol. 1, p. 68.

³² Doukas, pp. 205–7; Mümtaz Çolak, Valérie Thirion-Merle, Francine Blondé and Maurice Picon, 'Les régions productrices d'alun en Turquie aux époques antique, médiévale et moderne: gisements, produits et transports', *L'alun de Méditerranée*, ed. Philippe Borgard, Jean-Pierre Brun and Maurice Picon (Naples and Aix-en-Provence 2005), pp. 59–68 at p. 65, fig. 2; Mazarakis, *Zaccaria*, pp. 47–52, 59–61.

³³ Kantakouzenos, vol. 1, pp. 388–90; Mazarakis, *Zaccaria*, pp. 51–2, 64.

³⁴ Gregoras, vol. 1, pp. 525–35; Kantakouzenos, vol. 1, pp. 476–95; Balard, *Romanie*, pp. 72–3; Lemerle, *Emirat*, pp. 108–13.

³⁵ Gregoras, vol. 1, p. 553.

to attack Lesbos and Tenedos was not implemented.³⁶ Since the Genoese commune was unable to remunerate the private outfitters who had provided the warships, the conquered territories were turned over to them in pledge, to exploit for their own profit until the commune could repay their costs. In the event this never took place and the administration of the island and of New Phokaia remained thereafter in the hands of the Old Mahona of Chios, the corporation formed by these investors, and the New Mahona to whom they subsequently leased their interests.³⁷ The next year the former Byzantine governor of Chios, Leo Tsyvos, whom the Genoese had incautiously entrusted with the administration of the two Phokaias, rebelled against them in the empire's name and tried to retake the island. He was defeated and killed and the Mahona were soon able to regain New Phokaia, but the old town remained in the hands of Leo Kalothetos, a Chian aristocrat who had led the local conspiracy against Martino Zaccaria in 1329 and who was appointed governor by John VI Kantakouzenos after Tsyvos's death.³⁸

Following his victory in the civil war, John VI attempted to revive the capital's commercial fortunes and the imperial navy, but his efforts led to war with the Genoese of Pera and the destruction of the new Byzantine fleet in 1349.³⁹ After this mishap, the emperor tried to avoid entanglement in the subsequent war between Genoa and Venice, but was eventually driven to join forces with the Venetians and their Catalan allies. The fighting around the Bosphorus did not go well for this coalition and in 1352, abandoned by his allies and left to face the Genoese fleet alone, John VI was obliged to conclude a separate peace.⁴⁰ A fresh bout of civil war erupted shortly after this settlement. The young John V Palaiologos, now an adult, was seeking to throw off his father-in-law's tutelage and forestall

³⁶ Raimondo Morozzo della Rocca, *Lettere di Mercanti a Pignol Zucchello (1336-1350)* (Venice 1957), pp. 68-71 (no. 34).

³⁷ Stella, pp. 144-9; Kantakouzenos, vol. 2, pp. 582-4, vol. 3, pp. 68, 81-4; Argenti, vol. 1, pp. 86-146, vol. 2, pp. 1-55; Geo Pistarino, *Chio dei genovesi nel tempo di Cristoforo Colombo* (Rome 1995), pp. 23-35, 79-114; Balard, *Romanie*, vol. 1, pp. 123-6, 376-86.

³⁸ Kantakouzenos, vol. 3, pp. 83-5; Pistarino, *Chio*, pp. 43-8; Michel Balard, 'The Genoese in the Aegean (1204-1453)', *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204*, ed. Benjamin Arbel, Bernard Hamilton and David Jacoby (London 1989), pp. 158-74 at pp. 164-5.

³⁹ Kantakouzenos, vol. 3, pp. 68-80; Gregoras, vol. 2, pp. 841-67; Nicol, *Last Centuries*, pp. 220-5; Hélène Ahrweiler, *Byzance et la Mer. La marine de guerre, la politique et les institutions maritimes de Byzance aux VII^e-XV^e siècles* (Paris 1966), pp. 383-5.

⁴⁰ Kantakouzenos, vol. 3, pp. 118, 186-200, 209-37; Gregoras, vol. 2, pp. 876-8, 880-1; Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice*, pp. 273-7; Argenti, vol. 1, pp. 121-3.

the threat of John VI's son Matthew Kantakouzenos succeeding his father on the throne, permanently supplanting the Palaiologoi.⁴¹

The Lordships before the Battle of Ankara

It was amid this convergence of contesting powers that Francesco Gattilusio joined forces with John V. According to the mid-fifteenth-century testimony of Doukas, who provides by far the most detailed account of these events, Francesco had arrived in the vicinity of the Dardanelles with the intention of seizing land on the European side of the straits. This ambition was occasioned by the earthquake of March 1354, which had enabled the Ottomans to seize Gallipoli. Francesco also hoped to exploit the disorder and the destruction of fortifications to carve out a territory for himself.⁴² He was diverted from this speculative venture when he encountered John V, who had established himself on the island of Tenedos near the entrance to the Dardanelles the previous year and was gathering forces there to strike at Constantinople.⁴³ Doukas claims that Francesco played a decisive role in the coup, telling how he gained access to the city by subterfuge and led the way as the young emperor's followers stormed into the city.⁴⁴ There is some cause to suspect that this account of Francesco's part in events has been embellished.⁴⁵ The outcome, however, is not in doubt. John V was able to enter the capital and his arrival prompted a general uprising in the city in his support. To avoid bloodshed John VI came to an agreement with his son-in-law. Less than a fortnight later the elder emperor abdicated, leaving John V as sole ruler in the capital, although Matthew Kantakouzenos continued to hold sway as emperor over territories that had been assigned to him around Adrianople in Thrace.⁴⁶ At some point in the following months Francesco Gattilusio was married to the emperor's sister Maria and they set off for

⁴¹ Gregoras, vol. 3, pp. 147–89, 195–248; Kantakouzenos, vol. 3, pp. 238–69, 276, 279–99; Nicol, *Reluctant Emperor*, pp. 115–28.

⁴² Doukas, p. 67.

⁴³ Doukas, p. 67; Gregoras, vol. 3, pp. 226, 236–7; Kantakouzenos, vol. 3, pp. 253–8, 269–76, 282–3; Nicol, *Last Centuries*, pp. 238–9, 242–3.

⁴⁴ Doukas, pp. 67–9.

⁴⁵ See below, pp. 79–81.

⁴⁶ Kantakouzenos, vol. 3, pp. 284–312; Gregoras, vol. 3, pp. 241–9; Nicol, *Last Centuries*, pp. 238, 242–9; *idem*, *The Byzantine Family of Kantakouzenos (Cantacuzenus) ca. 1100–1460* (Washington D.C. 1968), pp. 109–12, 115–6.

Lesbos to take up the lordship that John had granted his new brother-in-law, assuming the government of the island on 17 July 1355.⁴⁷

Having entered the sphere of Aegean politics by helping John V strike the decisive blow in his conflict with the Kantakouzenoi, three years later Francesco's services were enlisted in the consolidation of John's triumph. The agreement that Matthew Kantakouzenos had reached with John V after his father's abdication swiftly broke down and conflict resumed. In 1357 Matthew fell into his rival's hands when he was captured by Serbs and sold to John V, who initially imprisoned him on Tenedos but soon ordered him to be placed in Francesco's custody on Lesbos. This confinement was to be brief, since a reconciliation was soon achieved between John and Matthew, who renounced his imperial title and settled in the Morea.⁴⁸

In the same year Francesco provided further help to his brother-in-law in a clash with John Kalothetos, the effectively autonomous governor of the isolated Byzantine enclave of Old Phokaia, who had seized power there from his father Leo. The conflict between the emperor and his nominal representative came about when Halil, son of the Ottoman emir Orhan, was captured by pirates and taken to Old Phokaia. John V was approached by Orhan to secure his son's release. Wishing to gain credit with this dangerous neighbour the emperor ordered Kalothetos to surrender the prisoner to him. The governor, however, demanded money and honours in exchange for handing him over. As supporters of the Kantakouzenoi who had originally been appointed to their position by John VI, the allegiance of the Kalothetos family to John V's diminished empire was somewhat nominal. With an irate Ottoman emir to placate and his own affronted prestige to repair, the emperor led a military expedition to impose his authority on the recalcitrant governor. Francesco contributed ships and men to this force and seemingly led his contingent himself. During the siege of Old Phokaia John was warned of a plot to take him prisoner, laid by a neighbouring Turkish ruler, probably the emir of Saruchan, who had formerly been allied with Kalothetos but had joined forces with the

⁴⁷ Dennis, 'Short chronicle', p. 5; Doukas, p. 73. Kaldellis and Efthymiadis raise doubts as to the identity of Francesco's bride, on the basis that she is not named in any source. In fact she is named by Doukas, a source which these authors omit from consideration on this point. Anthony Kaldellis and Stephanos Efthymiadis, *The Prosopography of Byzantine Lesbos, 284–1355 A.D.: a contribution to the social history of the Byzantine province* (Vienna 2010), pp. 162–3.

⁴⁸ Gregoras, vol. 3, pp. 503–4, 564–5; Kantakouzenos, vol. 3, pp. 311–4, 319–60; Nicol, *Byzantine Family*, pp. 117–8; *idem*, *Last Centuries*, pp. 249–50.

besiegers. On Francesco's advice John lured the Turk onto a ship for a hunting expedition on a nearby island and arrested him, but was eventually convinced to release him in exchange for a ransom and hostages. The siege failed to subdue Kalothetos and the emperor eventually had to pay him off to secure Halil's release.⁴⁹

In 1366 Francesco was again acting in support of John V, this time as part of a crusading expedition against the Ottomans led by Count Amadeo VI of Savoy. Amadeo had intended to participate in a crusade against the Mamluks of Egypt, launched the previous year by King Peter I of Cyprus (1359–69), but was unable to make his forces ready in time. Hoping to capitalise on previous diplomatic exchanges with John V on the subject of Church Union, Pope Urban V (1362–70) now encouraged Amadeo to assist the emperor, who was his cousin, against the Turks.⁵⁰ The count set out with a fleet prepared in Genoa, Venice, Marseilles and Nice, and was joined in the Aegean by a contingent commanded by Francesco Gattilusio. Together they attacked Gallipoli from land and sea in August 1366, Francesco taking command of the naval component of the assault. The Turkish garrison fled and the crusaders occupied Gallipoli, which they garrisoned and subsequently handed over to John V.⁵¹ Thus the ready

⁴⁹ Gregoras, vol. 3, pp. 559–66; Villani, vol. 2, pp. 96–7; Doukas, pp. 205–7; Franz Tinnfeld, 'Kaiser Ioannes V. Palaiologos und der Gouverneur von Phokaia 1356–1358: ein Beispiel für den Verfall der byzantinischen Zentralgewalt um die Mitte des 14. Jahrhunderts', *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi* 1 (1981), pp. 259–71. The Turkish ally was presumably the emir of Saruchan, since Doukas indicates that he was the neighbor of Phokaia and recipient of tribute from it in this period.

⁵⁰ Oskar Halecki, *Un Empereur de Byzance à Rome: vingt ans de travail pour l'union des églises et pour la défense de l'Empire d'Orient, 1355–1375* (Warsaw 1930), pp. 31–110; Aziz S. Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages* (London 1938), pp. 345–82; Eugene L. Cox, *The Green Count of Savoy: Amadeus VI and Transalpine Savoy in the Fourteenth Century* (Princeton, New Jersey 1967), pp. 204–6; Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 1, pp. 252–4, 285–7; below, pp. 327–9.

⁵¹ Jehan Servion, *Geste et chroniques de la Maison de Savoye*, ed. Frederic-Emmanuel Bollati, 2 vols. (Turin 1879), vol. 2, pp. 125–40; Frederic-Emmanuel Bollati di Saint-Pierre, *Illustrazioni della Spedizione in Oriente di Amadeo VI (Il Conte Verde)* (Turin 1900), *Biblioteca Storica Italiana* 5, p. 50 (nos. 154–5); Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 1, pp. 291–9. When the second day's fighting was halted by nightfall, Amadeo pulled his men back to their ships on Francesco's advice. The Turks made their escape during the night. According to the Savoyard chronicler Servion, the besiegers learned of the Turks' departure in the morning, when some Greeks within the walls shouted this news to them. Francesco reported this to the count and sent his nephew along with two of Amadeo's men to verify the report. Setton observes (p. 299) that a payment made by Amadeo to an inhabitant of Gallipoli who brought him the news of the Turks' departure from Gallipoli seems to contradict Servion's account of how this information was acquired (Bollati, pp. 51, 59 (nos. 161, 209)). However, it is possible that the 'expedición' which this man reported was the Turks' initial sortie to confront Amadeo's forces on the beach rather than their eventual withdrawal. Servion, vol. 2, pp. 133–4.

access to Thrace which the Turks had enjoyed since 1354 was severed by the loss of their most convenient port on the European side of the straits. However, renewed Byzantine control of Gallipoli lasted only a decade, while the Turks were already firmly established in Thrace, where they had by this time deprived the empire of most of its territories, and defeated a coalition of Serb rulers in a battle on the River Maritza in 1371.⁵²

After the capture of Gallipoli, the crusaders turned their attention to the personal plight of John V, who was then in a difficult situation of his own making. He had impetuously set off on a diplomatic mission to Hungary the previous winter, seeking help against the Turks. Having been rebuffed by the Hungarians, he attempted to return home, only to find his route blocked by the Bulgarians, whose hostility had been aroused by recent Byzantine and Hungarian attacks.⁵³ Amadeo and Francesco now acted to extricate their hapless relative from his predicament by bringing military pressure to bear on Bulgaria. Reinforced by the Byzantines and the Genoese of Pera, they succeeded in capturing the ports of Mesembria, Anchialos and Sozopolis, with Francesco again in command of the naval forces. These attacks had the desired effect and John was allowed to travel safely through Bulgaria, while the captured ports were to be placed under Byzantine control. Francesco was involved in beating off a counter-attack on Sozopolis by a combined force of Bulgarians and Turks.⁵⁴

With the emperor back in his capital, the military activities of the expedition came to an end and Amadeo moved on to his diplomatic objectives. Negotiations at Constantinople, in which Francesco took part, secured a promise from John to make his submission to papal authority in person. Satisfied, Amadeo returned home.⁵⁵ In 1369 the emperor fulfilled his pledge, travelling to Rome and making a confession of faith which accepted the papal position on the matters at issue in the schism. This was a purely personal declaration which did not alter the position of the Orthodox Church in the empire, although it committed John to endeavour to bring his subjects into acceptance of the same doctrines. Among

⁵² Fine, pp. 377–82; Kunt, pp. 849–50; Imber, *Ottoman Empire 1300–1481*, pp. 28–9.

⁵³ Halecki, pp. 111–4; John W. Barker, *Manuel II Palaeologus (1391–1425): A Study in Late Byzantine Statesmanship* (New Brunswick, New Jersey 1969), pp. 6–7.

⁵⁴ Servion, vol. 2, pp. 141–9, 155–6; Cox, pp. 221–30; Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 1, pp. 301–5.

⁵⁵ Servion, vol. 2, pp. 151–3, 156–7; Bollati, p. 120 (no. 450); Aloysius L. Tautu, *Acta Urbani PP. V (1362–1370) e Regestis Vaticanis aliisque fontibus collegit* (Rome 1964), CICO 11, p. 211 (no. 131a); Halecki, pp. 149–62; Cox, pp. 232–5; Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 1, pp. 305–7.

the entourage accompanying the emperor was Francesco Gattilusio, who was one of the witnesses to his declaration of faith.⁵⁶

From Rome John proceeded to Venice, seeking to improve his parlous financial position. He sought the cancellation of the empire's accumulated debts to Venice, the return of the Byzantine crown jewels which had been deposited as security on the Venetian loans, an additional sum of cash and several ships, all in exchange for the cession of Tenedos. This island would provide Venice with a base from which its naval forces might regulate traffic through the Dardanelles. The negotiations were inconclusive and John became trapped in Venice, unable to pay the expenses which he had incurred during his stay in the city or to leave without paying. He finally returned home after a year on the lagoon, his son Manuel having provided the means to resolve his immediate financial embarrassment and secure a fresh loan, but with no settlement concluded over Tenedos.⁵⁷ Disillusioned with the prospects of help from the Latin West, John adopted a policy of placating the Ottomans, submitting to the payment of tribute to Murad I (1362–89).⁵⁸

The hold that Murad had gained over the emperor was dramatically illustrated a short time later. In 1373 John V faced a rebellion mounted by his eldest son and co-emperor Andronikos IV (1376–9), in conjunction with a simultaneous revolt against Murad by his son Saudži. In the wake of this insurrection's failure, Murad blinded his son and insisted that John do the same to Andronikos and his young son, the future Emperor John VII (1390). John V complied, although the deed was done in such a manner that his son and grandson partially retained or regained their sight. Andronikos was also imprisoned and replaced as co-emperor

⁵⁶ Spyridon P. Lampros, 'Αὐτοκρατόρων τοῦ Βυζαντίου χρυσόβουλλα καὶ χρυσὰ γράμματα ἀναφερόμενα εἰς τὴν ἔνωσιν τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν', *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 11 (1914), pp. 241–54 at pp. 249–53; Tautu, *Acta Urbani V*, pp. 287–90 (no. 168); Odoricus Raynaldus, *Annales Ecclesiastici ab anno quo desinit Caes. Card. Baronius MCXXXIV Continuati ab Odorico Raynaldo Tarvisino Congreg. Oratorii Presbytero*, 22 vols. (Cologne 1694–1727), vol. 16, pp. 478–9; Halecki, pp. 188–212; Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 1, pp. 312–4.

⁵⁷ Julian Chrysostomides, 'John V Palaeologus in Venice (1370–1371) and the Chronicle of Caroldo: a reinterpretation', *OCP* 31 (1965), pp. 76–84; *eadem*, 'Studies on the Chronicle of Caroldo, with special reference to the history of Byzantium from 1370 to 1377', *OCP* 35 (1969), pp. 123–82 at pp. 160–1; Raymond-Joseph Loenertz, 'Jean V Paléologue à Venise (1370–1371)', *REB* 16 (1958), pp. 217–32; Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 1, pp. 314–20; Barker, *Manuel*, pp. 10–3.

⁵⁸ Laonikos Chalkokondyles, *Laonici Chalcocondylae Historiarum Demonstrationes*, ed. Eugenius Darkó, 2 vols. (Budapest 1922–7), vol. 1, p. 34; George T. Dennis, *The Reign of Manuel II Palaeologus in Thessalonica, 1382–1387* (Rome 1960), *Orientalia Christiana Analecta* 159, pp. 32–7.

and his father's expected successor by his younger brother Manuel II (1391–1425).⁵⁹

The divisions within the Palaiologan dynasty offered fertile ground for manipulation by the Italian republics and the Ottomans. Despite the failure of the negotiations in Venice, the question of Tenedos was revived and in 1376 John V finally agreed terms for the sale of the island to Venice.⁶⁰ Naturally the Genoese were alarmed by the prospect of their main rival gaining a stranglehold on the trade route through the straits. Before the grant could be put into effect the Genoese of Pera helped Andronikos to escape, and with the aid of troops supplied by Murad he seized power in Constantinople and imprisoned John and Manuel in their turn. He was to remain in control until 1379, when John V was restored to power, and then to continue the struggle from Pera until 1381. On seizing power, Andronikos had repaid his supporters by restoring Gallipoli to the Ottomans and awarding Tenedos to Genoa, rescinding John's agreement with Venice. The Venetians succeeded in taking possession of Tenedos and the Genoese sought to assert their claim to the island by force, triggering a full-scale war.⁶¹

Unsurprisingly, given the proximity of Lesbos to Tenedos, Francesco Gattilusio became embroiled in this conflict, known as the War of Chioggia, on the side of his Genoese compatriots. He contributed a galley to the main Genoese fleet, commanded by Luciano Doria and later by Pietro Doria, which conducted the war's principal campaign.⁶² This force penetrated the upper Adriatic and established itself at Chioggia on the edge of the Venetian lagoon in 1379, attempting from there to subdue Venice itself. However, the Venetians were able to turn the tables on the Genoese, besieging them in Chioggia and forcing them to surrender

⁵⁹ Doukas, pp. 71–3; Schreiner, *Kleinchroniken*, vol. 1, p. 95 (no. 9/24–8); Raymond-Joseph Loenertz, 'La première insurrection d'Andronic IV Paléologue (1373)', *Echos d'Orient* 38 (1939), pp. 334–45; Barker, *Manuel*, pp. 18–23.

⁶⁰ Chrysostomides, 'Studies', pp. 148–53, 162–73; Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice*, pp. 309–12.

⁶¹ Daniele da Chinazzo, *Cronica de la guerra da Veneciani a Zenovesi*, ed. Vittorio Lazarini (Venice 1958), pp. 17–20; Rafaino Caresini, *Raphayni de Caresinis Cancellarii Venetiarum Cronica AA. 1343–1388*, ed. Ester Pastorello (Bologna 1922), *RIS* n.s. 12/2, pp. 32–3; Stella, pp. 169–70; Chrysostomides, 'Studies', pp. 153–9, 173–82; Barker, *Manuel*, pp. 24–36; Dennis, *Manuel*, pp. 37–46; Nevra Necipoğlu, *Byzantium between the Ottomans and the Latins: politics and society in the late empire* (Cambridge 2009), pp. 120–9.

⁶² Enrico Basso, 'I Gattilusio tra Genova e Bisanzio. Nuovi documenti d'archivio', *Chemins d'outre-mer: études d'histoire sur la Méditerranée médiévale offertes à Michel Balard*, ed. Damien Coulon, Catherine Otten-Froux, Paule Pagès and Dominique Valérian (Paris 2004), pp. 63–74 at p. 69.

in June 1380.⁶³ The war also impinged on the Gattilusio much closer to home: at the beginning of 1380 it was reported that Venetian forces in the Aegean had captured Old Phokaia, which may or may not have been under Gattilusio control at that time, and burned the suburbs of both Chios and Mytilene.⁶⁴ However, although Lesbos was the closest territory in Genoese hands to Tenedos, there is no evidence that it was used as a base for Genoese operations against the Venetian garrison of the island.

Despite the disaster at Chioggia, the Genoese were able to continue the war and it ended with a compromise peace agreement, concluded at Turin in August 1381. According to this treaty the fortifications of Tenedos were to be destroyed and the population resettled elsewhere, preventing either republic from using the island as a naval base against the other. The demilitarisation and depopulation of the island was to be carried out by representatives of Amadeo of Savoy, who had hosted the peace negotiations and was accepted by both sides as an honest broker.⁶⁵ In the meantime Genoese galleys from Chios, Pera and Mytilene were to keep watch on the island by Venetian consent.⁶⁶ However, the Venetian governor of Tenedos, Zanachi Mudazzo, refused to comply with his orders to implement the agreement.⁶⁷ In justifying this action to the metropolitan authorities Mudazzo claimed that the Genoese were plotting to seize the island once it had been abandoned, and that Francesco Gattilusio in particular was making preparations to refortify it and had sent an agent to suborn the inhabitants.⁶⁸ Under sustained diplomatic pressure from Genoa, Venice sent a fleet to coerce its governor, which was instructed to use Lesbos as a supply base. Eventually Mudazzo was induced to submit without violence and the destruction of the fortifications and evacuation of the population were accomplished.⁶⁹

⁶³ Chinazzo, pp. 30–136; Stella, pp. 170–81; Caresini, pp. 34–49.

⁶⁴ Francesco Bonaini, 'Regesto e documenti di storia perugina, ad illustrazione delle precedenti cronache, dall'anno 1223 all'anno 1540', *Archivio Storico Italiano* 16/2 (1851), pp. 477–630 at pp. 554–5; see below, pp. 407–10.

⁶⁵ Chinazzo, pp. 136–203; Stella, pp. 181–4; Caresini, pp. 49–58; Epstein, pp. 238–40; Lane, pp. 189–96.

⁶⁶ ASV, *SMisti* 37, ff. 32^v–3.

⁶⁷ ASV, *SMisti* 37, ff. 57–8, 63^v–4, 72; Chinazzo, pp. 223–7; Caresini, pp. 58–9; Freddy Thiriet, 'Venise et l'occupation de Tenedos au XIV^e siècle', *Mélanges de l'Ecole française de Rome* 65 (1953), pp. 219–45, reprinted in *Etudes sur la Romanie greco-vénitienne (X^e–XV^e siècles)* (London 1977), II, pp. 229–32.

⁶⁸ ASV, *Commemoriali* 8, ff. 56^v–8 (nos. 118–20).

⁶⁹ ASV, *SMisti* 37, ff. 73–4, 75^v–6, 77, 91, 93^v–5, 96, 98^v, 103–5, 106^{r-v}, 127^{r-v}, 130, *SMisti* 38, ff. 10^v, 16^v, 28^{r-v}, 29^v, 35^v, 36^v, 42^v–3^v; Francesco Surdich, *Genova e Venezia fra Tre e Quattrocento* (Genoa 1970), pp. 152–4 (nos. 5–7); Chinazzo, pp. 227–8; Caresini, pp. 60–2.

The Gattilusio do seem to have derived one significant benefit from the violent upheaval of these years. By 1382 the family had gained control of the port of Ainos, situated in Thrace at the mouth of the Maritza, under ambiguous circumstances.⁷⁰ Ainos had managed to survive as a Byzantine enclave as Ottoman power spread through its hinterland. According to Laonikos Chalkokondyles, writing almost a century later, the Gattilusio were invited to take charge by the local population, who were engaged in a dispute with their Byzantine governor during the empire's dynastic strife.⁷¹ The acquisition of this town seems to have caused significant friction between Francesco I and John V.⁷² By June 1384 Francesco's brother Niccolò I Gattilusio was installed there as lord.⁷³ At this point the Gattilusio possessions in the Aegean, hitherto a unitary lordship based on Lesbos, began to develop into a small cluster of islands and coastal enclaves, often entrusted to members of the family to rule as their own lordships. Ainos was to be the most prominent of these apart from the original lordship of Mytilene.

The year 1384 also saw the death of the founder of the family's fortunes. On 6 August an earthquake struck Mytilene, and Francesco was killed along with his two elder sons, Andronico and Domenico, in the collapse of the tower where they were sleeping. The lord's wife Maria Palaiologina had already died, in 1376/7.⁷⁴ The youngest son, Jacopo, was also caught in the fall of the tower but survived and succeeded to the position of lord of Mytilene. On his accession he took his father's name and reigned as Francesco II. Perhaps owing to his youth, his uncle Niccolò came to Lesbos and the government of the island was divided between them for some years, until a dispute resulted in Niccolò returning to his own lordship in Ainos.⁷⁵

⁷⁰ Catherine Asdracha, 'Inscriptions de la Thrace orientale et de l'île d'Imbros (XII^e–XV^{es}.)', *Αρχαιολογικόν Δελτίον* 43/1 (1988), pp. 251–86 at pp. 259–60 (no. 29), plate 111a.

⁷¹ Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, p. 269.

⁷² See below, pp. 100, 413–5.

⁷³ A. Luxuro and G. Pinelli-Gentile, 'Documenti riguardanti alcuni dinasti dell'Arcipelago, pubblicati per saggio di studi paleografici', *Giornale Ligustico di archeologia, storia e belle arti* 1 (1874), pp. 84–90, 217–221, vol. 2 (1875), pp. 86–93, 292–7, vol. 3 (1876), pp. 313–6, vol. 5 (1878), pp. 345–70 at vol. 1, pp. 86–7 (no. 3).

⁷⁴ Schreiner, *Kleinchroniken*, vol. 1, p. 96 (no. 9/35).

⁷⁵ Dennis, 'Short chronicle', pp. 5–6; Demetrios Kydones, *Démétrius Cydones Correspondance*, ed. Raymond-Joseph Loenertz, 2 vols. (Vatican 1956–60), vol. 2, pp. 190–2 (no. 273); Sagacius and Petrus de Gazata, *Chronicon Regiense ab Anno MCCLXXII usque ad MCCCXXXVIII*, ed. Ludovico A. Muratori (Milan 1731), *RIS* 18, p. 90.

Following the settlement of the Byzantine civil war, which saw Andronikos IV reinstated as John V's designated successor, the discontented Manuel II had established his own regime in the city of Thessalonike in 1382. From this base he campaigned against the Ottomans, whose power was continuing to expand across the eastern Balkans. In defiance of the submissive policy of his father, Manuel set about challenging their dominance, and managed to make some modest gains in Macedonia. The Ottomans responded by undertaking a long siege of Thessalonike. In 1387 the inhabitants' will to resist broke down and Manuel was forced to flee, while the city surrendered to Ottoman rule.⁷⁶ Besides facing the hostility of Murad I, who had assumed the title of sultan, Manuel's disobedience and the resultant loss of the second city of the empire had earned the wrath of his father and much of the Byzantine aristocracy.⁷⁷ Manuel and his retinue sought refuge on Lesbos, where they were refused access to the city of Mytilene but were able to camp on the island.⁷⁸ Later moving to the now uninhabited island of Tenedos, Manuel opened negotiations with Murad. He was eventually permitted to submit to the sultan in person and receive his pardon.⁷⁹

Manuel's misfortune stoked the continuing rivalries within the troubled Palaiologan dynasty. Having yet again rebelled against his father, Andronikos IV died in 1385, but his cause soon resurfaced in the person of his son, John VII.⁸⁰ In 1390 the young co-emperor seized power in Constantinople with Ottoman support, besieging his grandfather John V in the fortress at the city's Golden Gate. However, within months he was driven from the capital by Manuel, who ousted him with the help of troops provided by the Knights of St. John.⁸¹ During this last clash, John VII was assisted by one of his Gattilusio relatives, who continued to fight even

⁷⁶ Dennis, *Manuel*, pp. 57–159; Barker, *Manuel*, pp. 41–59.

⁷⁷ Dennis, *Manuel*, pp. 108–9, 112–3; Barker, *Manuel*, pp. 50, 57–8, 61, 63–5; Thierry Ganchou, 'Autour de Jean VII: luttes dynastiques, interventions étrangères et résistance orthodoxe à Byzance', *Coloniser au Moyen Âge*, ed. Michel Balard (Paris 1995), pp. 367–81 at pp. 374–5.

⁷⁸ Kydones, *Correspondance*, vol. 2, pp. 289–92 (no. 350); Manuel II Palaiologos, *Letters of Manuel II Palaeologus*, ed. George T. Dennis (Washington, D.C. 1977), *CFHB* 8, pp. 186–205 (no. 67); Chalkokondyles, vol. 1, p. 48; Dennis, *Manuel*, pp. 155–8; Barker, *Manuel*, pp. 59–61.

⁷⁹ Barker, *Manuel*, pp. 61–4.

⁸⁰ Necipoğlu, pp. 129–37; Ganchou, 'Autour de Jean VII', pp. 367–81; Dennis, *Manuel*, pp. 109–12; Barker, *Manuel*, pp. 50–2, 68–9.

⁸¹ Ignatios of Smolensk, 'Journey to Constantinople', ed. and tr. George P. Majeska, *Russian Travelers to Constantinople in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries* (Washington D.C. 1984), pp. 48–113 at pp. 100–3; Necipoğlu, pp. 131–7; Barker, *Manuel*, pp. 72–8; Georgios

after John himself had fled.⁸² This was probably Francesco II of Mytilene, who had a galley in the vicinity that summer and whose daughter at some point married John VII; the two men were to appear repeatedly as close allies in the years that followed.⁸³

The fate of Manuel's regime in Thessalonike was a harbinger of a dramatic acceleration of Ottoman expansion in the last years of Murad and under his successor Bayezid I (1389–1402). In 1389 a coalition of Serb princes was defeated at Kosovo, leading to the establishment of Ottoman hegemony over Serbia and expansion into Albania, while in 1393 Bayezid conquered Bulgaria.⁸⁴ Meanwhile in Asia, by about 1391 the Ottomans had acquired the emirates of Germiyan, Saruchan, Aydin, Mentеше, and Kastamonu, uniting most of western and north-central Anatolia, including its whole Aegean coast.⁸⁵ In 1394 Bayezid exploited this dominance by imposing an embargo on exports of grain from Anatolia to Christian territories.⁸⁶

This escalation of Ottoman aggression obliged the Gattilusio, like other rulers in the region, to take steps to stave off the threat to their position, whether by placating the Ottomans or making preparations to oppose them militarily, avenues which were not mutually exclusive. During the reign of Murad the Gattilusio are reported to have joined the Palaiologoi in becoming Ottoman tributaries, following Turkish attacks on Lesbos.⁸⁷ Meanwhile, in 1388 they became part of a league for mutual defence against the Turks, together with their Genoese neighbours on Chios, the Hospitallers of Rhodes and the Kingdom of Cyprus, later joined by the Genoese of Pera. This agreement, its duration set at ten years, committed

T. Kolias, 'Η ανταρσία 'Ιωάννου Ζ' Παλαιολόγου ἐναντίον 'Ιωάννου Ε' Παλαιολόγου (1390)', *Ελληνικά* 12 (1951), pp. 36–64.

⁸² Ignatios, p. 102–3.

⁸³ Spyridon P. Lampros, 'Ιωάννου Ζ' Παλαιολόγου ἐγχώρησις τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς βυζαντιακῆς αὐτοκρατορίας δικαιωμάτων εἰς τὸν βασιλέα τῆς Γαλλίας Κάρολον ζ'', *Νέος Ελληνομνήμων* 10 (1913), pp. 248–57 at pp. 248–51; ASG, *SGCanc* (Sala 34) 590/1304 (Pera Massaria 1390), f. 30^v; below, pp. 47–8, 51, 53–4, 242n37, 342–4.

⁸⁴ Fine, pp. 408–24; Imber, *Ottoman Empire 1300–1481*, pp. 35–6, 42–3.

⁸⁵ Kunt, pp. 850–6; Imber, *Ottoman Empire 1300–1481*, pp. 37–9.

⁸⁶ Doukas, p. 75; Hippolyte Noiret, *Documents inédits pour servir à l'histoire de la domination vénitienne en Crète, de 1380 à 1485* (Paris 1892), pp. 36, 46, 74, 110–1; Kate Fleet, 'Ottoman grain exports from western Anatolia at the end of the fourteenth century', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 40/3 (1997), pp. 283–94; Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, 'Prix et marchés des céréales en Roumanie (1343–1405)', *Nuova Rivista Storica* 61 (1977), pp. 291–305, reprinted in *Romania and the Turks (c. 1300–c. 1500)* (London 1985), IX, pp. 298–9.

⁸⁷ Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, p. 268.

the participants to assist one another if attacked and to contribute a galley each to a fleet to patrol against Turkish raiders.⁸⁸

While the Genoese in the East were drawing together for mutual defence, their compatriots in Genoa itself were descending into a bout of internal strife which was extreme even by the standards of a commune chronically afflicted by political instability. The upheaval began in 1390 when Doge Antoniotto Adorno was unseated and replaced by Jacopo Campofregoso, an early clash in a prolonged rivalry between two families which would dominate Genoese politics in the fifteenth century. More immediately, it was followed by a long string of violent changes of regime over the next few years, accompanied by revolts in Genoa's Ligurian hinterland.⁸⁹ The prevailing state of anarchy was exploited by acquisitive neighbours, Giangaleazzo Visconti of Milan and Louis, Duke of Orléans, brother of King Charles VI of France (1380–1422). In 1396 the Genoese, despairing of finding any resolution to their internal conflicts and under military pressure from outside, submitted to the sovereignty of the French king. Besides pre-empting the prospect of conquest by force, they hoped that an outside power would be able to provide them with the stable government which they seemed unable to maintain for themselves.⁹⁰ This decision marked a watershed in Genoese history. The city would spend more than half of the fifteenth century subject to a series of foreign sovereigns, their regimes interspersed with periods of independence.

French attention had also been drawn to the East, where the pace of Ottoman expansion was becoming impossible to ignore. In 1394 Bayezid had placed Constantinople under a siege which would continue until 1402.⁹¹ Meanwhile Ottoman incursions into Hungary brought the Turkish threat to the doorstep of the Latin West.⁹² The Christians of western Europe were sufficiently alarmed to mount a major crusade to turn back the Ottoman tide, launched in 1396. The main thrust of the crusade was delivered by a predominantly Hungarian and French army which advanced against the

⁸⁸ L. T. Belgrano, 'Prima serie di documenti riguardanti la Colonia di Pera', *ASLSP* 13 (1877–84), pp. 97–336 at p. 173 (no. 38); *idem* 'Seconda serie di documenti riguardanti la Colonia di Pera', *ibid.*, pp. 931–1003 at pp. 953–65 (no. 8). In the event of the Turks deploying a fleet of more than 25 vessels, each member was to contribute a second galley.

⁸⁹ Stella, pp. 194–215; Enrico Basso, 'Antoniotto Adorno e la dominazione francese', *Storia Illustrata di Genova*, ed. Luca Borzani, Geo Pistarino and Franco Ragazzi, 6 vols. (Milan 1993–5), vol. 2, pp. 289–304 at pp. 292–5.

⁹⁰ Stella, pp. 215–7; Eugène Jarry, *Les Origines de la Domination Française à Gênes (1392–1402)* (Paris 1896), pp. 1–221, 438–544 (nos. 12–27).

⁹¹ Barker, *Manuel*, pp. 123–8, 139–49, 154, 200–18; Necipoğlu, pp. 149–83.

⁹² Imber, *Ottoman Empire 1300–1481*, pp. 44–5.

Ottomans on the Danube.⁹³ Meanwhile a modest fleet was assembled to provide naval support. Although the largest contingent was Venetian, the Gattilusio also contributed to it, as did their league partners on Chios and Rhodes.⁹⁴ Francesco II commanded his forces in person. In June 1396 he was in the waters of the Golden Horn when the Genoese authorities in Pera formally demanded that he fulfil his obligations under the league agreement by acting against Ottoman troops who were attacking Pera, a demand solemnised in a notarial act drafted on the deck of Francesco's galley. The lord of Mytilene had apparently been reluctant to become involved in the fighting, and agreed to attack only on condition that the garrison of Pera also mounted a sortie.⁹⁵

The main crusading expedition came to grief in the disastrous defeat at Nikopolis in September 1396. Many of its leaders were captured, including John the Fearless, Count of Nevers and son of the Duke of Burgundy, and the Marshal of France Jean le Meingre, commonly known as Boucicault.⁹⁶ Mytilene became a base of operations for those visiting the prisoners or organising succour, while the Gattilusio lords themselves took a leading role in assisting the prisoners, putting huge sums of money at their disposal. They sent food and clothing to the captives, lent them money to cover their expenses and petitioned Bayezid for compassionate treatment of a sick prisoner.⁹⁷ Finally they pledged to advance fully three quarters of the 200,000 ducats demanded by Bayezid for the ransom of the

⁹³ Aziz S. Atiya, *The Crusade of Nicopolis* (London 1934), pp. 33–65; Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 1, pp. 341–8; Joseph Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient au XIV^e siècle: Expéditions de Marechal Boucicaut*, 2 vols. (Paris 1886), vol. 1, pp. 227–50.

⁹⁴ Sime Ljubic, *Monumenta spectantia historiam slavorum meridionalium*, 6 vols. (Zagreb 1874), vol. 4, pp. 378 (no. 521); Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 1, pp. 343–7.

⁹⁵ Belgrano, 'Seconda serie', pp. 965–7 (no. 9).

⁹⁶ Atiya, *Nicopolis*, pp. 66–97; Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 1, pp. 348–56; Delaville, *France en Orient*, vol. 1, pp. 250–99; Jim Magee, 'Le temps de la croisade bourguignonne: l'expédition de Nicopolis', *Nicopolis 1396–1996: Actes du Colloque international organisé par l'Académie des sciences, arts et belles-lettres de Dijon et le Centre national de la recherche scientifique réuni à Dijon, au Conseil régional de Bourgogne, le 18 octobre 1996*, ed. Jacques Paviot and Martine Chauneu-Bouillot (Dijon: Centre d'Etudes Bourguignonnes 1997) (*Annales de Bourgogne* 68/3 (1996)), pp. 49–58; Bertrand Schnerb, 'Le contingent franco-bourguignon à la croisade de Nicopolis', *ibid.*, pp. 59–74; Jean Richard, 'Les prisonniers de Nicopolis', *ibid.*, pp. 75–83.

⁹⁷ ADN, B1279, no. 13670; Jean Froissart, *Oeuvres de Froissart*, ed. Joseph M. B. C. Kervyn de Lettenhove, 29 vols. (Brussels 1870), vol. 15, pp. 345, 347, vol. 16, p. 38; Delaville, *France en Orient*, vol. 2, p. 33 (no. 9); Prosper Bauyn, *Mémoire du voyage fait en Hongrie par Jean, dit Sans-Peur, Comte de Nevers*, MS Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris, *Collection de Bourgogne*, no. 20, ff. 339–67 at ff. 351^{r-v}.

captive leaders.⁹⁸ Once they had been released the prisoners travelled to Mytilene, where they were entertained by Francesco II before continuing their journey to the West.⁹⁹ While they were there, Francesco approached them with a proposal from his son-in-law John VII, who had appointed Francesco as his representative in the matter. John, frustrated in his ambition to secure the imperial throne, now hoped to cash in his claim by selling it to Charles VI. He made this offer on condition that the king or a prince of his blood should lead an army against the Turks, and required in exchange an annual income of 25,000 florins and a castle in France for his residence. Francesco asked his distinguished guests to put forward this offer to their sovereign.¹⁰⁰ In the event the French king evidently did not take up the proposal.

The Gattilusio lords' connections with the French, and with Marshal Boucicault in particular, were to be of continuing importance to them over the following years. In summer 1399 Boucicault, an inveterate crusading enthusiast, led a small expedition to assist the defenders of Constantinople against the Ottomans, using ships fitted out in Genoa.¹⁰¹ Arriving in the Aegean, Boucicault visited his former hosts at Mytilene and Francesco II Gattilusio provided a galliot to supplement his forces. However, with what must have been considerable embarrassment Francesco also informed his guest that he had notified the sultan of the approach of his expedition, fulfilling an obligation placed on him as an Ottoman tributary.¹⁰² Boucicault's force provided some minor relief to the beleaguered capital, and helped to bring about Manuel II's decision to travel to the West to seek more substantial help in person. To pave the way for this mission, Boucicault managed to negotiate a reconciliation between Manuel and his nephew John VII, who was left in charge in Constantinople in the senior emperor's absence.¹⁰³ Manuel would continue to pursue his diplomatic efforts in

⁹⁸ ADN, B1277, no. 13670; Froissart, vol. 16, pp. 39–40, 261–3; Denis Lalande (ed.), *Le livre des fais du bon Messire Jehan le Maingre, dit Bouciquaut, Mareschal de France et Gouverneur de Jennes* (Geneva 1985), pp. 122–3; Delaville, *France en Orient*, vol. 2, pp. 33–5, 43–5, 47–8, 91–3 (nos. 9–10, 14, 16, 23); Doukas, p. 81.

⁹⁹ Froissart, vol. 16, pp. 48–50; Lalande, p. 127; ASV, *Commemoriali* 9, f. 34^v (no. 64); Bauyn, ff. 357–8.

¹⁰⁰ Lampros, 'Ιωάννου', pp. 248–51.

¹⁰¹ Lalande, pp. 132–47; Delaville, *France en Orient*, vol. 1, pp. 359–68; Barker, *Manuel*, pp. 161–3.

¹⁰² Lalande, pp. 135–6, 138.

¹⁰³ Delaville, *France en Orient*, vol. 1, pp. 369–79; Barker, *Manuel*, pp. 163–5.

Italy, France and England until 1403, but despite widespread sympathy for his plight, no significant help was forthcoming.¹⁰⁴

From the Battle of Ankara to the Fall of Constantinople

The increasingly desperate situation of Byzantium and of the Christian East in general was abruptly transformed by the Battle of Ankara in July 1402, where Bayezid came to grief against the Mongol warlord Timur. From his base at Samarkand in Central Asia, Timur had already conquered much of the Middle East, and incursions into Anatolia prompted Bayezid to lead an army to halt his attacks. Some of the Anatolian emirs whose lands had recently been conquered by the Ottomans accompanied Timur's army, and loyalty to them encouraged many of Bayezid's Turkish troops to defect, along with a Mongol contingent. In the ensuing rout Bayezid was taken prisoner, and would die in captivity. Timur's forces advanced through Anatolia, restoring the Turkish emirs to power in their former territories. These included the emirates of Saruchan, Aydin and Menteshe along the Aegean coast.¹⁰⁵

During this triumphal progress, Timur received emissaries from the two Phokaiaes with offers of submission from the Mahona of Chios and from Francesco II of Mytilene.¹⁰⁶ At some point after 1363 the Gattilusio had acquired Old Phokaia under uncertain circumstances, while New Phokaia was still governed under the authority of Genoa and the Mahona.¹⁰⁷ Along with his Genoese neighbours Francesco now sought to deflect Mongol hostility from his territory, and succeeded in securing a peace agreement. When a force led by Timur's grandson subsequently approached Phokaia, Francesco travelled from Lesbos for a meeting in person, and a sceptre or standard was symbolically bestowed on him.¹⁰⁸ A new hegemon seemed to have replaced Ottoman supremacy in Anatolia, but Timur's armies soon withdrew from the region, leaving the newly restored emirs to govern on

¹⁰⁴ Barker, *Manuel*, pp. 165–99.

¹⁰⁵ Sheref ed-Din, *Histoire de Timurbec, connu sous le nom du grand Tamerlan, empereur des Mogoles et Tartares: en forme de journal historique de ses victoires et conquêtes dans l'Asie et dans l'Europe*, tr. Petit de la Croix, 4 vols. (Paris 1722), vol. 4, pp. 1–82; Maria M. Alexandrescu-Dersca, *La Campagne de Timour en Anatolie (1402)* (Bucharest 1942, reprinted London 1977), pp. 54–96; Imber, *Ottoman Empire 1300–1481*, pp. 52–6, 62–4.

¹⁰⁶ Doukas, pp. 107–9; Sheref ed-Din, vol. 4, pp. 56–7; Alexandrescu-Dersca, pp. 90, 138 (no. 6); below, pp. 377–8.

¹⁰⁷ See below, pp. 407–10.

¹⁰⁸ Doukas, pp. 107–9.

his behalf. The Ottomans were able to retain control of much of northern Anatolia, and with their European possessions safe from Mongol attack they would ultimately be able to recover even from such a catastrophic blow.¹⁰⁹

For the time being, however, they had further troubles ahead, and their neighbours an interlude of relief. As well as depriving the Ottomans of much of their territory in Asia, the disaster at Ankara led to civil war for control of their remaining possessions on both continents, as Bayezid's sons struggled for the succession. One of them, Suleiman (1402–11), was able to take control of all Ottoman territory in Europe. He sought to gain a free hand for the contest with his brothers by making peace with the Christian powers. Early in 1403 a treaty was concluded with Byzantium, Venice, Genoa, the Duke of the Archipelago, the Mahona of Chios and the Order of St. John, by which Suleiman made territorial concessions and dissolved tribute obligations in exchange for peace. Among the territories handed over was Thessalonike, which was restored to Byzantine control.¹¹⁰

With the siege of Constantinople abandoned and the Ottoman threat lifted for the present, Manuel II brought an end to his mission in the West and returned to his capital, where fresh ructions between him and John VII soon erupted. Manuel had supposedly promised John Thessalonike as a territory to govern for himself, but owing to his dissatisfaction with his nephew's conduct during his long absence, he subsequently cancelled this arrangement and exiled John to Lemnos.¹¹¹ John now planned to secure control of Thessalonike by force. He went to Lesbos and once again enlisted the help of his father-in-law Francesco II of Mytilene. In the autumn of 1403 Francesco assembled a flotilla and set off to Lemnos in preparation for the proposed attack on Thessalonike, but this ultimately seems not to have taken place.¹¹² A rapprochement was soon achieved

¹⁰⁹ Alexandrescu-Dersca, pp. 91–6; Dimitris J. Kastritsis, *The Sons of Bayezid: empire building and representation in the Ottoman civil war of 1402–1413* (Leiden and Boston 2007), pp. 41–50; Kunt, pp. 858–63.

¹¹⁰ Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, 'Süleyman çelevi in Rumili and the Ottoman chronicles', *Der Islam: Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur des islamischen Orients* 60/2 (1983), pp. 268–96; George T. Dennis, 'The Byzantine-Turkish treaty of 1403', *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 33 (1967), pp. 72–87, reprinted in *Byzantium and the Franks 1350–1420* (London 1982), VI; Kastritsis, pp. 50–9; Barker, *Manuel*, pp. 222–8.

¹¹¹ Doukas, p. 111; Barker, *Manuel*, pp. 238–42.

¹¹² Ruy Gonzales de Clavijo, *Embajada a Tamorlán*, ed. Francesco López Estrada (Madrid 1943), pp. 25–8; Barker, *Manuel*, pp. 242–5. This force consisted of two galleys and five galliots.

between Manuel and his nephew, and John was able to establish himself in Thessalonike with his uncle's consent. He would rule there apparently peaceably until his death in 1408, and he left no heir.¹¹³ This reconciliation effectively ended the recurrent conflict pitting Andronikos IV and John VII against John V and Manuel II, which had afflicted the empire for thirty years and had embroiled the Gattilusio in strife with the reigning emperor.

The summer and autumn of 1403 also saw the return of the irrepressible Boucicault to the East at the head of a fresh expedition. In 1401 Charles VI had appointed him governor of Genoa, where unlike the previous French governors he imposed his authority with a stringency to which the city was wholly unaccustomed.¹¹⁴ He took personal command of a Genoese fleet dispatched against King Janus of Cyprus (1398–1432), who had attempted to regain control of the port of Famagusta, which the Genoese had acquired by force in 1373.¹¹⁵ While taking this action in defence of Genoese interests, Boucicault also planned to put the fleet to use in pursuit of his personal preoccupation of war against the infidel. When he arrived in the Aegean Francesco of Mytilene and Niccolò of Ainos each provided him with reinforcements.¹¹⁶ In the event no fighting was required against the King of Cyprus, who capitulated in the face of the Genoese threat and made peace. Boucicault was able to launch his campaign against the Muslims, sacking the Turkish port of Alanya in southern Anatolia and then mounting a series of raids against Syrian ports controlled by the Mamluks of Egypt, sacking Botron and Beirut but being thwarted elsewhere.¹¹⁷

As Boucicault began his voyage home, the preparations for Francesco II and John VII's planned attack on Thessalonike were underway, and Francesco sent a galliot to intercept Boucicault at Rhodes and try to

¹¹³ Barker, *Manuel*, pp. 242–5.

¹¹⁴ Stella, pp. 252–7; Lalande, pp. 188–99; Jarry, pp. 352–65, 590–1 (no. 42); Basso, 'Antoniotto', pp. 296–300; Giovanna Petti Balbi, 'Tra dogato e principato: il Tre e il Quattrocento', *Storia di Genova: Mediterraneo, Europa, Atlantico*, ed. Dino Puncuh (Genoa 2003), pp. 233–324 at pp. 279–82.

¹¹⁵ Stella, pp. 165–8; Epstein, pp. 236–7; Francesco Surdich, 'Genova e Venezia fra Tre e Quattrocento', *ASLSP* 7 (1967), vol. 2, pp. 205–327 at pp. 242–9.

¹¹⁶ Lalande, p. 219; Antonio Morosini, *Il Codice Morosini: il mondo visto da Venezia (1094–1433)*, ed. Andrea Nanetti (Spoleto 2010), p. 204. The two Gattilusio lords contributed one galley and one galliot each.

¹¹⁷ Lalande, pp. 206–52; Morosini, pp. 204–11; Stella, pp. 263–6; Delaville, *France en Orient*, vol. 1, pp. 421–46; Surdich, 'Genova', pp. 249–62; Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 1, pp. 382–8; Eliyahu Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages* (Princeton 1983), pp. 216–21.

convince him to join the endeavour.¹¹⁸ In the event the Genoese fleet had already departed for the West when this vessel arrived at Rhodes. As he passed the Peloponnese, Boucicault was attacked off Modon by the Venetians, who had followed his expedition with acute suspicion and had been infuriated by the pillaging of goods belonging to Venetian merchants at Beirut. A number of Genoese galleys were captured, leading to conflict between Genoa and Venice and a protracted legal dispute.¹¹⁹ The Gattilusio vessels had left the fleet shortly before it reached Modon and were therefore not embroiled in these events.¹²⁰ The family's representatives and property would however fall victim to the recriminations that followed, as Venetians and Genoese arrested one another's citizens and seized ships and goods.¹²¹

Francesco II Gattilusio died shortly afterwards, in October 1403. His death was apparently the result of an improbable accident: during an overnight stop on a hunting expedition he was stung by a scorpion and his cry of pain brought his entourage crowding into the room in such numbers that the floor collapsed under their weight.¹²² Since his eldest son Jacopo was still underage, Niccolò of Ainos once again took charge on Lesbos, governing as regent on Jacopo's behalf until the latter came of age five years later. In 1408, around the time that the regency came to an end, Boucicault's efforts to reform the administration and exploitation of Genoese possessions overseas provoked the Mahona of Chios to an uprising against metropolitan authority. This was suppressed the following year by a fleet sent out from Genoa, and Niccolò apparently travelled to Chios to meet its commander.¹²³ However, the accumulation

¹¹⁸ Clavijo, p. 28.

¹¹⁹ Lalande, pp. 253–91; Stella, pp. 266–71; Delaville, *France en Orient*, vol. 1, pp. 447–504, vol. 2, pp. 111–223 (nos. 26–39); Morosini, pp. 211–25, 229, 242–3, 245, 266–7, 328–9, 366–7; Surdich, *Genova*, pp. 55–141, 175–296 (nos. 17–45); *idem*, 'Genova', pp. 262–327; Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 1, pp. 388–400.

¹²⁰ Lalande, p. 282.

¹²¹ Delaville, *France en Orient*, vol. 1, pp. 484–5, vol. 2, p. 189 (no. 37).

¹²² Dennis, 'Short chronicle', p. 6; Cristoforo Buondelmonti, *Christoph. Buondelmontii, Florentini, Liber Insularum Archipelagi*, ed. G. R. L. de Sinner (Leipzig and Berlin 1824), pp. 114–6. The chronological problem discussed by Dennis ('Short chronicle', pp. 18–9) is resolved by a Hospitaller document of 14 August 1404 which names Jacopo as lord of Mytilene, indicating that Francesco II died in October 1403, not 1404. Anthony Luttrell and Elizabeth Zachariadou, *Sources for Turkish History from the Hospitallers' Rhodian Archive/Πηγές για την Τουρκική Ιστορία στα Αρχεία των Ιπποτών της Ρόδου* (Athens 2008), p. 133 (no. 7).

¹²³ Argenti, vol. 1, pp. 155–65; Enrico Basso, 'De Boucicault à Francesco Sforza: persistence et changements dans la politique orientale des seigneurs étrangers de Gênes au

of discontents with Boucicault's government soon brought on rebellion in Genoa itself and the overthrow of French rule later in 1409.¹²⁴ Having relinquished his position on Lesbos, Niccolò returned to Ainos, and by July 1411 he was dead.¹²⁵ Since he left no sons he was succeeded by Jacopo, who for a few years ruled both lordships. When Francesco II's youngest son Palamede came of age he became lord of Ainos, while Francesco's second son Dorino I ruled as lord of Old Phokaia.¹²⁶

The enterprises of Boucicault and John VII in 1403 were the first of a series of military escapades in which the Gattilusio lords became involved in the years of relative security afforded by the Ottomans' preoccupation with their civil war. These outbreaks of more substantial violence took place against a backdrop of involvement in the routine low-level violence of piracy. Acts of piracy carried out by subjects of the Gattilusio lords or by vessels operating from their territory, and the complaints and reprisals of governments whose subjects were their victims, were a perennial feature of their rule in the Aegean. The active retaliation of the aggrieved party was usually confined to the arrest of merchants trading in their own territory and the seizure of their property.¹²⁷ However, in the early fifteenth century the response to attacks on Catalan shipping by pirates based on Lesbos, most notably the Basque Pedro de Larraondo, took a more drastic form. After failed attempts to gain redress diplomatically and abortive naval preparations in 1407, King Martin I of Aragon (1396–1410) dispatched a squadron in 1411 to enact reprisals. For some reason, rather than target Lesbos the Catalans instead struck at Chios, bombarding the island before sailing eastwards, where they succeeded in capturing Larraondo. He was handed over to the Mamluks of Egypt, whose subjects had also suffered at his hands. The Mahona of Chios swiftly armed ships to pursue them, and Jacopo of Mytilene added a galley to this force. They caught up with

XV^e siècle', *Le Partage du Monde: Échanges et Colonisation dans la Méditerranée Médiévale*, ed. Michel Balard and Alain Ducellier (Paris 1998), pp. 63–77 at pp. 65–6; *idem*, 'Note su tre documenti inediti e una presunta lettera di Niccolò I Gattilusio, signore di Enos', *Λεσβιακά* 20 (2004), pp. 338–53 at pp. 342–8, 351–2 (no. 3); below, p. 170n150.

¹²⁴ Stella, pp. 288–93; Basso, 'Antoniotto', pp. 300–2; Petti Balbi, pp. 281–2.

¹²⁵ Dennis, 'Short chronicle', pp. 6–7; Basso, 'Note', pp. 344–7, 351–2 (no. 3).

¹²⁶ Dennis, 'Short chronicle', p. 7; below, pp. 189–91.

¹²⁷ See below, pp. 240–3.

the Catalans at Alexandria, and in the ensuing fighting managed to burn or capture most of their ships.¹²⁸

In 1413 Centurione Zaccaria, the Genoese Prince of Achaia in the Peloponnese, approached the Genoese of Chios and Jacopo of Mytilene for naval support in his war with Carlo Tocco, ruler of the Ionian islands and of parts of Epiros, who had previously seized parts of Centurione's territory.¹²⁹ The Venetian government, informed that this request had been favourably received, anticipated the involvement of raiding craft from Chios and Ainos and hoped to convince them to withdraw without bloodshed.¹³⁰ It is not clear whether or not Gattilusio forces actually became involved in this conflict, but if they did they were presumably embroiled in the defeat of Centurione's naval offensive in 1414, in a battle in which the Tocco ships were joined by Venetian forces.¹³¹

An enigmatic incident also brought at least one member of the Gattilusio family into conflict with the Emperor Manuel II once more. In the summer of 1414 Manuel sailed to Thasos and spent three months subduing a revolt.¹³² While besieging a fortification on the island, Manuel wrote a letter reprimanding its commander, Giorgio Gattilusio, and encouraging him to surrender.¹³³ This Giorgio was perhaps Francesco II's illegitimate son of

¹²⁸ Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, 'Pedro de Larraondo, un corsario Vizcaíno en el Mediterráneo oriental (1405–11)', *Corsarios Castellanos y Vascos en el Mediterráneo Medieval* (Barcelona 2000), pp. 243–331 at pp. 260–81, 284–93, 297–300, 303–4, 306–8, 309–12, 326–31 (nos. 3, 6, 9, 12–15, 27–8); *eadem*, 'Una flotta catalana contro i corsari nel Levante (1406–1409)', *Oriente e Occidente tra Medioevo ed Eta Moderna: studi in onore di Geo Pistarino*, ed. Laura Balletto (Genoa 1997), pp. 325–55; *eadem*, 'Incidència del cors en les relacions catalanes amb l'Orient (segles XIII–XV)', *Els catalans a la Mediterrània oriental a l'edat mitjana* (Barcelona 2003), pp. 259–307 at pp. 285–99; Stella, pp. 304–6.

¹²⁹ Josephi Valentini, *Acta Albaniae Veneta: saeculorum XIV et XV*, 25 vols. (Rome 1967–79), vol. 7, pp. 69–71 (no. 1821); Antoine Bon, *La Morée Franque: recherches historiques, topographiques et archéologiques sur la Principauté d'Achaïe (1205–1430)* (Paris 1969), pp. 283–4.

¹³⁰ Valentini, *Acta*, vol. 7, pp. 74–6 (no. 1823).

¹³¹ Giuseppe Schirò (ed.), *Cronaca dei Tocco di Cefalonia di Anonimo* (Rome 1975), *CFHB* 10, p. 354–9.

¹³² Mazaris, *Journey to Hades: or interviews with dead men about certain officials of the imperial court*, ed. John Barry, Michael Share, Andrew Smithies and Leendert Westerink (Buffalo 1975), p. 80; George Sphrantzes, *Georgii Sphrantzae Chronicon*, ed. Riccardo Maisano (Rome 1990), *CFHB* 29, pp. 8–9; Constantin Marinescu, 'Manuel II Paléologue et les rois d'Aragon: commentaire sur quatre lettres inédites en Latin, expédiées par la chancellerie byzantine', *Academie Roumaine, Bulletin de la Section Historique* 11 (1924), pp. 192–206 at pp. 200–1 (no. 2).

¹³³ Manuel II, *Letters*, pp. 164–5 (no. 58).

that name.¹³⁴ The implications of this episode for the relations between the Gattilusio lords and Byzantium during this period are ambiguous.¹³⁵

During these years the Ottomans remained embroiled in their civil war and their affairs seem to have impinged little on those of the Gattilusio lordships. However, in 1413 the Ottoman state was reunited under the rule of Mehmed I (1413–21), and the threat it posed to its neighbours began to revive.¹³⁶ An early target of such attention was the Turkish warlord Juneid of Smyrna, whose wars with the Ottomans drew in the Christian rulers of the islands along the Anatolian littoral. The son of the *subaşı* (governor) who had administered the province of Smyrna on behalf of Bayezid, Juneid had emerged victorious from a power struggle with the Aydin emirs restored by Timur after the Battle of Ankara.¹³⁷ He was subsequently overthrown by the Ottoman prince Suleiman, who transferred him to a governmental post in Europe, but he soon took advantage of the continuing Ottoman civil war to return to power in the Aydin territory and its ports of Smyrna and Ephesos, then commonly known as Theologo or Altologo.¹³⁸ After reuniting the surviving Ottoman territories, Mehmed was able to set about retrieving the lost lands in Anatolia, advancing against Juneid in 1415. Having besieged his enemy in Smyrna, the Ottoman sultan was soon approached both by the neighbouring Turkish emirs of Monteshe and Germiyan and by the Christian rulers of the Anatolian littoral, all wishing to pay their respects and offer their help in his campaign. These included the Gattilusio of Mytilene and Old Phokaia as well as their Genoese neighbours from Chios and New Phokaia and even the

¹³⁴ Francesco's son Giorgio had been sent on a diplomatic mission to Burgundy in 1397. He remained there for about a year and a half as an equerry in the duke's service, before returning to his father. (ADCO, B1519, f. 134^v; B5518, f. 103; Bauyn, ff. 357^v–8). Ganchou has argued that Bauyn was mistaken and that Giorgio's father was actually Francesco I, but the original Burgundian documents confirm Bauyn's identification. Thierry Ganchou, 'Valentina Doria, épouse de Francesco II Gattilusio seigneur de l'isle de Mytilène (1384–1403), et sa parenté. Le Lesbian puzzle résolu', *Nuova Rivista Storica* 88 (2004), pp. 619–86 at pp. 675–6.

¹³⁵ See below, p. 101.

¹³⁶ Doukas, pp. 131–3; Chalkokondyles, vol. 1, pp. 167–72; Aşıkpaşazade, *Vom Hirtenzelt zur Hohen Pforte: Frühzeit und Aufstieg des Osmanenreiches nach der Chronik "Denkwürdigkeiten und Zeitläufte des Hauses 'Osman" vom Derwisch Ahmed, genannt 'Asik-Pasa-Sohn*, tr. Richard F. Kreutel (Graz 1959) pp. 121–2; Kastritsis, pp. 179–94; Imber, *Ottoman Empire 1300–1481*, pp. 70–9.

¹³⁷ Doukas, pp. 113–7; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 84–6, 116; Kastritsis, pp. 49–50.

¹³⁸ Doukas, pp. 117–23, 133; Kastritsis, pp. 118–20, 144–5, 151, 183–4; Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, pp. 86–7; Imber, *Ottoman Empire 1300–1481*, pp. 65–7.

Grand Master of the Hospitallers.¹³⁹ As well as acclaiming the sultan and securing his approval for various requests, the Christian rulers provided active naval support which helped Mehmed bring the siege of Smyrna to a swift conclusion. Juneid surrendered and was once again installed as an Ottoman provincial governor in Europe.¹⁴⁰

However, in 1416 Mehmed's brother Mustafa, or an imposter claiming to be that prince, raised a revolt against Mehmed in Europe, and Juneid soon joined forces with him. Defeated, they fled to Thessalonike and received asylum from Byzantium.¹⁴¹ Mehmed's death in 1421 seemed to create an opportunity for Christian rulers to create fresh dissension among the Ottomans. The Byzantine government sought to capitalise on this by releasing Mustafa and Juneid, setting them against Mehmed's successor Murad II (1421–51).¹⁴² The rebels enjoyed initial success, occupying Gallipoli and depriving Murad of ships with which to cross to Europe oppose them.¹⁴³ They crossed over to Asia themselves to confront Murad, but Juneid was persuaded to abandon his ally and resume his rule over his former territories as Murad's tributary. He slipped away from the army and returned once more to his native region, where he overthrew a prince of the Aydin dynasty who had managed to regain his family's emirate.¹⁴⁴ Juneid also managed to expand into the territory of Monteshe, acquiring its principal port of Palatia (Miletus), but he did not long enjoy his renewed power.¹⁴⁵ Murad soon crushed Mustafa, having crossed to Europe on ships supplied by Giovanni Adorno, the Genoese *podestà* and alum concession holder of New Phokaia.¹⁴⁶ In 1424 he sent an army against Juneid, which besieged him in the coastal fortress of Hypsele. The Ottomans were unable to overcome the landward defences without maritime support, but once again the Genoese came to their aid. Murad's army was supplied with ships by his acquaintance Percivale Pallavicini, while the Venetians heard

¹³⁹ The latter was in Smyrna supervising the construction, in defiance of Juneid, of a fortress on the harbour, intended to replace the one captured by the crusaders in 1344, which had been destroyed by Timur in 1402.

¹⁴⁰ Doukas, pp. 141–9; Imber, *Ottoman Empire 1300–1481*, pp. 78–9.

¹⁴¹ Doukas, pp. 155–61; Chalkokondyles, vol. 1, pp. 190–2; Barker, *Manuel*, pp. 340–4.

¹⁴² Doukas, pp. 173–5; Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, pp. 1–4; Barker, *Manuel*, pp. 353–7.

¹⁴³ Doukas, pp. 181–201; Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, p. 4; Imber, *Ottoman Empire 1300–1481*, pp. 91–3.

¹⁴⁴ Doukas, pp. 211–23; Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, pp. 4–6; Imber, *Ottoman Empire 1300–1481*, p. 93.

¹⁴⁵ ASV, DC 1/11 (*Ducali* 1424–6), ff. 51, 74.

¹⁴⁶ ASV, DC 1/9 (*Diversorum Locorum* 1420–2), ff. 5^v, 12^v; Doukas, pp. 209–11, 223–9; Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, pp. 6–7; Imber, *Ottoman Empire 1300–1481*, pp. 93–4.

that both Jacopo of Mytilene and the Mahona of Chios had also provided forces to assist the siege.¹⁴⁷ Juneid surrendered and was executed, his skill in extricating himself from the consequences of defeat by the Ottomans failing him at last.¹⁴⁸ When Murad himself crossed to Asia in the wake of this victory he, like Mehmed, received acclamations and negotiated treaties with Mytilene, Chios and Rhodes.¹⁴⁹ The continental hinterlands of the Gattilusio lordships were now once again united under Ottoman rule, a situation which would this time prove permanent.

As the Ottoman dominance shaken by Timur was reasserted, there was a recurrence of another old pattern: conflict between Venice and Genoa. However, the nature of the clash illustrated the extent to which Genoa's fortunes had changed since the War of Chioggia. This time the source of conflict was not the commercial rivalry between the two maritime cities but the power-struggle in Lombardy between Venice and Milan. In 1421 Genoa, under concerted attack from Milan and Aragon with the aid of Genoese rebels, had again submitted to a foreign ruler, the Duke of Milan Filippo Maria Visconti.¹⁵⁰ It thus became implicated in policies shaped by the priorities of another state, and was unable to avoid being drawn into Visconti's war with Venice in 1431. The Genoese commune, a reluctant participant in this conflict and afflicted by deepening financial debility, was slow to take effective steps for the defence of its overseas territories and citizens. The Venetians landed troops on Chios and laid siege to the island's capital in November 1431, while in Genoa relief forces were slowly gathered.¹⁵¹ By this time the lord of Mytilene was Dorino I Gattilusio, formerly lord of Old Phokaia, who had succeeded to the senior lordship on the death of his brother Jacopo some years earlier.¹⁵² He initially held aloof from the struggle, prompting Venetian inquiries as to whether he

¹⁴⁷ ASV, DC 1/12 (*Diversorum Locorum* 1424), f. 11; Doukas, pp. 237–45; Valentini, *Acta*, vol. 12, pp. 136–8 (no. 2958). The Venetians, who were at war with Murad, sent a fleet to extricate Juneid if possible and to try to persuade the Genoese to abandon the siege; failing that, they were to be treated as enemies.

¹⁴⁸ Doukas, p. 245; V. L. Ménage, 'The Annals of Murad II', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 39 (1976), pp. 570–84 at p. 574; Imber, *Ottoman Empire 1300–1481*, pp. 98–100.

¹⁴⁹ Doukas, pp. 245–7.

¹⁵⁰ Stella, pp. 340–51; Enrico Basso, 'Tommaso Campofregoso e la dominazione milanese', *Storia Illustrata di Genova*, ed. Luca Borzani, Geo Pistarino and Franco Ragazzi, 6 vols. (Milan 1993–5), vol. 2, pp. 321–36 at pp. 326–30.

¹⁵¹ Stella, pp. 370–4; Morosini, pp. 1540, 1551, 1553, 1568–70, 1574–7, 1579–80; Agostino Giustiniani, *Annali della Repubblica di Genova*, ed. C. G. B. Spotorno, 2 vols. (Genoa 1854), vol. 2, pp. 318–22; Argenti, vol. 1, pp. 174–87.

¹⁵² See below, p. 190n7.

wished to remain neutral. Despite these uncertainties, Dorino did eventually join forces with his compatriots.¹⁵³ The siege of Chios was abandoned in January 1432, long before the main Genoese fleet set out.¹⁵⁴ When it finally reached the Aegean in the summer Dorino's galley may have joined in its subsequent activities, which included pillaging the islands of Naxos and Andros, possessions of Dorino's relative by marriage, Jacopo II Crispo, Duke of the Archipelago.¹⁵⁵ The war came to an end the following year, but Gattilusio involvement in Genoese military undertakings continued. While Genoa was preoccupied with the struggle with Venice, the colony of Cembalo in the Crimea had been seized by Alexios, the ruler of the Greco-Gothic lordship of Mangup in the neighbouring highlands. In 1434 Dorino of Mytilene contributed to a fleet gathered from Genoa and its overseas territories, which retook Cembalo.¹⁵⁶ Further conflicts between Genoese interests and Visconti policy in Italy led to the overthrow of Milanese rule in 1435.¹⁵⁷

From the early 1430s the first evidence appears that the territorial reach of the Gattilusio lords had been extended beyond Lesbos, Ainos and Old Phokaia, to encompass the hitherto Byzantine islands along the northern coast of the Aegean. By 1431 Palamede of Ainos was in possession of Samothrake, while Thasos had come under Gattilusio rule by 1434, and by 1444 had its own Gattilusio lord, Dorino's eldest son Francesco III.¹⁵⁸ Manuel II, whose interests the Gattilusio had repeatedly opposed in the cause of John VII, had died in 1425, succeeded by his son John VIII (1425–49). This may have improved relations with Byzantium, smoothing the way for these territorial grants.¹⁵⁹

Amicable relations with Byzantium may also have contributed to the entanglement of the Gattilusio in the intrigues of the Empire of Trebizond.

¹⁵³ ASV, SS 12, ff. 3^{r-v}; Argenti, vol. 2, p. 407 (no. 20); Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 2, pp. 89–93 (nos. 13–8); below, pp. 149–52. Note that the documents published by Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile are in register 5 of the *Litterarum*, not register 3 as they state; ASG, AS 1781 (*Litterarum* 5), ff. 113^v–4, 148^{r-v}, 162^v–3^v (nos. 325–6, 413–4, 458, 461).

¹⁵⁴ Stella, p. 373; Morosini, pp. 1579–80; Giustiniani, vol. 2, p. 322.

¹⁵⁵ Giustiniani, vol. 2, p. 323; Argenti, vol. 1, pp. 187–8.

¹⁵⁶ Stella, pp. 377–8; Andrea Gatari, 'Diario del Concilio di Basilea di Andrea Gatari 1433–1435', ed. Giulio Coggiola, *Concilium Basiliense. Studien und Quellen zur Geschichte des Concils von Basel*, ed. Johannes Haller, Gustav Beckmann, Rudolf Wackernagel, Giulio Coggiola, Hermann Herre and Gabriel Pélouse, 8 vols. (Basle 1896–1936), vol. 5, pp. 375–442 at pp. 406–8; Alexander A. Vasiliev, *The Goths in the Crimea* (Cambridge, Massachusetts 1936), pp. 205–10.

¹⁵⁷ Stella, pp. 376–8, 382–4; Basso, 'Tommaso', pp. 333–5.

¹⁵⁸ See below, pp. 189–91, 278–9, 415–6.

¹⁵⁹ See below, pp. 101–4, 415–6.

The Emperor Alexios IV Komnenos (1416/7–29) had been overthrown and killed by his son, who took the throne as John IV (1429–60). John's younger brother Alexander, who had previously been designated as co-emperor and their father's successor and had married Dorino's daughter Maria, fled into exile and made preparations to seize power himself.¹⁶⁰ In this Alexander was assisted by his sister the Byzantine Empress Maria, and her husband John VIII Palaiologos. Dorino also gave support to his exiled son-in-law, and Mytilene became the gathering point for the forces being assembled for Alexander's planned expedition against his brother in 1437–8.¹⁶¹ This plotting displeased the leaders of the Genoese commune, which had colluded in John IV's coup.¹⁶² They urged Dorino to end his military aid to Alexander and instead to help make peace between him and his brother, while simultaneously encouraging their representatives in Pera, Caffa and the other Black Sea colonies to support John IV.¹⁶³ Whatever the impact of this intervention, it seems that Alexander's planned expedition did not in the event take place.

Soon after the formation of this link with the Komnenoi of Trebizond another dynastic marriage reaffirmed the bond between the Gattilusio lords and the Palaiologoi, the third in three generations of the imperial house. In July 1441 John VIII's brother the Despot Constantine, the future Emperor Constantine XI (1449–53), travelled from Constantinople to Lesbos and married Dorino's daughter Caterina, before continuing to the Morea, whose administration he shared with his brothers Theodore and Thomas. The following summer he set off to return to Constantinople, where John VIII was threatened by another brother, Demetrios, who attempted to seize the throne with Ottoman support. On his way to the

¹⁶⁰ Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, pp. 219–20; Alexios Savvidis, *Οι Μεγάλοι Κομνηνοί της Τραπεζούντας και του Πόντου: ιστορική επισκόπηση της βυζαντινής αυτοκρατορίας του μικρασιατικού ελληνισμού (1204–1461)* (Athens 2005), pp. 117–20, 122–3; Anthony Bryer, "The faithless Kabazitai and Scholarioi", *Maistor: Classical, Byzantine and Renaissance studies for Robert Browning*, ed. Ann Moffatt (Canberra 1984) (*Byzantina Australiensia* 5), pp. 309–27, reprinted in *Peoples and Settlement in Anatolia and the Caucasus, 800–1900* (London 1988), VII, pp. 314–21.

¹⁶¹ Pero Tafur, *Andanças e Viajes de Pero Tafur por Diversas Partes del Mundo Avidos (1435–1439)*, ed. José Maria Ramos (Madrid 1934), pp. 121, 129–30, 143; Spyridon P. Lampros, *Catalogue of the Greek Manuscripts on Mount Athos*, 2 vols. (Cambridge 1895–1900), vol. 2, pp. 305–6 (no. 52).

¹⁶² Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, pp. 219–20; Sergei P. Karpov, *L'Impero di Trebisonda, Venezia, Genova e Roma 1204–1461: rapporti politici, diplomatici e commerciali*, tr. Eleonora Zambelli (Rome 1986), pp. 158–61.

¹⁶³ Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 2, pp. 292–3 (no. 20).

capital, Constantine stopped at Mytilene and collected his wife.¹⁶⁴ As they continued together towards the Dardanelles, their way was barred by a Turkish fleet, in the face of which they took refuge in the fortress of Kotzinos on Lemnos. The defences held out against an Ottoman siege, but Caterina fell ill and died soon afterwards.¹⁶⁵

These years, whose events bear witness to the renewed engagement of the Catholic Gattilusio with their Palaiologan relatives and to a new connection with another Orthodox dynasty, also saw a transformation in the ecclesiastical relations between East and West. Following the end of civil strife among the Ottomans and their suppression of the Anatolian emirates which had been revived by Timur, the Turkish threat to Christian rulers had revived. Any prospect of Byzantine survival seemed dependent on Latin military help on a grand scale, and hence on the resolution of the religious schism. For decades after John V's personal submission to the papacy in 1369, Byzantine governments had refrained from serious moves towards Church Union. Despite his vigorous pursuit of western assistance during the crisis of the 1390s, his friendship with pro-Latin intellectuals and his own occasional overtures to the papacy, Manuel II avoided committing himself to a policy so fraught with political hazards, which was in any case obstructed by the papal schism of 1378–1417.¹⁶⁶ However, his sceptical attitude was not shared by his son, and in the 1430s John VIII made a fresh bid to resolve the intractable religious divide. The emperor personally led a Byzantine delegation to the Council of Ferrara-Florence in 1438–9, which concluded Union on Latin terms.¹⁶⁷

One of the leading members of this delegation was Dorotheos, the recently appointed Metropolitan of Mytilene and thus the most senior Orthodox cleric in the Gattilusio lordships. Having been one of the delegation's most vocal advocates of compliance with Latin position, Dorotheos was nonetheless insistent regarding the restitution of territories to the jurisdiction of the Greek hierarchy and the removal of Latin bishops from

¹⁶⁴ Sphrantzes, pp. 88–91; Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, pp. 80–1; Schreiner, *Kleinchroniken*, vol. 1, p. 216 (no. 29/11); Denis A. Zakythinos, *Le despotat grec de Morée*, 2 vols. (Athens 1932–53, 2nd ed. London 1975), vol. 1, pp. 204–17.

¹⁶⁵ Sphrantzes, pp. 90–1; Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, p. 80; ASV, *SMar* 1, ff. 121^v, 138^v; Nicolai Iorga, 'Notes et extraits pour servir à l'histoire des Croisades au XV^e siècle', *Revue de l'Orient Latin* 4, (1896), pp. 226–320, 503–622, vol. 5 (1897), pp. 108–212, 311–88, vol. 6 (1898), pp. 50–143, 370–434, vol. 7 (1899), pp. 38–107, 375–429, vol. 8 (1900–1), pp. 1–115 at vol. 7, pp. 75–6.

¹⁶⁶ Barker, *Manuel*, pp. 55–6, 150–1, 192–3, 257–8, 320–31.

¹⁶⁷ Joseph Gill, *The Council of Florence* (Cambridge 1959), pp. 85–304; Paris Gounarides, 'Πολιτικές διαστάσεις της συνόδου Φεράρας-Φλωρεντίας', *Θεσσαυρίσματα* 31 (2001), pp. 107–29.

Greek sees once the Union was concluded.¹⁶⁸ Under the terms agreed, in dioceses, such as Mytilene, where both Latin and Greek bishops held office together, the first to die should not be replaced and the surviving prelate should be succeeded on his own death by an adherent of his own rite, which would prevail in that see thereafter. In the event, however, on Dorotheos's death in 1444 his successor was not another Greek cleric but Leonardo of Chios, a Genoese Dominican and a distinguished humanist writer who completed many of his works during his tenure as Archbishop of Mytilene.¹⁶⁹

John VIII's recompense for the Union of Florence was the Crusade of Varna, an expedition into the Balkans which achieved some success in 1443 but came to grief in battle on the shores of the Black Sea the following year.¹⁷⁰ Like its ill-fated predecessor in 1396 this expedition saw a Latin fleet sent to the Dardanelles and the Black Sea in support of an army advancing into the Balkans, but this time no assistance was forthcoming from the Gattilusio or from other Genoese.¹⁷¹ A fleet financed by the Duke of Burgundy, the principal western European participant in the crusade, continued to mount attacks on the Ottomans for some years after the main expedition's defeat at the Battle of Varna.¹⁷² However, its indiscriminate rapacity attracted not cooperation but hostility and demands for retribution from the Genoese in the East, including the Gattilusio of Mytilene.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁸ Sylvester Syropoulos, *Les 'Mémoires' du Grand Ecclésiastique de l'Eglise de Constantinople Sylvestre Syropoulos sur le concile de Florence (1438-1439)*, ed. Vitalien Laurent (Paris 1971), *Concilium Florentinum Documenta et Scriptores* 9, pp. 258, 362-6, 444, 482, 496, 506; Joseph Gill, *Personalities of the Council of Florence and other essays* (Oxford 1964), pp. 48-9, 70, 72, 162-3, 169, 256. Laurent suggests that the desire to oust his Latin rival was key to Dorotheos's motives in supporting Union. Vitalien Laurent, 'A propos de Dorothee, Métropolitain de Mitylène (†c. 1444)', *REB* 9 (1951), pp. 163-6 at p. 164.

¹⁶⁹ ASVat, CAOS 72, f. 29^v; ASVat, RL 410, ff. 272^v-4; Syropoulos, pp. 302-3; Luciano L. Calzamiglia, 'Un Maonese di Chio: Leonardo Giustiniani Garibaldi, O. P., Arcivescovo di Mitilene (1395-1459)', *SG* 12/1 (1991), pp. 61-71 at p. 64.

¹⁷⁰ Colin Imber, *The Crusade of Varna, 1443-45* (Aldershot 2006), pp. 7-31, 41-106, 118-21, 123-5, 129-33, 167-80, 186-204; Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 2, pp. 74-91.

¹⁷¹ Jehan Waurin, *Recueil des croniques et anchiennes istories de la Grant Bretagne, a present nomme Engleterre*, 6 vols., ed. William Hardy and Edward Hardy (London 1868-91), vol. 6, pp. 30-41, 44-51; Imber, *Crusade of Varna*, pp. 14-5, 18-21, 27, 30; Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 2, pp. 84-9.

¹⁷² Waurin, vol. 6, pp. 58-119; Jacques Paviot, *La politique navale des Ducs de Bourgogne 1384-1482* (Lille 1995), pp. 113-23; Imber, *Crusade of Varna*, pp. 32-5, 133-66; Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 2, pp. 73-86, 91-2.

¹⁷³ ASG, AS 1789 (*Litterarum* 13), f. 151^v (no. 457); L. T. Belgrano and C. Desimoni, 'Documenti ed estratti inediti o poco noti riguardanti la storia del commercio e della marina ligure', *ASLSP* 5 (1867), pp. 357-547 at p. 421 (no. 78); Jacques Paviot, '“Croisade”

Despite holding aloof from the crusade, the Gattilusio lordships soon became the target of a new wave of Ottoman hostility, associated with a wider campaign of expansion driven forward by Mehmed II (1451–81). Already in the last years of Murad they had come under attack. In March 1450 a fleet commanded by the Ottoman admiral Balta attacked Lesbos. An attempt to buy off the Ottomans was unavailing and the town of Kallone was sacked. This incursion was estimated to have inflicted damage to property, including the theft of livestock, to a value of over 150,000 ducats, as well as the abduction into slavery of 3,000 people.¹⁷⁴ As a result, the lordship of Mytilene accepted the obligation to pay the Ottomans an annual tribute to ward off further attacks.¹⁷⁵

The figures regarding the harm done by the attack were given by Dorino Gattilusio, in a letter sent a year later to the government of Genoa appealing in desperate tones for help.¹⁷⁶ In 1449 Dorino's son Domenico had apparently taken over the administration of the lordship from his father, although Dorino remained nominally lord of Mytilene.¹⁷⁷ It is unclear whether this change of leadership took place by consent or coercion, but it was soon followed by the first recorded outbreak of the political strife which was to plague the dynasty during its last years, hamstringing efforts to withstand the Ottoman threat.¹⁷⁸

Despite the dramatic eruption of the long-dormant Ottoman menace in 1450, the Gattilusio lords displayed a striking willingness to continue to

bourguignonne et intérêts génois en Mer Noire au milieu du XV^e siècle', *Studi di Storia medioevale e di Diplomatica* 12–13 (1992), pp. 135–62.

¹⁷⁴ ASG, NA 847 (Tommaso de Recco 1), nos. 323, 324; Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 5, pp. 350–2 (no. 39); Doukas, p. 337; Zacharias Tsirpanlis, *Ανέκδοτα Εγγράφα για τη Ρόδο και τις Νότιες Σποράδες από το Αρχείο των Ιωαννιτών Ιπποτών 1421–1453* (Rhodes 1995), pp. 605–9 (no. 244); Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, pp. 267–8; Iorga, 'Notes', vol. 8, p. 65. The Ottoman fleet was reported to have numbered 120 vessels, including galleys and *fustas*.

¹⁷⁵ Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, p. 267.

¹⁷⁶ Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 5, pp. 350–2 (no. 39).

¹⁷⁷ Doukas, pp. 411–3. In documents drawn up during the six years preceding his death Dorino was still treated as lord of Mytilene (ASG, NA 658 (Branca Bagnara 11), no. 184; NA 847 (Tommaso de Recco 1), nos. 235, 239–40; Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 1, pp. 220–1 (no. 10), vol. 3, pp. 314–5 (no. 28); Iorga, 'Notes', vol. 5, pp. 350–3 (nos. 39, 41)). However, the basic veracity of Doukas's account of the transfer of power is established by a document of October 1450 regarding a payment to 'domino Metelini filio domini Dorini' (Argenti, vol. 3, pp. 598–9 (no. 128)). The description of Dorino in Doukas's account of the controversy following his death as 'τοῦ καθολικοῦ ἡγεμόνος', that is the lord holding a general, overarching authority, suggests that he retained his position in formal terms, while practical power had largely been turned over to his son. In this context the refusal of the Ottomans to accept that the lordship had been transferred to Domenico would seem to have considerable validity.

¹⁷⁸ See below, pp. 198–9.

contemplate ambitious military enterprises whose motivation or potential benefits are unclear. Notwithstanding the apparent abandonment of the scheme to install Alexander Komnenos on the throne of Trebizond, their attitude to John IV had evidently remained frosty. In 1447 the Genoese commune, whose own relations with John had deteriorated, held a commission to address abuses committed against its citizens by the Emperor of Trebizond, naming the Gattilusio among those with grievances to be resolved. In the same year the commune asked the lord of Mytilene as well as its own representatives at Pera, Caffa and Chios to prepare galleys for a possible war against Trebizond.¹⁷⁹ Remarkably, in 1451, in the same letter in which Dorino pleaded for aid against the Ottomans, he also requested the use of Genoese bases at Caffa and elsewhere for an offensive which he was proposing to launch against the Emperor of Trebizond. The commune resolved to assist the lord of Mytilene in this effort, while taking no action on his behalf against the Ottomans.¹⁸⁰ Perhaps unsurprisingly in the fraught circumstances of the time, these enterprises seem to have produced no concrete action.¹⁸¹

The Last Years

In 1453 Europe and the Mediterranean were shaken by the fall of Constantinople to Mehmed II and the extinction of the Byzantine Empire.¹⁸² The young sultan had been widely regarded on his accession as less menacing than his father, and had made soothing promises to the various rulers who acclaimed him on his accession, including the

¹⁷⁹ ASG, *SGCanc*, (Sala 34) 590/1308/3 (*Officium Provisionis Romanie* 2), ff. 45–6; Iorga, 'Notes', vol. 8, pp. 29–31; Karpov, *L'Impero*, pp. 163–7.

¹⁸⁰ Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 5, pp. 350–2 (no. 39).

¹⁸¹ Benedetto Dei, in a chronologically confused passage dated by him to 1456, describes abortive plans for war against Trebizond involving Mytilene, Phokaia, Chios, Caffa, the Turkish rulers Uzun Hasan of the Ak Koyunlu and Ismail of Kastamonu and the Crimean Mongols, which may relate to yet another scheme (Benedetto Dei, *La Cronica dall'anno 1400 all'anno 1500*, ed. Roberto Barducci (Florence 1985), pp. 156–7). John IV would continue to rule until his death in 1458/60, by which time Alexander had also died. Savvides, pp. 120–7; Thierry Ganchou, 'La date de la mort du basileus Jean IV Komnène de Trébizonde', *BZ* 93/1 (2000), pp. 113–24.

¹⁸² Agostino Pertusi (ed.), *La caduta di Costantinopoli*, 2 vols. (Verona 1976); Marios Philippides and Walter K. Hanak, *The Siege and the Fall of Constantinople in 1453: historiography, topography and military studies* (Farnham 2011); Steven Runciman, *The Fall of Constantinople 1453* (Cambridge 1965).

Gattilusio.¹⁸³ His overthrow of Byzantium emphatically refuted whatever expectations of a period of peace had then been entertained, while giving notice of the increased capabilities of the Ottomans, at sea in particular. To overcome the deficiencies of his predecessors' unsuccessful attacks on Constantinople, Mehmed had built an imposing war-fleet, the foundation of a new era of Ottoman naval power.¹⁸⁴ Despite their dynastic bonds with the Palaiologoi and their recent history of active collaboration, just as the Gattilusio had abstained from the crusade called to save the empire they now seem to have made no contribution to the final defence of the capital.

The islands of the northern Aegean were the first to learn the news of the city's fall and feel the repercussions of the disaster as shiploads of refugees from the city arrived. This triggered a further exodus of islanders from Lemnos who feared that the sultan's fleet would soon arrive to claim the residual territories of Byzantium.¹⁸⁵ The status of Ainos as a Christian enclave close to the city and to the Ottoman capital at Adrianople made it a useful base of operations for people seeking to ransom relatives captured at Constantinople, including the historian George Sphrantzes.¹⁸⁶ The abrupt elevation of Ottoman prestige and of fear at where Mehmed might turn next brought a procession of embassies from neighbouring Christian territories to his new capital, offering their submission and accepting new or increased tribute obligations.¹⁸⁷ For the Gattilusio the relief from Ottoman hostility thus purchased lasted barely two years.

Despite the terror induced by the fall of Constantinople and the escalating price of coexistence with the Ottomans, the extinction of Byzantium did also offer certain opportunities with regard to the division of the spoils. The main remaining Byzantine possession outside the capital and its hinterland was the Morea, whose current ruling princes, Demetrios and Thomas Palaiologos, were allowed to remain in place for a time as

¹⁸³ Doukas, p. 291; Nicol, *Last Centuries*, pp. 373–4.

¹⁸⁴ Michael Kritovoulos, *Critobuli Imbriotae Historiae*, ed. Diether Roderich Reinsch (Berlin and New York 1983), *CFHB* 22, pp. 38–40; Jacopo Tedaldi, 'Informazioni sulla conquista di Costantinopoli', Agostino Pertusi, *La caduta di Costantinopoli: le testimonianze dei contemporanei* (Milan 1976), pp. 172–89 at p. 177.

¹⁸⁵ Kritovoulos, p. 86.

¹⁸⁶ Sphrantzes, p. 144; Eusebius of Caesarea, *Die Praeparatio Evangelica*, ed. Karl Mras, 2 vols. (Berlin 1954–6), *Eusebius Werke* 8, vol. 1, p. xxii; Thierry Ganchou, 'Le rachat des Notaras après la chute de Constantinople ou les relations "étrangères" de l'élite byzantine au XV^e siècle', *Migrations et Diasporas Méditerranéennes (X^e–XVI^e Siècles)*, ed. Michel Balard and Alain Ducellier (Paris 2002), pp. 151–228 at pp. 174–9, 207–10.

¹⁸⁷ Doukas, p. 395.

Ottoman tributaries.¹⁸⁸ However, those islands in the northern Aegean which had not previously been entrusted to the Gattilusio had continued to be directly administered from Constantinople, and arrangements would have to be made for their future. The Gattilusio lords moved swiftly to secure Mehmed's consent for them to take over these islands. On Lemnos, where they seem to have already held the fortress of Kotzinos, they apparently established a *fait accompli* by seizing the rest of the island immediately after Constantinople fell.¹⁸⁹ Their diplomatic efforts secured significant backing from the inhabitants, who had sent their own representatives to Mehmed.¹⁹⁰ The sultan agreed to grant Lemnos to Dorino of Mytilene and Imbros to Palamede of Ainos in return for tribute.¹⁹¹ The other remaining Byzantine islands, Skyros, Skiathos and Skopelos, were also conferred on Dorino, but the inhabitants had other ideas. Having debated the possibility of an appeal to the Gattilusio or to the Mahona of Chios to take charge, they opted instead to offer the government of their islands to Venice. Here it was the Venetians who were able to approach Mehmed from the position of a *fait accompli* and secure possession of the islands regardless of protests from Mytilene.¹⁹²

The fall of Constantinople thus brought the Gattilusio lordships to the climax of their territorial expansion, but from this peak they plunged swiftly into oblivion. In the wake of his triumph Mehmed soon set about employing the expanded Ottoman fleet to impose his will on the Latin regimes in the Aegean. In summer 1454 an expedition dispatched to coerce Chios and attack Rhodes stopped on both its outward and return journeys at Lesbos, where gifts and hospitality were lavished on the admiral.¹⁹³ Despite such efforts at ingratiating themselves, a year later the dissolution of the Gattilusio lordships began. In August 1455 the ambassador of

¹⁸⁸ Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, pp. 169–76; Doukas, p. 395; Zakythinos, vol. 1, pp. 241–56; Franz Babinger, *Mehmed the Conqueror and his Time*, tr. Ralph Manheim, ed. William C. Hickman (Princeton, New Jersey 1978), pp. 125–6, 156–62.

¹⁸⁹ See below, pp. 416–8.

¹⁹⁰ Kritovoulos, pp. 86–7.

¹⁹¹ Kritovoulos, pp. 86–7; Doukas, pp. 411–3.

¹⁹² Valentini, *Acta*, vol. 22, pp. 171–9, 184, 265, 297 (nos. 6114, 6120, 6202, 6232); Stefano Magno, *Annali Veneti*, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna, MSS. 6214–6217, 6239–6340 at MS. 6215, ff. 197^v–8, extracts published by Carl Hopf, 'Estratti degli Annali Veneti', *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes, inédites ou peu connues* (Berlin 1873), pp. 179–209 at pp. 198–9; Alfonso Assini, 'La "compera Metilini" e la difesa genovese del Gattilusio dopo la caduta di Costantinopoli', *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οι Γατελούζοι της Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 223–80 at pp. 259–61 (no. 4).

¹⁹³ Doukas, pp. 403–11.

Domenico of Mytilene, the historian Doukas, arrived at Mehmed's court at Adrianople to deliver the yearly tribute. Dorino Gattilusio had died some weeks earlier and Doukas reported this fact to the sultan's officials. They insisted that, although Domenico had for several years been the effective ruler of the lordship of Mytilene, his succession to his father's possessions was not valid unless he came in person to accept them as grants from Mehmed. When Domenico arrived he was compelled to hand over Thasos to the sultan and to accept a further increase in his tribute for Lesbos.¹⁹⁴ Further Ottoman intimidation culminated in the seizure of Old Phokaia in December, following the fall of the Mahona-ruled new town the previous month.¹⁹⁵ Four days after the fall of Old Phokaia Domenico wrote to Genoa pleading for help to defend his remaining possessions.¹⁹⁶

Ottoman attention then shifted to Ainos, where succession to the lordship again supplied an opening. Following the death of Palamede Gattilusio, the lordship was disputed between his younger son Dorino and Helena Notaras, the widow of his elder son Giorgio, acting on behalf of her children. Dorino seized control and rejected a proposal to share power; Helena then turned to Mehmed for restitution, accusing Dorino of intriguing against his overlord. Taking advantage of this pretext, Mehmed launched a winter campaign against Ainos in January 1456, advancing over land while his fleet menaced the city from the sea. Dorino had been wintering on Samothrake and in his absence Ainos soon surrendered. The city was pillaged and 150 children enslaved.¹⁹⁷ The Ottoman fleet went on to occupy Imbros and Samothrake, while Dorino went to Adrianople to plead his case with Mehmed. He was offered an estate in Macedonia in lieu of the lands he had lost, but fearing for his safety he fled and settled on Naxos, where he married the duke's daughter.¹⁹⁸

The last Gattilusio territory outside Lesbos itself soon followed. In the spring of 1456 a revolt broke out on Lemnos against the island's lord Niccolò Gattilusio, the younger brother of Domenico of Mytilene. The rebels appealed to the Ottomans and a fleet was despatched to secure the island. Domenico sent a small expedition to Lemnos to extricate his

¹⁹⁴ Doukas, pp. 411–5.

¹⁹⁵ Doukas, pp. 415–9.

¹⁹⁶ Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 5, pp. 354–5 (no. 42).

¹⁹⁷ Kritovoulos, pp. 101–7; Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, p. 225; Doukas, p. 419; Aşikpaşazade, pp. 82–3, 202–4; Tursun Beg, *The History of Mehmed the Conqueror by Tursun Beg*, tr. Halil Inalcik and Rhoads Murphey (Minneapolis and Chicago 1978), pp. 37–8. The fleet involved in the campaign is said to have comprised ten galleys.

¹⁹⁸ Kritovoulos, pp. 106–7.

brother, but its commanders disobeyed his orders by confronting the rebels with their own much smaller force and were defeated. The island passed under Ottoman rule, with the exception of one fortress, probably Kotzinos, which remained in the hands of the Gattilusio.¹⁹⁹

Meanwhile the Genoese government had taken steps to assist the lordship of Mytilene in response to the recent losses and Domenico's appeal of December 1455. These were not propitious years for seeking effective help from Genoa. The commune's ever-deepening financial troubles had by this time become acute.²⁰⁰ In 1455 war broke out against King Alfonso V of Aragon (1416–58), and the ensuing Catalan attacks were abetted by Genoese rebels.²⁰¹ Nevertheless, in March 1456 the commune agreed to fund the provision of 200 infantry to defend Lesbos. This undertaking would be financed in characteristic Genoese fashion through a *compera*, an instrument of public debt underpinned by the assignment of tax revenues to pay interest to the contributors. Shares in this *Compera Mitilene* were issued in April, raising a total of £43,100, and arrangements were made for the shipment of the troops, who had arrived by July.²⁰² Still feeling in need of further help, Domenico launched a fresh diplomatic initiative, sending Leonardo of Chios, the Archbishop of Mytilene, on an embassy to Genoa. He failed to convince the Genoese authorities to pay to retain the soldiers for a further six months, but provisions were made for a fresh contingent to be sent if an attack seemed imminent. Cannon were also to be supplied to strengthen the defences of Lesbos.²⁰³

The efforts of the Genoese to defend their compatriots against the Ottomans were small in comparison with an initiative to restore the Christian position in the Aegean which was launched soon afterwards. Mehmed II's conquest of Constantinople and subsequent gains at the expense of Christian rulers including the Gattilusio had provoked a fresh outburst of papal exertion to organise a crusade. The establishment of a

¹⁹⁹ Doukas, pp. 419–21; below, pp. 417–8.

²⁰⁰ Epstein, pp. 277–80; Heers, *Gênes*, pp. 97–110.

²⁰¹ Giustiniani, vol. 2, pp. 384–405; Giustina Olgiati, *Classis contra regem Aragonum (Genova 1453–1454): organizzazione militare ed economica della spedizione navale contro Napoli* (Cagliari 1990), pp. 11–215.

²⁰² Assini, pp. 235–40, 256–8 (nos. 2–3); P. Amadeo Vigna, *Codice diplomatico delle colonie Tauro-Liguri durante la signoria dell'Ufficio di S. Giorgio (MCCCCLIII–MCCCCLXXV)*, 2 vols. (Genoa 1868–71) (ASLSP 6, 7/1), vol. 6, pp. 616–21, 641–2 (nos. 276, 297); Ausilia Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene, 1454–60', *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: atti rogati a Pera e Mitilene* (Genoa 1982), II, pp. 33–5 (no. 5); ASVat, *Armadio XXXIX*, no. 7, f. 28.

²⁰³ Assini, pp. 240–4, 259–61, 263–4 (nos. 4, 7); Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 5, p. 355 (no. 43).

Turkish stranglehold on the straits and the advance into the Aegean islands, which were made possible by Mehmed's expansion of the Ottoman navy and represented an unprecedented escalation of Ottoman ambitions at sea, were a particular focus of concern. On the Danube a crusading army achieved some success, but the appeals of Pope Calixtus III (1455–8) for contributions to a naval force met little response.²⁰⁴ He therefore decided to set about outfitting a fleet at his own expense to challenge the Ottomans in the Aegean. This force set out from Naples in August 1456 under the command of the papal legate Cardinal Lodovico Trevisan.²⁰⁵ Having visited Rhodes, which would become his base of operations, Trevisan proceeded to Chios and Lesbos, where he urged the Mahona and Domenico of Mytilene to halt their payment of tribute to Mehmed; at Lesbos the papal fleet was reinforced by Catalan and other pirates.²⁰⁶ By the end of the year Trevisan had succeeded in capturing and garrisoning Lemnos, Samothrake and Thasos, while on Imbros local leaders headed by the historian Michael Kritovoulos agreed to acknowledge papal sovereignty but avoided the installation of a Latin garrison.²⁰⁷

After these early achievements the papal campaign lost its momentum and the initiative began to shift back to Mehmed. Ottoman retaliation arrived in July 1457, when a fleet landed troops on Lesbos, unimpeded by the ships left by Trevisan to keep watch on the island. The Ottomans laid siege to the island's second city Methymna but after two weeks the siege broke up in confusion, supposedly after an assault on a breach in the walls was routed by defenders who had been rallied by an armoured woman. Trevisan's forces seem to have belatedly intervened as the Ottomans withdrew and the attackers returned to Gallipoli having suffered heavy losses.²⁰⁸ However, the papal fleet achieved no further progress and in

²⁰⁴ Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 2, pp. 163–72, 178–83.

²⁰⁵ Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 2, pp. 166–7, 184–8; Pio Paschini, 'La flotta di Callisto III (1455–1458)', *Archivio della Reale Società Romana di Storia Patria* 53–5 (1930–2), pp. 177–254 at pp. 184–99, 207–17; Zacharias Tsirpanlis, 'Οι "εύπρεποι άνθρωποι", το παιδομάζωμα και οι επιχειρήσεις του παπικού στόλου στο Αιγαίο με ορμητήριο τη Ρόδο (1456–1458)', *Δωδώνη* 15/1 (1986), reprinted in *Η Ρόδος και οι Νοτιές Σπώραδες στα χρόνια των Ιωαννιτών Ιπποτών, 14^{ος}–16^{ος} αι.: Συλλογή ιστορικών μελετών* (Rhodes 1991), pp. 64–102 at pp. 71–9.

²⁰⁶ Doukas, p. 423; Kritovoulos, p. 129; below, pp. 234–5, 354–5.

²⁰⁷ ASVat, *Armadio XXXIX*, 7, ff. 58–9, 62^v; Matteo Sciambra, Giuseppe Valentini, Ignazio Parrino, *Il 'Liber Brevium' di Callisto III. La Crociata, l'Albania e Skanderbeg* (Palermo 1968), pp. 114, 115, 123 (nos. 135, 137, 164); Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, pp. 191, 225; Kritovoulos, pp. 115–6; Doukas, pp. 423.

²⁰⁸ ASVat, *Armadio XXXIX*, 7, ff. 126^{r-v}, 132^v, 134; Sciambra *et al.*, pp. 174, 178, 179 (nos. 308, 321, 322); Kritovoulos, pp. 129–31; Doukas, p. 423; Gelasio Caetani, *Epistolarium Honorati Caietani: lettere familiari del Cardinale Scarampo e corrispondenza della guerra Angioina*

November 1457 Trevisan returned to the West, marking the effective end of the campaign.²⁰⁹

Domenico had continued to appeal to Genoa for assistance, threatening that if sufficient help was not forthcoming he would have to place himself under the protection of some other power.²¹⁰ In late 1457 the defence of the lordship of Mytilene was again under consideration in Genoa. The Ottoman attack in the summer had apparently triggered the dispatch of troops from Chios and the commune made further financial provisions to cover the costs of past and future help, while raising the number of men to be supplied in any subsequent emergency to 300.²¹¹ However, its own difficulties remained acute. In 1458 the Catalans laid siege to Genoa itself by land and sea. Earlier that year the mounting crisis had driven the communal government to place the city once more under the authority of a foreign sovereign, in this case King Charles VII of France (1422–61). Civil conflict continued in the years that followed.²¹²

However, the Gattilusio did enjoy a few years of respite from Ottoman aggression after the failure of the attack on Methymna. Unfortunately this external peace was offset by internal upheaval. In late 1458 Domenico Gattilusio was overthrown and murdered by his brother Niccolò, who became the last lord of Mytilene.²¹³ He promptly launched a new diplomatic effort to secure help from western Europe. Archbishop Leonardo was again sent to beg for help in early 1459. At his prompting the Genoese

(1450–1467) (Sancasciano 1926), p. 54 (no. 958); Pope Pius II, *Enea Silvio Piccolomini, Papa Pio II: I Commentarii*, ed. Luigi Totaro, 2 vols. (Milan 1984), vol. 2, p. 1830; Zacharias Tsirpanlis, 'Εὐπρεποι ἄνθρωποι', pp. 89–96; Oberto Foglietta, *Uberti Folietae Clarorum Ligurum Elogia* (Rome 1573), pp. 97–8; Magno, MS. 6215, f. 245; below, pp. 337–8. Two Venetian reports originating with a Genoese vessel which met the retreating Ottoman fleet near Tenedos enumerate it at 100 vessels, carrying 5–12,000 men, and state that the Turks had lost 1300 men killed in the fighting (Tsirpanlis, 'Εὐπρεποι ἄνθρωποι', pp. 94–5 (nos. 1–2)). Another Venetian report puts their number at 170 craft including 22 galleys and their losses at 900 dead (Tsirpanlis, 'Εὐπρεποι ἄνθρωποι', pp. 95–6 (no. 3)). A letter from Trevisan himself, written at Rhodes and relating the report brought there from Lesbos by Archbishop Leonardo, puts the fleet at 160 vessels and the Ottoman losses at 2,000 dead and 1,000 injured (Caetani, p. 54 (no. 958)).

²⁰⁹ Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 2, pp. 189–90; Paschini, pp. 250–2.

²¹⁰ Vigna, vol. 6, pp. 800–2 (no. 371).

²¹¹ In December fresh shares in the *Compera Mitileni* were issued to offset the recent expenditure, with a corresponding increase in the tax assigned to reward the investors. The commune also attended to the costs of the cannon which had previously been supplied to the lord of Mytilene. Assini, pp. 245–50, 266–75 (nos. 9–13); Vigna, vol. 6, pp. 800–2 (no. 371).

²¹² Giustiniani, vol. 2, pp. 405–20; Petti Balbi, pp. 300–2.

²¹³ Doukas, pp. 433–5; Pius II, *Commentarii*, vol. 2, p. 1830; Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, pp. 268, 275; Kritovoulos, pp. 168–9; Giustiniani, vol. 2, p. 384.

government dispatched a circular letter to the leaders of Christendom appealing for aid. Individual letters were also directed to Genoa's French sovereign and two other likely patrons of any future crusade: the new Pope, Pius II (1458–64), and the Duke of Burgundy.²¹⁴ Beyond this Genoa offered only words of encouragement and a reiteration of the existing arrangements for help.²¹⁵ Leonardo continued in person to the Burgundian court, travelling as far as Brussels.²¹⁶ In the autumn, representatives from Mytilene were among the numerous eastern Christian delegations making supplications for aid at the Congress of Mantua, summoned by Pius II to discuss measures to be taken against the Turks.²¹⁷ Leonardo seems never to have returned from his mission to the West, and by the end of the year he was dead.²¹⁸

While the lordship of Mytilene experienced a lull, Ottoman forces in the Aegean were not inactive in these years. Following the withdrawal of the papal fleet, Lemnos was restored to Ottoman control by an uprising among the inhabitants, abetted by Kritovoulos, whose tactical acknowledgement of papal sovereignty had been short-lived, and by the Ottoman fleet. The castle of Kotzinos, which may still have been in the hands of the Gattilusio, now fell at last.²¹⁹ Soon afterwards the Ottoman fleet seized Samothrake and Thasos, reversing the remaining gains of Trevisan's offensive.²²⁰ On land the Ottomans pressed on into peninsular Greece. The conquest of the Byzantine Morea was completed in 1460, and later that year Demetrios Palaiologos, with the help of Kritovoulos, secured from the sultan the grant of most of the former Gattilusio territories: Ainos, Imbros, Lemnos, Samothrake and Thasos.²²¹

In the face of the continuing Ottoman advance, Pius II strove like his predecessor to marshal a concerted response, but without much effect.²²²

²¹⁴ Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 5, pp. 359–61 (nos. 53–4); Assini, pp. 275–8 (nos. 14–16).

²¹⁵ Assini, pp. 278–80 (nos. 17–8).

²¹⁶ ADN, B2034, f. 186^{r-v}.

²¹⁷ Pius II, *Commentarii*, vol. 1, pp. 444–5.

²¹⁸ Calzamiglia, p. 71.

²¹⁹ Kritovoulos, pp. 133–6; Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, p. 225; Magno, MS. 6215, ff. 244^v–5^v, MS. 6216, ff. 35^{r-v}.

²²⁰ Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, pp. 225–6; Magno, MS. 6216, ff. 35^{r-v}.

²²¹ Kritovoulos, pp. 134, 136, 150; Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, pp. 224, 237; Sphrantzes, p. 172; Konstantin Mihailović, *Memoirs of a Janissary*, ed. and tr. Benjamin Stolz, commentary by Svat Soucek (Ann Arbor 1975), pp. 114–5; Zakythinos, vol. 1, pp. 256–74; Babinger, pp. 173–9.

²²² Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 2, pp. 196–241. A characteristic attitude was that of the Venetians, who agreed in January 1460 to contribute galleys to a proposed crusading fleet, but

Under the circumstances Genoa was the only likely source of aid for the Gattilusio. Niccolò made yet another approach to the commune in February 1460, seeking and receiving a revival of the provisions for reinforcements from Chios.²²³ A final plea for help in April 1462 brought assurances of goodwill but no concrete action.²²⁴ The French regime had been driven from Genoa by a revolt in 1461, which had been followed by a French counter-offensive to retake the city and renewed factional conflict between and within the Adorno and Campofregoso families.²²⁵ Genoa remained debilitated and paralysed by its own troubles as the dissolution of the last Gattilusio lordship approached.

The final Ottoman attack on Lesbos took place in September 1462. This was a grander undertaking than the previous seaborne offensives against the island, commanded by Ottoman admirals. Not only did Mehmed II deploy a powerful fleet, but he also came in person through Anatolia with an army, 40,000 strong according to a Hospitaller narrative written a few weeks later.²²⁶ The defenders of the city of Mytilene included 70 men from Rhodes and 110 Catalan mercenaries from Chios, presumably paid for by the Genoese authorities through the existing arrangements.²²⁷ After demanding the surrender of the island without success, the Ottomans established their siege works and began to bombard the citadel.²²⁸ Having

with preconditions including the demand that other rulers such as the lord of Mytilene, the Order of St. John and the republics of Ragusa and Ancona should commit at least ten galleys in total. Valentini, *Acta*, vol. 24, pp. 108, 118, 134 (nos. 6853, 6859, 6876).

²²³ Vigna, vol. 7, pp. 77–8 (nos. 525–6).

²²⁴ Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 5, pp. 364–6 (nos. 59–60).

²²⁵ Giustiniani, vol. 2, pp. 420–33; Petti Balbi, pp. 300–2.

²²⁶ Roberto Valentini, 'L'Egeo dopo la caduta di Costantinopoli nelle relazioni dei gran maestri di Rodi', *Bullettino dell'Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo e Archivio Muratoriano* 51 (1936), pp. 137–68 at pp. 166–7 (no. 4). The fleet is variously enumerated at 8 ships armed with siege engines (presumably cannon), 25 galleys and 80 smaller craft by the Hospitaller account; at 5 armed ships, 24 galleys and 96 *fustas* by Archbishop Benedetto; at 6 ships, 12 galleys and 47 *fustas* by Stefano Magno; at 7 ships and 60 oared vessels by Doukas; at about 65 vessels by Venetian reports; at 25 galleys and 100 smaller craft by Chalkokondyles; and at 200 vessels by Kritovoulos. Valentini, 'L'Egeo', pp. 166–7 (no. 4); *idem*, *Acta*, vol. 24, p. 470 (no. 7225); Benedetto, Archbishop of Mytilene, 'Leonardi Chien-sis [sic] de Lesbo a Turcis capta epistola Pio Papae II missa', ed. Carl Hopf, *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes inédites ou peu connues* (Berlin 1873), pp. 359–66 at p. 360; Magno, MS. 6216, f. 151; Magno, ed. Hopf, p. 201; Doukas, p. 433; Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, p. 271; Kritovoulos, p. 168.

²²⁷ In total the defenders numbered more than 5,000 according to Doukas, or according to an account written by Archbishop Benedetto almost 1,000. Doukas, p. 435; Archbishop Benedetto, p. 361.

²²⁸ Archbishop Benedetto, pp. 360–2; Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, pp. 271–2; Kritovoulos, pp. 169–71; Doukas, p. 435; Valentini, 'L'Egeo', p. 167 (no. 4); Tursun Beg, p. 49; Konstantin Mihailović, pp. 132–5.

battered breaches in the walls they captured a lower portion of the fortress known as the Melanoudion by assault, triggering panic among the defenders, laced with the suspicion of treachery.²²⁹ Niccolò despaired of withstanding the siege and went out accompanied by his leading subordinates to surrender the city and the island to the sultan. At Mehmed's instruction he ordered the surrender of the island's other garrisons.²³⁰ The lives of all those within the city had been guaranteed when Mytilene surrendered, but the Ottomans nonetheless carried out a massacre of hundreds of Latin soldiers and pirates. The surviving inhabitants were divided up, some distributed or sold as slaves, others deported to help repopulate Constantinople, and those deemed least valuable left behind on Lesbos.²³¹ Mehmed took Niccolò Gattilusio and his relatives back to the capital. There the last lord of Mytilene subsequently converted to Islam in an attempt to save his life but was soon strangled on the sultan's orders.²³²

Niccolò's death left the deposed Dorino of Ainos as the last surviving Gattilusio lord. He is last attested in 1488, when he ceded his rights as heir to the lordships of Mytilene and Old Phokaia to Marco Doria, while

²²⁹ Archbishop Benedetto, pp. 362–4; Doukas, p. 435; Valentini, 'L'Egeo', p. 167 (no. 4).

²³⁰ Archbishop Benedetto, p. 364; Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, pp. 272–3; Kritovoulos, pp. 171–2; Doukas, p. 435; Valentini, 'L'Egeo', p. 167 (no. 4). These were the *kastra* of Methymna, Eressos and the Agioi Theodoroi. The location of the *kastron* of the Agioi Theodoroi is not definitely identified, beyond the fact that it lay in within the metropolitan see of Methymna and in the northern part of the island (Franz Miklosich and Joseph Müller, *Acta et Diplomata Graeca Medii Aevi: Sacra et Profana, Collecta et Editā*, 6 vols. (Vienna 1968) at vol. 1, pp. 164–7 (no. 73); Buondelmonti, ed. de Sinner, p. 116). It was evidently a substantial settlement rather than merely a fortress, being described as a 'colonia' by Leonardo of Chios and possessing at least one monastery inside the walls and two outside (Leonardo of Chios, *De Statu Hominis*, Biblioteca del Seminario Vescovile, Albenga, MS Leonardo di Chio, f. 38). It is probably to be equated with the site of the ancient *polis* of Antissa, where the medieval fortifications of the peninsular acropolis form the largest surviving fortress on the island apart from the castle of Mytilene. The maps accompanying Buondelmonti's description show a castle on a peninsula on the vicinity of Antissa, though leaving open the possibility that this was actually on the larger promontory slightly further to the east (Cristoforo Boundelmonti, *Description des Iles de l'Archipel par Christophe Buondelmonti: version grecque par un anonyme*, ed. Emile Legrand (Paris 1897), plate 39). Cf. Ioannis K. Moutzouris, 'Μεσαιωνικά κάστρα της Λέσβου', *Λεσβιακά* 4 (1962), pp. 50–68 at pp. 65–6; Johannes Koder, *Aigaion Pelagos (die nördliche Ägäis)* (Vienna 1998), *Tabula Imperii Byzantini* 10, p. 294.

²³¹ Archbishop Benedetto, pp. 364–5; Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, pp. 273–4; Kritovoulos, p. 172; Doukas, pp. 435–7; Valentini, 'L'Egeo', pp. 167 (no. 4); Tursun Beg, pp. 49–50; Pius II, *Commentarii*, vol. 2, p. 1820; Konstantin Mihailović, pp. 134–5; Dei, p. 161; Magno, MS. 6216, ff. 151^{r-v}; cf. Stephanos Gerasimou, 'Η επανόικηση της Κωνσταντινούπολης μετά την άλωση', 1453: *Η άλωση της Κωνσταντινούπολης και η μετάβαση από τους μεσαιωνικούς στους νεότερους χρόνους*, ed. Tonia Kioussopoulou, (Iraklion 2005), pp. 3–21; Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, 'Constantinople se repeuple', *ibid.*, pp. 47–59.

²³² Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, pp. 274–6; Doukas, p. 437; Dei, pp. 161, 165.

explicitly reserving his right to possession of Ainos, Samothrake, Thasos and his personal estates on Lesbos, supposing that these places should ever come back into Christian hands.²³³ As lately as 1481, amid the euphoria that followed the repulse of Ottoman offensives at Otranto and Rhodes and the death of Mehmed II, there had been an upsurge of enthusiasm in Genoa for a scheme to retake Lesbos and the two Phokaïas, but all such dreams of restoration would remain unfulfilled.²³⁴ While other small Latin regimes in the Aegean would cling on for many decades before succumbing to the Ottoman advance, they were a fading residue of the vanished era whose conditions had made their establishment possible. The balance of the multi-faceted Aegean world in which the Gattilusio lordships had emerged and flourished had been irretrievably overturned.

²³³ Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 5, pp. 371–2 (no. 70). It is notable that there is no mention of Imbros or Lemnos, despite the fact that they were held by the Gattilusio between 1453 and 1456. Seemingly it was not felt that Dorino had a credible legal claim to assert to these islands. Such a view may be related to the brevity of the family's tenure, or to their acquisition through a grant not from a Christian prince but from an infidel who had gained them by the violent overthrow of their rightful rulers.

²³⁴ Giustiniani, vol. 2, p. 535; cf. Gian Giacomo Musso, 'Le ultime speranze dei genovesi per il Levante: ricerche d'archivio', *Genova, la Liguria e l'Oltremare tra Medioevo ed età moderna: studi e ricerche d'archivio*, ed. Raffaele Belvederi, 2 vols. (Genoa 1974–6), vol. 1, pp. 3–39.

CHAPTER TWO

BYZANTIUM: SOVEREIGNTY AND LEGITIMACY

For all the rulers who established themselves in the Aegean and the Balkans after 1204, the context in which they found themselves was defined by the legacy of Byzantium. The Aegean basin formed the centre around which the empire's fluctuating territorial fortunes revolved and the region's history had been essentially that of the empire for many centuries. This old order was overturned through a combination of processes of disintegration, which dissolved a paradigm of unity which the empire had managed to uphold through earlier crises. The conquest and settlement of much of the empire by outside groups, the division of its remaining territories between competing Byzantine claimants, the decay of administrative institutions, the devolution of authority to local regimes and the breakdown of a system of economic redistribution centred on Constantinople all played their part.

However, the empire's legacy, and survival in diminished form, did continue to exert an influence across the region both within and beyond its truncated frontiers, through its influence on the identity, beliefs and outlook of the inhabitants. The extent and nature of the impact of this Byzantine background on the development of other regimes, through their relations with the people they ruled, is of general importance in determining how far views of the world shaped by the era of political unity survived its collapse, and thus how deep-seated was the fragmentation that followed. For the continuing empire in particular, whose material capacities were so sharply diminished, this influence through hearts and minds was critical in determining its ability to operate a network of power that could gain any purchase on the world around it. In the customary manner of empires, it had traditionally enlisted the services of a wide range of outsiders, and cultivated a fringe of client rulers who upheld its claims to universal sovereignty and adjusted their policies to suit its needs. Its hold upon such clients was founded on some combination of military protection or threat, financial incentives, religious persuasion and its capacity to underpin other rulers' authority through the imprimatur of its own charisma and prestige. For an empire deprived of its wealth and might, the ideological elements of this arsenal were the ones retaining

the greatest potential effectiveness. Whereas once clientage had on occasion been a prelude to absorption, as it would be on a grander scale in the expanding ambit of the Ottomans, in an empire in acute decline client regimes were more likely to be the legacy of retreat, a means of maintaining a limited grip on areas which might otherwise slip from the Byzantine sphere entirely.

The Gattilusio lordships occupy an important position in these developments, as Latin regimes in the erstwhile Byzantine world that owed their original foundation to Byzantine authority. Their integration into the Byzantine network must be understood both from the imperial point of view, in terms of the motives and wider trends which favoured the territorial concessions that created the lordships, and from that of the Gattilusio themselves, in terms of the incentives which underpinned their enduring attachment to Byzantium. Between these fundamental poles of the relationship lies the shifting pattern of alliances and estrangements between individuals which both underpinned and undermined what was at once the most formal and the most personal of the lordships' wider affiliations. These fluctuations also reflect the influences exerted on the functioning of this relationship by the other networks of power that influenced the Gattilusio lordships. The way in which the Gattilusio regime was established and expanded by successive Byzantine emperors illustrates the final permutations of the Byzantine response to the perennial imperial challenge of turning the energies of dangerous groups to the empire's advantage, and the extent to which its assets and methods had been transformed by its decline. Its enduring adherence to the empire reflects the advantages which could accrue to non-Byzantine rulers who managed to work with the grain of the civilisation which had shaped the indigenous society on which their regimes were superimposed.

The Place of the Lordships in Byzantine Government

As the creation of a Byzantine Emperor, the significance of the Gattilusio regime must first be assessed in terms of the purposes for which it was established. These in turn depend on the circumstances and motives underlying the original grant of Lesbos to Francesco I Gattilusio. This was one of a number of territorial concessions made by John V Palaiologos in the immediate wake of his acquisition of effective control of what remained of the empire. Another was his recognition in 1355 of Genoese rule on Chios, in return for acknowledgement of imperial

sovereignty and a nominal tribute.¹ This agreement was clearly an acknowledgement of a *fait accompli* which the empire in its debilitated condition was powerless to challenge. It could no longer even seek to impose more substantial conditions for its approval, such as those which John VI Kantakouzenos had negotiated with Genoa in the wake of the conquest of 1346 but had been unable to implement.² John V's concession marks the end of the intermittent clashes between Byzantium and Genoese groups over islands and coastal enclaves along the northern Aegean coast of Anatolia which had begun with the termination by Byzantium of the Zaccaria lordship of Chios in 1329. Whereas Byzantium had repeatedly overcome Genoese lords in this region before the civil war, John V evidently did not feel strong enough at this point to contest the position which the Genoese had secured.³ It is in the light of this context that the acquisition of Lesbos by Francesco Gattilusio has been interpreted as a clear expression of the ascendancy of the dynamic Genoese community and its commercial agenda over a crumbling Byzantium. It has even been presented as the product of a calculated scheme orchestrated by the Genoese government in accordance with a systematic masterplan pursued by the commune and its citizens over a period of decades.⁴

However, this interpretation rests upon regarding the grant of Lesbos as the product of Francesco's parasitic initiative, a high price extracted from an essentially passive and dependent John V for a service which he could not afford to refuse. Such a view receives some substantiation from Gregoras, who refers to Francesco seizing the opportunity to offer help to John V and secure promises from him in return, which were fulfilled after

¹ Philip Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese and their Administration of the Island 1346–1566: described in contemporary documents and official dispatches*, 3 vols. (Cambridge 1958), vol. 2, pp. 173–7.

² These terms had included a ten-year limit on Genoese occupation of the island, an annual tribute of 12,000 *hyperpyra*, the continued presence of an Orthodox metropolitan and even the installation of an imperial official to govern the population of the island outside its capital. The pact was a dead letter as a result of its rejection by the Genoese authorities on Chios itself. John Kantakouzenos, *Ioannis Cantacuzeni Imperatoris Historiarum Libri IV*, ed. Ludwig Schopen, 3 vols. (Bonn 1828–32), *CSHB* 7, 8, 9, vol. 3, pp. 81–3.

³ See above, pp. 36–7.

⁴ Geo Pistarino, 'La difesa genovese dell'Egeo nord-orientale nel tempo dei Gattilusio (1355–1462)', *Le Stelle e le Strisce: studi americani e militari in onore di Raimondo Luraghi*, 2 vols. (Milan 1998), vol. 2, pp. 51–64 at pp. 53–4; Laura Balletto, 'I Gattilusio fra economia e politica', *AALSL* 54 (1997), pp. 449–64 at p. 456; Sandra Origone, *Bisanzio e Genova* (Genoa 1992, 2nd ed. 1997), p. 243.

the coup through his marriage and princely dowry.⁵ In Doukas's more detailed account only the marriage is said to have been agreed at Tenedos; Lesbos enters the picture only after the success of the enterprise.⁶ It seems rather unlikely that Francesco was in a position to extort such concessions as the price of his help. Conceding permanent possession of an asset as valuable as Lesbos, all the more precious to a state of such starkly diminished resources, would have been a remarkably lavish reward for the services of a galley or two.

Francesco would have had to enjoy an extremely strong bargaining position to be able to impose such terms. Yet the evidence suggests that his support was far from indispensable and may even have been peripheral to the actual seizure of Constantinople. Doukas provides a dramatic account of Francesco's ingenuity in gaining access to the city by deception and his leading role in the fighting that followed. This story was presumably related by the Gattilusio family, the historian's employers in the 1450s; as the 'origin myth' of the lords of Mytilene it may well have been embellished in the course of a century's retelling.⁷ The two sources closest to the events, Kantakouzenos and Gregoras, not only fail to report Francesco's presence at Constantinople but in fact indicate the absence of foreign troops.⁸ If Francesco's forces were actually not even to be involved in the main action, the scope for him to make exorbitant demands in exchange for his help would be distinctly limited. However, the Florentine historian Matteo Villani, writing within a few years of these events, states that Francesco covertly transported John to Constantinople.⁹ While Villani was not as close to events as Kantakouzenos and Gregoras, this corroboration by a contemporary considerably enhances the credibility of Doukas's version of events, at least in its essentials.

Nevertheless, even if Doukas's account of Francesco's central role is accepted, this does not lead to the conclusion that John had no realistic

⁵ Nikephoros Gregoras, *Nicephori Gregorae Historiae Byzantinae*, ed. Immanuel Bekker and Ludwig Schopen, 3 vols. (Bonn 1829–55), *CSHB* 12, 14, 15, vol. 3, p. 554.

⁶ Doukas, *Ducas Istoria Turco-Bizantina (1341–1462)*, ed. Vasile Grecu (Bucharest 1958), pp. 67, 71–3.

⁷ Doukas, pp. 67–9.

⁸ Kantakouzenos states that when addressing his supporters at the time he emphasised that they were fighting their own countrymen rather than foreigners. Gregoras asserts that John took the capital without the aid of foreign allies, despite his reference elsewhere to Francesco's offer of unspecified assistance to the coup and his subsequent reward. Kantakouzenos, vol. 3, p. 287; Gregoras, vol. 3, pp. 241–2, 554; Donald M. Nicol, 'The abdication of John VI Cantacuzene', *BF* 2 (1967), pp. 269–83 at pp. 275–8.

⁹ Matteo Villani, *Cronica*, ed. Giuseppe Porta, 2 vols. (Parma 1995), vol. 1, pp. 540–1.

alternative to accepting his terms. All accounts indicate that Francesco's contingent represented only a fraction of the troops and vessels available to John.¹⁰ It is possible that Francesco, described by Gregoras as a successful pirate and said by Doukas to be in the area in pursuit of conquests, commanded fighting men of a higher quality than the other, more numerous forces at John's disposal, but even so it is hard to see how their absence would have left him unable to proceed. It also seems unlikely that he should have been unable to recruit alternative forces, willing to serve for a somewhat less princely reward.¹¹

The idea that John had been exploited or pressurised by Francesco is also hard to square with the emperor's subsequent willingness to entrust Matthew Kantakouzenos to the custody of his new brother-in-law.¹² It is hard to believe that John would have voluntarily taken the risk of placing an active rival claimant to his own throne in the hands of a lord whom he distrusted or towards whom he felt ill-will, particularly when that lord had a record of opportunistic participation in successful Byzantine *coups d'état*. Evidently John set considerable store by the bond

¹⁰ Doukas states that Francesco commanded two galleys, but puts the total force with which John attacked Constantinople at 2,000 men, several times the maximum combined complement of those galleys. According to both Gregoras and Giovanni Stella, Francesco had only a single galley, whereas Gregoras states that John came to Constantinople with two large triremes and sixteen monoremes. These included some vessels built for him previously, some gathered from Tenedos, Lemnos and Lesbos, and others that were independent operators ('αὐτόνομον διατώμενοι βίον'), an expression perhaps signifying pirates. Later Gregoras says more vaguely that John was reported to have arrived with some biremes and monoremes from Tenedos and Imbros and one trireme. He also states that John had originally come to Tenedos from Thessalonike with four triremes and biremes and many monoremes, securing his grip on the loyalties of Lemnos, Samothrake, Imbros and Lesbos along the way. Kantakouzenos describes John's flotilla as one trireme and a number of monoremes. Doukas, pp. 67–9; Gregoras, vol. 3, pp. 226, 241–2, 247, 554; Kantakouzenos, vol. 3, p. 284; Giorgio and Giovanni Stella, *Annales Genuenses*, ed. Giovanna Petti Balbi (Bologna 1975), *RIS* n.s. 17/2, p. 154.

¹¹ John's negotiating position might have been weakened if he were subject to some intense pressure of time, which would leave him with little opportunity to seek alternative forces, but no such constraint seems to have applied. Since John V's arrival on Tenedos the only attempt that an increasingly unpopular and dispirited John Kantakouzenos had made to avert the looming attack was an abortive expedition to the island, which Kantakouzenos himself describes as an effort to sue for peace which was thwarted by the hostility of the inhabitants and their protectiveness towards the younger emperor. Gregoras portrays the expedition in darker terms as an attempt to convince the people of Tenedos to turn over John V or to capture him, but in any case Kantakouzenos made no attempt to overwhelm his rival by force and the outcome was a fiasco. Kantakouzenos, vol. 3, pp. 282–3; Gregoras, vol. 3, pp. 236–7.

¹² Gregoras, vol. 3, pp. 503–4, 564–5; Kantakouzenos, vol. 3, p. 335.

of kinship he had established with Francesco and regarded him as a loyal and dependable ally.

If Francesco did not extort the grant of Lesbos from the emperor, it must be concluded that John had his own reasons for making the concession, in response to the circumstances that he would confront as sole ruler of the empire. Such a voluntary grant would fit readily into a larger pattern of Byzantine governmental expedients during the Palaiologan period. Autocracy was still upheld in principle, but the disintegration of the bureaucratic substructure meant that in practice a more diffuse, associative pattern of authority was taking hold, dominated by the family principle. The association in power of the emperor's relatives by blood or marriage had first come to the fore in the time of Alexios I Komnenos (1081–1118), who introduced the ethos of the aristocratic clan to the conduct of the imperial office. His regime relied heavily on his relatives for political support and he introduced a series of ranks reserved for them at the top of the court hierarchy. Their services, status and loyalty were underpinned through the assignment to individuals of particular tax revenues, the genesis of the institution of *pronoia*.¹³ This contributed to the establishment of a pattern of dynastic government which proved enduring. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the resultant assumption that members of the emperor's family were entitled to a share in government was extended to the assignment of 'appanage' territories to imperial relatives. As the effectiveness of formal structures connecting centre and provinces deteriorated, the empire's possessions became more fragmented, while dynastic strife intensified the pressure to placate imperial relatives. In this context the practice of devolving supreme authority in a given region to an imperial substitute on the spot became increasingly prevalent. In the early fourteenth century Andronikos II had explicitly rejected the

¹³ Elisabeth Malamut, *Alexis I^{er} Comnène* (Paris 2007), pp. 125–52, 183–5, 267–87; Michael Angold, *The Byzantine Empire 1025–1204: a political history* (London 1984, 2nd ed. Harlow, New York 1997), pp. 128–9, 136–7, 146–56; Paul Magdalino, 'Innovations in government', *Alexios I Komnenos*, ed. Margaret Mullett and Dion Smythe (Belfast 1996), pp. 146–66; Mark Bartusis, *Land and Privilege in Byzantium: the institution of pronoia* (Cambridge 2012), pp. 132–65. Over the following centuries, and especially after the Fourth Crusade, *pronoia* became a commonplace mechanism for remunerating soldiers; in this context the grant was explicitly conditional on the performance of military service, whereas earlier grants to imperial relatives and other distinguished individuals had been without formal conditions. Bartusis, *Land and Privilege*, pp. 165–282; *idem*, *The Late Byzantine Army: arms and society, 1204–1453* (Philadelphia 1992), pp. 162–82; Nicolas Oikonomides, 'The role of the Byzantine state in the economy', *The Economic History of Byzantium*, ed. Angeliki E. Laiou, 3 vols. (Washington D.C. 2002), vol. 3, pp. 973–1058 at pp. 1042–8.

proposal of his Empress Eirene (Yolanda) of Montferrat to partition the empire between his sons, insisting in ideological terms on the indivisibility of the empire, but his own assignment of territories to members of the imperial family actually tended in this direction.¹⁴ Following the civil war of the 1340s the practice of granting portions of the diminished empire to members of the imperial family became habitual, given initial impetus by the desire to mollify rivalries shaped by that struggle.¹⁵ These assignments differed markedly from the earlier practice of awarding imperial relatives large grants in *pronoia*, since their holders not only received the revenues of the areas involved but took charge of the provincial administration and enjoyed most of the prerogatives of imperial rule in those areas, including the appointment of officials, the administration of justice at the highest level, the conduct of their own foreign and military policy and the power to make grants of lands and privileges. The breadth of their powers and perquisites, as well as the character of their authority as a personal concession outside the regular administrative structure, also set them apart from the more senior class of *kephale* (provincial governor), a post typically held by members of the imperial family and an institution which seems to have been the precursor of the 'appanage'.¹⁶

In becoming the emperor's brother-in-law, Francesco had therefore gained associate membership of a group with a generally accepted claim to high authority in imperial service, an authority increasingly construed in territorial terms.¹⁷ His status as a foreigner and a Latin presented no necessary obstruction to such a distinguished role: for centuries, imperial marriage had provided a route into the heart of Byzantine government for

¹⁴ Gregoras, vol. 1, pp. 233–5, 237, 241, 354–5, 394–5; John W. Barker, 'The problem of appanages in Byzantium during the Palaeologan period', *Byzantina* 3 (1971), pp. 105–22 at pp. 105–9; Donald M. Nicol, *The Last Centuries of Byzantium 1261–1453* (London 1972), pp. 151–2, 157.

¹⁵ The areas typically singled out for such concessions were the city and hinterland of Thessalonike, various portions of Thrace, and the Byzantine Morea or some part of it. The holders were usually close male blood relatives of the senior emperor, but occasionally included marital connections such as the Empress Anna of Savoy or John VI's son-in-law Nikephoros Orsini. Nicol, *Last Centuries*, pp. 230–1, 237–9, 282–3, 291–2, 322–3, 339, 370.

¹⁶ Barker, 'Problem of appanages', pp. 105–22; Denis A. Zakythinos, *Le despotat grec de Morée*, 2 vols. (Athens 1932–53, 2nd ed. London 1975), vol. 2, pp. 71–90; Ljubomir Maksimović, *The Byzantine Provincial Administration Under the Palaiologoi* (Amsterdam 1988), pp. 25–6, 92–7, 101–4, 128–54, 160–2, 199.

¹⁷ Paul Magdalino, 'Court society and aristocracy', *The Social History of Byzantium*, ed. John Haldon (Chichester 2009), pp. 212–32 at pp. 226–7, 229–30; Angeliki E. Laiou, 'The Byzantine aristocracy of the Palaeologan period: a story of arrested development', *Viator: Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 4 (1973), pp. 131–51 at pp. 146–9.

capable Latins, such as Renier and Conrad of Montferrat in the twelfth century.¹⁸ By Francesco's time, the changing character of authority in Byzantium meant that a long-term grant to an imperial brother-in-law of comprehensive authority over a portion of territory was hardly an incongruous expedient for a Byzantine emperor.

Of course, Francesco's position differed to some extent from the 'appanages' of the Palaiologoi, in that it was heritable and thus amounted to a potentially permanent detachment of the island from the main body of the empire. The 'appanages' were vested in a particular individual and were not supposed to amount to the creation of a distinct dynastic inheritance. There was only one actual instance of such a concession passing from father to son, when John VII took Andronikos IV's place in Selymvria.¹⁹ However, it must be observed that in practice the question of heredity in the Palaiologan 'appanage' was avoided by default, since the beneficiaries almost invariably either succeeded to the imperial throne themselves, died without male issue, or lost their position to internal strife, outside attack or the cession of their territory to a foreign power. It cannot be assumed that the effective heritability seen in the case of John VII would not have become the norm, had it not been so consistently forestalled by political or reproductive contingencies.

Actual hereditary devolution of power also had precedents in Palaiologan governmental practice. Most notable was the grant of Phokaia to the Zaccaria, who held the port in person or through their own grantees for over fifty years.²⁰ This was made to beneficiaries who possessed none of the leverage over their benefactor Michael VIII which Francesco supposedly enjoyed over John V. The fact that an emperor in a position of considerable strength could decide to take such a step without duress weighs heavily against the notion that John's arrangement with Francesco must have been forced upon him, or even that it must have arisen purely from the thoroughly abject condition of the empire at that time.

It is also striking that in 1329, when the Byzantines had confiscated Chios from Martino Zaccaria by force, Andronikos III and John Kantakouzenos

¹⁸ Niketas Choniates, *Nicetae Choniatae Historia*, 2 vols., ed. J.-L. Van Dieten (Berlin and New York 1975), *CFHB* 11/1, 11/2 at vol. 1, pp. 171, 200–1, 382–7, 391, 395.

¹⁹ Doukas, p. 83; Barker, 'Problem of appanages', pp. 119–20.

²⁰ Roberto S. Lopez, *Benedetto Zaccaria: ammiraglio e mercante nella Genova del Duecento* (Messina and Milan 1933, 3rd ed. Genoa 2004), pp. 52–91, 253–64; Enrico Basso, 'Gli Zaccaria', *Dibattito su famiglie nobili del mondo coloniale genovese nel Levante: Atti del Convegno Montoggio, 23 ottobre 1993*, ed. Geo Pistarino (Genoa 1994), pp. 46–71 at pp. 48–61.

were apparently willing to restore the island to his estranged brother Benedetto, albeit on terms more restrictive than those which had previously applied. This proposal is said to have foundered only because Benedetto demanded permanent unconditional possession of the island, a concession extending far beyond what his family had hitherto enjoyed, and would accept nothing less.²¹ Similarly, when the imperial fleet then sailed to New Phokaia, the Byzantines confirmed Andreolo Cattaneo della Volta in possession of the place in return for his submission to imperial sovereignty, rather than removing him.²² Despite the rupture with Martino, and despite the fact that they were militarily in a position to impose their will, the first preference of the empire's rulers was apparently to leave control of these places devolved into the hands of Latin lords rather than restore direct imperial control. Evidently such a policy could be pursued voluntarily on its own merits.

The dwindling capacity of the central government to direct provincial affairs magnified the advantages of placing all the governmental resources of a particular region in the hands of an administrator enjoying wide discretion. A ruler on the spot could devote greater attention to solving the particular problems of his territory and exploiting its particular potential than an overstretched central government. If such an arrangement allowed the revenues of a region to be spent locally the resources available to the central government would inevitably be undermined, but it might still hope to draw assistance from such regimes from time to time. The most obvious attraction of assigning a portion of imperial territory to a resident lord enjoying considerable freedom of action would appear to lie in the field of defence. In the case of territories under particular threat, the prospect of a local ruler being better able to preserve imperial sovereignty than the imperial government itself might seem to justify the loss of many of the benefits that would otherwise accrue from those lands. The huge territorial losses which had been sustained during the civil wars and the weakness of the empire in their aftermath may well have increased the appeal of such expedients.

Such logic would have been more compelling in the case of the empire's remaining islands. The Byzantine navy had seemingly never fully regained

²¹ While this account comes from John Kantakouzenos himself, and may on that score be subject to scepticism, he does defend his veracity by citing numerous Latin dignitaries who witnessed the formal offer to Benedetto and his response. Kantakouzenos, vol. 1, pp. 379–88.

²² Kantakouzenos, vol. 1, pp. 388–90.

its former strength after being drastically run down by Andronikos II in the 1280s.²³ Following the collapse of efforts at its revival mounted by John Kantakouzenos, Byzantine naval resources were at a low ebb, jeopardising the defence of maritime territories.²⁴ Lesbos would have been a particular concern. Its proximity to Anatolia left it especially vulnerable to the Turkish raids of recent decades, which may on occasion have extracted tribute from the inhabitants.²⁵ The Genoese threat was more menacing still, as manifested in Domenico Cattaneo's attack of 1335–6 and Simone Vignoso's plans a decade later. As recently as 1351, hostages had been taken from Lesbos by the Genoese fleet of Paganino Doria, on its way to fight the Venetians, Byzantines and Catalans for control of the straits, suggesting that the fleet had extorted tribute or asserted some sort of Genoese claim to authority in passing.²⁶ The fact that Francesco was a Genoese rendered him an especially suitable choice, since by placing him in charge of Lesbos the island could be inoculated against the predatory attentions of his compatriots, which might otherwise soon wrest it from the Byzantine sphere entirely.

In this respect the Genoese tradition of expansion in the eastern Aegean and the dwindling ability of Byzantium to resist it can be seen to have lain behind the establishment of the original Gattilusio lordship, albeit indirectly. However, there were also other advantages to recommend the enlistment of capable Italian seafarers such as Francesco to protect islands or coastal enclaves. The fortunes of Latin and Byzantine rulers in their contests for such maritime holdings over the decades after 1204 present a conspicuous contrast with their relative capacity to gain and retain portions of the continental hinterland. After the initial rapid expansion of Latin control in Anatolia and the Balkans during the first decade following the capture of Constantinople, Latin rulers in those regions could usually at best manage only to cling onto what they held, in the face of

²³ Hélène Ahrweiler, *Byzance et la Mer. La marine de guerre, la politique et les institutions maritimes de Byzance aux VII^e–XV^e siècles* (Paris 1966), pp. 374–81.

²⁴ Kantakouzenos, vol. 3, pp. 68–80; Gregoras, vol. 2, pp. 841–67; Nicol, *Last Centuries*, pp. 220–5; Ahrweiler, pp. 382–7.

²⁵ Kantakouzenos, vol. 2, p. 387; Gregoras, vol. 1, p. 207; Paul Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin, Byzance et l'Occident: recherches sur 'La geste de Umur Pacha'* (Paris 1957), pp. 59–60.

²⁶ ASG, AC 215 (*Officium guerre introitus et exitus* 1351), f. 34; Michel Balard, 'A propos de la bataille du Bosphore: l'expédition génoise de Paganino Doria à Constantinople (1351–1352)', *Travaux et Mémoires du Centre de Recherche d'Histoire et Civilisation Byzantines* 4 (1970), pp. 431–69, reprinted in *La mer Noire et la Roumanie génoise (XIII^e–XV^e siècles)* (London 1989), II, p. 441.

advancing Byzantine states which drove them successively from north-western Anatolia, Thessaly, Macedonia, Thrace, Constantinople and the Peloponnese. In general, when the Byzantines lost ground on the two continents it was to Anatolian Turks and Balkan Slavs that they gave way, not to invaders from the West. At sea, by contrast, a more complex picture of territorial ebb and flow emerges. Here Latins and Byzantines both enjoyed considerable successes at times but the Latins were ultimately triumphant, with the civil wars of the mid-fourteenth century finally curtailing the empire's challenge to the Latin maritime powers' grip on their islands and ports. Other groups failed to intrude on this maritime territorial sphere: the Balkan rulers never took hold of any significant islands, while with minor exceptions the Turks only began to do so after 1453.²⁷ Thus, whereas on land the Latins were the least effective of the region's territorial contenders, at sea they were the strongest, and by 1354 their ascendancy was plain.

Those wishing to gain or maintain power amongst the islands could do so more effectively if they were able to tap into the Latin expertise and resources which lay behind this success. Coming from societies whose energies and resources were focused on maritime trade and which produced the foremost seafarers of the Mediterranean, citizens of the Italian republics could offer their employers familiarity with the most advanced techniques of seafaring and naval power, and access to networks of contacts which would help them to muster effective forces by sea when required. Just as the empire capitalised upon Latin maritime skills by employing them in its own navy, so it might hope to preserve those lands which were most accessible by sea by entrusting them to Latin governors or lords, turning the capacities which made them dangerous to its own advantage.²⁸ This had an added benefit in that it gave the communities to which these lords belonged an interest in maintaining them in power, so as to preserve the preferential access to commercial opportunities, safe harbours and other advantages which they could derive from a regime headed by one of

²⁷ In 1403 the Ottomans restored Skyros, Skiathos and Skopelos to Byzantium; they had presumably acquired these islands no earlier than the 1380s or 1390s, when they gained control of neighbouring parts of the European mainland. George T. Dennis, 'The Byzantine-Turkish treaty of 1403', *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 33 (1967), pp. 72–87, reprinted in *Byzantium and the Franks 1350–1420* (London 1982), VI, p. 79; John Fine, *The Late Medieval Balkans: a critical survey from the late twelfth century to the Ottoman conquest* (Ann Arbor 1987), pp. 430–1.

²⁸ Ahrweiler, pp. 281–3.

their own.²⁹ Thus, installing Francesco on Lesbos not only deflected any future Genoese attempt to seize the island from Byzantium, but actually turned the Genoese community into defenders of the government under imperial sovereignty which Francesco's rule represented.

The Genoese were particularly well-represented among the Latin individuals chosen for such devolved authority. The installation of the Zaccaria in Phokaia in the 1270s and on Chios in 1304 was the most celebrated previous example of this pattern, but there were a number of others. In the 1270s Michael VIII established his admiral Giovanni dello Cavo as lord of Rhodes; around 1304 Andronikos II's admiral Andrea Moresco and his brother Lodovico were granted Karpathos, Kassos and other islands near Rhodes, while in the 1300s Vignolo de Vignoli apparently held Kos and Leros from the emperor.³⁰ In seeking to enlist the maritime capacities of Latin societies to defend their lands, it was natural for Byzantine emperors to look to the two great Italian maritime communes, and of the two the Genoese were the more apt to the purpose, owing to the diffuse nature of the Genoese polity. The chronic weakness and instability of communal institutions encouraged the Genoese to pursue their own initiatives as individuals and families, whereas the robust and sophisticated Venetian state exerted a tighter grip on its citizens both at home and overseas. As a result, the Genoese were inclined to treat political boundaries as porous, entering readily into relationships of service and mutual advantage with foreign rulers; Byzantium was just one of many societies to make use of this promiscuity.³¹

It is therefore not sufficient to set the establishment of Francesco's lordship of Mytilene only in the specific context of Genoese triumph in a mid-fourteenth century struggle with Byzantium over a collection of territories in the north-eastern Aegean, or of the debilitating impact of the crisis surrounding the civil wars on the empire. It must be understood also as a manifestation of older and more wide-ranging patterns of

²⁹ See above, pp. 14–22 below, pp. 132–7, 144–9, 172–85, 201–17.

³⁰ George Martin Thomas, *Diplomatarium Veneto-Levanticum: sive acta et diplomata res venetas, Graecas atque Levantis illustrantia*, 2 vols. (Venice 1880–99, reprinted New York 1966), vol. 1, pp. 128–32, 139–50, 154–64 (nos. 73, 77, 79); Franz Dölger, *Regesten der Kaiserkunden des oströmischen Reiches*, 5 vols. (Munich 1924–2003), vol. 4, p. 46 (no. 2287); Joseph Delaville le Roulx, *Les Hospitaliers en Terre Sainte et à Chypre* (Paris 1904), pp. 274–6; Arturo Ferretto, *Codice diplomatico delle relazioni fra la Liguria, la Toscana e la Lunigiana ai tempi di Dante: 1265–1321* (Genoa 1903) (ASLSP 31/2), pp. 244–6 (no. 1); Anthony Luttrell, 'The Genoese at Rhodes: 1306–1312', *Oriente e Occidente tra Medioevo ed Eta Moderna: studi in onore di Geo Pistarino*, ed. Laura Balletto (Genoa 1997), pp. 737–61 at pp. 742–7.

³¹ See below, pp. 129–32, 362–4.

Palaiologan government, in which the devolution of territorial authority was widespread, and in which imperial relatives and Genoese clients were the preferred choice of recipients. The Gattilusio lordships represented a synthesis of these two practices, combining the utility of the Genoese with the legitimacy and hopefully the lasting commitment of members of the imperial family.

The importance of the familial element in the integration of the Gattilusio lordships into the Byzantine network gains added emphasis from the lack of evidence for institutional underpinnings. Just as the grant of Lesbos was set apart from Palaiologan 'appanages' by its permanence, it was also distinguished from earlier concessions to Genoese lords by the lack of attested conditions imposed upon Francesco and his successors. None of the numerous sources relating to the Gattilusio mentions any obligation to render financial payments or military service to Byzantium in exchange for possession of any of their territories, nor to any time limit on their possession. The Zaccaria are said to have been obliged to make an annual payment in exchange for their position in Phokaia.³² The grant of Chios to the same family was limited to an initial ten years and repeatedly renewed for periods of five years.³³ The Moresco brothers' possession of Karpathos was termed a fief, Lodovico was described as the emperor's vassal in a document written in Latin, and Andronikos II asserted that he owed him military service.³⁴ Even John V's acceptance of the Mahona's control of Chios was accompanied by the imposition of a nominal annual payment of 500 *hyperpyra*.³⁵ Byzantine willingness to confer authority on outsiders is more easily accounted for if the empire was still entitled to derive some concrete benefit from the territories involved, albeit much reduced, or if a limited duration put pressure on their holders to pursue the empire's goodwill so as to secure a renewal. What the empire stood to gain from unconditional grants is harder to discern.

Such arrangements were however clearly not unknown in the Palaiologan tradition, and indeed specifically in the early years of John V's personal rule. In 1357 he awarded the island of Thasos and the nearby Thracian towns of Anaktoropolis (Kavalla) and Chrysopolis to two Greek brothers from Bithynia, the *megas primikerios* Alexios and the *protosevastos* John, who were soon afterwards promoted in the court hierarchy

³² Doukas, p. 205.

³³ Kantakouzenos, vol. 1, pp. 370–1.

³⁴ Thomas, vol. 1, pp. 139–50 (no 77).

³⁵ Argenti, vol. 2, pp. 173–7.

to *megas stratopedarches* and *megas primikerios* respectively, and who were connected with the imperial family by marriage. A translation of the chrysobull survives, confirming that this grant was both heritable and without formal conditions.³⁶ Admittedly, this action seems to have amounted merely to the legitimization of a *fait accompli*: Alexios had been a naval commander under Alexios Apokaukos during the civil war of the 1340s, who had thereafter continued to defy John Kantakouzenos from his base at Anaktoropolis and extended his power over coastal and island territories nearby. Alexios himself claimed that he and his brothers had seized some of their mainland possessions from the Serbs and some from the Turks and he appears to have regarded these as belonging to them by right of conquest. In the case of Thasos, Alexios acknowledged the imperial chrysobull as the basis of his authority, but the account of his rise given by John Kantakouzenos indicates that the brothers were already making their presence felt on the island long before John V's grant.³⁷ With their background as at least nominal partisans of the Palaiologan cause, it may have been easier for John V to come to an accommodation with the brothers than for his father-in-law, but he was clearly not in a position to make great demands on them. Nevertheless, in its unrestricted terms and hereditary character the concession gives an explicitly documented case of precisely the type of grant that seems to have been made to the Gattilusio.

In a wider context, sweeping acts of alienation of governmental power for little specified return were a characteristic and increasingly prevalent feature of late Byzantine government. The practice of placing landowners' estates and whole towns under *exkousseia*, immunities giving exemption from taxes and from the authority of imperial officials, without imposing formal service obligations on the recipients in return, became increasingly

³⁶ Thomas, vol. 2, pp. 164–7 (no. 98). The chrysobull was issued on 9 March 1357; on 10 June of the same year the brothers, residing in Christoupolis, issued a document confirming the possessions of the Grand Lavra on Thasos, using the more senior titles (Paul Lemerle, André Guillou, Denise Papachrysanthou and Nicolas Svoronos, *Actes de Lavra*, 4 vols. (Paris 1970–82), AA 5, 8, 10, 11, vol. 3, pp. 71–2 (no. 137)). Thus their promotion was presumably part of the same initiative, to regularise their position and tie them more closely to John V's regime, as the territorial concession.

³⁷ Kantakouzenos, vol. 3, pp. 114–6; Thomas, vol. 2, pp. 164–7 (no. 98). On Alexios and John, see also Nicolas Oikonomides, 'Patronage in Palaiologan Mt. Athos', *Mount Athos and Byzantine Monasticism*, ed. Anthony Bryer and Mary Cunningham (Aldershot 1996), pp. 99–111 at pp. 103–11; Paul Lemerle, *Philippe et la Macédoine Orientale* (Paris 1945), pp. 201–12.

widespread after the Fourth Crusade.³⁸ In the short term such concessions could bring benefits to the individual emperor who made the grant as a means of securing or rewarding political support, but whatever goodwill and sense of moral obligation they engendered was unlikely to last much beyond the death of the original grantor or recipients. Since they were typically heritable or conferred on institutions or whole settlements they amounted to a permanent alienation of resources and authority for temporary gain. Only by maintaining a continuing flow of fresh concessions could a family or community's enduring loyalty be assured. Nevertheless, these arrangements were not the product of duress or of the overweening strength of a foreign power but were the calculated political expedients of successive Byzantine governments. When applied to towns, around which administrative districts were organised, they could negate much of the authority of the provincial administration over a considerable area.³⁹ In a sense, the comprehensive grant of authority over large, coherent blocks of territory such as islands was merely an extension and expansion of such practices. Echoes are also to be found in a developing tendency for members of the Byzantine aristocracy to be appointed to posts in the provincial administration which gave them governmental authority over the same areas in which they held privileged estates.⁴⁰ If the unconditional character of John's grant to Francesco seem to have offered little guarantee of long-term benefits for the empire, this state of affairs was a characteristic one.

However, while there is no evidence that the Gattilusio were bound to Byzantium by the kind of formal and active obligations which constrained other Genoese lords, the family was distinguished by the depth and durability of its Byzantine connections. The affiliation between Byzantium and the Gattilusio established in 1354 became an enduring feature of their subsequent century of development. In this respect the Gattilusio stood out from the other Genoese lords who had been sponsored by Byzantium. Initially the Zaccaria proudly emphasised their Byzantine connections, to the extent of naming the heir to their lordship Palaeologus after the imperial dynasty.⁴¹ However, with the passage of generations their attachment

³⁸ Maksimović, pp. 10–6, 148, 217, 231–5, 256–67; Laiou, 'Byzantine aristocracy', pp. 144–50; George Ostrogorsky, 'Pour l'histoire de l'immunité à Byzance', *Byzantion* 28 (1958), pp. 165–254.

³⁹ Maksimović, pp. 266–7.

⁴⁰ Laiou, 'Byzantine aristocracy', pp. 147–8; Maksimović, pp. 160–6.

⁴¹ Argenti, vol. 1, p. 56.

to the empire markedly waned, and the seal was set on their estrangement when in 1325 Martino Zaccaria became a vassal of the titular Latin Emperor of Constantinople, the Angevin Philip of Taranto, and accepted from him the title of 'King and Despot of Asia Minor' along with a collection of territorial claims.⁴² This amounted to an endorsement of the legitimacy of a ruler who claimed the title and rights of the Byzantine Emperor and an affirmation that it was from him that Martino held the lands which Byzantium had granted his family. A more comprehensive diplomatic affront to the Byzantines is hard to imagine, and it can have come as little surprise that when in 1329 an opportunity arose to humble or eliminate Martino it was seized upon.⁴³ Byzantium's relationships with other Genoese clients had also tended to end badly. Vignolo de Vignoli turned on Byzantium, joining forces with the Knights of St. John to wrest Rhodes from the empire in 1306.⁴⁴ Having been confirmed in possession of New Phokaia by the Byzantines in 1329, only six years later the Cattaneo della Volta made their attempt to seize Lesbos.⁴⁵ The predatory and opportunistic instincts of the Genoese were difficult for Byzantium to tame, and long-term symbiosis proved elusive. In the case of the Gattilusio, however, the relationship seems to have had a more tenacious basis, enabling it to endure in spite of considerable ruptures between emperors and Gattilusio lords. Clearly this must be accounted for in terms other than the integrating effects of institutional structures and legal obligations, given that these were if anything even weaker in the case of the Gattilusio lordships than in those of their precursors. In the context of Byzantine weakness the apparent lack of material demands on the Gattilusio may have worked in favour of their continued adherence to the empire. One of the most obvious sources of the impulse to revolt against any authority is the desire to shed unwelcome obligations; in the absence of such burdens the influence of the benefits impelling the Gattilusio to remain integrated with the Byzantine order would have had free rein.

While the supposition that the Gattilusio lords were not placed under formal obligations in return for their territories is based essentially on silence, there is positive evidence that their position had an informal character which differed from earlier imperial practice and reflected the

⁴² Basso, 'Zaccaria', p. 58.

⁴³ Kantakouzenos, vol. 1, pp. 370–91; Gregoras, vol. 1, pp. 438–9; above, pp. 36–7.

⁴⁴ Luttrell, 'Genoese', pp. 744–55.

⁴⁵ Kantakouzenos, vol. 1, pp. 388–90, 476–95; Gregoras, vol. 1, pp. 525–35.

changing character of the Byzantine approach to authority. Traditionally holders of power and distinction in the Byzantine world had always been incorporated into the empire's hierarchy of court ranks and bureaucratic offices, which was gradually reconfigured in response to changing circumstances throughout the empire's history. According to traditional Byzantine norms, senior imperial officials would receive court titles, as would foreign rulers who accepted the status of imperial clients.⁴⁶ Since the establishment of the emperor's family at the heart of government under Alexios I, close relations of the emperor by blood or by marriage had been placed in the upper ranks of the hierarchy by virtue of that relationship.⁴⁷ Though pared down as the empire dwindled and its administrative structures became less formal and elaborate, the system of titulature continued to operate under the Palaiologoi.⁴⁸ Latins in imperial service continued to figure among those awarded court titles in the early fourteenth century. Roger de Flor, commander of the Catalan Grand Company, who had married the niece of Andronikos II and been assigned wide-ranging territorial authority in Anatolia, received the title first of *megas doux* in 1303 and of caesar two years later.⁴⁹ Shortly afterwards Andrea Moresco was granted the title of *vestiarios* before being elevated to the rank of admiral.⁵⁰

In this context, from whatever perspective the relationship of the Gattilusio lords with the empire is regarded, they might be expected to have received court titles as a matter of course. In fact, however, the titles usually employed to define the Gattilusio lords' position of authority over the territories they ruled were not part of any formal hierarchy

⁴⁶ Nicholas Oikonomides, *Les listes de préséance byzantines des ix^e et x^e siècles* (Paris 1972), pp. 21–7, 46–63, 81–99, 134–65, 242–53, 262–73, 281–301; J. B. Bury, *The Imperial Administrative System in the Ninth Century* (London 1911), pp. 20–36, 133–5; Paul Lemerle, 'Roga et rente d'état aux x^e–xi^e siècles', *REB* 25 (1967), pp. 77–100; Mark Whittow, *The Making of Orthodox Byzantium, 600–1025* (Basingstoke 1996), pp. 107–11, 209, 217, 296, 308, 365–6; Kimon E. Plakogiannikes, *Τιμητικοί τίτλοι και ενεργά αξιώματα στο Βυζάντιο. Ετιμοτυπία, διοίκηση, επαρχότητες, έπαρχοι, λογοθέσια, λογοθέτες, σύγκλητος, δήμοι, θέματα, ανακτορική φρουρά, βασιλικό και θεματικό πλώιμο, στρατός ξηράς, νομισματικό σύστημα* (Thessalonike 2001), pp. 21–36.

⁴⁷ Magdalino, 'Court society', pp. 216, 224–7.

⁴⁸ Pseudo-Kodinos, *Traité des Offices*, ed. Jean Verpeaux (Paris 1966), pp. 133–9, 167–87, 291–349; Tonia Kiousopoulou, *Βασιλεύς ή Οικονόμος: πολιτική εξουσία και ιδεολογία πριν την άλωση* (Athens 2007), pp. 117–23.

⁴⁹ Ramon Muntaner, *Crònica*, ed. Editorial Barcino, 9 vols. (Barcelona 1927–52), vol. 6, pp. 21, 41–2; George Pachymeres, *Georges Pachymères Relations Historiques*, ed. Albert Failler, tr. Vitalien Laurent, 5 vols. (Paris 1984–2000), *CFHB* 24, vol. 4, pp. 433, 571.

⁵⁰ Pachymeres, vol. 4, pp. 543, 607, 625–7; Thomas, vol. 1, pp. 125, 131–2, 143–4, 156 (nos. 72–3, 77, 79); Luttrell, 'Genoese', pp. 742–4.

but rather generic ones simply denoting 'lord'.⁵¹ The title applied to them in Latin was invariably 'dominus'; the usual Greek term employed by the Gattilusio lords themselves and their subjects was 'αὐθέντης', while other writers normally used either this title or the similarly generic 'ἡγεμῶν' or 'ἄρχων'.⁵² Other terms appear on isolated occasions. Doukas, the only Greek source to mention Niccolò II's rule in Lemnos, characterises him as the island's 'ἀρχηγός', another generic term for a lord or chief.⁵³ Michael Kritovoulos twice calls Palamede the 'ἑπαρχος' of Ainos, while a reference by Demetrios Kydones to the 'ὑπαρχος' of Ainos probably relates to Niccolò I, though it may pertain to a Byzantine governor.⁵⁴ Both terms are more suggestive of a governor than a lord, but neither corresponds to an office in the Byzantine provincial administration or a title in the court hierarchy.⁵⁵

More peculiarly, Kydones describes both Francesco I and Francesco II by the word 'δεσπότης' in two of his letters.⁵⁶ The use of this term is striking, since despot was a specific title in the Byzantine court hierarchy, a dignity second only to that of emperor. It seems most unlikely, however, that these lords of Mytilene in fact held that official title, given its failure to appear in other contexts, including the rest of Kydones's own letters, whereas such a distinguished honorific would surely have been employed as a matter of routine in Greek sources had the Gattilusio lords been entitled to it. Most compellingly, it is absent from formal protocols of address for Byzantine correspondence with the lords of Mytilene and Ainos which are preserved in a manuscript in the monastery of Panteleimon, dating from the time of Francesco II.⁵⁷ Thus the most probable interpretation

⁵¹ Cf. Geo Pitarino, 'Il secolo dei Gattilusio, signori dell'Egeo', *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οι Γατελούζοι της Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 281–306 at pp. 287–8.

⁵² Cf. Tudor Teoteoi, 'Les notions d' "authentēs" et "despotes" dans les sources byzantines et post-byzantines', *Revue des Etudes Sud-Est Européennes* 44 (2006), pp. 71–81 at pp. 73–6; Andreas Mazarakis, 'Il contesto istituzionale della dominazione e l'amministrazione dei Gattilusio a Mitilene (1355–1462)', *Cercetari Numismatice* 12–13 (2006–7), pp. 249–69 at pp. 252–6.

⁵³ Doukas, p. 419.

⁵⁴ Michael Kritovoulos, *Critobuli Imbriotae Historiae*, ed. Diether Roderich Reinsch (Berlin and New York 1983), *CFHB* 22, pp. 86, 150; Demetrios Kydones, *Démétrius Cydones Correspondance*, ed. Raymond-Joseph Loenertz, 2 vols. (Vatican 1956–60), vol. 2, pp. 127–8 (no. 231); below, p. 285.

⁵⁵ Cf. Mazarakis, 'Contesto', pp. 254–8.

⁵⁶ Kydones, *Correspondance*, vol. 2, pp. 228, 291 (nos. 307, 350).

⁵⁷ Spyridon P. Lampros, *Catalogue of the Greek Manuscripts on Mount Athos*, 2 vols. (Cambridge 1895–1900), vol. 2, pp. 304–5 (no. 41); Jean Darrouzès, 'Ekthesis néa, Manuel des phtakia du XIV^e s.', *REB* 27 (1969), pp. 5–127 at p. 61.

is that Kydones was applying the term in a loose sense to denote a ruler, not as an actual title; in each case he used it in the specific context of the authority of the lord in question over Lesbos or its inhabitants, not as an indicator of personal standing or the lord's relationship with the emperor.

Given their lack of court titles, it is particularly significant that the letter formulae address Francesco II as lord of Mytilene and as the emperor's 'ἀνεψιός' (nephew or cousin) and his uncle Niccolò as the emperor's 'συνπένθερος' (relative by marriage). This reflects a wider pattern in the Palaiologan period of employing a distinguished individual's family relationship with the emperor in lieu of a title; such individuals did however usually also hold court titles.⁵⁸ The status of the Gattilusio in Byzantine eyes was seemingly defined entirely in terms of their territorial holdings and of their dynastic bonds with the Palaiologoi. No place needed to be assigned to them in the administrative and social structures centred on the capital and palace which had formed the framework of traditional Byzantine autocracy. To enjoy high worldly power and status under imperial sovereignty had once meant, by definition, to enjoy a formal relationship with the emperor as autocrat, whose nature and degree in relation to other such favoured individuals was fixed by placement within the hierarchy of rank and office. Under the Palaiologoi the deterioration of administrative structures and the allocation of territorial shares in imperial authority to members of the emperor's family undermined the principles of unitary autocratic organisation. Control over land rose in importance at the expense of position in the apparatus of court and administration, while the importance of status rooted in a biological relationship with the emperor as a human being gained ground against that of status officially assigned by the discretion of the emperor as holder of a unique, transcendent office. This shifted the empire towards a more diffuse, associative form of government within which the role of an eminent individual could be adequately defined by their position in the dynastic consortium surrounding the emperor and the geographical sphere assigned to them. The Gattilusio lordships epitomised this transformation of the way in which authority in the Byzantine world was construed.

⁵⁸ Zakythinos, vol. 2, p. 96.

Family Relationships and Dynastic Struggles

The family-dominated character of Palaiologan government and the indications that the place of the Gattilusio in the Byzantine world was conceived of in specifically familial terms heighten the significance of personal attachments in their lordships' relations with Byzantium. In the light of the chronic dynastic strife of Byzantium in its last decades, close personal bonds with its rulers were liable to entail involvement in conflict with their relatives. Taking sides in a Byzantine dynastic conflict had been of fundamental importance in bringing the Gattilusio into the imperial sphere; involvement in subsequent internecine struggles could act either to reinforce their integration into the Byzantine world or to undermine it. Support for a successful contender in dynastic strife would be inclined to generate goodwill towards them at the imperial centre and attract rewards which would deepen their attachment to it. Conversely, where they aligned themselves with a losing cause the likely upshot would be estrangement and mutual antagonism between the Gattilusio lords and the individuals now ruling the empire, which could fundamentally weaken the connection between them and the empire as an institution.

The role of the Gattilusio lords in Byzantine dynastic politics was shaped both by their direct relations with members of the imperial family and others within the empire's ruling elite and by their alignments in the wider world. These elements were inevitably interwoven, given the extent to which the interests and rivalries of other powers were played out in Byzantine internal conflicts in this period, and the prominence of disagreements regarding external policy in determining the empire's political divides. To the extent that they can be distinguished, the balance between these different forces illustrates the political realities shaping the lordships' integration into the Byzantine world.

In the 1350s and 1360s Francesco I was closely associated with John V in internal conflicts and in his favoured policy of making religious concessions to the papacy in return for Latin military help.⁵⁹ During the 1370s and 1380s their relationship became markedly more fractious.⁶⁰ By the 1390s Francesco II was firmly allied with John VII against John V and Manuel II, an alignment that persisted until the young emperor's death.⁶¹

⁵⁹ See above, pp. 42–3; below, pp. 327–8, 349.

⁶⁰ See also below, pp. 413–5.

⁶¹ See above, pp. 47–8, 51.

This transition might be accounted for as a straightforward process driven by a Genoese agenda. After initially cordial relations the Genoese were estranged from John V by his pursuit and eventual conclusion of an agreement for the cession of Tenedos to Venice, impelling them to support the ambitions of Andronikos IV, an alignment continued through his son John VII. Adherence to a similar political trajectory would suggest that the Gattilusio lords' involvement in Byzantine politics was shaped above all by their pursuit of Genoese interests. The timing of the estrangement between John V and Francesco I resonates with such an interpretation, since evidence of this begins to emerge in the early 1370s.

However, there is reason to doubt that the relationship between John VII and Francesco II was simply a continuation of an alliance between their respective fathers. During the same years in which his relations with John V were in difficulties, Francesco I maintained a friendship with the leading Byzantine scholar and politician Demetrios Kydones, who later attempted to cultivate a similarly cordial relationship with his successor.⁶² Kydones, who served as chief minister under both John VI and his rival John V and acted as tutor to Manuel II, was an enthusiastic proponent of the western Scholastic tradition and a passionate advocate of Church Union and Byzantine-Latin cooperation against the Turks.⁶³ Since Kydones was a close friend and ally of Manuel, and bluntly refused to serve Andronikos after his coup in 1376, Gattilusio support for his enemies would have made the preservation of such cordial and affectionate relations difficult.⁶⁴ His efforts after Francesco I's death in 1384 to befriend Francesco II proved unsuccessful, and Demetrios himself attributed the difficulties between them to a change in counsels. He complained to the young lord of Mytilene that certain of the latter's advisors had slandered him, people who had previously tried to turn Francesco I against Kydones and whom the elder lord had learned to distrust, but who were now

⁶² Kydones, *Correspondance*, vol. 1, pp. 155–7, 163–4, vol. 2, pp. 1–5, 145, 190–2, 228–9, 250 (nos. 117, 127, 132–5, 242, 273, 307, 321).

⁶³ Raymond-Joseph Loenertz, 'Démétrius Kydonès', *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 36 (1970), pp. 47–72, vol. 37 (1971), pp. 5–39 at vol. 36, pp. 47–72, vol. 37 pp. 5–18; Demetrios Kydones, *Briefe*, tr. Franz Tinnefeld, 5 vols. (Stuttgart 1981–2003), *Bibliothek der griechischen Litteratur* 12, 16, 33, 50, 60, vol. 1/1, pp. 4–74; Frances Kianka, *Demetrius Cydones (c.1324–c.1397): intellectual and diplomatic relations between Byzantium and the West in the fourteenth century* (PhD thesis Fordham 1981); Judith Ryder, *The Career and Writings of Demetrius Kydones: a study of fourteenth-century Byzantine politics* (Leiden and Boston 2010).

⁶⁴ Kydones, *Correspondance*, vol. 2, pp. 23–5 (no. 154).

influential with his son.⁶⁵ This could be a reference to the faction of Andronikos and John VII, who were no friends of Kydones and who certainly came to enjoy Francesco II's favour. In this case, the reported contrast between the attitudes of father and son would suggest that the younger Francesco's firm alignment with the faction formerly of Andronikos IV and now of John VII represented a change of course.

The possibility that the Gattilusio had been committed partisans of Andronikos in Francesco I's time is also hard to square with the events of 1387, when the Ottoman siege of Thessalonike forced Manuel II to flee to Lesbos, where he was denied admission to Mytilene.⁶⁶ While it is significant that the Gattilusio refused to associate themselves too closely with Manuel, possibly prompted by fear of Ottoman displeasure, it is still more striking that Manuel chose Lesbos as his destination in the first place. In the aftermath of the fall of Thessalonike his fortunes were at their lowest ebb. He was the target not only of Murad I's hostility but also of the fury of John V and the Byzantine court for bringing about the loss of the second city of the empire and compromising the senior emperor's policy of conciliation towards the Ottomans.⁶⁷ This circumstance must also have emboldened the partisans of the young John VII in hopes of eliminating Manuel from the line of succession and ensuring the accession of their own candidate. Manuel therefore had an abundance of foes

⁶⁵ Kydones, *Correspondance*, vol. 2, pp. 250–1 (no. 321).

⁶⁶ It is unclear how brusque this rebuff was or how deeply it was felt. Manuel wrote a long and reflective letter during his stay on Lesbos in which he bewailed his exposure to the elements along with his other troubles, but assigned no explicit or implicit blame for this hardship (Manuel II Palaiologos, *Letters of Manuel II Palaeologus*, ed. George T. Dennis (Washington, D.C. 1977), *CFHB* 8, pp. 186–205 (no. 67)). In a letter to one of Manuel's companions, Kydones refers to his correspondent's description of the 'φιλανθρωπία' of their reception on Lesbos, and boasts of having written himself to recommend the fugitives to the lord of Mytilene. This would seem to suggest that Manuel and his followers did not feel that they had been outrageously mistreated (Kydones, *Correspondance*, vol. 2, pp. 289–92 (no. 350)). It has been suggested that the problem of accommodating Manuel's retinue was a significant factor in the decision to exclude him (George T. Dennis, *The Reign of Manuel II Palaeologus in Thessalonica, 1382–1387* (Rome 1960), *Orientalia Christiana Analecta* 159, pp. 156–7).

⁶⁷ John W. Barker, *Manuel II Palaeologus (1391–1425): A Study in Late Byzantine Statesmanship* (New Brunswick, New Jersey 1969), pp. xxiii 9–10, 29, 40–4, 272–3, 346–7; Thierry Ganchou, 'Autour de Jean VII: luttes dynastiques, interventions étrangères et résistance orthodoxe à Byzance', *Coloniser au Moyen Âge*, ed. Michel Balard (Paris 1995), pp. 367–81 at pp. 373–5.

who would welcome his arrest, and it is hard to credit that at such a time he would choose to take refuge with known enemies.⁶⁸

These indications also suggest an alternative explanation for the initial estrangement between Francesco I and John V. The early 1370s saw not only John's efforts to engage with Venice and the insurrection of Andronikos IV but also the senior emperor's abandonment of his policy of resistance to the Turks and religious rapprochement with the Latins, a shift influenced by the disappointments of his journey to the West. This led to the acceptance of tributary obligations towards the Ottomans and the fall from favour of those who had promoted the former policy, most prominently Kydones.⁶⁹ It is in connection with Kydones that the first evidence of strained relations between the lord of Mytilene and his imperial brother-in-law appears. A letter to Demetrios, perhaps written while he was in Venice with John V in 1370–1, implies that his contacts with the Gattilusio were regarded with considerable suspicion, suggesting an abrupt falling-out shortly after Francesco's appearance in Rome as part of the emperor's entourage. However, the uncertainty of this dating precludes any firm conclusion.⁷⁰ More definite evidence comes from 1373, when Demetrios himself recorded that John was hostile to his plans to visit Francesco on Lesbos. Having at first prohibited the trip, John apparently permitted Kydones to go but then became aggrieved after he had departed, for reasons which seem to have involved the emperor's

⁶⁸ Safe refuges were clearly available to him elsewhere. Kydones, as a friend of Manuel's who was in correspondence with his entourage in Thessalonike, anticipated his flight from the city and urged him not to go to his brother Theodore in the Morea or to the West, clearly regarding these as likely courses of action (Kydones, *Correspondance*, vol. 2, pp. 263–6, 278–81 (nos. 332, 342)). Alternatively, Manuel could have made for Venetian territory, Negroponte in particular being conveniently close at hand. Given the past alliance between Andronikos IV and the Genoese, Venice had reason to prefer Manuel to Andronikos's son John VII, and therefore to seek to ensure his safety and the restoration of his fortunes.

⁶⁹ Laonikos Chalkokondyles, *Laonici Chalcocondylae Historiarum Demonstrationes*, ed. Eugenius Darkó, 2 vols. (Budapest 1922–7), vol. 1, p. 34; Barker, *Manuel*, pp. 12–19; Loenertz, 'Démétrius', vol. 36, pp. 67, 70, vol. 37, pp. 8, 12; Frances Kianka, 'Demetrios Kydones and Italy', *DOP* 49 (1995), pp. 99–110.

⁷⁰ Kydones, *Correspondance*, vol. 1, p. 173 (Appendix 2). This letter was written on Lesbos by George Gabrielopoulos, who speculates that Demetrios may have failed to write to him recently because communicating with anyone there might attract suspicion. Clearly this was written at a time when Kydones was absent from Constantinople, as Gabrielopoulos states that he will soon be going to the capital, a place with which Demetrios can correspond without such concerns. Loenertz's tentative conclusion that John V's journey to the West is the most likely context for this absence is plausible, but far from certain.

unfavourable feelings towards Francesco as well as Demetrios himself.⁷¹ Given that Francesco was a Latin, an active proponent of Church Union and an apparently staunch opponent of the Turks, as well as a friend of Kydones, it seems natural that John's shift in policy should have driven a wedge between the two men, independently of Francesco's feelings about the emperor's dealings with Venice.⁷²

Thus it seems plausible that Francesco's religious and anti-Turkish inclinations, combined with the influence of personal considerations such as his friendship with Kydones, kept him from joining forces with the Ottoman-linked Andronikos until John V's cession of Tenedos and the ensuing war between Genoa and Venice pushed him willy-nilly into Andronikos's camp. Even then this alignment seems not to have been firm or lasting enough to rupture his relationships with Kydones or Manuel in the years that followed, despite controversy over the Gattilusio acquisition of Ainos in the early 1380s.⁷³ This threatened to sour his friendship with Kydones when the latter was sent on a diplomatic mission to Lesbos by John V. In one letter, Demetrios complained of Francesco's furious reaction when he raised the matter of Ainos, while in another to Francesco himself he sought to soothe the lord of Mytilene's anger.⁷⁴ No details of the dispute are given, but it seems likely that the matter at issue was the acquisition of the Thracian port by the Gattilusio during the recent conflicts, which had evidently not been approved by John V.

Only after Francesco I had been succeeded by his son Francesco II did Gattilusio policy come to be clearly identified with the faction generally favoured by the Genoese, now headed by John VII. Nor can this shift necessarily be ascribed simply to Genoese influences. Besides the role of specifically personal considerations in creating what seems to have been a close relationship, Francesco II's apparently more ambivalent attitude to the Turks may have removed a significant obstacle dissuading his father from a firm alignment with the Ottomans' protégés.⁷⁵

Francesco II's support for John VII in his conflicts with John V and Manuel II must have generated resentment between the Gattilusio lords and Manuel, complicating the family's connections with the empire as a whole. Even after the deaths of Francesco II and John VII, bad

⁷¹ Kydones, *Correspondance*, vol. 1, pp. 155–7, vol. 2, pp. 1–5 (nos. 117, 132–5).

⁷² See above, pp. 43–4; below, pp. 327–9, 346–7, 366–8.

⁷³ See below, pp. 413–5.

⁷⁴ Kydones, *Correspondance*, vol. 2, pp. 78–80, 145 (nos. 202, 242).

⁷⁵ See below, pp. 329–33, 346, 371–4.

blood between the Gattilusio and the long-reigning Manuel may have lingered. The years that followed offer little evidence of how relations developed.⁷⁶ The principal recorded incident was Giorgio Gattilusio's bid for power on Thasos, which was thwarted by Manuel in 1414.⁷⁷ It is also unclear whether what took place on Thasos was a local rebellion or an invasion from outside, and whether or not the Gattilusio lords were themselves involved.⁷⁸ All that can be said with confidence is that the episode cannot have improved their relations with Manuel.

Yet it is clear that none of these troubles produced a permanent breakdown in relations. From the last years of Manuel's reign there is evidence that the Gattilusio lords were at least on tolerable terms with the empire's rulers.⁷⁹ By the later 1430s relations with Byzantium under John VIII were apparently cordial, and the connection between Gattilusio and Palaiologoi was reinforced through reiteration of the same elements of military

⁷⁶ In August 1404 a Hospitaller embassy to Theodore Palaiologos, Despot of the Morea, was accredited to the lord of Mytilene, implying that the Gattilusio were still seen as weighty figures in Byzantine politics, even in a matter with which they were not directly involved. However, the fact that John VII was also one of the embassy's anticipated interlocutors, along with Manuel and Theodore himself, may suggest that the significance of the Gattilusio was a function of their relationship with John. As such, it need not imply that they were in good standing with Manuel. Anthony Luttrell and Elizabeth Zachariadou, *Sources for Turkish History from the Hospitallers' Rhodian Archive/Πηγές για την Τουρκική Ιστορία στα Αρχεία των Ιπποτών της Ρόδου* (Athens 2008), p. 133 (no. 7).

⁷⁷ George Sphrantzes, *Georgii Sphrantzae Chronicon*, ed. Riccardo Maisano (Rome 1990), CFHB 29, pp. 8–9; Manuel II, *Letters*, pp. 164–5 (no. 58); Mazaris, *Journey to Hades: or interviews with dead men about certain officials of the imperial court*, ed. John Barry, Michael Share, Andrew Smithies and Leendert Westerink (Buffalo 1975), p. 80; Constantin Marinesco, 'Manuel II Paléologue et les rois d'Aragon: commentaire sur quatre lettres inédites en Latin, expédiées par la chancellerie byzantine', *Académie Roumaine, Bulletin de la Section Historique* 11 (1924), pp. 192–206 at pp. 200–1 (no. 2); above, pp. 57–8.

⁷⁸ The use of the word 'στασιασάση', rebellion, by Mazaris to describe the situation on the island suggests an upheaval among the population rather than an attack by an outside force. The question is further complicated by his reference elsewhere to the purchase of the island by a man he calls Raoul Myrmix, engineered by the latter's father-in-law, a Byzantine official named Skaranos, whose pro-Latin sympathies and dealings with the Genoese authorities of Pera Mazaris denounces (Mazaris, p. 48). The satirical character of this work further complicates the issue, raising uncertainties as to how literally its account of events should be taken. However, it has been remarked that the denunciations of Skaranos are unusual in the extent to which they appear to be driven by a serious political agenda. Lynda Garland, 'Mazaris's *Journey to Hades*: further reflections and reappraisal', *DOP* 61 (2007), pp. 183–214 at pp. 201–2.

⁷⁹ A document quoted in the contemporary chronicle of Antonio Morosini records that the Venetian fleet that took charge of Thessalonike in 1423 was accompanied by an imperial galley fitted out at Mytilene. Such employment of the maritime facilities of Lesbos by the Byzantine government need not imply entirely friendly relations, but it does suggest that they were not hostile. Antonio Morosini, *Il Codice Morosini: il mondo visto da Venezia (1094–1433)*, ed. Andrea Nanetti (Spoleto 2010), p. 977.

cooperation, marriage and territorial concessions which had combined to establish it. This was in spite of possible Gattilusio involvement in a Genoese attack on Constantinople in 1434.⁸⁰ In 1435/6 George Scholarios, the future Patriarch Gennadios II of Constantinople (1454–6) but at that time a senior imperial official, writing to one of his pupils, described Dorino Gattilusio in laudatory terms and remarked on how highly the lord of Mytilene was regarded in Scholarios's milieu.⁸¹ The marriage between Dorino's daughter Maria and John VIII's brother-in-law Alexander Komnenos and the joint effort by the Byzantine Emperor and the lord of Mytilene to restore Alexander to the throne of Trebizond show the Gattilusio and the Palaiologoi once more acting in concert.⁸² Besides reinforcing their connections with the Palaiologoi through Caterina Gattilusio's marriage with the Despot Constantine in 1441, the Gattilusio also established links with the Byzantine aristocratic family of Notaras, the most powerful in the empire apart from the imperial dynasty itself. Palamede Gattilusio's eldest son Giorgio married Helena, the daughter of the Byzantine chief minister Loukas Notaras, while Loukas himself escorted Constantine to his wedding on Lesbos.⁸³ John VIII had spent time in Ainos at some point

⁸⁰ The lordship of Mytilene had contributed forces to the Genoese fleet sent to retrieve Cembalo from Alexios of Mangup in 1434 (Stella, p. 377). This expedition coincided with a conflict between John VIII and the Genoese of Pera, and after the fleet's return from the Crimea it launched an unsuccessful assault on the imperial capital before returning to the West (Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, pp. 59–62). There is no direct evidence as to whether or not the Gattilusio contingent was involved in the fighting at Constantinople. If they were, this was evidently a byproduct of their participation in an expedition originally mounted for other purposes. Chalkokondyles claims that the expedition was launched with the dual aims of reasserting Genoese power in the Crimea and aiding the people of Pera against Byzantium. However, he was clearly ill-informed about the circumstances of the campaign, substituting a supposed seizure of Caffa by the Mongols for Alexios's capture of Cembalo. A contemporary Genoese letter from Pera expressed tentative hopes that on its return from the Crimea the fleet might be of assistance in protecting the interests of Pera against the emperor, in terms that suggest this was not part of its intended purpose (Aldo Agostò, 'Due lettere inedite sugli eventi del Cembalo e di Sorgati in Crimea nel 1434', *ASLSP* 17/2 (1977), pp. 507–17 at pp. 515–7 (no. 2)). Both Chalkokondyles and the author of the letter imply that John VIII was the instigator of the conflict with Pera, which ended favourably for him. Hence this conflict would not necessarily have generated serious resentment between the emperor and the Gattilusio, even if their forces did indeed become involved on the Genoese side.

⁸¹ George Scholarios, *Oeuvres complètes de Georges Scholarios*, ed. Louis Petit, Xenophon Siderides and Martin Jugie, 8 vols. (Paris 1928–36), vol. 4, pp. 412–3 (no. 4).

⁸² See above, pp. 61–2.

⁸³ Lampros, *Catalogue*, vol. 2, p. 165 (no. 4652); Sphrantzes, pp. 88–9; Thierry Ganchou, 'Helena Notara Gatelousaina d'Ainos et le Sankt Peterburg Bibl. Pub. Gr. 243', *REB* 56 (1998), pp. 141–68; *idem*, 'Le rachat des Notaras après la chute de Constantinople ou les relations "étrangères" de l'élite byzantine au XV^e siècle', *Migrations et Diasporas Méditerranéennes*

before 1442.⁸⁴ The failure of Demetrios Palaiologos's attempt to overthrow John in 1442, followed by Constantine's accession on John's death, ensured that members of the imperial dynasty with whom the Gattilusio lords had enjoyed congenial relations remained in power, while Loukas Notaras retained his preeminence until the empire's fall. Thus these associations remained a force for the integration of the Gattilusio with Byzantium, rather than the potentially alienating one which their connection with John VII had become.

The continuing force of the Gattilusio lords' attachment to their Byzantine affiliation is suggested by the fact that at times it set them at variance with other powerful influences upon them. The support given to Alexander Komnenos in the 1430s was inimical to the policy of Genoa, which had colluded in his deposition and intervened to curtail Gattilusio support for his cause, and was also said to go against the wishes of the Ottomans.⁸⁵ The marriage alliance with Constantine was a striking indication of the importance which the Gattilusio placed on their connection with Byzantium. At a time when it was becoming increasingly clear that Ottoman power would shape the future fortunes of the Aegean region and its rulers, their goodwill was an ever more valuable commodity. The Genoese were habitually on unusually good terms with the Ottomans for a Christian community, whereas Byzantium had been and remained one of the prime targets of Ottoman aggression.⁸⁶ For a regime with the option of emphasising their Genoese background, such a public renewal of affiliation with the Palaiologoi would seem somewhat imprudent, all the more so when the Palaiologos in question was Constantine, the dynasty's most conspicuous opponent of the Ottomans.⁸⁷ Furthermore, the alliance went against the grain of Genoese policy, notably including the attitude of Palamede Gattilusio's son-in-law Lodovico Campofregoso, who as doge some years later espoused a close bond with Constantine's younger brother and chief rival Demetrios.⁸⁸ This was in accord with the traditional Genoese practice of aligning with the same Palaiologan

(*X^e-XVI^e Siècles*), ed. Michel Balard and Alain Ducellier (Paris 2002), pp. 151-228 at pp. 153-7.

⁸⁴ Josephi Valentini, *Acta Albaniae Veneta: saeculorum XIV et XV*, 25 vols. (Rome 1967-79), vol. 17, p. 460 (no. 4079).

⁸⁵ Pero Tafur, *Andanças e Viajes de Pero Tafur por Diversas Partes del Mundo Avidos (1435-1439)*, ed. José Maria Ramos (Madrid 1934), p. 143.

⁸⁶ See below, pp. 362-4.

⁸⁷ Sphrantzes, pp. 90-1; Nicol, *Last Centuries*, pp. 363-5.

⁸⁸ ASG, AS 1793 (*Litterarum* 17), f. 426^v.

contenders as the Ottomans supported, as in the case of Andronikos IV and John VII. Here again the Gattilusio lords made their connections within Byzantine politics without adhering to Genoese preferences.

Thus it seems clear that the commitment of the Gattilusio to their Byzantine affiliations retained the force to hold its own against what might seem more compelling outside pressures, and that it was reciprocated by the Palaiologoi. The evolution of Gattilusio alignments in Byzantine politics also suggests a nuanced and variable response to the contradictory pressures derived from the lordships' integration into other networks: from membership of the Genoese community and implication in its rivalry with Venice, from the demands of participation in Latin Christendom's common endeavours of Church Union and resistance to the Turks, and from increasing pressure to come to their own accommodation with the Ottomans. In the interplay between these considerations no single influence seems to have been consistently predominant. The outcome depended rather on changes in the diplomatic environment, shifts in policy at the imperial court and the dynamics of personal relations between the Gattilusio lords and their Byzantine friends and relatives. Such a pattern of behaviour would not constitute total immersion in the Byzantine political world, but it does suggest that the Gattilusio lords were not simply the agents of a particular outside influence but were responding to a range of considerations from both within and beyond imperial politics, not unlike those affecting the empire's native elite.

This multi-faceted engagement may help explain the unusual durability of the relationship between the Gattilusio lordships and the empire. The endurance of this attachment on both sides in the face of the strife of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries is striking. It is however explicable in the light of the particular character of Palaiologan family politics. In binding themselves to the Palaiologoi, the Gattilusio had become affiliated with a dynasty in which internecine warfare was endemic, but in which conflicts were never continuous or prosecuted to the death of any of the contending princes, and indeed seldom even to their permanent exclusion from government.⁸⁹ Sporadic outbursts of violence interspersed with reconciliation and renewed power-sharing were a standard

⁸⁹ It is telling that the only deliberate act of serious physical violence between members of the imperial dynasties of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the partial blinding of Andronikos IV and John VII after the former's revolt in 1373, was forced upon the pusillanimous John V by Murad I as a counterpart to his action against his own son, a reflection of the habitually far more savage character of competition within the Ottoman dynasty. Cf. Laiou, 'Byzantine aristocracy', p. 136.

characteristic of late Byzantine dynastic politics, from the wars between Andronikos II and Andronikos III to the final futile scuffles between the Despots Demetrios and Thomas in the Morea.⁹⁰ If Gattilusio lords at times became embroiled in the conflicts between individual Palaiologoi or even in disputes on their own account, this need not have been any more than a normal expression of their membership of the extended family of the emperors and their political world. In accordance with the norms of that world, the antagonism that arose was in time dissolved. This in itself is suggestive of the extent to which they had come to be regarded not as outsiders but as a valued element of the extended imperial family.

Legitimacy and Mutual Advantage

Together with familial connections, it was a territorial grant which had first drawn the Gattilusio into the Byzantine world, and it was as wielders of territorial authority as well as imperial relatives that their place in the imperial order continued to be defined. During the fifteenth century this role expanded as fresh imperial territories in the northern Aegean passed into their hands. By 1431 the family had acquired Samothrake and by 1434 Thasos; they may also have gained part of Lemnos around the same time.⁹¹ No known source indicates the manner by which the new territories changed hands, but it seems likely that they did so by imperial consent. The symbolism employed by the Gattilusio lords continued to emphasise their links to the Palaiologoi.⁹² Moreover, the good relations between the two families which are discernible in the 1430s and 1440s are hard to reconcile credibly with the kind of sustained process of aggression which would have been necessary for the Gattilusio to gain these territories by force. It is therefore difficult to escape the conclusion that, as in the case of Lesbos, these lands were granted voluntarily by Byzantine emperors who had reasons of their own for doing so. It is possible that money changed hands, but even if this was the case, such a transaction would have taken place in the context of wider political and governmental considerations.⁹³

⁹⁰ Nicol, *Last Centuries*, pp. 153–61, 184–208, 238–46, 277–82, 285–6, 291–2, 360, 398.

⁹¹ See below, pp. 415–6.

⁹² See below, pp. 114–23.

⁹³ The enigmatic reference by the satirist Mazaris to the sale of Thasos to one Raoul Myrmix earlier in the fifteenth century may suggest that arrangements of this sort regarding the islands were under consideration, although the nature of the source and the vagueness of the allusion leave the interpretation of this reference obscure (Mazaris, p. 48; above,

Gratitude for such grants would naturally have contributed to the family's continuing integration into the imperial sphere. As has been observed in regard to the grant of privileges to Byzantine landowners by the Palaiologoi, the benefits to the imperial government of granting heritable rights without formal conditions or obligations attached were liable to wane as goodwill faded with the passage of generations; only fresh grants would maintain loyalty at the same level. More interestingly, such willingness to concede further territories to the Gattilusio would amount to a verdict on the results of earlier concessions to the family, as well as a reflection of more general attitudes regarding the distribution of authority. It would seem that the empire's rulers had been sufficiently pleased with the results of their establishment of Gattilusio lordship in the Aegean to extend the experiment to other parts of their surviving domains. It is noticeable that whereas a number of Genoese had been enlisted to administer Byzantine maritime territories in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, after 1354 Byzantium ceased to recruit fresh individuals as it had before. When Byzantine lands were entrusted into Genoese hands, these hands were now those of the Gattilusio. The one exception to this was the proposal to confer Lemnos on Giovanni Giustiniani Longo as a reward for his help in defending Constantinople in 1453, a product of the empire's final desperation and clearly driven by this *quid pro quo* rather than by any governmental agenda.⁹⁴ The expedient of placing imperial territories under the control of the Gattilusio had evidently proved a success in Byzantine eyes where other such attempts to establish client regimes had failed to serve their purposes.

At first glance, the grounds on which the establishment of Gattilusio rule could be considered such a success as to invite its extension are not obvious. In the apparent absence of formal obligations to provide the empire with money or military service as a condition of their territorial grants, the empire would only have been able to draw upon Gattilusio

p. 101n78). The sale of Tenedos to the Venetians in the 1370s and of parts of the Morea to Venice and the Order of St. John in the 1390s reflect the willingness of the empire's rulers to take money in exchange for territory, though diplomatic manoeuvring and concerns over defence against the Ottomans were also involved. See above, p. 43; Julian Chrysostomides, *Monumenta Peloponnesiaca: documents for the history of the Peloponnese in the 14th and 15th centuries* (Camberley 1995), pp. 97–105, 107–9, 123, 269–75, 290–2, 382–8, 390, 415–6, 437–8 (nos. 45–7, 49, 60, 141, 148, 192–3, 195, 213, 223); Manuel II Palaiologos, *Funeral Oration on his Brother Theodore*, ed. Julian Chrysostomides (Thessalonike 1985), pp. 20, 167–85, 204–5.

⁹⁴ Doukas, p. 331; Kritovoulos, p. 40.

aid by specific voluntary arrangements. The regularity with which it managed to do so is dubious, since there are relatively few known cases of the Gattilusio aiding the undertakings of the empire as an institution.⁹⁵ Such activities are less conspicuous in the sources than the military assistance which the family provided to other Genoese groups.⁹⁶ It is notable that when the empire's final crisis came the Gattilusio lords were not among the Latins who assisted in the defence of Constantinople.⁹⁷ Active collaboration between Gattilusio lords and Byzantine emperors is most abundantly attested in Francesco II's frequent involvement in the schemes of John VII, and these were almost invariably personal undertakings inimical to the wider interests of the empire and the Palaiologan dynasty.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Despite the family's considerable wealth and the perennial financial neediness of Byzantium in its beleaguered final century, there is no attested instance of the Gattilusio lords making any monetary contribution to the empire in times of need (see below, pp. 254–7). When Loukas Notaras arranged a loan from a number of Genoese contributors on Constantine XI's behalf as the empire faced its final crisis, the only member of the Gattilusio clan who contributed was Battista, an erstwhile senior official of the lordship of Mytilene who had fallen out with his employers and fled from Lesbos in 1450 (Ausilia Roccatagliata, 'Nuovi documenti su Pera genovese', *SG* 11 (1990), pp. 127–43 at p. 143; below, pp. 198–9). Mytilene is attested as sending grain and perhaps troops to Constantinople during Bayezid's siege, but it must be noted that Venice and the Genoese colonies of the Black Sea provided similar assistance (Joan Bogdan, 'Ein Beitrag zur bulgarischen und serbischen Geschichtsschreibung', *Archiv für slavische Philologie* 13 (1891), pp. 481–543 at p. 542). Otherwise, identified instances of joint military action are limited to Francesco I's cooperation with John V against John Kalothetos in 1357, the proposed joint effort to install Alexander Komnenos on the throne of Trebizond in 1437–8 and Dorino's contribution to the flotilla taken by the Despot Constantine to the Morea in 1441. To this may be added the participation of the Gattilusio in crusading enterprises which were aimed wholly or in large part at assisting the empire. This would include Amadeo of Savoy's crusade of 1366, the Crusade of Nikopolis in 1396 and Boucicault's expedition of 1399, but it is impossible to be sure how far they were motivated by their Byzantine affiliations and how far by other considerations (see above, pp. 41–2, 50–1; below, pp. 327–33). The procurement of a galley for imperial service at Mytilene recorded in 1423 illustrates the potential usefulness to the empire of the maritime resources of the Gattilusio territories, but this may have been a simple business transaction (Morosini, p. 977).

⁹⁶ See below, pp. 144–52.

⁹⁷ The account of the fall of Constantinople written by Leonardo of Chios does refer to one Lodisio Gattilusio among the Latins who played a prominent part in the defence. This may have been Lodisio Gattilusio *olim* de Porta, a member of a distinct lineage within the extended Gattilusio clan whose links with the lords of Mytilene and Ainos are uncertain but who had commercial interests in Pera (see below, p. 200). However, Leonardo otherwise gives no indication of any contribution from the lordships; given his own close connection with the Gattilusio lords it seems unlikely that he would have failed to mention such an intervention. Leonardo of Chios, 'Historia Constantinopolitanae urbis a Mahumete II capta per modum epistole die 15 Augusti anno 1453 ad Nicolaum V Rom. Pont.', ed. Jacques-Paul Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus: Series Graeca*, 166 vols. (Paris 1857–83), vol. 159, coll. 923–44 at col. 936.

⁹⁸ See above, pp. 47–8, 51, 53–4.

Had John succeeded in gaining durable control of the empire for himself and his descendants, as Francesco I had helped his grandfather to do in 1354, Gattilusio support for his rise would presumably have attracted rewards, but since this did not occur, such partisan contributions to Byzantine internal politics cannot account for the gains the family continued to accrue.

If the active employment of the resources of Gattilusio territories in the service of the empire and its interests was indeed a rarity, the apparent lasting satisfaction of Byzantine rulers with their arrangement with the Gattilusio must be accounted for in large part by more modest benefits. Territories held by the family at least remained out of the hands of hostile groups and in public deference to imperial authority. Such an outcome could not be guaranteed by keeping them under direct imperial control. The sureness of Constantinople's grip on Thasos and Samothrake during the preceding decades is questionable. In Thasos as in Old Phokaia and Ainos, the upheavals of the mid-fourteenth century had left Byzantine territories in the hands of local regimes of Byzantine origin who had established themselves regardless of the imperial government and who either ruled in defiance of it or acknowledged its authority but were beyond its effective control.⁹⁹ While the island seems to have reverted to central control, the enigmatic troubles of the early fifteenth century are suggestive of continuing vulnerability.¹⁰⁰ Still greater doubts exist as to the empire's position on Samothrake. In 1379 the island, or at least a castle there, appears to have been in Turkish hands.¹⁰¹ Its fortunes in the following decades are unclear. The less consistent and assured the empire's hold on such places had been in the recent past, and the less confident its rulers were of their ability to maintain control in future, the less there was to lose by devolving their administration to the Gattilusio.

The track record the family had established over the decades indicated their effectiveness in preserving the lands they held and their consistency in acknowledging the sovereignty of the empire. The significance of this consideration is not to be discounted. The Byzantine diplomatic tradition had always placed a peculiarly great emphasis on the assertion and recognition of the emperor's titular supremacy within the Christian world. The ideological edifice of imperial primacy was both a tool by which

⁹⁹ See above, pp. 38, 41, 89–90; below, pp. 407–10, 413–4.

¹⁰⁰ See above, pp. 57–8, 101.

¹⁰¹ Daniele da Chinazzo, *Cronica de la guerra da Veniciani a Zenovesi*, ed. Vittorio Lazzarini (Venice 1958), p. 217.

the empire could exert cultural and political influence beyond what its material resources alone would have permitted, and a vital end in itself. Symbolic and ideological objectives could be accorded an importance equalling or exceeding that of more pragmatic goals of securing resources or territorial control.¹⁰² In the context of such attitudes, the apparently minor distinction between a region beyond the grasp of imperial administration but upholding imperial sovereignty and one which made no pretence of allegiance was a matter of considerable weight.

Just as the behaviour of the Gattilusio served the empire's ideological agenda, it may in large part be explained by the surviving efficacy of the empire's ideological resources as a means of influencing behaviour. The battered prestige of the empire undermined the mystique that had once enabled it to overawe and enchant outsiders and thus to shape their behaviour directly. However, where foreigners were obliged to take into consideration the views of those over whom the imperial idea still had some grip, they could still be influenced indirectly. The Gattilusio lordships operated in the heart of the former Byzantine world and the attitudes of the Greek inhabitants of this old imperial heartland were of considerable importance to them. The Gattilusio were encouraged to maintain their commitment to the empire by the advantages which the Byzantine connection brought them in terms of establishing the legitimacy of their rule in the eyes of their subjects, and thus avoiding the upheavals which had troubled or destroyed other Latin regimes in the Aegean.

There were two ways in which the Byzantine tradition of authority could be employed to underpin a foreign regime. The first was to appropriate or adapt the imperial ideology of divinely authorised rule and borrow the means which the empire had developed for communicating and promoting that system of thought. This course was pursued by rulers who themselves laid claim to sovereign authority, whether royal or imperial. They directly imitated elements of the empire's repertoire of self-presentation, inserting themselves in the role within the institutional, symbolic or behavioral scheme in question which had originally been filled by the Byzantine emperor, as a means of asserting their own authority over a political structure independent of Byzantium. These methods

¹⁰² Dimitri Obolensky, 'The principles and methods of Byzantine diplomacy', *Actes du XII^e Congrès d'Études Byzantines, Ohrid 1961*, 3 vols. (Belgrade 1964), vol. 1, pp. 45–61, reprinted in *Byzantium and the Slavs: Collected Studies* (London 1971), I; Donald M. Nicol, 'Byzantine political thought', *The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought c. 350–c.1450*, ed. J. H. Burns (Cambridge 1988), pp. 51–79.

drew on the aura of sacralised power associated with the empire, its capital and its religious institutions in ways which arguably influenced the rulers employing them to show a degree of restraint in their aggression against an enfeebled Byzantium that might otherwise have been absent.¹⁰³ Nevertheless, such practices founded on the empire's traditions and accumulated mystique owed little and contributed little to its current condition. The regimes it strengthened included those such as the Serbs and Bulgarians, or in an earlier age the Franks, who were both hostile neighbours of Byzantium engaged in violent competition with it for territory and the loyalties of its inhabitants, and usurpers of the imperial office which it claimed as exclusively its own. Thus this imitative employment of the Byzantine tradition of authority was significantly detrimental to the empire's material interests and ideological standing. In the Palaiologan period, when the empire's material influence and prestige was greatly attenuated, such practices were generally the preserve of Orthodox rulers of Orthodox peoples, denizens of the 'Byzantine commonwealth' who came from a cultural and ideological background long suffused with elements of the Byzantine tradition and whose ecclesiastical world was centred on Constantinople.

This approach must be distinguished from that followed by the Gattilusio, or by precursors and contemporaries such as the Zaccaria or the Tocco rulers of Epiros, who sought legitimation of their power by assuming the position of dependents of the Byzantine Empire itself, casting themselves not in the imperial role or one analogous to it but in that of subordinates who owed their claim to rule to the endorsement of the emperor in Constantinople. Whereas imitative appropriation affirmed the status of Byzantium subtextually but subverted it directly, this espousal of imperial endorsement upheld it explicitly. Its practitioners, including the Gattilusio themselves, commonly originated outside the Orthodox world but ruled over Orthodox populations with a history of allegiance to Byzantium.

This approach to legitimation was much more dependent for its effectiveness on the heft of the empire as it presently existed than was that of rulers who drew on Byzantine traditions to underpin their own claims to

¹⁰³ Jonathan Shepard, 'Byzantium's overlapping circles', *Proceedings of the 21st International Congress of Byzantine Studies, London 21–26 August 2006*, ed. Elizabeth Jeffreys, 3 vols. (Aldershot 2006), pp. 15–55 at pp. 20–4, 50–2; *idem*, 'The Byzantine Commonwealth 1000–1550', *The Cambridge History of Christianity*, 9 vols. (Cambridge 2006–9), vol. 5, *Eastern Christianity*, ed. Michael Angold, pp. 3–52.

wield independent power by divine right. In the last decades of Byzantium it may fairly be questioned what weight the attitude of such a diminished and enervated empire could still carry. While the decline of a state's prestige and the influence derived from it might lag behind that of its material power, particularly in the case of a state with the refined and forcefully asserted ideological arsenal of Byzantium, the decay of the empire inevitably sapped the credibility of its claims to special status and authority. However, the empire's capacity to shape perceptions would survive longest among those whose cultural and political inheritance owed most to Byzantium. The acknowledgement of the empire's role as the source of legitimate worldly authority would be likely to prove more durable in the eyes of its own current or recent subjects, and especially the Greeks, who were most closely bound to its cultural mainstream.

The success of a variety of Latin regimes, established by conquest at the expense of Byzantium, in securing at least the passive consent of the native population raises questions as to the extent of the empire's remaining influence even among the Greeks. Even when, as in the Morea, they directly bordered Byzantine territory, Latin rulers were often successful in retaining the loyalty of Greek notables.¹⁰⁴ In a number of Latin territories the emergence of local identities defined in geographical terms, spanning the sectarian divide and undermining adherence to a universalist Constantinopolitan imperial tradition has been discerned.¹⁰⁵ In so far as cultural hostility to Latin rule persisted, it may be questioned how far imperial endorsement could counteract it. During the Palaiologan period the fading strength of the empire encouraged shifts in the terms in which Greeks defined their own identity, even within areas where the empire retained control. There was increasing emphasis on Orthodox Christianity and the Hellenic cultural inheritance at the expense of identification with

¹⁰⁴ David Jacoby, 'The encounter of two societies: western conquerors and Byzantines in the Peloponnesus after the Fourth Crusade', *American Historical Review* 78 (1973), pp. 873–906 at pp. 889–906; Peter Topping, 'Co-existence of Greeks and Latins in Frankish Morea and Venetian Crete', *XVI^e Congrès international d'études byzantines. I. Histoire Rapports* (Athens 1976), pp. 3–23, reprinted in *Studies on Latin Greece A.D. 1205–1715* (London 1977), XI; Jeannine Horowitz, 'Quand les Champenois parlaient le grec: la Morée franque au XIII^e siècle, un bouillon de culture', *Cross cultural convergences in the crusader period: essays presented to Aryeh Grabois on his sixty-fifth birthday*, ed. Michael Goodich, Sophia Menache and Sylvia Schein (New York 1995), pp. 111–50.

¹⁰⁵ Teresa Shawcross, *The Chronicle of Morea: historiography in crusader Greece* (Oxford 2009), pp. 190–259; Sally McKee, *Uncommon Dominion: Venetian Crete and the myth of ethnic purity* (Philadelphia 2000); Gill Page, *Being Byzantine: Greek identity before the Ottomans* (Cambridge 2008), pp. 177–242.

the Byzantine state and its ideology of universal authority.¹⁰⁶ Such trends might be expected to undermine the capacity of the empire to influence the acceptability or otherwise of foreign, Latin rule to an Orthodox Greek population.

However, the islands and enclaves of the Anatolian littoral in the first half of the fourteenth century had in fact produced a conspicuous amount of unrest directed against Latin regimes, mounted by members of the local elite and the general population. This dissidence was expressed in terms of loyalty to Byzantium and sometimes enacted in active cooperation with imperial forces, with the aim of restoring the territories involved to the empire's control. The smaller islands under Hospitaller rule had been affected by such convulsions.¹⁰⁷ Most compellingly from the Gattilusio point of view, the Zaccaria, the Cattaneo and the Mahona of Chios had all fallen victim to it, suffering significant losses of territory or the total destruction of their regimes.¹⁰⁸ They had apparently refrained from inflammatory policies such as severe religious repression or the indiscriminate expropriation of land.¹⁰⁹ Yet Latin rule still frequently generated violent and sometimes successful Greek opposition, construed in specifically pro-Byzantine terms, in the particular environment in which the Gattilusio regime was established.

There are also grounds for supposing that the upheavals in the eastern Aegean were not simply the product of hostility to Latin rule as such,

¹⁰⁶ Anthony Kaldellis, *Hellenism in Byzantium: the transformation of Greek identity and the reception of the classical tradition* (Cambridge 2007), pp. 42–111; Speros Vryonis, 'Byzantine cultural self-consciousness in the fifteenth century', *The Twilight of Byzantium: aspects of cultural and religious history in the late Byzantine Empire. Papers from the colloquium held at Princeton University 8–9 May 1989*, ed. Slobodan Curcic and Doula Mouriki (Princeton, N. J. 1991), pp. 5–14 at pp. 7–14; Michael Angold, 'Byzantine 'Nationalism' and the Nicaean Empire', *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 1 (1984), pp. 49–70 at pp. 50–6, 62–8; Paul Magdalino, 'Hellenism and nationalism in Byzantium', *Tradition and Transformation in Medieval Byzantium* (Aldershot 1991), XIV, pp. 9–18; Jonathan Harris, 'Being a Byzantine after Byzantium: Hellenic identity in Renaissance Italy', *Κάμπος: Cambridge Papers in Modern Greek* 8 (2000), pp. 25–44; Page, pp. 219–24, 283–388.

¹⁰⁷ In 1319 the Greek inhabitants of Leros slaughtered their Hospitaller garrison and sought to bring the island back under Byzantine rule (Joseph Delaville le Roulx, *Les Hospitaliers à Rhodes (1310–1421)* (Paris 1913, reprinted London 1974), pp. 365–7 (no. 2)). In 1347 there was another revolt against the Order's feudatories on Nisyros (AOM 317 (*Libri Bullarum* 2), f. 240).

¹⁰⁸ See above, pp. 35–8.

¹⁰⁹ Anthony Luttrell, 'The Greeks of Rhodes under Hospitaller rule: 1306–1421', *Rivista di studi bizantini e neoellenici* n.s. 29 (1992), pp. 193–223, reprinted in *The Hospitaller State on Rhodes and its Western Provinces* (Aldershot 1999), III, pp. 207–17; Argenti, vol. 1, pp. 99–100, 569–76, 652; cf. below, pp. 292–3.

or of the interaction between particular regimes and their subjects, but were influenced by the relations between Latin rulers and Byzantium. Only where those rulers had secured their position by force, or where they had been established by imperial mandate but subsequently broken with the empire, did they become the targets of rebellion or attack by local forces. It is conspicuous that for decades the Zaccaria and their Cattaneo clients, ruling by imperial consent, were apparently able to avoid any conflict with their subjects, yet in the wake of Martino Zaccaria's effective renunciation of his Byzantine allegiance through his compact with the Latin Emperor the Greeks of Chios were ready to rise against him in the name of Byzantium. At that time the legitimacy of Cattaneo rule in Phokaia was renewed by Andronikos III, and the insurrection against the Genoese there came only after Domenico Cattaneo's open aggression against the empire at Lesbos in 1335–6. The capture of Chios and Phokaia by the Genoese in 1346 was followed by hostilities, but after John V's acceptance of the rule of the Mahona it appears to have remained untroubled by active Greek opposition. The evidence is circumstantial, but there does seem to have been a correspondence between imperial endorsement and local Greek acquiescence. This suggests that even while the empire's ability to coerce the rulers of this region directly withered, the continued loyalty of its inhabitants remained a significant source of indirect pressure. The imperial imprimatur therefore remained a valuable asset for a Latin regime.

The experience of their Genoese compatriots in the very region where they had now acquired authority themselves, and the part played in it by relations with Byzantium, can hardly have escaped the notice of the Gattilusio lords. While the significance of the religious and cultural rifts between the Genoese dynasty and their subjects could be moderated by a judicious sensitivity toward the Orthodox Church and its devotees, the Gattilusio could not ultimately eradicate the problem without forsaking their own religious tradition.¹¹⁰ For a regime which retained its Latin identity, the most open field for endeavour in gaining the goodwill of a Greek population lay in the sphere of political legitimacy. The manner in which the rule of the Gattilusio lords had first been established meant that they were already fortunate enough to possess both the formal stamp of imperial endorsement for their rule and a close familial bond with a long-standing ruling dynasty. They thus enjoyed a legitimate claim to wield

¹¹⁰ See below, pp. 286–302, 313–7.

power both in terms of the ancient standards of Byzantine autocracy and the emerging practice of imperial government through family connection. Without efforts to consolidate and maintain these advantages they could readily be eroded, as the cautionary example of the Zaccaria made clear. Their exploitation depended on preserving and periodically reinforcing the Byzantine connection, by continuing to acknowledge imperial authority, by avoiding open and sustained conflict with the empire and the imperial dynasty as a whole, and by periodically renewing their marital bond with the Palaiologoi.

The conventional means by which empires secured the loyalty of client rulers and prevented co-opted barbarians from reverting to predatory type were lacking in late Byzantium. The empire retained only a starkly attenuated and dwindling capacity to retain its clients' loyalty through the threat of military force and it could offer them no protection or financial incentives. Its cultural and ideological blandishments were undermined by the robust, sophisticated and often antagonistic cultural arsenal of the Latin West, and by its own diminished prestige. Yet its residual grip upon the thinking of its own traditional subjects enabled the empire to incorporate itself into the very foundations of a client regime, whose rulers would then be loath to stray from it for fear of jeopardising the power established with imperial help. Paradoxically, the cultural and religious divide between Greeks and Latins could strengthen the bonds formed in this way, by increasing the potential for hostility between a Latin dynasty and its Greek subjects and thus enhancing the benefits of the imperial connection in defusing that antagonism.

The Self-Representation of the Regime

Fundamental both to the benefits which Byzantium could achieve through its relationship with the Gattilusio and to the means by which the Gattilusio could exploit that relationship was their outward affirmation of their Byzantine connection. The priority which Byzantine ideology and diplomatic traditions placed on acknowledgement of imperial sovereignty demanded clear public proclamation of the fact that their clients ruled by their permission, while those clients could only impress the legitimacy of their rule on their subjects by advertising the same fact. The terms on which the Zaccaria had received territories from Byzantium had required them to display the imperial standard and acknowledge the emperor's authority on ceremonial occasions; they had also produced coins whose

inscription declared them to be the issues of 'Servorum Imperatoris'.¹¹¹ The Genoese colony of Pera, which likewise owed its existence to Byzantine concessions, also displayed imperial symbols in recognition of the sovereignty of the emperor.¹¹² It is unknown whether the Gattilusio lords were under any explicit formal obligations such as those placed on the Zaccaria. However, the available evidence for their public presentation of themselves and their rule to their subjects and to other observers is suffused with symbolic evocations of their rule by imperial consent and their affiliation with the Palaiologoi.

The family connection was emphasised through the use of the compound surname 'Palaiologos Gattilusio'. This is found in only one of the numerous western documents relating to the family, a Genoese notarial act relating to Jacopo.¹¹³ However, it appears on a number of occasions in contexts where the author or intended audience was at least partly Greek. These include an inscription erected by Dorino at Old Phokaia, one regarding the founding of a church in Ainos which mentions Palamede, and another erected on the latter's behalf on a tower on Samothrake.¹¹⁴ Dorino was also assigned this surname by the Byzantine courtier and historian George Sphrantzes.¹¹⁵ All known examples of this nomenclature relate to these three lords, all belonging to the third generation of the dynasty. It was not used in the Byzantine formulae for addressing letters dating from the time of Francesco II of Mytilene and Niccolò of Ainos.¹¹⁶

¹¹¹ Kantakouzenos, vol. 1, pp. 370–1; Giuseppe Lunardi, *Le Monete delle Colonie Genovesi* (Genoa 1980) (ASLSP 94/1 (n.s. 20/1)), pp. 179, 183–6; Gustave Schlumberger, *Numismatique de l'Orient Latin*, 2 vols. (Paris 1878), vol. 2, pp. 414–5, plates 13–4; Andreas Mazarakis, 'Some thoughts on the Chios mint during the time of the Zaccaria family rule 1304–1328', *Atti del Congresso Internazionale "Dai feudi monferrini e dal Piemonte ai nuovi mondi oltre gli Oceani" Alessandria 2–6 aprile 1990*, ed. Laura Balletto (Alessandria 1993), pp. 319–36 at pp. 321–6; *idem*, *Zaccaria e Della Volta nell'Egeo Orientale, 1268–1329* (Athens 2006), pp. 68, 76–7.

¹¹² Nicholas Oikonomides, 'The Byzantine overlord of Genoese possessions in Romania', *Porphyrogenita: Essays on Byzantine History, in honour of Julian Chrysostomides*, ed. Charalambos Dendrinios, Jonathan Harris, Eirene Harvalia-Crook and Judith Herrin (Aldershot 2003), pp. 235–8.

¹¹³ ASG, *NI L*, no. 74.

¹¹⁴ F.W. Hasluck, 'Monuments of the Gattalusi', *Archive of the British School of Archaeology* 15 (1908–9), pp. 248–69 at pp. 254, 258; Catherine Asdracha, 'Inscriptions de la Thrace Orientale et de l'île d'Imbros (XII^e–XV^e s.)', *Αρχαιολογικόν Δελτίον* 43/1 (1988), pp. 251–86 at pp. 264–7 (no 34), plate 113b; Catherine Asdracha and Charalambos Bakirtzis, 'Inscriptions Byzantines de Thrace (VIII^e–XV^e siècles): édition et commentaire historique', *Αρχαιολογικόν Δελτίον* 35/1 (1980), pp. 241–82 at pp. 271–3 (no 30), plate 77; Alexander Conze, *Reise auf den Inseln des Thrakischen Meeres* (Hannover 1860), plate 3, no. 8.

¹¹⁵ Sphrantzes, pp. 88–9.

¹¹⁶ Lampros, *Catalogue*, vol. 2, pp. 304–5 (no. 41); Darrouzès, 'Ekthesis', p. 61.

Clearly only those Gattilusio lords who were themselves descended from the Palaiologoi could style themselves in this way, but there is also no indication that the first such lord, Francesco II, chose to do so. The introduction of the compound surname by his sons could indicate an intensification of the desire to identify with their imperial heritage; certainly it suggests that it had not diminished.

The most prominent physical manifestations of Gattilusio rule were the fortifications and other buildings they erected in their territories, and the inscriptions these bore give a clear impression of the conception of their government they wished to convey to onlookers.¹¹⁷ The same collection of symbols recur time and again on their sarcophagi and stone plaques incorporated into their buildings. Unsurprisingly, the most common motif of all was the fish-scale pattern which comprised the arms of the Gattilusio family itself. Another common symbol was a single-headed eagle, apparently reflecting the close connection of the Gattilusio with the great Genoese Doria family.¹¹⁸ Alongside these emblems are displayed others which emphasise the family's Byzantine affiliations, primarily the Palaiologos monogram, the imperial double-headed eagle and the Palaiologan emblem of a cross surrounded by four Betas.¹¹⁹ A plaque from Lesbos bears a monogram of the emperor Manuel II; another from the

¹¹⁷ Cf. Geo Pistarino, 'I simboli del potere', *I signori del mare* (Genoa 1992), pp. 41–96 at pp. 68–71.

¹¹⁸ It has been suggested that the use of this eagle derives from its employment as a Byzantine symbol (Andreas Mazarakis, 'Συμβολή στην εραλδική των αναμνηστικών και επιτάφιων πλακών της περιόδου των Γατελούζων στη Μυτιλήνη', *Αρχαιολογικόν Δελτίον* 53 (1998), pp. 361–86 at p. 369). This may be true in some instances. However, such an eagle appears on a Gattilusio plaque from Mytilene in a coat of arms which combines it with both the Gattilusio scales and the four Betas of the Palaiologoi (Mazarakis, 'Συμβολή', pp. 382–3 (no. 15), plate 117β, Hasluck, p. 264). Thus this single-headed eagle presumably represents a third strand in the genealogy of the lord who set up the plaque. Given the exact resemblance between this eagle and the arms of the Doria, that family's early intermarriage and enduring close relationship with the Gattilusio lords, and the prestige within the Genoese community of this connection with one of the city's foremost noble houses, this third family is surely the Doria.

¹¹⁹ Asdracha, 'Thrace', pp. 259–64, 282–4 (nos. 29–33, 46), plates 111a–b, 112b, 118b; Asdracha and Bakirtzis, pp. 271–6, 278–80 (nos. 30–1, 33), plates 76b, 77, 78b; Hasluck, pp. 254–64; Eric A. Ivison, 'Funerary Monuments of the Gattalusi at Mitylene', *Archive of the British School of Archaeology* 87 (1992), pp. 423–37; Conze, plate 3; Mazarakis, 'Συμβολή', pp. 375–9, 381–2 (nos. 1–3, 5, 7–8, 12–14), plates 113ε, 114α–β, 115α–γ, 116α, δ–ε, 117α; Antonio M. de Guadan, 'El escudo personal de los Paléologos y la amonedación de los Gattilusio de Metelin en los siglos XIV y XV', *Acta Numismatica* 5 (1975), pp. 137–49 at pp. 141–6; Alfred R. Bellinger, Philip Grierson and Michael F. Hendy, *Catalogue of the Byzantine Coins in the Dumbarton Oaks Collection and in the Whittemore Collection*, 5 vols. (Washington D.C. 1966–99), vol. 5, pp. 87–9.

same island with monograms of Manuel and of his brother Theodore is identical to a plaque from Lemnos, at that time under direct Byzantine rule.¹²⁰

Almost all of the extant coins minted by the Gattilusio likewise bear acknowledgements of imperial authority; in the case of most of their silver and copper issues this recognition was conveyed through Byzantine symbols of the same kind as the family used in their monumental inscriptions. For the most part these take the form of the Palaiologan emblem of the cross and four Betas on one face of the coin. This was matched with a variety of other designs on the reverse, typically either the Gattilusio arms, the initial letter of the name of the lord who issued the coin or the Lamb of God, all symbols used by a series of different lords.¹²¹ In one case, a silver coin issued by Niccolò II as lord of Mytilene, the design chosen was an image of his namesake saint.¹²² The four Betas emblem constituted a public recognition of the authority by which the Gattilusio ruled and minted, while the design on the opposite face represented the family themselves, the individual lord in question or, in the case of the Lamb of God, perhaps their adherence to Catholicism. This practice finds a parallel in anonymous coins from Rhodes bearing the four Betas or variations on the emblem, which were apparently issued by the Genoese lords who had been established there by the empire in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.¹²³

The Gattilusio lords also employed coin designs derived from common western types; these were the coins of higher value, for which the credibility gained by association with the trusted currency on which they were based would have been more important. While the need to remain close to the appearance of the original did not afford so much scope for the display of Byzantine symbols, deference to imperial sovereignty could be conveyed verbally. The only known gold coinage issued by the Gattilusio lords was the ducat. As the region's most widely used gold coin in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, this Venetian type was widely imitated by

¹²⁰ Mazarakis, 'Συμβολή', plates 113α, 113β; Conze, plate 3, no. 3.

¹²¹ S. Kofopoulos and A. Mazarakis, 'I Gattilusio: revisioni genealogiche e numismatiche', *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οι Γατελούζοι της Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 399–434 at pp. 412–5, 418–9, 421–32; Lunardi, pp. 135–6, 247, 250–9, 262–71.

¹²² Lunardi, p. 268; Kofopoulos and Mazarakis, pp. 428–9; R. A. G. Carson, 'A grosso of the lords of Mytilene', *The Numismatic Chronicle* 6th series 15 (1955), pp. 255–6.

¹²³ Lunardi, pp. 149–68.

regimes in the eastern Mediterranean.¹²⁴ The ducats issued by Francesco I displayed a particularly high quality of workmanship and made significant modifications to the original imagery by altering the image of the Venetian doge on the obverse into a figure in military dress representing Francesco himself, who was named in the accompanying inscription. They also bore the name of the Emperor John V in Greek in place of the usual inscription on the reverse.¹²⁵ These alterations may reflect the particular importance to a newly established regime of asserting its own identity and legitimacy. This offset the practical imperative to remain as close as possible to the trusted coinage being imitated without straying into actual counterfeiting. Under Francesco's successors this consideration seems to have been less persuasive, as the surviving ducats of later Gattilusio lords departed from the form of the Venetian original only in identifying the lord who issued them in the inscription on the obverse.¹²⁶

Another western type adapted by the Gattilusio lords was the silver *gigliato*, based on an Angevin coin which, like the ducat, was widely imitated in modified forms in the Latin East.¹²⁷ A single type of Gattilusio *gigliato* survives, issued by either Francesco I or Francesco II. This altered the original imagery by replacing the small Angevin emblems at the extremities of the large cross on one face with shields displaying the Gattilusio arms. The image of an enthroned ruler on the opposite face, which in the original represented the Angevin king, is here identified by a Greek inscription as the Byzantine Emperor. This accorded with the practice applied in other Aegean imitations of the *gigliato*, which likewise placed symbols of the issuing regime at the tips of the cross and identified the figure on the other face as that regime's own head or the sovereign authority it acknowledged.¹²⁸ While the *gigliato* remained part of the system of money of account in use in the lordship of Mytilene, the lack of surviving

¹²⁴ Herbert E. Ives, *The Venetian Gold Ducat and its Imitations* (New York 1954), pp. 18–28.

¹²⁵ Ernest Oberländer-Târnoveanu, “Immo verius sub ducati Venetiarum communis proprio stigmatē” La question des émissions d'or de Francesco I^{er} Gattilusio, seigneur de Metelino (1355–1384), *Revue Numismatique* 160 (2004), pp. 223–40.

¹²⁶ Lunardi, pp. 133–4, 248–9, 260–1; Kofopoulos and Mazarakis, pp. 420, 424, 430–1; William de Peyster, ‘Un ducat inédit de Dorino Gattilusio, seigneur de Phocée (1400–1449)’, *Revue Numismatique* 6th series 11 (1969), pp. 294–5.

¹²⁷ Philip Grierson, ‘La moneta veneziana nell'economia mediterranea del '300 e '400', *La civiltà veneziana del Quattrocento* (Florence 1957), pp. 75–97 at pp. 83–5.

¹²⁸ Giorgio Giacosa, ‘Un gigliato inedito di Francesco I Gattilusio, signore di Lesbo’, *Numismatica e Antichità Classiche (Quaderni Ticinesi)* 19 (1990), pp. 337–44; Kofopoulos and Mazarakis, pp. 415–7.

coins recognisable as *gigliati* struck by later lords suggests that the actual coin dropped out of production by the Gattilusio.¹²⁹

Verbal allusions to the emperor had particular importance on these coin types, based closely on western models, since their established design effectively precluded the prominent use of emblems to transmit the message. While such acknowledgements in words were normally absent from the more original Gattilusio coin designs, in which recognition of imperial sovereignty was conveyed by symbols alone, a carat issued by Francesco I or Francesco II does exist bearing the emperor's title in Greek along with the four Betas.¹³⁰ The fact that this explicit verbal acknowledgement is found only on the coins of one or both of the first two lords of Mytilene is probably to be connected with the recent establishment of the regime and the associated need to spell out its character as a Byzantine dependency unambiguously. The practice did not operate across the full range of coinage types even at that time, as the surviving *denari* bearing the name of Francesco do not carry the imperial title.¹³¹ It is only those coin types which bear verbal references to the emperor that have Greek inscriptions, perhaps because it was felt to be appropriate to use the imperial language when the message of the inscription related directly to the empire, while a preference for Latin otherwise prevailed. This pattern is unlikely to reflect a chronological shift away from the use of Greek, since the evidence of Gattilusio inscriptions suggests a contrary development.¹³² Only two surviving Gattilusio coin types besides their later ducats carry no acknowledgement of imperial authority. These are a carat of Francesco I or Francesco II bearing the Lamb of God on the reverse and on the obverse a kneeling figure holding a banner, and a carat of Jacopo displaying his initial and the Lamb of God.¹³³

The employment of Byzantine symbols on Gattilusio coinage differs starkly from the direct imitation of Byzantine coins which was common in the Christian lands of the medieval eastern Mediterranean, and which sprang from very different motives. In contrast to the Gattilusio practice

¹²⁹ Andreas Mazarakis, 'Some new evidence regarding the numismatic system of the Gattilusii, lords of Lesbos', *Νομισματικά Χρόνικα* 9 (1990), pp. 141–54 at pp. 147–9; Kofopoulos and Mazarakis, pp. 405–7, 432–3.

¹³⁰ Kofopoulos and Mazarakis, pp. 418–9.

¹³¹ Lunardi, pp. 247, 258–9; Kofopoulos and Mazarakis, pp. 414–5, 419.

¹³² See below, p. 123.

¹³³ Lunardi, p. 246; Kofopoulos and Mazarakis, pp. 412–3, 422–3; Anastasios P. Tzamalīs, 'Some new evidence of the coinage of the Gattilusii, lords of Lesbos', *Numismatic Circular* 88 (1980), pp. 2–4 at p. 2.

of presenting a Byzantine symbol on one side of a coin rendered unmistakably different from imperial ones by the design on the other side, this kind of emulation roughly duplicated the form of imperial issues. Such mimicry was driven partly by ideological aggrandisement and partly by practical considerations, having its roots in the period, up until the early eleventh century, when the imperial gold *nomisma* was of consistently high purity and Byzantine issues were in widespread use.¹³⁴ In this context, imitation was favoured by the benefits of familiarity and borrowed credibility. By the time the Gattilusio lords began to mint coins the age of Byzantine numismatic dominance was a distant memory and the empire's acutely devalued coinage had long since been replaced as an international currency by the Florentine florin and more recently the Venetian ducat.¹³⁵ The economic motives that had once encouraged the adoption of Byzantine motifs by peoples such as the Serbs and Bulgarians thus impelled the Gattilusio to model their own gold coinage on that of Venice rather than mimic current imperial designs. They may have gone so far as to counterfeit actual Venetian ducats, an accusation directed at Francesco I by the Venetians in 1357, although it is questionable whether this allegation was well-founded.¹³⁶ Even had Byzantine coinage still possessed any commercial lustre which might reflect upon them, the Gattilusio coins that did bear imperial symbols could not have benefited from it, since they did not in fact resemble imperial issues.

With regard to ideological considerations, rulers imitating Byzantine models normally borrowed religious motifs and imagery glorifying the ruler issuing the coin, such as the portrayal of the ruler receiving a cross or standard from Christ, a saint or an angel, or rulers in imperial regalia sharing such an emblem between them. As in Byzantine issues, this was typically matched on the reverse by the portrayal of Christ enthroned. In these designs the rulers in question took the place occupied by

¹³⁴ Cécile Morrisson, 'Byzantine money: its markets and circulation', *The Economic History of Byzantium*, ed. Angeliki E. Laiou, 3 vols. (Washington D.C. 2002), vol. 3, pp. 909–66 at pp. 921–3, 928–31, plates 2, 5.

¹³⁵ Michael F. Hendy, *Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy c.300–1450* (Cambridge 1985), pp. 526–30; Alan M. Stahl, *Zecca: the mint of Venice in the Middle Ages* (Baltimore and London 2000), pp. 212–7.

¹³⁶ A. Luxuro and G. Pinelli-Gentile, 'Documenti riguardanti alcuni dinasti dell'Arcipelago, pubblicati per saggio di studi paleografici', *Giornale Ligustico di archeologia, storia e belle arti* 1 (1874), pp. 84–90, 217–221, vol. 2 (1875), pp. 86–93, 292–7, vol. 3 (1876), pp. 313–6, vol. 5 (1878), pp. 345–70 at vol. 1, pp. 84–5 (no. 1); Oberlander-Tarnoveanu, pp. 234–40.

Byzantine emperors in the originals.¹³⁷ Such appropriation of the imagery of the divinely authorised sovereign was not recognition of Byzantine supremacy but rather its negation. The specifically imperial, but not definitively Palaiologan, image of the double-headed eagle was also employed by monarchs such as the Bulgarian tsars who themselves claimed the status of emperor, or by those recognising those monarchs' claims and sovereignty.¹³⁸ This sort of practice was fundamentally at odds with the Gattilusio lords' non-imitative use of imperial and Palaiologan imagery, which did not usurp Byzantine authority but affirmed it and claimed its imprimatur. Unlike the Gattilusio lords, rulers imitating Byzantine coinage for their own non-deferential purposes did not borrow more definitively Byzantine dynastic imagery such as the four Betas or the Palaiologos monogram. In the hands of those not themselves claiming to be emperors, the use of imagery like the double-headed eagle implied an acknowledgement of subjection to an imperial authority, whether that of Byzantium or of another claimant to imperial dignity such as Bulgaria. The use of emblems exclusively associated with the Byzantine ruling dynasty was inextricably bound up with recognition of the supremacy of that empire specifically.

The use of Byzantine imagery did not cease with the extinction of the empire in 1453. The surviving coins issued by Domenico and by Niccolò II as lords of Mytilene all continued to bear the four Betas emblem.¹³⁹ This is presumably to be explained by some combination of inertia, the family's own Palaiologan ancestry and the desire of the Gattilusio lords to continue emphasising to their subjects that their regime was of Byzantine foundation and continued to rule in the Byzantine tradition despite the empire's demise.

The straightforward display of symbols relating to the empire and the ruling dynasty advertised the formal legitimacy of Gattilusio rule in imperial eyes, in a fashion comparable to the practice of other Genoese regimes whose authority derived from Byzantine concessions. Conveying the other aspect of the Byzantine foundations for the family's claim to the right to rule, their dynastic connection with the Palaiologoi, was presumably the purpose of the compound symbols they employed. Coats of arms displayed on some Gattilusio plaques combined the fish-scale

¹³⁷ E.g. Stojan Avdev, *Bŭlgarskite Srednovekovni Moneti* (Sofia 2007), pp. 24–44, 68–72, 88–91, 106–29, 141–50, 190–3; Vesna Radić, *Eight Centuries of the Serbian Dinar: medieval coins* (Belgrade 1994), pp. 14–5, 17, 38–9, 42, 44, 53, 58, plates.

¹³⁸ E.g. Avdev, pp. 172–4, 237–41, 245–7; Radić, pp. 45, 49, plates.

¹³⁹ Lunardi, pp. 266–71; Kofopoulos and Mazarakis, pp. 427–30.

pattern of the Gattilusio arms with the four Betas of the Palaiologoi, accompanied on occasion by the single-headed eagle apparently denoting the Doria connection, indicating the family's affiliations in standard heraldic terms.¹⁴⁰ This sort of blending of symbols to assert the family's personal bonds with the Palaiologoi is absent from the surviving coinage of most of the Gattilusio lords, but is present on the *denari* issued by Dorino I as lord of Old Phokaia and later as lord of Mytilene. These show another compound emblem: the double-headed imperial eagle with the Gattilusio arms upon its chest.¹⁴¹ This symbol also appears on plaques from Old Phokaia and Mytilene.¹⁴²

All the datable uses of compound symbols derive from the 1420s or later, and it has been argued that at this point a Byzantine tradition of symbolism which was embodied in the display of Gattilusio and Byzantine symbols alongside one another was displaced by western heraldic practice.¹⁴³ It is not clear, however, what change could have promoted such a development, when the passage of time might be expected to have distanced the Gattilusio from western norms rather than binding them more tightly to them. Nor is the display of such symbols side by side a specifically Byzantine practice, but one which is also observable within the Genoese tradition. Most notably, the appearance of the Doria eagle alongside the cross of St. George, patron of Genoa, on similar stone plaques on the walls of the family church of the Doria in Genoa presents an exact parallel, placing the arms of the family alongside the emblem of the polity whose authority they acknowledged.¹⁴⁴

It is also noticeable that it is from the same point in time that the compound surname 'Palaiologos Gattilusio' first appears in surviving inscriptions.¹⁴⁵ This development amounts to a verbal counterpart to the visual message of integrating Gattilusio and Byzantine symbols into a single emblem. It can scarcely be attributed to the advance of heraldry, nor to the advance of western norms of any sort. Such compound surnames

¹⁴⁰ Hasluck, pp. 255, 264; Mazarakis, 'Συμβολή', plate 117β; Asdracha, 'Thrace', pp. 261–4, 282–4 (nos. 32–3, 46), plates 112b, 118b; Angelo Sanguineti, 'Iscrizioni Greche della Liguria', *ASLSP* 11 (1875), pp. 289–352 at pp. 341–6 (no. 13).

¹⁴¹ Lunardi, pp. 264–5; Kofopoulos and Mazarakis, pp. 426, 432.

¹⁴² Hasluck, p. 258; Mazarakis, 'Συμβολή', plate 117α.

¹⁴³ Mazarakis, 'Συμβολή', pp. 366–8. It should be noted that multiple undated examples both with and without compound symbols exist.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Edoardo Mazzino, Teofilo Ossian di Negri and Leonard von Matt, *Il Centro Storico di Genova* (Genoa 1969, 4th ed. 1978), p. 119.

¹⁴⁵ See above, pp. 115–6.

abounded among the Byzantine aristocracy but were rare in Genoa, except where they commemorated the former name of a family absorbed into a larger *albergo* (composite clan).¹⁴⁶ It was also around the 1420s that Latin apparently gave way to Greek as the most usual language of extant Gattilusio monumental inscriptions, another development which would sit oddly with a putative displacement of Byzantine forms by western ones.¹⁴⁷

It therefore seems more likely that the shift in symbolism, verbal as well as visual, reflects a shift not in form but in content, and that this was the product of changed genealogical circumstances, namely the accession of Gattilusio lords of imperial ancestry. Rather than separate symbols standing side by side, corresponding to houses allied with one another but remaining essentially separate, the Gattilusio now sought to convey a genuine synthesis, a purpose for which the forms of heraldry were ideally suited. The later generations of Gattilusio lords were as eager as their predecessors to emphasise that they were loyal adherents of the Byzantine ruling dynasty, but were also able to proclaim that they were themselves an offshoot of it, an option that had not been open to the first lords of Mytilene and Ainos.

¹⁴⁶ Laiou, 'Byzantine aristocracy', pp. 135–6; Cesare Cattaneo Mallone di Novi, *I "politici" del Medioevo genovese (ricerche d'archivio): Il Liber Civilitatis del 1528* (Genoa 1987), p. 61; below, pp. 152–3.

¹⁴⁷ All dated Gattilusio inscriptions of the fourteenth century bear text in Latin only; this pattern continues as far as an inscription of 1413 from Ainos (Mazarakis, 'Συμβολή', pp. 375–7 (nos. 1–4), plates 113ε, 114α–δ; Asdracha, 'Thrace', pp. 259–61 (nos. 29–30), plate 111a–b). The first Greek inscription appears in 1416/7, also in Ainos (Asdracha, 'Thrace', p. 261 (no. 31)). The majority of the inscriptions set up by the regime thereafter, including examples from Ainos, Old Phokaia, Samothrake and Imbros, are in Greek only (Asdracha, 'Thrace', pp. 263–4, 282–4 (nos. 33, 46), plate 118b; Asdracha and Bakirtzis, pp. 273–6, 278–80 (nos. 31, 33), plates 77, 78b; Hasluck, p. 258). Two inscriptions of the 1430s, one from Samothrake and the other from Thasos, employ both languages (Asdracha and Bakirtzis, pp. 271–3 (no. 30), plate 76b, Conze, plate 3, no. 4). Two more are entirely in Latin. The first of these, from Thasos, does not survive but was recorded by Ciriaco of Ancona on his visit there in 1444, having been set up some time after the installation of the young Francesco III, son of Dorino of Mytilene, as the island's ruler (Ciriaco of Ancona, *Cyriac of Ancona: later travels*, ed. Edward Bodnar and Clive Foss, (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts 2003), p. 108). The other was erected by Niccolò II to mark the construction of a loggia in Mytilene in 1460 (Mazarakis, 'Συμβολή', pp. 380–1 (no. 11); Spyridon P. Lampros, 'Σύμμικτα', *Νέος Ελληνισμός* 8 (1911), pp. 91–103 at pp. 94–5). This is the only surviving inscription from Lesbos dated to the period after the appearance of Greek inscriptions in the family's other territories, so it may be that the shift to the use of Greek apparently discernible elsewhere did not take place on Lesbos. This would not be surprising, given the probably greater concentration of Latin settlement there, particularly in Mytilene and other major centres (see below, pp. 260–6).

The Impact of the Byzantine Connection

There is a distinct shortage of positive evidence regarding the actual impact which the legitimacy conferred on the Gattilusio lords by Byzantium, and their efforts to advertise it, had on the attitudes and behaviour of their subjects. The view that they succeeded in securing the consent of the Greek populace to an extent unusual for a Latin regime is therefore founded to a considerable extent on silence.¹⁴⁸ This is almost inevitable, since contentment or acquiescence attract less comment than protest and resistance. Nevertheless, there are some more positive indications that the Gattilusio lords enjoyed significantly better relations with their Greek subjects than was normal for Latin regimes in the Aegean, a discrepancy most readily accounted for by the Byzantine connection. Greeks appear to have been entrusted with positions of power and responsibility on a level which was unusual elsewhere in the Latin East, a reflection of the ruling family's belief that their loyalty could be relied upon.¹⁴⁹ There is also evidence that the general level of sectarian tension and suspicion within their territories was low, despite the potential for aggravation presented by the arrival of a Catholic ruling family and the Latin community that gathered around them.¹⁵⁰ The unusual extent to which the Gattilusio seem to have refrained from interference in the operation of the Orthodox Church surely also contributed to this atmosphere.¹⁵¹ Presumably, however, this attitude was itself a reflection of the different character conferred on Gattilusio rule by the Byzantine foundations of its authority.

The evidence of Greek goodwill towards Gattilusio rule presented by the apparent lack of rebellions they faced may also be reinforced by their apparent involvement in revolts against Byzantine rule. According to Chalkokondyles they acquired Ainos at the invitation of a population discontented with their present governor. The evidence regarding the conflict on Thasos in 1414 leads to the tentative conclusion that Giorgio Gattilusio had somehow become involved in an uprising by the island's inhabitants.¹⁵² These episodes, which set members of the family at odds

¹⁴⁸ E.g. William Miller, 'The Gattilusj of Lesbos (1355–1462)', *BZ* 22 (1913), pp. 406–47, reprinted in *Essays on the Latin Orient* (Cambridge 1921, reprinted Amsterdam 1964), pp. 351–2; Balletto, 'Gattilusio', pp. 455–8.

¹⁴⁹ See below, pp. 266–86.

¹⁵⁰ See below, pp. 308–9.

¹⁵¹ See below, pp. 292–302.

¹⁵² See above, pp. 57–8, 101.

with imperial authority and flew in the face of legitimacy in any strict sense, may paradoxically amount to evidence of their integration into the Byzantine political sphere. Whereas other Latin regimes in the region had been afflicted by Greek rebellions against them aimed at restoring Byzantine rule, the Gattilusio seemingly found themselves the beneficiaries of insurrections which proclaimed a preference for their rule over that of the existing administration. This contrast may be accounted for in part by the effect of decades of Gattilusio rule under imperial sovereignty and the family's association with the Palaiologoi. If the Gattilusio were widely regarded within the empire as having become an intrinsic part of its politics and a benign element in its government rather than predatory outsiders, this might greatly enhance their allure to disgruntled Byzantine Greeks as potential alternative rulers. By appealing to the Gattilusio they could escape whatever problems rendered their present governors obnoxious to them without passing entirely outside the Byzantine sphere. Such acceptability in Byzantine terms may also have contributed to the support for the establishment or continuation of Gattilusio rule among Aegean islanders in the wake of the fall of Constantinople.¹⁵³

The Gattilusio approach to governing a Greek population failed to prevent revolt on only one attested occasion: the uprising which ended their presence on Lemnos in the spring of 1456.¹⁵⁴ This may be a revealing exception: since the Gattilusio had acquired most of the island after the fall of Constantinople, this control had never been endowed with an imperial mandate, and the inhabitants had not become accustomed to their rule while it was still backed by current imperial authority.¹⁵⁵ While the unsettled circumstances of the time were conducive to unrest in any case, the loss of Lemnos may plausibly be considered an object lesson in what the Gattilusio lords had gained from the Byzantine connection. In the absence of such a foundation of legitimacy, there was no reason beyond the calculation of material advantage or the fear of repressive force for a population to accept its existing government. Consequently, whenever some benefit seemed to be available from a shift in allegiance, a population and its local leaders were liable to pursue it. The Lemnians

¹⁵³ Kritovoulos, pp. 85–7; Stefano Magno, *Annali Veneti*, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna, MSS. 6214–6217, 6239–6340 at MS. 6215, ff. 197^v–8, extracts published by Carl Hopf, 'Estratti degli Annali Veneti', *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes, inédites ou peu connues* (Berlin 1873), pp. 179–209 at pp. 198–9.

¹⁵⁴ Doukas, p. 419–21.

¹⁵⁵ See below, pp. 416–8.

in fact did so three times in as many years, first replacing the Gattilusio with the Ottomans, then replacing them in turn with the papal forces of Cardinal Trevisan, and finally expelling the papal garrison and submitting to the Ottomans once again.¹⁵⁶ Without ideological or sentimental attachment to any of these rulers, other considerations could be given free rein, to the detriment of any regime which found itself at a disadvantage in the balance of forces or which provoked discontent. The inherently unstable position of small regimes in a fragmented environment was worsened by the disadvantages of rulers separated from their subjects by a sectarian divide. An aura of legitimacy could be an asset of critical importance. The benefits of this ideological underpinning for their regime render more comprehensible the apparent faithfulness of the Gattilusio to their affiliation with Byzantium and the apparent satisfaction of the Byzantines with their record of upholding imperial sovereignty in the northern Aegean.

These benefits amounted to a force for integration into the Byzantine network based both on subordination to a higher authority, and on associate membership of the group to whom that authority was now in practice commonly devolved, the imperial family. However, that force derived its power from pressures from below, from the population dwelling within the Gattilusio lordships and subject to their authority. The imperial supremacy of the metropolis on the Bosphorus was upheld indirectly, through the need to satisfy assertive local forces. Thus the enduring incorporation of the lordships into the Byzantine world was the product of the interaction between vertical connections extending both upwards and downwards from the Gattilusio lords and associative bonds of a less sharply hierarchical character. This combination, embracing the threadbare but enduring principle of imperial autocracy, the familial character of late Byzantine government and the demands of those who wielded power with increasing freedom at a local level, reflects the combination of forces at play in the government of Byzantium under the Palaiologoi.

The Gattilusio regime in the Aegean was one of the last instances of the Byzantine Empire successfully turning the energies of dangerous outsiders to its own purposes, incorporating them into its own sphere with durable effect. It was thus an affirmation of Byzantium's continuing capacity to fulfil one of the quintessential requirements of imperial rule through the

¹⁵⁶ Kritovoulos, pp. 115–6, 133–6; Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, p. 225; C. N. Sathas, *Μνημεία Ελληνικής Ιστορίας: Documents inédits relatifs à l'histoire de la Grèce au Moyen Age*, 9 vols. (Paris 1880–90) vol. 9, pp. xxxi–xxxii; above, pp. 69–71, 73.

ages, even at such a late stage and when in such an enervated condition. At the same time, the fact that the Gattilusio could only be integrated in a loose and informal fashion based on indirect pressure and the alienation of imperial resources, and that their integration manifested itself more noticeably in symbolism and broadly defined alignment than in material support or cultural assimilation, is an illustration of the acute depletion of the empire's powers. It also encapsulates the manner in which Byzantine methods of preserving what little remained to the empire had been transformed by the empire's own long evolution and the impact of its recent weakness. The role of the Gattilusio lordships in the Byzantine system synthesised all of the principal emerging strands in Palaiologan management of the provinces: the alienation of imperial assets and rights into private hands, devolution of imperial responsibilities to the emperor's relatives and territorial concessions to foreign rulers. These processes rendered Byzantium increasingly typical of the wider patterns of the Aegean world in this period, tending in the direction of political fragmentation, associative patterns of authority, diverse political structures and cultural diversity among those holding power. The bureaucratic centralism and large-scale political integration which had characterised Byzantium in its heyday were the antithesis of the patterns that characterised the situation in its erstwhile territories after the Fourth Crusade, and the efforts at imperial revival which followed that cataclysm drove against those prevailing trends. The eventual collapse of those efforts in the mid-fourteenth century confirmed and intensified the progressive absorption of the empire into the diffuse, heterogenous order which had emerged from its own downfall in 1204. The Gattilusio lordships exemplified this final permutation of Byzantine government during the empire's last century of life.

CHAPTER THREE

GENOA: MIGRATION AND SOLIDARITY

As Byzantium supplied the context and the political foundation for the Gattilusio lordships, so Genoa provided the ruling family's social and cultural background, the chief outside economic influence on their regime and the predominant element in the lordships' Latin population. Among the various kinds of territorial authority exercised by Genoese in the East, the Gattilusio lordships were as loosely bound as any to the metropolitan commune. In this very looseness of integration, however, they were paradoxically characteristic of the Genoese community, which was distinguished by the tenuous quality of the formal bonds and hierarchical structures which united it. This tendency was evident in the city of Genoa itself, where the commune was more a shared space for cooperation between private interest groups than the structure of a coherent state like its Venetian counterpart. It was also visible in the overseas network, where the metropolitan authorities enjoyed distinctly limited control over emigrant communities. The capacity of associative bonds to elicit solidarity and coordinated action, combined with the independent flair of Genoese individuals and groups, was the basis of Genoa's success in transcending its limitations as a formal polity.¹

¹ Roberto S. Lopez, 'Venise et Gênes: deux styles, une réussite', *Diogenes* 71 (1970), pp. 43–51, reprinted in *Su e giù per la storia di Genova* (Genoa 1975), pp. 35–42; Geo Pistarino, 'Comune, "Compagna" e "Communitas" nel medioevo genovese', *SG* 3 (1983), pp. 9–28, reprinted in *La capitale del Mediterraneo: Genova nel Medioevo* (Genoa 1993), pp. 105–26 at pp. 107–11, 124–5; *idem*, 'Riflessi d'oltremare nelle istituzioni medievali genovesi', *I signori del mare* (Genoa 1992), pp. 9–40 at pp. 22–4, 30–3; Gherardo Ortalli, 'Venezia-Genova percorsi, paralleli, conflitti, incontri', *Genova, Venezia, il Levante nei secoli XII–XIV: Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi Genova-Venezia 10–14 marzo 2000*, ed. Gherardo Ortalli and Dino Puncuh (Genoa 2001), pp. 9–27 at pp. 21–7; Antonia Borlandi, 'Potere economico e vicenda politica nella Genova del Quattrocento', *Aspetti della vita economica medievale: Atti del Convegno di Studi nel X Anniversario della morte di Federigo Melis Firenze-Pisa-Prato, 10–14 marzo 1984* (Florence 1985), pp. 602–5; however, cf. Michel Balard 'L'amministrazione genovese e veneziana nel Mediterraneo orientale', *Genova, Venezia, il Levante nei secoli XII–XIV: Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi Genova-Venezia 10–14 marzo 2000*, ed. Gherardo Ortalli and Dino Puncuh (Genoa 2001), pp. 201–12. The latter article challenges the traditional impression of contrast between Venetian and Genoese systems as it pertains to the colonial sphere, but confines its attention to the institutional forms prevailing within territories under direct communal rule. It neglects other key characteristics of the Genoese overseas such as the tendency over time for authority to move from the

These qualities rendered the Genoese particularly characteristic of the world of the late medieval Aegean. Their far-flung overseas holdings formed a heterogeneous network in which colonies governed by communal officials stood alongside territories devolved by the commune onto individuals or corporate bodies such as the Mahona of Chios, and lordships without formal bonds to the commune such as those of the Zaccaria. The passage of time tended to see territories move further from the control of the commune.² This politically loose-knit network bound together by commercial interests epitomised the devolved and disparate nature of government in this politically fragmented but economically interlinked environment. The facility with which the Genoese crossed political and cultural boundaries to participate in the governmental, military and economic enterprises of others was unparalleled. Their propensity to exploit their particular skills and connections to enter the upper echelons of Byzantine, Ottoman and other societies in this region reflected a predisposition also displayed in the West, where the ubiquity of Genoese admirals in foreign service echoed that of Genoese merchants.³ Thus even as the variegated affiliations of the Gattilusio lordships and the lack of communal authority over them limited the influence of the strictly Genoese elements in their makeup, they were in another sense particularly expressive of the norms of the Genoese community.

commune into private hands, while the reverse was true of Venice (Guillaume Saint-Guillain, 'Seigneuries insulaires: les Cyclades au temps de la domination latine (XIII^e–XV^e siècle)', *Medievales. Langue, textes, histoire* 47 (2004), pp. 31–45 at pp. 32–5; George T. Dennis, 'Problemi storici concernanti i rapporti tra Venezia, i suoi domini diretti e le signorie feudali nelle isole greche', *Venezia e il Levante fino al secolo XV*, ed. Agostino Pertusi, 2 vols. (Florence 1973), vol. 1, pp. 219–35 at pp. 224–33), or the propensity of prominent Genoese citizens to conduct their own private foreign policy, notably in their relations with the Turks (see above, pp. 59–60, below, pp. 361–4, 383–4).

² This can be seen for example when the Genoese concessions in the Holy Land were contracted out to the Embriaco family in the twelfth century, or when the colonies in the Black Sea were entrusted to the *Casa di San Giorgio* in 1453. Franco Cardini, 'Gli Embriaci', *Dibattito su famiglie nobili del mondo coloniale genovese nel Levante: Atti del Convegno Montoggio, 23 ottobre 1993*, ed. Geo Pistarino (Genoa 1994), pp. 36–45 at pp. 41–2; P. Amadeo Vigna, *Codice diplomatico delle colonie Tauro-Liguri durante la signoria dell'Ufficio di S. Giorgio (MCCCCLIII–MCCCCLXXV)*, 2 vols. (Genoa 1868–71) (ASLSP 6, 7/1), vol. 6, pp. 24–43 (nos. 3–4).

³ E.g. Roberto S. Lopez, *Benedetto Zaccaria: ammiraglio e mercante nella Genova del Duecento* (Messina and Milan 1933, 3rd ed. Genoa 2004), pp. 217–36; *idem*, 'Ugo Vento, primo ammiraglio genovese di Castiglia', *Bollettino Ligustico* 3 (1951), pp. 65–71, reprinted in *Su e giù per la storia di Genova* (Genoa 1975), pp. 241–52; Enrico Basso, 'Ugo Lercari e Giacomo di Levanto, Ammiragli di S. Luigi IX', *SG* 10 (1990), pp. 197–209; Geo Pistarino, 'Genova medievale tra Oriente e Occidente', *La capitale del Mediterraneo: Genova nel Medioevo* (Genoa 1993), pp. 69–104 at pp. 85, 95–6.

The network of interconnections which bound together the Genoese of the eastern Mediterranean included both strands stretching back to Genoa and its Ligurian periphery and others linking them laterally to their emigrant compatriots. It was their personal or ancestral roots in Liguria and shared citizenship of its metropolis which defined the Genoese in the East as a community, delineating the common identity around which notions of solidarity coalesced. It was there that the great noble families and many of the community's commercial partnerships were based. The commune of Genoa was also the one political authority with which they all had some sort of juridical relationship, and which in many cases appointed and oversaw the heads of local administrations. It was also through the institutions of the metropolis that large-scale cooperative undertakings embracing the community in general were coordinated. However, those residing overseas interacted most routinely those of their compatriots who dwelt nearby around the shores of the Aegean or the Black Sea. The ties of common interest which gave motive force to their solidarity bound most strongly and consistently those whose interests were most closely analogous to one another's. Those who shared the circumstances of migrant communities among a largely foreign population, who were alike implicated in the political environment of the eastern Mediterranean and who occupied similar roles in the commercial structures of the region were united by shared concerns and priorities, which did not necessarily impinge in the same way or to the same extent on their compatriots based in Italy. The latter were similarly subject to pressures which did not have a corresponding impact in the East. Between different Latin communities some of these commonalities, chiefly in the commercial sphere, might heighten rivalries, even if other shared pressures encouraged them to set aside those divisions. Between those sharing a communal identity these shared circumstances would in most cases work to entrench solidarity and encourage cooperation.

As in the case of Byzantium, the nature and depth of the integration of the Gattilusio lordships into the Genoese network depended both on the approach of the family and their associates towards that network and on the reciprocal attitudes and behaviour of the wider community and its leaders towards them. Whereas their relationship with Byzantium was founded on the transfer of great resources into the hands of the Gattilusio, until the 1450s there is little evidence of the institutions of Genoa or its overseas dependencies being called upon to make costly commitments to the Gattilusio lordships. Genoese involvement with the lordships was chiefly a matter of pursuing the opportunities they offered. Thus the more

searching demands which were placed on the forces of integration, and the most revealing evidence of their nature, are largely to be found in the response of the Gattilusio to the demands of their city of origin and of other Genoese overseas, rather than the converse. However, the final crisis of the lordships did demand exertion and expense from their compatriots, and the Genoese response gives some indication of metropolitan attitudes that had hitherto gone untested. It raises the question of which interests and considerations were most significant in determining the importance of the lordships from the point of view of the wider Genoese community.

The Place of the Lordships in the Genoese World

While the origin of the Gattilusio regime must be understood in the context of Byzantine practice, policies and problems, its establishment chimed with an aspiration that had been current among ambitious Genoese for some time. Domenico Cattaneo's attempt to conquer Lesbos in 1335–6 and Simone Vignoso's abortive plans for a fresh offensive in 1346 attest to the desirability of the principal Gattilusio lordship in Genoese eyes.⁴ The basis of the Genoese community's interest in Lesbos and in the other territories acquired by the Gattilusio has often been seen primarily in terms of their proximity to the straits and their position on the route up the Anatolian coast to the Black Sea. One interpretation of Francesco I's acquisition of Lesbos is that it was driven by a systematic Genoese agenda, pursuing the goal of establishing a series of bases along this route. The other islands and Ainos have been portrayed as forming a double chain of military outposts enabling the Genoese to control transit through the approaches to the Dardanelles.⁵ However, given that the Gattilusio acquired their territories through their involvement with Byzantium, their geographical distribution can be far more simply explained by the fact that the remaining island territories of Byzantium had been concentrated

⁴ Nikephoros Gregoras, *Nicephori Gregorae Historiae Byzantinae*, ed. Immanuel Bekker and Ludwig Schopen, 3 vols. (Bonn 1829–55), *CSHB* 12, 14, 15, vol. 1, pp. 525–35; John Kantakouzenos, *Ioannis Cantacuzeni Imperatoris Historiarum Libri IV*, ed. Ludwig Schopen, 3 vols. (Bonn 1828–32), *CSHB* 7, 8, 9, vol. 1, pp. 476–95; Raimondo Morozzo della Rocca, *Lettere di Mercanti a Pignol Zucchello (1336–1350)* (Venice 1957), pp. 68–71 (no. 34).

⁵ Geo Pistarino, 'La difesa genovese dell'Egeo nord-orientale nel tempo dei Gattilusio (1355–1462)', *Le Stelle e le Strisce: studi americani e militari in onore di Raimondo Luraghi*, 2 vols. (Milan 1998), vol. 2, pp. 51–64 at pp. 53–5, 61–3.

in the north-eastern Aegean, the part of the sea closest to Constantinople. The chronology of Gattilusio expansion reinforces this impression. Among the territories the family gained, the ones which would have been the highest priority of anyone seeking to control the strategic space around the straits were Imbros and Lemnos.⁶ Yet in fact these were the very last territories the family acquired, suggesting that the expansion of their lordships was not shaped by any attempt to dominate the Dardanelles. Apart from Lesbos none of the other Gattilusio gains could significantly tighten the Genoese hold on the route to the straits, and it is doubtful how much difference even that island could really make.⁷

Even if their acquisition had little to do with their value as staging posts on the way to the Black Sea or adjuncts to Genoese naval strategy, the Gattilusio possession of so many places in the north-eastern Aegean was clearly favourable to the interests of the commune in its geopolitical

⁶ See above, pp. 20–1.

⁷ While it was clearly of the utmost importance for the Genoese to have a base in the Aegean, once Chios had been secured in 1346 the additional advantage to be had by gaining a neighbouring island must have been decidedly limited. Whatever the theoretical appeal of the idea of a continuous chain of bases along the Anatolian littoral, Genoese ships sailing from the western Mediterranean to the Black Sea had to pass Catalan Sardinia and Sicily and then to traverse a broad belt of possessions and dependencies of Venice, extending from its Adriatic holdings via its Peloponnesian bases to Crete and the Cyclades, at times also including Corfu and the Ionian Islands, without any Genoese port to offer refuge or support until reaching Chios (Michel Balard, 'La lotta contro Genova', *Storia di Venezia dalle origini alla caduta della Serenissima*, 11 vols. (Rome 1991–8), vol. 3, ed. Girolamo Arnaldi, Giorgio Cracco and Alberto Tenenti, pp. 87–126 at p. 98; *idem*, 'Escales génoises sur les routes de l'Orient méditerranéen au XIV siècle', *Les grandes escales: Première partie: Antiquité et Moyen-Age: colloque organisée en collaboration avec la Commission Internationale d'Histoire Maritime* (10 Colloque d'Histoire Maritime) (Brussels 1974), *Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin* 32, pp. 243–64 at pp. 248–9, plate; Enrico Basso, *Insediamenti e commercio nel Mediterraneo bassomedievale: i mercanti genovesi dal Mar Nero all'Atlantico* (Turin 2008), p. 108). The remaining gap between Chios and Pera was not much shortened by the acquisition of Lesbos, while it was less advantageous than Tenedos for ships traversing the straits. Even if control of Lesbos could have brought a guarantee of security in the surrounding waters, the difference this would have made to the ability of Genoese ships to complete their long voyages in safety must have been marginal. Any Genoese ambition to increase the security of shipping by acquiring a chain of bases might have been better directed at peninsular Greece and its attendant islands. The commune in fact had an opportunity to acquire two key Peloponnesian ports in 1414, when Centurione Zaccaria offered to cede Klarentza and Navarino in return for being taken under Genoese protection, but the communal government, preoccupied with internal strife, turned him down; the towns were soon lost to other powers. ASG, AS 2737B (*Materie Politiche* 1408–1577), no. 10; Enrico Basso, 'Gli Zaccaria', *Dibattito su famiglie nobili del mondo coloniale genovese nel Levante: Atti del Convegno Montoggio, 23 ottobre 1993*, ed. Geo Pistarino (Genoa 1994), pp. 46–71 at pp. 67–8; Antoine Bon, *La Morée Franque: recherches historiques, topographiques et archéologiques sur la Principauté d'Achaïe* (1205–1430) (Paris 1969), pp. 284–7, 320–5, 414–7.

manoeuvring over the eastern trade routes. If nothing else, their presence precluded the acquisition of these places by Venice. However, beyond this basic benefit their practical contribution in such terms is questionable. Whereas from the mid-fifteenth century the Ottomans were to prove brutally efficient in establishing a stranglehold on the straits by land and sea and exploiting this for political and economic gain, the furious decades-long struggle over the corridor between the Italian republics was ultimately an exercise in futility. No Latin power was ever able to block or regulate its rivals' access to the Black Sea for any sustained period, and if Genoese strategists ever had any notion of using the Gattilusio islands as a blockade line to trap Venetian or Ottoman ships it remained purely hypothetical. Indeed, there is no evidence that any of the Gattilusio territories were ever used as operational bases by any Genoese war-fleet. Their identifiable naval value was confined to the contribution of forces to Genoese expeditions, a role in which their precise position was of little significance. Indeed, the identified Genoese operations in which the Gattilusio assisted mostly took place far from their own territories, in the Adriatic, the Ionian Sea and the shores of the Crimea, southern Anatolia, Cyprus, Syria and Egypt.⁸ Only in plans for the supervision of Tenedos in 1382 and operations against the Venetians in 1432 are the Gattilusio lords to be found contributing to Genoese forces operating in their own vicinity.⁹ Otherwise it is only in the function of the Gattilusio territories as pirate lairs from which mercantile rivals could be harassed, a decidedly mixed blessing for the Genoese community, that any real correlation between notional strategic positioning and genuine effect is discernible.¹⁰

Thus it seems reasonable to suppose that the importance of Lesbos in Genoese eyes was chiefly a product of its inherent desirability as a large island with a significant productive economy, endowed with the bounty of major alum deposits. This would accord with the enthusiasm of the Genoese for Phokaia, their first territorial foothold in the Aegean, whose great assets were its own riches of alum and its potential as a conduit for the grain and other exports of Anatolia, or for Chios with its lucrative production of mastic. The same may be said of the attraction of the Gattilusio to Ainos, with its own natural resources, chiefly its salt pans, and its commercial value as a port for the produce of Thrace.¹¹ It is also consonant

⁸ See above, pp. 44–5, 54–7, 61.

⁹ See above, pp. 45, 60–1; below, pp. 150–1.

¹⁰ See below, pp. 234–43.

¹¹ See below, pp. 206–10.

with recent analysis of the incentives which drew both Genoese and Venetians to contest for control of Crete, an attraction which has often been construed in strategic terms.¹²

The unsystematic quality of the incorporation of the Gattilusio lordships into the Genoese network is underlined by the most basic circumstance of their relationship with Genoa: their lack of subordination to any Genoese authority. For most if not all of their history the Gattilusio lordships' only official bond with Genoa was their lords' personal status as Genoese citizens. The Gattilusio did not in any sense owe their territorial position to Genoa or hold their lordships as dependencies of the commune.¹³ Genoa did on occasion deploy its diplomatic weight for their benefit, such as when inviting them to share in the peace treaties contracted with Aragon in 1428 and 1444, or including their claims for restitution in the 1406 treaty with Venice.¹⁴ However, it is significant that the Gattilusio lords themselves had to be consulted on such matters and to supply their own representatives to sign treaties on their behalf: they were by no means considered to be included as a matter of course within accords made by the commune. Such invitations to participate could lead the commune into practical difficulties. Genoa postponed ratification of the peace with Venice in 1433 to enable the inclusion of the Gattilusio to

¹² David Jacoby, 'Changing economic patterns in Latin Romania: the impact of the West', *The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World*, ed. Angeliki E. Laiou and Roy Parviz Mottahedeh (Washington, D.C. 2001), pp. 197–233, reprinted in *Commercial Exchange Across the Mediterranean: Byzantium, the Crusader Levant, Egypt and Italy* (Aldershot 2005), IX, pp. 206–8; cf. Ruth Gertwagen, 'L'isola di Creta e i suoi porti (dalla fine del XII secolo all fine del XV secolo)', *Venezia e Creta. Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Studi Iraklion-Chania, 30 settembre–5 ottobre 1997*, ed. G. Ortalli (Venice 1998), pp. 337–74.

¹³ This is reflected in the absence of allusions to Genoa in the regime's use of visual symbols. The one exception that has been suggested is a plaque set in the wall by the main gate of the castle at Ainos. Stringa identifies this as a depiction of Genoa's patron St. George slaying the dragon, comparable with sixteenth-century plaques from the residence of the Genoese governor at Bastia on Corsica (Paolo Stringa, *Genova e la Liguria nel Mediterraneo: insediamento e culture urbane* (Genoa 1982), pp. 110, 135, 285). However, alongside a horseman the relief carving shows not one but two animals, of which the larger is certainly not a dragon. It appears that this is actually a reused hunting scene, appearing as it does alongside another piece of reused relief sculpture and in a section of wall composed of reused blocks.

¹⁴ ASG, AS 1780 (*Litterarum* 4), ff. 90^{r-v}, 91^v–2 (nos. 320, 323); A. Luxuro and G. Pinelli-Gentile, 'Documenti riguardanti alcuni dinasti dell'Arcipelago, pubblicati per saggio di studi paleografici', *Giornale Ligustico di archeologia, storia e belle arti* 1 (1874), pp. 84–90, 217–221, vol. 2 (1875), pp. 86–93, 292–7, vol. 3 (1876), pp. 313–6, vol. 5 (1878), pp. 345–70 at vol. 2, pp. 86–9 (nos. 11–2), vol. 3, pp. 314–5 (no. 28); Joseph Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient au XIV^e siècle: Expéditions de Marechal Boucicaut*, 2 vols. (Paris 1886), vol. 2, p. 189 (no. 37).

be arranged, a provision which was reconsidered when Alexios of Mangup seized Cembalo. The Genoese feared that he would use the delay to seek his own inclusion in the peace as an adherent of Venice, in order to avert retaliation.¹⁵ The possibility of such extemporised diplomatic contrivances illustrates the fact that this kind of inclusion did not necessarily imply any strong bond between a major party to a treaty and those that it invited to share in its agreements. Thus Gattilusio participation in these treaties did not imply Genoese sovereignty over the lordships or contradict their status as dependencies of Byzantium.

It has been customary to present Gattilusio rule in Old Phokaia as an exception to this, ascribing the family's control of that port to a conditional grant from the Mahona of Chios and thus ultimately from the Genoese commune, on comparable terms to the concession of New Phokaia to individual *appaltatores* (contractors of a farmed source of revenue) drawn from the members of the Mahona.¹⁶ However this supposition is without any discernible foundation in evidence. The circumstances of the Gattilusio acquisition of Old Phokaia are unknown, but there is no evidence that it came to them from Genoese hands. The Gattilusio lords' enduring and apparently unconditional hereditary tenure there contrasts starkly with the short-term contracts purchased at great cost by the *appaltatores* of New Phokaia. The Gattilusio used the same terminology for their rule in Old Phokaia as in Mytilene or Ainos, and deployed the same symbolism to express its character. There is thus no evidence that the Gattilusio lords acknowledged any superior besides the Byzantine Emperor in their capacity as rulers of Old Phokaia.¹⁷

There may have been some doubts and ambiguities concerning the status of those subject to the Gattilusio lordships in relation to the Genoese commune. This is suggested by a dispute attested in 1426. The Genoese government instructed the administration on Chios to deal sympathetically with the complaints of certain subjects of the lord of Mytilene who had been ordered to pay a tax called the *staliaticum*, for which they

¹⁵ ASG, AS 1780 (*Litterarum* 4), ff. 90^{r-v}, 91^{v-2} (nos. 320, 323); above, pp. 61, 102n80.

¹⁶ E.g. William Miller, 'The Gattilusj of Lesbos (1355–1462)', *BZ* 22 (1913), reprinted in *Essays on the Latin Orient* (Cambridge 1921, reprinted Amsterdam 1964), pp. 313–53 at p. 322; Geo Pistarino, 'Notazioni su Focea', *AALSL* 48 (1992), pp. 631–8 at p. 635; David Jacoby, 'Production et commerce de l'alun oriental en Méditerranée, XI^e–XV^e siècles', *L'alun de Méditerranée*, ed. Philippe Borgard, Jean-Pierre Brun and Maurice Picon (Naples and Aix-en-Provence 2005), pp. 219–67 at pp. 236–7.

¹⁷ See below, pp. 407–10.

claimed not to be liable.¹⁸ It is unclear on what basis the subjects of the lord of Mytilene claimed exemption. However, it seems plausible to speculate that the disagreement concerned the issue of whether or not they were to be considered Genoese, a status which could make them liable for some taxes and exempt from others. By this date, they could well have been the descendants of Genoese emigrants born on Lesbos, perhaps of mixed parentage. Later attempts by the Genoese commune to disclaim responsibility for such individuals are indicative of the complexities at work and the scope for exploiting them in a legal argument.¹⁹

The position of the Gattilusio lordships as territories under the rule of Genoese citizens but entirely outside the commune's political structures was a distinctive one, but far from unique. The closest parallels are to be found among the lordships which other Genoese had acquired from Byzantium in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, although these had all ceased to exist by the time the Gattilusio regime was established. The one strictly contemporary authority occupying a comparable position in the Genoese community was the Zaccaria family. After the loss of Chios they had continued to hold estates and growing influence in the Latin portion of the Peloponnese, culminating in the reign of Centurione Zaccaria as the last Prince of Achaia in 1404–18.²⁰

The absence of institutional connections between the Gattilusio lordships and the Genoese commune or its colonies left free play for sentiment, personal connections and perceived self-interest to determine attitudes and policy, both on the side of the Gattilusio and that of their compatriots. The commune's lack of formal authority over Gattilusio territories prevented it benefiting directly from their resources through taxation or appointing officials to direct their affairs. Conversely, however, it was also free of the costs of administering and defending their territories. There are no recorded instances of the Gattilusio seeking or receiving military or financial help from the commune or its colonial offshoots before 1450, in contrast to the succession of occasions on which

¹⁸ Laura Balletto, *Liber Officii Provisionis Romaniae (Genova, 1424–1428)* (Genoa 2000), pp. 155–6 (no. 137). The tax in question may have been a Genoese adoption of the *skaliatikon*, a Byzantine charge on ships using a landing stage, though there are other possibilities. Nicolas Oikonomides, 'The role of the Byzantine state in the economy', *The Economic History of Byzantium*, ed. Angeliki E. Laiou, 3 vols. (Washington D.C. 2002), vol. 3, pp. 973–1058 at pp. 1051–2.

¹⁹ See below, pp. 238, 309–10.

²⁰ Basso, 'Zaccaria', pp. 61–9.

other Genoese are known to have benefited from the lordships' own aid.²¹ Besides their apparent ability to manage their external security satisfactorily without Genoese help, the political legitimacy which the lordships derived from Byzantium may have diminished their sense of dependence on their compatriots. While Genoese regimes in the East were able from the 1350s onwards to avoid the Greek revolts that had troubled them in earlier decades, the possibility of such trouble must have heightened the desirability of reliable outside sources of military support to underwrite their territorial control. Such concerns which would have borne less heavily on the Gattilusio lordships.

Even with regard to their inclusion in Genoese treaties the Gattilusio lords were not necessarily supplicants for communal support. It was the commune which took the initiative in offering the Gattilusio inclusion in the agreements with Aragon, rather than receiving a request from them. This sort of diplomatic solicitude cost the Genoese commune little, and by protecting the lordships from future hostilities it safeguarded Genoese economic interests there. By formally treating the Gattilusio lordships as affiliates of Genoa it might increase the exposure of the Genoese community to reprisals for the misdeeds of the lords or their subjects, but their origins and citizenship meant that their compatriots were liable to be targeted for such attention in any case.²² The commune was also able in other treaties to absolve itself of responsibility for Gattilusio transgressions.²³

Only when Ottoman hostility erupted in the 1450s were the leaders of the commune forced to consider seriously how much the Gattilusio lordships were worth to them. The letter to the Genoese government written by Dorino I Gattilusio in July 1451, bemoaning the damage done by the Ottoman attack on Lesbos the previous summer and pleading for help, marks a watershed in the history of Gattilusio relations with Genoa. For the first time the lordships were placed in the position of dependents of the Ligurian metropolis, reliant on its aid. Its tone of dismay is palpable, as is the strength of Dorino's insistence that the commune should respond with concrete action and not mere words. On this occasion the commune refused to assist, seemingly for fear of provoking Ottoman hostility.²⁴ However, the Ottoman onslaught triggered by the death of Dorino and the steady succession of appeals beginning with

²¹ See below, pp. 144–52.

²² See below, pp. 240–2.

²³ See below, pp. 241–2.

²⁴ Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 5, pp. 350–2 (no. 39).

Domenico's letter of December 1455 elicited significant active assistance in the shape of diplomatic support, cannon and the financing of soldiers to defend Lesbos at moments of crisis.²⁵ This shift in policy is perhaps to be explained by the fact that losses suffered by the Gattilusio lordships in the months preceding and following this appeal were accompanied by the Ottoman seizure of New Phokaia, and had been preceded during the previous few years by the conquest of Constantinople and Pera and by Ottoman attacks on Genoese holdings in the Black Sea. Such a succession of disasters underlined the unsustainability of the policy of placating the Turks and the fact that the Gattilusio and their compatriots faced a common threat demanding collective action.²⁶

It is possible that the formal nature of the relationship between the Gattilusio lords and Genoa also changed during these years. The conversion of the *Officium Rerum Chyensium* into the *Officium Rerum Chyensium et Mitilinsium* in 1456 and the detachment from this of a dedicated *Officium Rerum Mitilinsium* later that year are indicative of a changed attitude to the place of the last surviving Gattilusio lordship in the Genoese community.²⁷ The perilous situation of the Gattilusio lords in these years was undoubtedly the driving force behind these institutional changes, whose purpose was to make provision for the defence of Lesbos. However, they may also imply that following the demise of Byzantium the commune had assumed a more proprietorial attitude towards the Gattilusio territories, whose welfare was now formally treated as coming within its purview.

Nevertheless, the commune's willingness to continue committing resources to the defence of the Gattilusio may soon have waned. As part of its response to the final embassy of Archbishop Leonardo, in March

²⁵ Alfonso Assini, 'La "compera Metilini" e la difesa genovese del Gattilusio dopo la caduta di Costantinopoli', *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οι Γατελούζοι της Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 223–80; above, pp. 68–70, 72–4.

²⁶ Geo Pistarino, *Chio dei genovesi nel tempo di Cristoforo Colombo* (Rome 1995), pp. 295–313. This Genoese help was all directed towards the defence of the lordship of Mytilene. It is impossible to judge whether the communal authorities would have felt similarly moved to act on behalf of Ainos, since that lordship had already fallen to the Ottomans when the Genoese authorities took their first recorded action in the spring of 1456. There is also no evidence that Palamede or Dorino of Ainos had made any appeal for Genoese help, which may reflect the fact that the balance between the prospects for survival through armed resistance to the Ottomans and the risks of provoking them through military preparations weighed more heavily against such defensive efforts in the case of Ainos than in that of Mytilene. See below, pp. 325, 364–5, 384–5.

²⁷ Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 5, pp. 354–5 (nos. 42–3); Assini, pp. 262–3 (no. 5).

1459 the Genoese government wrote to the commissioners on Chios who were responsible for supplying troops to Mytilene. This reminded them of the continued Turkish menace and the importance of their responsibilities, but it also alluded to the fact that expenditure on the defence of the lordship should not exceed the funds set aside for the purpose, and emphasised that the commissioners should not enact the deployment of troops unless they were certain that an imminent threat demanded it.²⁸ Thus, only three years after the commune had taken its first steps to help the Gattilusio, its leaders were beginning to begrudge the cost of that assistance. In July 1460 the provisions for raising troops were renewed, but with the specification that the steps taken to help should not be such as to require additional taxation.²⁹ In a time of financial hardship, the unaccustomed costs of a relationship which for decades had been available to the Genoese community largely free of charge were biting home.

Genoese support for the lordship of Mytilene in its time of need was also impaired by the repercussions of Niccolò II's violent seizure of power, at least as regards Chios, the base from which any emergency help would have to come. His murdered brother Domenico had been married to the daughter of Paride Giustiniani, the leading figure among the Mahona of Chios at the time. According to a later tradition she perished alongside her husband.³⁰ This is not substantiated by contemporary documents, but Niccolò certainly became embroiled in a prolonged financial dispute with Paride, who demanded the return of his daughter's dowry and of loans which he had made to Domenico.³¹ In April 1462 the Genoese government wrote to the authorities on Chios encouraging them to look to the defence of Lesbos and urging them not to do anything to the detriment of the lordship of Mytilene for private reasons.³² This injunction presumably relates to the grievances arising from the dispute with Paride. Such bad blood between the Gattilusio and the Chians would hardly have enhanced the latter's willingness to help as the final Ottoman onslaught approached.

Even when Genoese commitment to helping the Gattilusio was at its height, the practical deficiencies of the aid provided reveal the limitations

²⁸ Assini, pp. 278–9 (no. 17).

²⁹ Vigna, pp. 77–8 (no. 525); Sandra Origone, 'La fine del dominio greco nel mar Nero', *Byzantinoslavica: Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi* 2nd series, 8 (2006), pp. 245–71 at pp. 268–70.

³⁰ Agostino Giustiniani, *Annali della Repubblica di Genova*, ed. C. G. B. Spotorno, 2 vols. (Genoa 1854), vol. 2, p. 384.

³¹ Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 5, pp. 363–4 (no. 58).

³² Assini, p. 280 (no. 19); Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 5, pp. 364–6 (nos. 59–60).

of what the commune had to offer in these years. 200 or 300 infantry would have been a very welcome addition to the forces available to a penurious lordship, comparing very respectably with the permanent garrisons of the major Genoese colonies.³³ However, unlike these they were not a standing force and they evidently comprised only a fraction of the total forces which the Gattilusio gathered for the final clash, even if they were of higher quality than most.³⁴ In any case, aid on this scale was of little consequence against the vast armies of the sultan. At sea, where despite the burgeoning naval power of the Ottomans the prospects for repulsing attacks should have been greatest, Genoa apparently had nothing to offer the Gattilusio. Despite the perennial political and financial weakness of the Genoese commune, in its conflicts with its commercial rivals it had always somehow managed to muster naval forces on a sufficient scale to trade blows with them on roughly equal terms, in both the western and eastern basins of the Mediterranean. Though the community's strengths lay more in the initiative of individuals and smaller networks within itself than in its central institutions, it had nevertheless formerly been able to present a formidable united front when necessary. Faced with a new and deadly sea-borne threat from the Ottomans, Genoa failed to supply serious forces to defend its interests against them. This was in marked contrast to the resources deployed by the Venetians to defend their eastern possessions when they went to war with the Ottomans in 1463–79.³⁵ The only serious naval challenge faced by the Ottomans in the decade after

³³ For instance, the garrison of Chios tended to be somewhat over 250, while recorded figures for that of Famagusta between 1391 and 1462 fluctuate widely between 285 and 587. Caffa employed 236 soldiers at a tense moment in 1386–7 but only 65 in 1374–5, while other Crimean ports had a few dozen regular soldiers each. Michel Balard, 'Les formes militaires de la colonisation génoise (XIII^e–XV^e siècles)', *Castrum 3: guerre, fortifications et habitat dans le monde méditerranéen au Moyen Âge: colloque organisé par la Casa de Velázquez et l'Ecole Française de Rome Madrid 24–27 novembre 1985*, ed. Andrés Bazzana (Madrid 1988), pp. 67–78 at p. 77; *idem*, 'In extremo Europae: les soudoyers de l'Orient génois (XIV^e–XV^e siècles)', *Histoire et société: melanges offertes à Georges Duby*, 4 vols. (Aix-en-Provence 1992), vol. 2, pp. 167–80 at pp. 170–1.

³⁴ The defenders of Mytilene alone in 1462 were variously enumerated at 1,000 and 5,000, while the other major settlements on Lesbos were also garrisoned. Doukas, *Ducas Istoria Turco-Bizantina (1341–1462)*, ed. and tr. Vasile Grecu (Bucharest 1958), p. 435; Benedetto, Archbishop of Mytilene, 'Leonardi Chiensis [sic] de Lesbo a Turcis capta epistola Pio Papae II missa', ed. Carl Hopf, *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes inédites ou peu connues* (Berlin 1873), pp. 359–66 at p. 361.

³⁵ Giuseppe Gullino, 'Le frontiere navali', *Storia di Venezia dalle origini alla caduta della Serenissima*, 11 vols. (Rome 1991–8), vol. 4, ed. Alberto Tenenti and Ugo Tucci, pp. 13–111 at pp. 62–79; Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204–1571)*, 4 vols. (Philadelphia 1976–84), vol. 2, pp. 240–57, 273–6, 283–93, 296–311, 316–8, 327–8.

the fall of Constantinople came from the papal fleet of Cardinal Trevisan.³⁶ Whatever the respective importance of western preoccupations, hopes of placating the Ottomans and financial debility in producing this weakness, the end result for the Gattilusio was the same.

The limitations of Genoa's resolve and capacity to help and the desperation of the Gattilusio led to overtures to rival powers. Soon after the fall of Constantinople, Venice sought to have Chios and the Gattilusio lordships included in its peace agreement with the Ottomans, and stated that they should be considered neutral in any future war between the two republics.³⁷ In making his appeal to Genoa in 1451 Dorino Gattilusio warned that if the metropolis did not provide genuine assistance he would turn to other patrons for help.³⁸ This threat was repeated by Domenico in 1457.³⁹ The obvious powers which would have been able to give effective help, and whose acquisition of increased influence over the Gattilusio lordships would have been most unwelcome to the Genoese, were Venice and Aragon. The Venetians' hopes of acquiring islands such as Lemnos after the fall of Constantinople and their sustained efforts to take and hold various former Gattilusio territories during their war with the Ottomans indicate that they had a significant interest in these places.⁴⁰ They might have been willing to adopt the position of protectors of the Gattilusio if sufficient concessions were made to them. Willingness on the part of the Gattilusio to use offers of submission to entangle potential protectors more deeply in their affairs is also suggested by a remark of Pius II's. In March 1457 he claimed that the lord of Mytilene had become subject to the papacy as a result of the intervention of Trevisan's fleet.⁴¹

Nevertheless, it seems that the threat to appeal elsewhere was either not carried out with regard to Genoa's commercial rivals, or never received any meaningful response. Apart from the statement of Pius II the considerable volume of documentation relating to the Gattilusio lordships during these

³⁶ See above, pp. 71–2.

³⁷ Josephi Valentini, *Acta Albaniae Veneta: saeculorum XIV et XV*, 25 vols. (Rome 1967–79), vol. 22, pp. 171–9 (no. 6114).

³⁸ Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 5, pp. 350–2 (no. 39).

³⁹ Vigna, vol. 6, pp. 800–2 (no. 371).

⁴⁰ Valentini, *Acta*, vol. 22, pp. 171–9, 184, 265, 297 (nos. 6114, 6120, 6202, 6232); Marcantonio Sabellico, *Historiae Rerum Venetarum ab Urbe Condita* (Venice 1487, new ed. Venice 1718), pp. 724–7, 730, 733–6, 748–9, 789–90; Michael Kritovoulos, *Critobuli Imbriotae Historiae*, ed. Diether Roderich Reinsch (Berlin and New York 1983), *CFHB* 22, pp. 190–2, 202; Gullino, pp. 63–72, 79; Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 2, pp. 251, 283, 287, 293, 300, 311 n. 158, 328.

⁴¹ See below, p. 340.

years contains no mention of any such initiatives. There may never have been any serious intention to make such a sharp break with tradition and with the sentiments of the lordships' main Latin community, merely the hope of increasing the pressure on the commune to take action. Apart from the transitory intervention of Trevisan's fleet, Genoa remained the only outside power to make any substantial contribution to the survival of the Gattilusio lordships.⁴²

The years after 1450, when the integration of the lordships into the Genoese network took on a more organisational character with the emergence of formal institutional structures and military commitments, differ markedly from the rest of the history of the Gattilusio regime. However, the nature of the communal response to crisis is revealing of the underlying orientation of Genoese attitudes, which had been less clearly apparent during the decades when the Gattilusio had had little need for Genoese help. For the first time the Gattilusio required Genoa to operate not as the focus of a diffuse network of contacts but as a coherent and formidable polity capable of defending its clients by the sustained deployment of force. The deficiencies of its capacity to do so were painfully exposed during these last years, while some doubts remain as to the depth of its commitment. Nevertheless, the efforts made, at a time of debility and crisis for the commune itself, attest that the existence of the Gattilusio lordships was valued as an asset to the Genoese community at large. The experience of the preceding decades appears to have left the leaders of that community with the view that the Gattilusio lordships were a part of the Genoese world, and one that was worth saving.

⁴² It is possible that the fear of rival powers establishing a hold on the Gattilusio territories by such means played a part in persuading the commune to help, but it must be noted that the two diplomatic initiatives known to have made this threat explicit, in 1451 and 1457, were not conspicuously successful in eliciting assistance. An actual attempt to enlist Venetian support seemingly emerged from the final desperation of the Gattilusio regime in 1462. Shortly after the fall of Mytilene the Venetian government referred to a letter which had been received from Niccolò Gattilusio, giving notice of the Ottoman offensive against Lesbos (Valentini, *Acta*, vol. 24, p. 470 (no. 7225)). Unlike Genoa, the old rival retained a serious naval capability in the Aegean and a Venetian fleet of 24 galleys was in the area at the time of the attack, but its commander declined to intervene, a decision in line with the policy of his government (Valentini, *Acta*, vol. 24, p. 470 (no. 7225); Pope Pius II, *Enea Silvio Piccolomini, Papa Pio II: I Commentarii*, ed. Luigi Totaro, 2 vols. (Milan 1984), vol. 2, p. 1820).

Solidarity with the Genoese Community

Besides the advantageous access to economic opportunities which they afforded, the most conspicuous way in which the existence of the Gattilusio lordships could benefit the Genoese network was through the deployment of the resources of their territories in support of the community's military undertakings. The Gattilusio lords' contributions to such collective efforts would have encouraged other Genoese to promote the lordships' well-being and cultivate their rulers' continued loyalty; they also offer the strongest evidence of the lords' reciprocal concern with wider Genoese interests. Whereas the extent of the commune and the wider community's commitment to the Gattilusio lordships is only really discernible in their final years, the commitment of the Gattilusio to their compatriots can be more readily assessed through incidents scattered through the decades. As has been argued, it is doubtful whether Genoese loyalties necessarily overrode other alignments in determining the part played by the Gattilusio in Byzantine politics.⁴³ Nevertheless, in spite of their formal detachment from the commune, the Gattilusio lords' record of political and military action otherwise reveals an enduring commitment to the common causes of the Genoese community. This is apparent to a degree scarcely less than one might expect of an administration formally subordinated to the government of the commune. The Gattilusio were often to be found supporting the undertakings of the metropolis and of other Genoese overseas against commercial rivals and other enemies, although it is often hard to discern the balance between concern for Genoese interests and other possible motives for such action.

The lordships' most prominent involvement in Genoa's foreign affairs came with the War of Chioggia.⁴⁴ The Gattilusio were unsurprisingly embroiled in a conflict whose immediate bone of contention lay so menacingly close to the family's own territories. Regardless of the strength or weakness of their loyalties to wider Genoese interests, it was scarcely conceivable that the Gattilusio would look with equanimity on the prospect of the Venetian fleet establishing a permanent base on Tenedos. The

⁴³ See above, pp. 96–105.

⁴⁴ The war is also the earliest attested instance of such participation; however, there is circumstantial evidence that Francesco I may also have taken part in Genoa's war with Cyprus in 1373–4. See below, p. 161n12.

consonance between their own particular concerns and the wider interests of the Genoese community was here especially close.⁴⁵

Francesco's role in the Venetian governor Zanachi Mudazzo's obstruction of the demilitarisation and evacuation of Tenedos which was required by the peace settlement is more mysterious. Mudazzo asserted in defence of his conduct that his hand had been forced by the island's Venetian garrison and Greek population, who had been provoked into unrest by the activities of Francesco's agent Raffaele de Quarto. According to Mudazzo, de Quarto had sought to subvert the islanders against their planned evacuation, claiming that after the demolition of the fortifications of Tenedos the island would soon be seized and refortified by the Genoese, a prospect vehemently opposed by many of the inhabitants. Mudazzo also claimed that large quantities of lime and other building materials were being stockpiled on Lesbos for use in this refortification. He connected the alleged scheme with reports of the mistreatment of Venetians by the Byzantine authorities in Constantinople, with the implication that Francesco and the Genoese were in league with the emperor in the alleged plot to seize Tenedos.⁴⁶ Such a proposition seems hard to square with the evidence that John V, then in control of Constantinople, was on decidedly poor terms with Francesco at this time.⁴⁷ It appears quite plausible that Mudazzo's version of events was a fabrication, or at least an excessively conspiratorial interpretation of casual remarks on de Quarto's part and of unrelated events in Lesbos and Constantinople, intended to justify the governor's own actions. He certainly made no secret of his personal reluctance to implement the peace agreement. In the absence of corroboration it remains unclear whether the lord of Mytilene was indeed scheming to subvert the agreement over Tenedos.

Venetian suspicions of Gattilusio designs on Tenedos continued into the fifteenth century. In 1406 the Venetian government ordered a fleet to investigate reports that the island was being refortified by the lords of Mytilene and Ainos, perhaps in concert with other local rulers, and to ascertain whether the Genoese of Pera or the emperor were involved. If necessary this activity was to be curtailed by force.⁴⁸ Any effort to occupy

⁴⁵ See above, pp. 44–5.

⁴⁶ ASV, *Commemoriali* 8, ff. 56^v–8 (nos. 118–20).

⁴⁷ See above, pp. 96–100; below, pp. 413–5.

⁴⁸ ASV, SS 3, ff. 7^v–9^v; Nicolai Iorga, 'Notes et extraits pour servir à l'histoire des Croisades au XV^e siècle', *Revue de l'Orient Latin* 4, (1896), pp. 226–320, 503–622, vol. 5 (1897), pp. 108–212, 311–88, vol. 6 (1898), pp. 50–143, 370–434, vol. 7 (1899), pp. 38–107, 375–429, vol. 8 (1900–1), pp. 1–115 at vol. 4, pp. 282–3.

the island might have been a continuation of the enduring contest over Tenedos, aimed at strengthening the position of the Gattilusio and their fellow Genoese at Venice's expense. Alternatively, the Gattilusio may have been concerned to prevent the Ottomans from taking advantage of the island's unfortified state to tighten their grip on the Dardanelles. Certainly the exposed condition of Tenedos was a cause for widespread concern at the time: in 1404 Manuel II had proposed the island's refortification as a joint enterprise by Venice, Genoa and himself, while in 1405 the Knights of St. John had proposed that they should be allowed to fortify it, but both had been rebuffed by Venice.⁴⁹ It is again unclear whether there was any foundation for the reports of Gattilusio machinations, although the subsequent silence of the sources may be taken to imply that no serious conflict ensued, and therefore perhaps that the rumours were unfounded.

The early fifteenth century saw a spate of Gattilusio participation in Genoese military activities. They contributed to Boucicault's expedition of 1403, whose aims combined the crusading aspirations of its leader with the defence of Genoa's interests on Cyprus.⁵⁰ In the light of Boucicault's personal relationship with the Gattilusio lords and the benefits which supporting his agenda against Muslim targets might bring, it is hard to be certain how far concern for Genoese interests motivated their action.⁵¹ Their motives for joining in the pursuit of the Catalan squadron which had bombarded Chios in 1411 seem more clearly evident.⁵² Since the Catalan attack was a response to the depredations of the Basque pirate Pedro de Larraondo, an associate of the Gattilusio who operated out of Mytilene, it would scarcely have been diplomatic for them not to provide some sort of assistance after Chios had suffered for the activities of their ally. Self-defence against continuing reprisals provided still more pressing reasons for joining in the effort to eliminate the Catalans.⁵³ The apparent readiness of the Gattilusio to cooperate the Mahona of Chios in assisting

⁴⁹ ASV, *SMisti* 46, f. 166; C.N. Sathas, *Μνημεία Ἑλληνικῆς Ἱστορίας: Documents inédits relatifs à l'histoire de la Grèce au Moyen Age*, 9 vols. (Paris 1880–90), vol. 1, pp. 11–2 (no. 11); Freddy Thiriet, 'Venise et l'occupation de Tenedos au XIV^e siècle', *Mélanges de l'Ecole française de Rome* 65 (1953), pp. 219–45, reprinted in *Etudes sur la Romanie greco-vénitienne (X^e–XV^e siècles)* (London 1977), II, pp. 241–3; Iorga, 'Notes', vol. 4, pp. 276–8.

⁵⁰ Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 2, pp. 382–91; Delaville, *France en Orient*, vol. 1, pp. 408–57.

⁵¹ See below, pp. 330–3, 340–4.

⁵² Giorgio and Giovanni Stella, *Annales Genuenses*, ed. Giovanna Petti Balbi (Bologna 1975), *RIS* n.s. 17/2, pp. 304–6; Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, 'Pedro de Larraondo, un Corsario Vizcaíno en el Mediterráneo Oriental (1405–11)', *Corsarios Castellanos y Vascos en el Mediterráneo Medieval* (Barcelona 2000), pp. 243–331 at pp. 326–31 (nos. 27–8).

⁵³ See above, pp. 56–7, below, pp. 238–9, 241.

Centurione Zaccaria against Carlo Tocco is less readily explicable in terms of their own interests.⁵⁴ Apart from the War of Chioggia, this is the only known instance of the forces of the Gattilusio lordships venturing west of the Aegean. They had no known stake in the area under dispute, while the influence of the parties to the conflict did not significantly impinge on areas in which the Gattilusio were involved. Besides solidarity between rulers of Genoese origin in opposition to a dynasty connected with Venice it is not clear what lay behind this move, except perhaps the lure of plunder. Both of these last episodes show the Gattilusio combining their energies with other Genoese emigrant regimes without any apparent reference to the metropolis, reflecting the diffuse nature of authority and the necessity for local initiative in the far-flung Genoese world.

Whatever the uncertainties about their motives in individual cases, nothing in the behaviour of the Gattilusio lords in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries suggests any reluctance to exert themselves in pursuit of communal interests. Besides the actions they actually took or planned, their active solidarity with other Genoese was habitually expected both within that community and among its enemies. For instance, when in 1383 the commanders of a Genoese fleet sent to install King James I of Cyprus (1382–98) on his throne discussed action against the recalcitrant nobility of Cyprus, it was suggested that the rulers of Chios and Mytilene should be consulted.⁵⁵ When a moment of high tension with Genoa in 1402 led the Venetian government to take precautions for the defence of its merchants, Mytilene was specified along with Chios as a likely source of trouble.⁵⁶ The impression of a firm political alignment with the Genoese network given by the Gattilusio lords' own behaviour is reinforced by the pattern of piratical activity associated with the lordships. The territories and ships of Genoa's Venetian and Catalan rivals were prominent among its victims.⁵⁷

In the mid-fifteenth century a degree of ambiguity arises as to the reliability of Gattilusio commitment to Genoese interests. The 1430s saw participation in the war against Venice and the expedition against Alexios of Mangup.⁵⁸ Such events have been seen as a clear affirmation of the

⁵⁴ Valentini, *Acta*, vol. 7, pp. 69–71, 74–6 (nos. 1821, 1823).

⁵⁵ Stefania Mangiante, 'Un consiglio di Guerra dei Genovesi a Cipro nel 1383', *ASLSP* 77/2 (n.s. 3/2) (1963), pp. 253–62.

⁵⁶ Delaville, *France en Orient*, vol. 1, p. 413.

⁵⁷ See below, pp. 236–7.

⁵⁸ Stella, pp. 377–8; Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 2, pp. 89–93 (nos. 13–8). Note that these documents are in register 5 of the *Litterarum*, not register 3 as cited; ASG, AS 1781 (*Litterarum* 5), ff. 113^v–4, 148^{r-v}, 162^v–3^v (nos. 325–6, 413–4, 458, 461).

undiminished mutual attachment between the Gattilusio and Genoa, even after many decades in the Aegean.⁵⁹ In general this picture has much to commend it, but it requires some qualification. Dorino's alliance with Alexander Komnenos of Trebizond in his conflict with his usurping brother John IV in the 1430s was at odds with the policy of Genoa, as reflected in the commune's intervention to halt the military expedition being prepared at Lesbos.⁶⁰ This episode illustrates how the demands of affiliation with different networks of power could conflict with one another. The fact that the planned expedition against Trebizond did not apparently materialise suggests that in the end Genoa's influence may have prevailed over that of Byzantium in this case. However, there may have been other reasons for this failure: the Ottomans were apparently also opposed to the venture, while subsequent schemes against Trebizond in 1447 and 1451 were supported or actually instigated by the Genoese commune, which had reversed its policy of support for John IV, yet these proved equally abortive.⁶¹

The Gattilusio lords had also developed affiliations with other groups in the Aegean which tended against Genoese norms. They contracted a series of marriages with the Crispo Dukes of the Archipelago or their close relatives. The first of these marital connections had been established by 1426, when the lord of Mytilene acted as an intermediary for the Crispo in peace negotiations with the Ottomans.⁶² Duke Jacopo II Crispo of the

⁵⁹ E.g. Giustina Olgiati, 'I Gattilusio', *Dibattito su famiglie nobili del mondo coloniale genovese nel Levante: Atti del Convegno Montoggio, 23 ottobre 1993*, ed. Geo Pistarino (Genoa 1994), pp. 85–99 at pp. 90–1; Laura Balletto, 'I Gattilusio fra economia e politica', *Atti dell'Accademia Ligure di Scienze e Lettere* 54 (1997), pp. 449–64 at pp. 462–3.

⁶⁰ Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 2, pp. 292–3 (no. 20); Sergei Pavlovic Karpov, *L'Impero di Trebisonda, Venezia, Genova e Roma 1204–1461: rapporti politici, diplomatici e commerciali*, tr. Eleonora Zambelli (Rome 1986), pp. 158–62; above, pp. 61–2.

⁶¹ Pero Tafur, *Andanças e Viajes de Pero Tafur por Diversas Partes del Mundo Avidos (1435–1439)*, ed. José Maria Ramos (Madrid 1934), p. 121; Iorga, 'Notes', vol. 8, pp. 29–31; ASG, *SGCanc* (Sala 34) 590/1308/3 (*Officium Provisionis Romanie* 2), ff. 45–6; Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 5, pp. 350–2 (no. 39); above, p. 66.

⁶² The existence of a relationship by marriage is established by the Venetian document alluding to these negotiations, conducted on behalf of Niccolò Crispo, lord of Syra and Santorini, which does not name the lord of Mytilene involved (Valentini, *Acta*, vol. 12, p. 259 (no. 3058)). Dated 7 July 1426, this notice falls between the last identified document naming Jacopo Gattilusio as lord of Mytilene, dated 13 March that year, and the first known reference to Dorino as his successor on 14 October 1428. Thus it is not completely certain which of these two was the lord in question. However, this notice comes less than three months into the period of some two-and-a-half years during which Jacopo's death must be placed; the fact that the negotiations it reports must have consumed some time, added to the additional time it would have taken for news of them to reach Venice, makes it almost certain that it was Jacopo, not Dorino, who was involved (see below, p. 190n7). While no

Archipelago apparently married a daughter of Dorino I Gattilusio in about 1444.⁶³ Following the fall of his lordship of Ainos Dorino II Gattilusio married this couple's daughter Elisabetta Crispo, and settled for a time on Naxos.⁶⁴ Such connections indicate a significant and enduring dynastic bond with a family ruling under Venetian overlordship, albeit of Veronese origin themselves. The traditional antipathy between Genoese and Venetian communities seems here to have been less compelling than the benefits of cultivating good relations with the most important of the neighbouring insular lords. More striking are indications that the lords of Ainos at times enjoyed warm relations with the Venetian government itself.⁶⁵ There is also some evidence of collusion with Catalan pirates during the last years of the Gattilusio lordships.⁶⁶

The attitude of the Gattilusio to the war with Venice which broke out in 1431 was particularly ambiguous. Thanking Dorino of Mytilene for his assistance to the fleet sent to relieve Chios, the communal government was effusive in its praise and pledges of protection. It acclaimed him for following in the glorious tradition of his predecessors, who had always contributed to Genoa's greatest victories.⁶⁷ However, viewed in the context of the evidence of the preceding months and years this enthusiasm comes to seem an expression of relief as much as anything else. When the Genoese government notified Dorino of the outbreak of war in March 1431 it made no specific demands of him, but asked him to provide whatever help he could without jeopardising his own lands.⁶⁸ It seems clear that

document has been identified directly indicating the nature of this marital connection, it has been argued that Niccolò Crispo's wife Valenza was a daughter of Jacopo Gattilusio. Thierry Ganchou, 'Valentina Doria, épouse de Francesco II Gattilusio seigneur de l'isle de Mytilène (1384–1403), et sa parenté. Le Lesbian puzzle résolu', *Nuova Rivista Storica* 88 (2004), pp. 619–86 at p. 679.

⁶³ ASV, *NCol* 16, f. 14 (no. 40); Leonardo of Chios, 'Leonardi Chiensi, Archiepiscopi Mitilenaevi, ex praedicatorum familia contra Carolum Poggium Florentinum De Vera Nobilitate Tractatus Apologeticus', ed. Michele Giustiniani, *Caroli Poggii De Nobilitate contra Poggium Tractatus Apologeticus, cum eorum vita, et annotationibus* (Abeilhan 1657), pp. 53–139 at p. 55. Hopf names this daughter as Ginevra, but without citing a source. Carl Hopf, 'Ducs de l'Archipel', *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes inédites ou peu connues* (Berlin 1873), pp. 480–1 at p. 481; cf. Walter Haberstumpf, 'Questioni storiche e prosopografiche circa i Sanudo, i Dalle Carceri e i Crispo, duce dell'Archipelago (secc. XIII–XV)', *Studi Veneziani* 48 (2004), pp. 193–212 at pp. 208, 210.

⁶⁴ Kritovoulos, p. 169.

⁶⁵ See below, pp. 232–4.

⁶⁶ See below, pp. 234–5, 354–5.

⁶⁷ Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 2, p. 93 (no. 18). Note that this document is in register 5 of the *Litterarum*, not register 3 as stated by the editors.

⁶⁸ Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, p. 89 (no. 13).

he took no part in the war during its early months, and there appears to have been a suspicion on all sides that this neutrality might prove lasting. The instructions issued in August to Venetian galleys on their way to Constantinople and the Black Sea included orders to attack Caffa, other Genoese territories and any Genoese vessels encountered at sea, but specifically excepted the territories and ships of the lord of Mytilene and his subjects.⁶⁹ The possibility of attacking New Phokaia was raised, but with no reference to the old town, and in September the commander of the fleet sent against Chios was ordered to make contact with the lord of Mytilene and ascertain whether he wished to remain neutral, or even to align himself with Venice.⁷⁰ On this occasion the Venetians clearly entertained high hopes of detaching the Gattilusio from their solidarity with the wider Genoese community. In December the Venetians besieging Chios sent a galley to Mytilene seeking news of expected reinforcements from Venice, suggesting that at this point Dorino was still uncommitted to the Genoese cause.⁷¹

There are indications that Venetian hopes found a counterpart in Genoese anxiety. When the communal government had warned Jacopo Gattilusio of the possibility of war with Venice on 13 March 1426, the same day had seen letters dispatched to Genoese administrators in the East, urging them to show favour to the Gattilusio lords and their people. The authorities on Chios were asked to look sympathetically on the complaints of Gattilusio subjects regarding tax demands imposed on them by officials of the Mahona, while those in Pera were encouraged to support certain subjects of the lord of Mytilene in current law-suits within their jurisdiction.⁷² This may be coincidence, but such interventions, occurring just as looming conflict increased the importance of dependable Genoese allies, hint that there were already doubts over the reliability of the Gattilusio and a consequent concern to shore up their loyalty.

In late 1431 and early 1432, while the Genoese government prepared a fleet to lift the siege of Chios, a string of letters were sent to Dorino, assuring him of the strenuous efforts being made to expedite this relief expedition and urging him to provide a galley to assist it on arrival in the Aegean.

⁶⁹ ASV, SS 12, f. 3^{r-v}.

⁷⁰ Philip Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese and their Administration of the Island 1346–1566: described in contemporary documents and official dispatches*, 3 vols. (Cambridge 1958), vol. 2, pp. 401–14.

⁷¹ Antonio Morosini, *Il Codice Morosini: il mondo visto da Venezia (1094–1433)*, ed. Andrea Nanetti (Spoleto 2010), p. 1575.

⁷² Balletto, *Liber*, pp. 154–6 (nos. 136–7).

Similar letters were sent to the commune's representatives in Pera and Caffa, but those for the lord of Mytilene are distinguished by their emphasis on persuasion. They repeatedly insisted on the bonds of common interest uniting the Gattilusio with their compatriots and returned time and again to Dorino's predecessors' glorious tradition of participation in the commune's martial endeavours.⁷³ Dorino was a third-generation Aegean lord who had come to maturity and power after the death of Niccolò of Ainos, the last Genoese-born Gattilusio lord. The communal government's emphasis on the past may betray a new anxiety as to whether he retained his forebears' instinctive affinity with Genoa. The new fleet finally set out from Genoa in May 1432, commanded by Pietro Spinola. His instructions specified the local forces which were soon expected to assemble at Chios and join in the fleet's operations, including the galley of Mytilene alongside those of Pera, Caffa and Chios. However, while Spinola was instructed to offer thanks to Dorino for his help, he was told that these should be 'maiores aut minores', depending on what he found out about Dorino's actual behaviour during the siege of Chios.⁷⁴ Thus for all the commune's acclamation of an enduring Gattilusio tradition of loyalty, it is clear that there were serious doubts on all sides as to whether the family's identification with and commitment to the Genoese community had survived the turning of the generations.

Such uncertainties must have been deepened by the fact that whereas the bone of contention in the War of Chioggia had been an island on the doorstep of the Gattilusio lordships, they had no stake in the aims of this war, fought for the Italian interests of Genoa's Milanese overlords.⁷⁵ The Venetian discussion of the uncertain attitude of the Gattilusio defined their possible willingness to join the Genoese war effort in terms of their being 'in opinione Ianuensium qui obediunt duci Mediolanum'. The ambiguous Gattilusio position may also have been influenced by ties to the family of the former doge of Genoa Tommaso Campofregoso, who had been fighting to oust the Milanese regime since 1425.⁷⁶ By potentially detaching

⁷³ Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 2, pp. 90–3 (nos. 14–7). Note that these documents are in register 5 of the *Litterarum*, not register 3 as stated by the editors; ASG, AS 1781 (*Litterarum* 5), ff. 113^v–4, 148^{r-v}, 162^v–3^v (nos. 325–6, 413–4, 458, 461).

⁷⁴ ASG, AS 2707A (*Instructiones et Relationes* 1396–1464), no. 39.

⁷⁵ Enrico Basso, 'De Boucicault à Francesco Sforza: persistence et changements dans la politique orientale des seigneurs étrangers de Gênes au XV^e siècle', *Le Partage du Monde: échanges et colonisation dans la Méditerranée médiévale*, ed. Michel Balard and Alain Ducellier (Paris 1998), pp. 63–77 at pp. 73–4.

⁷⁶ Stella, pp. 357–65, 368–9, 374–5. Affiliation with the Campofregoso is not firmly attested until 1442, but there are indications of an alliance in the late fourteenth century. Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 2, pp. 296–7 (no. 25). See below, pp. 160–1, 167–8.

Genoese policy even from the interests of the inhabitants of Liguria, let alone their compatriots overseas, foreign rule threw into relief the double-edged impact of integration into the Genoese network. The solidarity of other Genoese offered the lordships a defence against the encroachment of common enemies like the Venetians and the Catalans; on the other hand, implication in the quarrels of others could expose them to greatly increased threats from these rivals. The evidence of goodwill between the lordship of Ainos and Venice is suggestive of the scope for an amicable accommodation with Genoa's rivals, should the Gattilusio choose to step back from active alignment with the commune.⁷⁷

The fact that Dorino ultimately frustrated Venetian hopes may well have less to do with any enthusiasm for the war's aims or sentimental attachment to the metropolis than with the fact that as the war unfolded it had brought on the immediate possibility of a Venetian conquest of Chios. This would have left Lesbos and Old Phokaia sharply exposed to Venetian power at very close quarters, and torn apart the commercial network through which the trade of these territories was conducted, a structure of which Chios formed the focal point.⁷⁸ However jaundiced their view of the metropolitan regime, the common interests connecting the Genoese emigrants of the Aegean to one another remained too compelling for such a stark prospect to be endured.

Physical and Financial Disengagement from the Metropolis

The doubts about the loyalties of the Gattilusio lords which are evident in the 1420s and 1430s are more readily understandable in the light of evidence for the progressive sundering of the connections binding the Gattilusio lords to Genoa. This process appears to have passed through a critical phase during the period immediately leading up to the events discussed above.

The most basic of the bonds uniting Genoese overseas were the familial connections by blood and marriage that linked them with one another and with those still resident in the metropolis. The importance of the family as the foundation of social relationships was particularly pronounced in Genoa, with its weak, unstable political institutions and its distinctive institution of the *albergo*. This was an extended clan created through a

⁷⁷ See below, pp. 232–4.

⁷⁸ See below, pp. 172, 181–5, 219–27.

noble house's absorption of its clientele or through the amalgamation of a number of lesser families under a new name.⁷⁹ The most obvious family connections of the Gattilusio lords were those with other members of their own extended family, and these might have formed a durable bond anchoring them to the metropolis. However, the available sources suggest that this was not the case. There is a substantial amount of evidence for the presence of members of other branches of the Gattilusio *albergo* in the East as servants or associates of the Aegean lords.⁸⁰ By contrast, evidence for the Gattilusio lords making use of members of their own house to oversee their interests in Genoa is conspicuous by its absence.⁸¹ This is in spite of the availability of material identifying a substantial number of people connected with the Gattilusio lords' affairs in the metropolis, including procurators appointed to do business on their behalf and individuals drawing interest on their investments or making tax payments on their behalf.

This may have been in part the result of a preference for more influential representatives such as the family's connections in the great Doria *albergo*. However, particularly in later years, it must have been related to the apparent disappearance of the family from Genoa in the decades following 1355, a process which was presumably closely connected with the allure of the family's holdings in the East. The number of references to resident Gattilusio in Genoese documents dwindles markedly through the course of the life of their Aegean lordships. Commonplace in the mid-fourteenth century, after the first few years of the fifteenth century no evidence at all has been found for male members of the *albergo* residing

⁷⁹ Jacques Heers, *Gênes au XV^e Siècle: activité économique et problèmes sociaux* (Paris 1961), pp. 564–76, 579–83; *idem*, 'Consorterie e alberghi a Gênes: la ville et la campagne', *SG* 9 (1989), pp. 45–63; Edoardo Grendi, 'Profilo storico degli alberghi genovesi', *Mélanges de l'Ecole française de Rome: Moyen Age Temps Modernes* 87 (1975), pp. 241–301; *idem*, 'Problemi di storia degli alberghi genovesi', *SG* 1 (1981), pp. 183–97; Cesare Cattaneo Mallone di Novi, *I "politici" del Medioevo genovese (ricerche d'archivio): Il Liber Civilitatis del 1528* (Genoa 1987), pp. 53–63.

⁸⁰ See below, pp. 194–201.

⁸¹ In 1395 Battista Gattilusio, son of Ugolino, drew letters of exchange in Genoa on Pera on behalf of Francesco II of Mytilene. (ASG, NA 324 (Theramo de Maggiolo 6), f. 85^{r-v}. These documents have been published (Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 1, pp. 89–90 (no. 5)), but erroneously dated to 1400.) However, it may reasonably be supposed that this was the same Battista Gattilusio whose activities appear in other documents of this period. These other dealings were focused in the East, where he was established as a burgher of Pera. If so, his presence in Genoa would hardly have been habitual. See below, p. 197.

in Genoa as long as the Aegean lordships endured.⁸² Women who had been born into the *albergo* lingered slightly longer, but evidence of their presence also fades away in the early fifteenth century, excluding those daughters of the Aegean lords who were sent west to marry Genoese noblemen.⁸³ The records of the *Avaria*, the taxes charged on movable property in Genoa, are suggestive in this regard. During the second half of the fourteenth century assessments levied on members of the Gattilusio *albergo* continue to appear regularly, featuring as late as 1392.⁸⁴ While these records survive for only a few years of the fifteenth century, it is noticeable that the Gattilusio appear in none of the extant cartularies.⁸⁵ No members of the Gattilusio *albergo* appear on the lists of well over two hundred Genoese nobles summoned to attend the councils that debated submission to France in 1396.⁸⁶

⁸² The last identified example of a male member of the *albergo* in Genoa in this period was Luchino Gattilusio son of Andrea. He regularly collected interest payments on accounts in the public debt in person until 1403, but had ceased to do so by 1405 (ASG, CM 63, ff. 5, 39, 172; CM 66, ff. 5, 39, 170; CM 736, f. 11; CM 744, f. 11).

⁸³ See below, pp. 159–60, 167–8. Aside from these brides sent from the Aegean, Gattilusio women whose presence is attested at a relatively late stage include Marietta, daughter of one Niccolò Gattilusio (not the lord of Ainos), who was collecting her own interest and managing her accounts at least as late as 1406 (ASG, CM 744, f. 152; CM 1390, f. 248). Orietta, daughter of Ugolino Gattilusio, and Domeneghina, daughter of Raffaele Gattilusio, were both still to be found in Genoa collecting interest as late as 1409–10 (ASG, CM 1251, ff. 138, 157^v; ASG, SGCol 4307 (*Comperarum Sancti Georgii Introitus et Exitus* 1409), ff. 769^v, 778^v, 786^v, 791, 800^v, 813). Domeneghina was dead by 1419, when her accounts were closed (ASG, SGCol 43 (*Cartularii PN, B* 1419), ff. 308^v, 310; SGCol 7676 (*Descriptionum Locorum* 1419), f. 6). Orietta's account was closed in 1422 (ASG, SGCol 7677 (*Descriptionum Locorum* 1422), f. 2^v).

⁸⁴ ASG, AC 514 (*Avariorum Capitis* 1357), ff. 142^v, 171^v; AC 515 (*Avariorum Capitis* 1359), ff. 37^v, 106^v, 137^v, 166^v; AC 516 (*Avariorum Capitis* 1363), ff. 112, 123^v; AC 519 (*Avariorum Capitis* 1386), ff. 122^v, 176^v; AC 526 (*Avariorum Capitis* 1365), f. 196; AC 527 (*Avariorum Capitis* 1369), ff. 101^{r-v}, 157; AC 530 (*Avariorum Capitis* 1377), f. 144; AC 531 (*Avariorum Capitis* 1392), ff. 62^v, 63^v, 68^v, 72; AC 539 (*Avariorum seu Spendium Exactum a Quatuor Compagnis* 1366), ff. 8, 9^v, 10^v, 40^v, 41^v, 45, 121^v. In 1359 those liable for payment included one Francesco Gattilusio, possibly the lord of Mytilene (AC 515, f. 106^v; cf. below, pp. 157–9). Those liable in 1357, 1359, 1366 and 1369 included the heirs of Domenico Gattilusio, perhaps the same Domenico who was the father of the first Aegean lords (AC 514, f. 142^v; AC 515, f. 106^v; AC 527, f. 12; AC 539, f. 9^v; below, p. 195).

⁸⁵ This significance of this silence should not be overstated, since the organisation of these levies and their records varies widely, and members of the Gattilusio *albergo* are similarly absent from some of the surviving cartularies of the fourteenth century. Nevertheless, it forms part of a wider pattern manifested elsewhere, as in the disappearance of members of the *albergo* from those collecting interest on investments in the public debt and from the representatives employed by the Gattilusio lords to pursue their interests in Genoa. See below, pp. 162–7.

⁸⁶ Eugène Jarry, *Les Origines de la Domination Française à Gênes (1392–1402)* (Paris 1896), pp. 472–4, 493–6 (nos. 16–17).

A particularly significant document in this context is a Genoese report produced in support of the commune's effort to distance itself from the depredations of the pirate Giuliano Gattilusio in the 1450s. This sought to exculpate Genoa by asserting that the pirate was not Genoese but Greek, or of 'nationis Metilimensis'. It extended this argument by quoting an assertion that although the Gattilusio family was Genoese in origin, it had been many years since any member of the family was to be found in the city.⁸⁷ This assertion that by the mid-fifteenth century the Gattilusio had long since abandoned their native city is entirely in keeping with their general disappearance from the records in Genoa.

Alongside the physical removal of the extended Gattilusio clan from Genoa came a progressive withdrawal of the family's assets and interests in the metropolis. This can be observed both in their ownership of real estate and in their investments in the public debt of the commune. The Gattilusio lords continued to own houses and portions of houses in Genoa until the very last years of their rule in the Aegean, and these possessions of the Gattilusio continued to be entered in the property tax registers of the *Cabella Possessionum* as a distinct *albergo*. This has been cited as a demonstration of the durability of the links between the Aegean lords and Genoa.⁸⁸ The trend over time, however, is clearly one of dwindling holdings, as properties were disposed of and no new ones acquired to take their place.

The houses belonging to the Gattilusio *albergo* in Genoa itself were clustered in the north-west of the city around Piazza Fossatello and Piazza San Pancrazio, while they also owned property in settlements along the coast to the west, all within a few miles of the city itself.⁸⁹ The earliest surviving cartulary, that for 1414, records four houses in Genoa and two properties in Sestri Ponente, one of them neighbouring the Gattilusio family church of St. James, as the possessions of the heirs of Francesco Gattilusio. Another house in Genoa was listed as the shared property of Jacopo Gattilusio, lord of Mytilene, and Luchino Gattilusio.⁹⁰ Presumably the house entered in the names of Jacopo and Luchino had been acquired

⁸⁷ ASG, NA 795 (Andrea de Cario 1), no. 10.

⁸⁸ Assini, pp. 224–5.

⁸⁹ Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 1, p. 217 (no. 6); ASG, AC 559 (*Cabella Possessionum* 1414), ff. 261–2; Luciano Grossi Bianchi and Ennio Poleggi, *Genova: una città portuale nel Medioevo* (Genoa 1980), pp. 202, 204, 209.

⁹⁰ ASG, AC 559 (*Cabella Possessionum* 1414), ff. 261–2. Half of a house belonging to Francesco II, the other half of which was owned by Oberto and Luchino Gattilusio, had been handed over to Pietro Doria son of Ignazio in 1401 in settlement of a debt. Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 1, p. 217 (no. 6); cf. below, p. 167n140.

since Jacopo inherited from his father in 1403; it was seemingly the last Ligurian real estate the Gattilusio lords would ever acquire. In 1418 half of this house and halves of two of the houses of Francesco's heirs in Genoa were acquired by Battista de Uncio and by Valarano Lomellini, already neighbours of the Gattilusio.⁹¹ This transaction was carried out through Jacopo's procurator Pietro Centurione, who had been engaged in negotiations for the sale of houses belonging to Jacopo in Genoa and Sestri Ponente as early as 1413.⁹² In 1425 the whole of another house in Genoa was transferred into the name of Domeneghina Gattilusio, a member of the clan who had continued to reside in Liguria but who was by then deceased. This presumably placed it in the hands of her heirs, who were not members of the Gattilusio *albergo*.⁹³ Two of the divided houses clearly remained in the hands of the Gattilusio lords until the very end of their rule in the Aegean.⁹⁴ The fate of their remaining properties is uncertain, but at the very least it is clear that within a period of only eight years the Gattilusio lords had disposed of more than two-fifths of their Ligurian real estate, as valued in 1414, and quite possibly the majority of it.⁹⁵ The tenure

⁹¹ ASG, AC 559 (*Cabella Possessionum* 1414), ff. 261–2.

⁹² ASG, NA 603 (Giovanni Balbi 1), no. 328.

⁹³ ASG, AC 562 (*Cabella Possessionum* 1425), f. 238; ASG, SGCol 43 (*Cartularii PN, B* 1419), ff. 308^v, 310. By 1442 this house had disappeared from the list of Domeneghina's holdings (ASG, AC 570 (*Cabella Possessionum* 1442), f. 150). Another property, in Sampierdarena, continued to be recorded under Domeneghina's name for decades after her death, again presumably in the hands of her non-Gattilusio heirs. A house in Genoa neighbouring those of the lords of Mytilene remained under the name of the heirs of Giuliano Gattilusio (e.g. ASG, AC 566 (*Cabella Possessionum* 1429), f. 72^v; AC 575 (*Cabella Possessionum* 1446), ff. 173^v–4; AC 588 (*Cabella Possessionum* 1459), f. 132^v). Their identities are unknown, although it is possible that this Giuliano is to be equated with Giuliano son of Ugolino, in which case his heirs probably included a leading official of the lordship of Mytilene, Battista Gattilusio. See below, pp. 197–9.

⁹⁴ E.g. ASG, AC 570 (*Cabella Possessionum* 1442), f. 150; AC 575 (*Cabella Possessionum* 1446); AC 583 (*Cabella Possessionum* 1455), AC 586 (*Cabella Possessionum* 1458), f. 138; AC 591 (*Cabella Possessionum* 1463), f. 174^v.

⁹⁵ This uncertainty is due to the inconsistencies of the records of the *Cabella Possessionum*, in which different cartularies contain different combinations of individual properties. One of the properties of Francesco's heirs in Sestri appears only in the cartulary for 1414; the other makes its last identifiable appearance in 1425. After the sale in 1418 of half of the house of Jacopo and Luchino the remaining half disappears from the record. Some or all of these properties may well have been disposed of along with the others sold in these years, but the intermittent appearances of the two half-houses retained by the Gattilusio throughout the period, one or both of which are sometimes omitted from the cartularies, renders this an unsafe conclusion (e.g. ASG, AC 561 (*Cabella Possessionum* 1424), f. 215; AC 576 (*Cabella Possessionum* 1447), f. 215; AC 588 (*Cabella Possessionum* 1459), f. 132^v). Still more so does the case of a house with a tower on the waterfront which was included among the possessions of Francesco's heirs in 1414. This house disappears

of Jacopo of Mytilene, the first third-generation Gattilusio lord, therefore emerges as a turning point. In its early years the Gattilusio lords were apparently still acquiring new property in Genoa, but in the latter part of the reign such expansion gave way to a rapid and extensive disposal of assets. Thereafter inertia apparently prevailed.

The investments of the Aegean lords in the public debt present a still more clear-cut picture of the retention and extension of interests in the metropolis until the early fifteenth century, followed by rapid and permanent abandonment of these Genoese assets. At moments of financial need the Genoese commune would raise a new *compera* or *mutuum*: a loan, often forced, whose contributors were compensated by fixed interest payments derived from specific fiscal revenues assigned to the purpose. Holdings of this public debt were routinely bought and sold. Many of the *compere* and *mutui* were later consolidated through the creation in 1407 of the *Casa di San Giorgio*, which gained an ever more preponderant role in Genoese finance as the commune's debts continued to grow and more of the older debt holdings were absorbed into it.⁹⁶

Francesco I and Niccolò I both possessed holdings in the *compere*. An account valued at only £50, opened at some point before 1352, was held in the name of one Francesco Gattilusio.⁹⁷ There is no specific evidence to indicate that this was the same Francesco who later became lord of Mytilene. However, another account was listed as that of 'dominus Francesco Gateluxius dominus Metellini'. This first appears in the cartulary for 1374, while the last surviving entry is that for 1384, implying that the account was dissolved shortly after Francesco's death.⁹⁸

from the cartularies thereafter, yet in 1451 Dorino's procurator entered into an agreement to lease it out for nine years from 1453, suggesting that it had remained in the hands of the lords of Mytilene, unless it had been disposed of and later re-acquired (ASG, NA 658 (Branca Bagnara 11), no. 184). The permanent disappearance of a number of Gattilusio properties from the tax registers after the cartulary of 1414 therefore cannot be taken as definitive proof that they were no longer in the family's hands.

⁹⁶ Heers, *Gênes*, pp. 103–17; Domenico Giofrè, *Il Debito Pubblico Genovese: inventario delle comperie anteriori a San Giorgio o non consolidate nel Banco (Sec. XIV–XIX)* (Milan 1967) (ASLSP 80 (n.s. 6)), pp. 7–22; Jacques Heers, 'Il debito pubblico: dalle comperie al Banco di San Giorgio', *Storia Illustrata di Genova*, ed. Luca Borzani, Geo Pistarino and Franco Ragazzi, 6 vols. (Milan 1993–5), vol. 2, pp. 305–20; Michele Fratianni, 'Debito pubblico, reputazione e tutele dei creditori: la storia della Casa di San Giorgio', *La Casa di San Giorgio: il potere del credito: atti del convegno, Genova, 11 e 12 novembre 2004*, ed. Giuseppe Felloni (Genoa 2006) (ASLSP 120/2 (n.s. 46/2)), pp. 199–220.

⁹⁷ E.g. ASG, CM 354, f. 105; CM 500, f. 239.

⁹⁸ E.g. ASG, CM 1030, f. 178^v; CM 1038, f. 190^v. The termination of this account is problematic, since it is already absent from the register for 1385, which survives (CM 1039), but

Accounts of the Gattiluso Lords in the Genoese Public Debt⁹⁹

Account-holder	Compera	Value	Interest	Date opened	Date closed
Franciscus Gateluxius	Magna Mutuorum Veterum	£50	6%	[Pre-1352]	1418
Dominus Franciscus Gateluxius dominus Metellini	Magna Venetorum	£285	10%	[1370–3]	[1384?]
Dominus Nicolaus Gateluxius quondam domini Dominici	Magna Pacis	£1050	10%	[1377–9]	1426
Dominus Nicolaus Gateluxius quondam domini Dominici	Nova Sancti Pauli de Octo Pro Centenario (SG from 1408)	£500	8%	[Pre-1390]	1408
Dominus Nicolaus Gateluxius dominus Eney	Magna Venetorum (SG from 1408)	£400	10%	[1387]	1408
Dominus Nicolaus Gateluxius dominus Eney	Vetus Sancti Pauli de Octo Pro Centenario (SG from 1408)	£333 s10	8%	[1389–93]	1408
Dominus Nicolaus de Gataluxiis dominus Enii	Regiminis	£200	8%	[1395–1405]	[1406–10] ⁹⁹
Magnificus et nobilis dominus Nicolaus de Gateluxiis dominus Enii	Nova Sancti Pauli de Octo Pro Centenario (SG from 1408)	£593 s15	8%	1398	1408
Dominus Nicolaus Gateluxius	Nova Gazaria (SG from 1408)	£117 s 7	10%	[1404–6]	1408

the entry in the 1384 register (*CM* 1038, f. 190^v) does not carry the note that would normally accompany its dissolution. The folios at the rear of the latter register, where the deletion of an account would be recorded in greater detail, are missing.

⁹⁹ Dates in square brackets indicate the possible date range for the acquisition or disposal of an account where the register recording this action does not survive.

¹⁰⁰ Part of the *Compera Regiminis* was dissolved in 1407, while the remainder was reconstituted as the *Compera Nova Regiminis*. Since the cartularies of 1407–9 do not survive, it is unclear whether Niccolò's account was dissolved as part of this general liquidation or as part of Niccolò's own withdrawal of funds the following year. Gioffrè, *Debito*, pp. 207–9.

Niccolò of Ainos possessed at least seven different accounts in six *compere*. These were opened at various dates both before and after he became lord of Ainos and amounted to a total capital of £3,194 s12.¹⁰¹ The majority of these were absorbed into the *Casa di San Giorgio* upon its formation and were promptly sold off by Niccolò's procurator Paolo Lercario.¹⁰² This may well have been a direct response on financial grounds to the formation of the *San Giorgio*, which set the rate of interest on accounts in the amalgamated *compere* to 7%, whereas Niccolò's holdings had previously brought returns at a rate of 8% or 10%.¹⁰³ This likelihood that this was his motive is enhanced by the fact that Niccolò retained an account worth £1,050 in the *Compera Magna Pacis*, one of the *compere* which had not been amalgamated, carrying an interest rate of 10%.¹⁰⁴ This account remained in existence under his name even after his death, as was common practice, until 1426, when it was transferred into the possession of Giovanni Doria son of Adano.¹⁰⁵ The account still entered in the name of Francesco Gattilusio had finally been wound up in 1418.¹⁰⁶ The investments of the Gattilusio lords in the Genoese public debt were thus dissolved between 1408 and 1426, a period corresponding closely to that during which so much of their Ligurian real estate was disposed of and one which fell entirely within the tenure of Jacopo Gattilusio as lord of Mytilene.

Whereas the brothers Francesco I and Niccolò I, the original emigrants from Genoa, purchased Genoese government stock even many years after their emigration to the Aegean, their successors appear not to have made any comparable investment in the metropolis. No accounts in the public debt owned by any of the Gattilusio lords of the second, third or fourth generations have been identified to date, nor have any held by their children resident in the Aegean. Even more completely than in the case of their property holdings, the Gattilusio lords in the Aegean seem to have abandoned Genoese securities as a repository for their wealth, making no new investments and withdrawing those that already existed. However, in the 1440s extensive investments were made in several different accounts in the name of Palamede's daughter Ginevra, wife of Lodovico

¹⁰¹ E.g. ASG, CM 691, f. 225^v; CM 703, f. 6; CM 1172, f. 140; CM 1353, f. 277; CM 1369, f. 230^v; CM 190, f. 61^v; CM 1250, f. 138; CM 1042, f. 78^v.

¹⁰² ASG, SGCol 7671 (*Descriptionum Locorum* 1408), ff. 12^v–3, 17.

¹⁰³ Fratianni, pp. 203–5; Gioffrè, *Debito*, pp. 59, 165, 167, 201, 207.

¹⁰⁴ Gioffrè, *Debito*, p. 121.

¹⁰⁵ ASG, CM 786, f. 331.

¹⁰⁶ ASG, CM 500, f. 239.

Campofregoso.¹⁰⁷ These arrangements for a member of the family whose marriages took her away from the Gattilusio lordships and the world of the Aegean highlight the contrasting situation of those who remained in the East.

This financial withdrawal from Genoa is especially striking given that as the environment of the Aegean grew increasingly threatening, wealthy individuals such as the Notaras family prudently deposited wealth in western securities, and in the Genoese public debt in particular.¹⁰⁸ The apparent failure of the Gattilusio to do likewise may be an indication of their confidence of surviving the emerging hegemony of the Ottomans and a consequent preference for investing their wealth in their own domains or in other repositories nearby. It may also have been encouraged by the vulnerability of investments in Genoa to the vagaries of communal politics. In 1388 Gattilusio goods in Genoa were sequestered by the government of Antoniotto Adorno. The sequestration was rescinded in 1390, shortly after Adorno's overthrow and replacement as doge by Jacopo Campofregoso.¹⁰⁹ The reasons behind this seizure and its reversal are not specified, but it seems likely that they were a result of the Gattilusio becoming entangled in the antipathy between the Adorno and Campofregoso families. Members of one or other of these two families held office as doge of Genoa for much of the late fourteenth century and between them they virtually monopolised the post in the fifteenth century; they also at times acted

¹⁰⁷ These included £6,000 in the *Casa di San Giorgio* and £8,550 in the *Compera Neapolis Unius Pro Centenario*, to which a further £800 was added in 1447; in the same year she acquired an account worth £10,596 13s 4d in the *Compera Quartae et Quintae Salsae*, while both of these *compera* were absorbed into the *San Giorgio*. The interest from these accounts was, however, assigned to other people by Lodovico's order (ASG, *SGCol* 145 (*Cartularii M*, *SL* 1445), f. 280; ASG, *CM* 1508, f. 385^v; *CM* 1509, f. 35). Ginevra's sister Valentina, wife of Giorgio del Carretto, left capital in the *San Giorgio* to her Hungarian former nurse Elena in her will in 1458 (ASG, *AS* 2737B (*Materie Politiche* 1408–1577), no. 50). However, the absence of any accounts in the *San Giorgio* under Valentina's name indicates that this was a new investment created by the legacy, rather than a transfer of existing holdings of Valentina's. Elena already possessed an account of her own. ASG, *SCol* 198 (*Cartularii PN*, *B* 1458), f. 458.

¹⁰⁸ Thierry Ganchou, 'Le rachat des Notaras après la chute de Constantinople ou les relations "étrangères" de l'élite byzantine au XV^e siècle', *Migrations et Diasporas Méditerranéennes (X^e–XVI^e Siècles)*, ed. Michel Balard and Alain Ducellier (Paris 2002), pp. 151–228; Klaus-Peter Matschke, 'The Notaras family and its Italian connections', *DOP* 49 (1995), pp. 59–72.

¹⁰⁹ Enrico Basso, 'I Gattilusio tra Genova e Bisanzio. Nuovi documenti d'archivio', *Chemins d'outre-mer: études d'histoire sur la Méditerranée médiévale offertes à Michel Balard*, ed. Damien Coulon, Catherine Otten-Froux, Paule Pagès and Dominique Valérian (Paris 2004), pp. 62–73 at pp. 68–9.

as governors of Genoa during spells of foreign rule. Rivalry between, and at times within, the two families was commonplace and they formed the principal poles around which the commune's political factions coalesced during these decades.¹¹⁰ While there is no evidence of a familial connection between the Gattilusio and Campofregoso at this date, they would be bound together by a series of marriages in the 1440s and 1450s.¹¹¹ The Gattilusio lords had also been granted fiscal privileges by the government of Domenico Campofregoso in 1373, to which others were added by the government of Niccolò Guarco in 1379, as a reward for their assistance in the War of Chioggia. These were rescinded by the Adorno regime at the same time as the sequestration of their property and then reinstated when it was restored to them by the Campofregoso.¹¹² Thus it seems plausible to suppose that the Gattilusio were already in some way aligned with the Campofregoso in the late fourteenth century, and that through this connection they fell foul of a government headed by the Adorno, before having their rights restored thanks to the return to power of their Campofregoso allies. For a family resident in Genoa such vicissitudes would have been an unavoidable hazard of life, but for the Gattilusio their own sphere of influence in the Aegean may well have seemed a more secure and defensible place to invest their wealth than the metropolis.

Another source of concern may have been the risks of managing financial affairs from such a distance through agents who could not always be trusted. In 1405 the commune seized the possessions of Ansaldo Spinola at the request of the lord of Mytilene, because Spinola had absconded with a large sum of his money.¹¹³ This may have been part of the repayment of the money owed to the Gattilusio lords by the Duke of Burgundy, for their contributions to the ransom of the leaders of the Crusade of Nikopolis and loans made at that time.¹¹⁴ As will be seen, Gattilusio investments in Genoa also appear to have fallen victim to the dishonesty of the family's

¹¹⁰ Stella, pp. 162–3, 171–2, 181–2, 194–8, 203–7, 328–32; Giustiniani, vol. 2, pp. 373–4, 376, 380–1, 384, 405–26, 430–3; Enrico Basso, 'Antoniotto Adorno e la dominazione francese', *Storia Illustrata di Genova*, ed. Luca Borzani, Geo Pistarini and Franco Ragazzi, 6 vols. (Milan 1993–5), vol. 2, pp. 289–304 at pp. 289–95; *idem*, 'Tommaso Campofregoso e la dominazione milanese', *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 321–36; Giustina Olgiati, 'L'età delle guerre civili', *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 353–68; Heers, *Gênes*, pp. 576–7, 601–5.

¹¹¹ See below, pp. 167–8.

¹¹² Basso, 'Gattilusio', pp. 64, 68–9, 71–3. The timing of the original grant suggests that it may also have been a reward for assistance in a military undertaking, in this case the successful war waged by Genoa against Cyprus in 1373–4 (Stella, pp. 165–8).

¹¹³ ASG, NI L, no. 74.

¹¹⁴ See below, p. 257.

representatives there. The memory of such mishaps could have contributed to a preference for keeping the family's wealth where it could be more directly supervised.¹¹⁵

Family Connections and Representatives in Genoa

As the Gattilusio family grew increasingly detached from their Ligurian roots, their interests there were managed by Genoese associates from outside their own *albergo*. Some of these representatives appear only once or twice in the sources and the basis of their connections with the Gattilusio remains undetermined: procurators and emissaries such as Giovanni de Diano, Giovanni Arduino and Battista Riccio.¹¹⁶ Members of the Centurione *albergo* acted on behalf of the Gattilusio lords in connection with their property in Genoa and in particular with the administration of the church of St. James in Sestri. This was a Gattilusio foundation under the patronage of the lords of Mytilene, which was eventually handed over to the Centurione entirely.¹¹⁷ The origins of this connection may relate to the close proximity between Gattilusio and Centurione dwellings in Genoa, although commercial links are also likely to have played a part.¹¹⁸

However, most of the evidence for the conduct of the Gattilusio lords' affairs in Genoa relates to their connections among the members and associates of the powerful Doria clan. This alliance may have predated the establishment of the Gattilusio lordships; it was in any case cemented by marital connections during the early decades of Gattilusio rule in the Aegean. Francesco II of Mytilene married Valentina Doria, half-sister of Pietro Doria, who had commanded the fleet which menaced the Venetian lagoon during the War of Chioggia.¹¹⁹ His uncle Niccolò of Ainos married Petra Doria, the daughter of Luciano Doria.¹²⁰ Her father had been

¹¹⁵ It is of course possible that the Gattilusio lords made investments in western Europe outside Genoa, but none have to date been discovered.

¹¹⁶ ASG, NA 454 (Oberto Foglietta 11), f. 226^{r-v}; ASG, NA 744, f. 329^v.

¹¹⁷ ASG, AC 559 (*Cabella Possessionum* 1414), ff. 433–5; ASG, NA 776 (Battista Parisola 10), no. 145; Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 1, pp. 218–9 (no. 8); Arturo Ferretto, *Annali storici di Sestri Ponente e delle sue famiglie (del secolo VII al secolo XV)*, (ASLSP 34 (1904)), p. 345 (no. 1508).

¹¹⁸ Grossi Bianchi and Poleggi, pp. 202, 204, 209; below, p. 166.

¹¹⁹ Ganchou, 'Valentina', pp. 619–86.

¹²⁰ This is established by an account in the *Compera Gazarie* whose owner is identified as 'Petra filia quondam domini Luciani de Auria et uxor domini Nicolai Gateluxii'. ASG, CM 190, f. 68.

the original commander of the same fleet, which Pietro took over after Luciano's death at the Battle of Pola, the victory which opened the way to the lagoon.¹²¹ It is possible that Francesco I's contribution of a galley to this fleet played a part in establishing personal bonds with its successive commanders or their relatives, laying the foundations for subsequent marriage alliances. Niccolò and Petra's marriage presumably benefited from the commitment made by the Genoese commune after Pola to pay the dowries of Luciano's daughters as a reward for the deceased admiral's service.¹²²

Petra is not specifically identified as Niccolò's wife until 1406, when an account in the *Compera Magna Venetorum* listed her as 'Petra uxor domini Nicolai de Gateluxii domini Enii'.¹²³ The date of the marriage can be clarified by examining the entries in each annual cartulary identifying those who collected the quarterly interest payments on each account. In the early 1380s Niccolò's interest had been withdrawn by Leonardo Tartaro and by Ignazio Doria and Benedetto Doria, members of separate branches of the huge Doria *albergo* from Petra's family.¹²⁴ From 1387 onwards it passed to Giovanni *de dominis de Lagneto*, an associate of Petra's brothers, joined from 1394 by her brothers Luciano, Ugolino and Gotifredo themselves, who also collected the interest of her own account.¹²⁵ It would seem that the marriage had taken place by this time and that Niccolò had transferred the conduct of his affairs to his new relations.

However, from 1399 another, sharper change occurred: Petra's brothers and their associates ceased completely to draw the interest from both Niccolò's and Petra's accounts. They were replaced by a different branch of the Doria: the relatives of the same Ignazio Doria son of Accelino who had collected Niccolò's interest before his marriage, and who had also drawn interest on Francesco I Gattilusio's account.¹²⁶ Over the years

¹²¹ Stella, pp. 171–4.

¹²² Stella, p. 174.

¹²³ ASG, CM 1064, f. 190.

¹²⁴ ASG, CM 691, f. 225^v; CM 693, f. 139; CM 698 f. 203^v; P. Natale Battilana, *Genealogie delle famiglie nobili di Genova*, 3 vols. (Genoa 1825–33), vol. 1, Doria section, pp. 72–3, 83.

¹²⁵ ASG, CM 703, f. 209; CM 1042, f. 78^v; CM 1044, f. 129; CM 1353, f. 277; CM 718, f. 174^v; CM 1172, f. 140; CM 1053, f. 169; CM 1369, f. 230^v; CM 1370, f. 279; CM 1351, f. 94; CM 1367, f. 102^v; CM 1368, f. 104^v; CM 1369, ff. 98, 201^v.

¹²⁶ ASG, CM 1038, f. 190^v. Ignazio Doria collected Francesco's interest in 1384, the last year in which that account appears. The interest on Francesco's account had previously been pledged to Bianca, widow of Scacco Gentile, for her lifetime. This arrangement was still in effect in 1381, but by 1384 Bianca had presumably died and the order had therefore lapsed. ASG, CM 1030, f. 178^v; CM 1032, f. 246; CM 1037, f. 215^v.

between 1398 and 1426 Ignazio's brother Raffaele, his son Pietro, Raffaele's sons Niccolò and Accelino and Accelino's widow Salvagia Lercario all drew payments, as did Paolo Lercario, Ideto Lercario, Leone Lercario, Baldasare Lercario and Filippo de Pontremulo.¹²⁷ It may be supposed that these members of the Lercario family were relatives of Salvagia, and so became involved through the Doria connection. The only figure with a close family connection to Petra who was included in this group was Niccolò Doria son of Accio. He was married to Petra's sister Andreola but has not been identified as dealing with her accounts or Niccolò Gattilusio's during the period when her brothers and Giovanni de Lagneto were collecting the interest.¹²⁸ This change was not simply a matter of convenience or preference: both Petra's and Niccolò's accounts now carried explicit orders specifying that the interest should only be disbursed to certain designated individuals: initially Raffaele Doria son of Accelino and Niccolò Doria son of Accio, with others later added to the list.

These unusual instructions were presumably intended to exclude those who had previously been authorised to draw payments, implying that there had been an acrimonious rupture between Niccolò and his wife's family, whom he now displaced from their role as managers of his affairs in Genoa. It is unlikely to be coincidental that in June 1398, a few months before the restrictions on payments were established, an account in the *Compera Nova Sancti Pauli de Octo pro Centenario* was transferred into Niccolò's possession. It had been jointly opened by Giovanni de Lagneto and the now deceased Ugolino Doria, whose share was now entrusted to his brother Luciano on behalf of Ugolino's daughter. A document entered into the end of the cartulary indicates that this was not a normal act of sale. It was enacted by order of the *podestà* of Genoa and the officials of the *compera*, who had ruled that the account belonged to Niccolò in as much as he had paid for it with his own money.¹²⁹ This verdict was supported by the testimony of the same Raffaele Doria who some months later received, along with Niccolò Doria, the exclusive right to claim the interest on the accounts of Niccolò Gattilusio and his wife. The most plausible explanation is that Niccolò was alienated from his wife's relatives by a dispute in which the ownership of this account was one of the issues at

¹²⁷ E.g. ASG, CM 732, f. 349^v; CM 1376, f. 106, CM 1184, f. 140; CM 190, f. 61^v CM 1250, f. 138; CM 1393, f. 106^v; CM 753, f. 319^v; CM 757, f. 334^v; CM 774, f. 317; ASG, SGCol 4 (*Cartularii PN, B* 1409), f. 659.

¹²⁸ Battilana, vol. 1, Doria section, pp. 33–4.

¹²⁹ ASG, CM 1369, ff. 201^v, 230^v, 289^v.

stake, and that Raffaele had stepped forward as the champion of Niccolò's interests. It may be that Giovanni and Ugolino had abused their position as Niccolò's agents to make investments using his money but in their own names. Raffaele's disputes with Giovanni de Lagneto on Niccolò's behalf continued at least until 1404, and further controversies with Giovanni in which Niccolò was represented by Morruale Doria dragged on for many more years.¹³⁰

It has been remarked that these disputes set one branch of the vast Doria *albergo*, including the sons of Luciano Doria and associated with Giovanni de Lagneto, against another represented by Raffaele and Morruale and connected to Niccolò by the marriage of his nephew Francesco II to Valentina Doria, who was Morruale's step-sister and a distant cousin of Raffaele.¹³¹ However, since it is now established that the sons of Luciano were Niccolò's own brothers-in-law, it is clear that this rupture in fact led him to go against the grain of family relationships, restoring his affairs to the hands of those with whom his connections by marriage were far more tenuous. Niccolò's affinity with the group of Doria who returned to the management of his affairs after the rupture of 1398 probably owed less to genealogy than to commerce. The key figure in this connection, Raffaele Doria son of Accelino, seems to have had a long-standing involvement in business relating to the Gattilusio lordships, while himself remaining established in Genoa. In 1381 he and a partner had chartered a craft to carry a cargo of wine and oil from Naples and Gaeta to Mytilene, and in 1393 he had sold a letter of exchange to be drawn in Mytilene, indicating the presence there of an agent who could cash it on his behalf.¹³² His existing relationship with the Gattilusio lords is suggested by a reference

¹³⁰ ASG, AS 501 (*Diversorum Registri* 1403–5), f. 51 (no. 102); Enrico Basso, 'Note su tre documenti inediti e una presunta lettera di Niccolò I Gattilusio, signore di Enos', *Λεσβιακά* 20 (2004), pp. 338–53. After Niccolò's death control of Petra's investments evidently reverted to her brothers. Her various accounts in the *compere* had been absorbed into the *San Giorgio*; although one of her holdings there was liquidated in 1426, another remained active until 1458. ASG, SGCol 7679 (*Descriptionum Locorum* 1426), f. 12^v; SGCol 195 (*Cartularii* 1458), f. 190^v.

Accounts in the name of Francesco I's widow Valentina also continued to exist; these were a legacy from her mother Violante Doria, whose proceeds had been entirely made over to religious institutions from the time of their establishment and remained so thereafter, so their later development offers little evidence for the management of Gattilusio affairs and relations with the Doria. Ganchou, 'Valentina', pp. 661–7, 682–3 (nos. 2–3).

¹³¹ Basso, 'Note', pp. 346–8.

¹³² ASG, NA 321 (Theramo de Maggiolo 3), f. 332; NA 322/I (Theramo de Maggiolo 4), f. 124^v.

in a document of 1395 to money belonging to him which was deposited in a house in Genoa owned by Francesco II of Mytilene.¹³³

The chosen representative of Niccolò's interests in Genoa was thus a man with interests of his own in Gattilusio territory, creating a reciprocal connection between the Genoese and Aegean ends of his involvement with the Gattilusio. Commercial ties with Gattilusio territories can also be found among other representatives of their lords in Genoa. Theramo Centurione, master of two ships that were engaged to ship alum from Lesbos in 1413, was the father of Bernabo, Giovanni and Niccolò, whom Dorino I Gattilusio entrusted with the administration of the church of St. James in Sestri in 1439.¹³⁴ Theramo's son was probably the same as the Niccolò Centurione who acted as a procurator for Francesco II in business relating to that church in 1409, and also the man of that name to whose sons Dorino II had ceded the patronage of the church by 1484.¹³⁵ Pietro Centurione son of Niccolò, who oversaw the sale of many of the Gattilusio properties in Liguria, was also active in Chios at the time.¹³⁶ Paolo Lercario, who was appointed Niccolò's procurator at Mytilene in 1406 and who dissolved his accounts in the *San Giorgio* two years later, may reasonably be identified with the Paolo Lercario who had shipped alum from Lesbos to Flanders in 1404, suggesting a similar combination of commercial dealings in the Gattilusio lordships with conduct of the Gattilusio lords' affairs in Genoa.¹³⁷ Morruale Doria likewise combined action on behalf of the Aegean lords in Liguria and elsewhere in western Europe with involvement in the commercial affairs of their lordships, although he and his son Giovanni evidently came to reside in Mytilene and his interventions in the West were perhaps the work of temporary visits.¹³⁸ An exemplar of this pattern in later years was Bartolomeo Doria son of Jacopo, attested

¹³³ ASG, NA 451 (Oberto Foglietta 8), ff. 345^v–6.

¹³⁴ ASG, NA 603 (Giovanni Balbi 1), no. 305; NA 776 (Battista Parisola 10), no. 145.

¹³⁵ Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 1, pp. 218–9 (no. 8); Ferretto, *Annali*, p. 345 (no. 1508).

¹³⁶ ASG, NA 603 (Giovanni Balbi 1), no. 328; AC 559 (*Cabella Possessionum* 1414), ff. 261–2; above, p. 156.

¹³⁷ ASG, SGCol 7671 (*Descriptionum Locorum* 1408), f. 12^v; Paola Piena Toniolo, *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: atti rogati a Chio da Gregorio Panissario (1403–1405)* (Genoa 1995), pp. 126–9 (nos. 76–8).

¹³⁸ Domenico Giofrè, 'Atti rogati in Chio nella seconda metà del XIV secolo', *Bulletin de l'Institut Historique Belge de Rome* 34 (1962), pp. 319–404 at pp. 401–3; Pietro Gioffredo, 'Storia delle Alpe Marittime', *Monumenta Historiae Patriae* 4 (1839), pp. 1001–2; Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 1, pp. 217–8 (no. 7); Basso, 'Note', pp. 349–52 (nos. 2–3); ADCO, B1560, f. 101^v; B1562, f. 40^{r-v}; ADN, B1277, no. 13670.

as a major investor in the alum concession of Lesbos in 1449, who was appointed as a procurator for Dorino I Gattilusio in 1447 and was acting in this capacity in Genoa in 1451.¹³⁹ In this context it seems natural that having fallen out with his relatives by marriage Niccolò turned instead to contacts whose commercial activities made them a part of the Aegean networks of the Gattilusio.¹⁴⁰

It is in any case unsurprising that Niccolò's change of representatives was a switch from one group of Doria contacts to another, since it was always chiefly through associates in that great noble house and their Campofregoso allies that the Gattilusio lords interacted with Genoese society, as the marriages they contracted in the fifteenth century illustrate. After the marriages of Niccolò to Petra and Francesco II to Valentina there were in fact no further definitively established matches with the Doria.¹⁴¹ However, in the mid-fifteenth century the Gattilusio contracted a series of marriages with the Campofregoso and with their allies the del Carretto and the Manfredi of Faenza.¹⁴² Only in the case of the marriages of Francesco II's son Jacopo and daughter Caterina with the Grimaldi of Boglio did they marry Genoese resident in the West who were not

¹³⁹ ASG, NA 847 (Tommaso de Recco 1), no. 51, NA 658 (Branca Bagnara 11), no. 184.

¹⁴⁰ Even with Raffaele's branch of the Doria relations were not entirely smooth: between 1396 and 1401 Francesco II of Mytilene was entangled in a dispute with Raffaele's nephew Pietro Doria son of Ignazio. This ended with Pietro receiving Francesco's half of a house in Genoa, which was seized by the commune in lieu of the money which Francesco owed him. Ganchou, 'Valentina', p. 669; Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 1, p. 217 (no. 6).

¹⁴¹ According to Carl Hopf, Marco Doria son of Oberto married Caterina Gattilusio, a daughter of Palamede of Ainos, and this has not subsequently been disputed. However, he cites no source, while giving the date at which Caterina is attested as 1488; the known document of that year regarding Marco's dealings with Dorino II Gattilusio makes no mention of such a marriage connection. Some doubt must therefore persist as to whether this marriage in fact occurred. Carl Hopf, 'Dynastes génois de l'Archipel', *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes inédites ou peu connues* (Berlin 1873), pp. 502–25 at p. 502; Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 5, pp. 371–2 (no. 70).

The sixteenth-century work of Oberto Foglietta identifies one Orietta Doria as the wife of the lord of Mytilene and heroine of the 1457 siege of Methymna (see above, p. 71; below, p. 337n60). The appropriation of the events at Methymna for her is certainly erroneous, since the contemporary account of Pius II makes clear that the woman who rallied the defenders of Methymna remained unidentified, which could hardly have been the case were she the wife of the island's lord. However, it is possible that the information on the marriage is accurate, although no known contemporary source confirms it; the wife of Dorino of Mytilene is otherwise unidentified. Oberto Foglietta, *Uberti Folietae Clarorum Ligurum Elogia* (Rome 1573), pp. 97–8; Pius II, *Commentarii*, vol. 2, p. 1830.

¹⁴² ASG, AS 2737B (*Materie Politiche* 1408–1577), no. 50; Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 5, pp. 345–8, 349 (nos. 32, 34, 35, 37); Ausilia Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene, 1454–60', *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: atti rogati a Pera e Mitilene* (Genoa 1982), II, pp. 52–3 (no. 18); Olgiati, 'Gattilusio', pp. 93–6.

conspicuously part of this Doria-Campofregoso alignment. Even Caterina's marriage was negotiated by Corrado Doria, while Morruale and Giovanni Doria were responsible for the delivery of her dowry.¹⁴³

The later marriages within that connection seem to have been of limited benefit to the Gattilusio, being shaped by the political agenda of Lodovico Campofregoso, doge of Genoa and Palamede's son-in-law, and of his allies within the fractious Campofregoso family. The connection was particularly counter-productive with regard to Lodovico's intervention in 1449 to block the requested papal indulgence for the marriage of Dorino's son Domenico to Palamede's daughter Constanza. In this Lodovico was apparently guided by his wish to induce Constanza to marry his own brother Gian Galeazzo, a match which did eventually take place, but which his successor as doge Pietro Campofregoso attempted to thwart.¹⁴⁴

Thus, while familial connections linking the Gattilusio lords to Genoa remained important and new ones continued to be forged throughout their history, these connections with relatives far away in Italy could be distinctly fraught. They embroiled the Gattilusio in costly and frustrating financial, dynastic and political difficulties which they were not well placed to handle from the remoteness of the Aegean. In dealing with the threats to their interests posed by metropolitan intrigues they seem to have been inclined to look to relationships of trust forged more through their Aegean affairs than through links in Genoa, just as the turbulence of their ancestral city may well have encouraged them to see even the unstable Aegean as a safer place for their wealth.

Conflict Within the Community

The political dangers jeopardising Gattilusio interests in Genoa were cast into relief by the contrast between the character of politics in the metropolis and that found in the Genoese East. Whereas in their homeland internecine political violence was never far away, armed conflict between the Genoese of the metropolis and the settlements overseas,

¹⁴³ R. Latouche and L. Imbert, *Inventaire sommaire du fonds 'Città e Contado di Nizza' des Archives d'Etat de Turin* (Cannes 1937), p. 38; Gioffredo, pp. 1001–2; George T. Dennis, 'The short chronicle of Lesbos 1355–1428', *Αεσβιακά* 5 (1965), pp. 3–22 reprinted in *Byzantium and the Franks 1350–1420* (London 1982), I, pp. 6–7, 20–1.

¹⁴⁴ ASG, AS 1785 (*Litterarum* 9), ff. 87–8 (no. 263); AS 1793 (*Litterarum* 17), f. 193 (no. 872); Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 5, pp. 346–7, 349 (nos. 34–5, 37); Olgiati, 'Gattilusio', pp. 93–6.

between those different settlements or within them was relatively uncommon. Rivalries within ruling families occasionally led to violence, such as Tedisio Zaccaria's incitement in 1307 of a Catalan raid on Phokaia, Benedetto Zaccaria's collusion in the Byzantine capture of Chios in 1329, or the troubles that afflicted the Gattilusio themselves in their last years.¹⁴⁵ It was also not completely unknown for metropolitan conflicts to embroil the East. During the unusually protracted and intense civil war of 1317–31 the colonial authorities of Pera and the Black Sea supported the ousted Ghibellines who held much of Liguria against the Guelfs controlling Genoa itself, leading to a Guelf naval expedition against them in 1323.¹⁴⁶ However, this campaign was the only attested clash in the East during this long war. There is no evidence of violence between the Ghibelline colonies and the Zaccaria and Cattaneo in Chios and Phokaia, who inclined towards the Guelfs.¹⁴⁷ In any case, such active strife was a rare phenomenon in comparison with the chronic turmoil of the Ligurian homeland. Distance muted the repercussions of conflicts in the metropolis. Defensive solidarity arising from their position as a minority population among the more numerous native inhabitants of the eastern Mediterranean, and often in close proximity to Latin rivals, seems to have largely subdued the characteristic Genoese tendency to factional strife. In line with this wider pattern, despite occasional disagreements in which they sought the intervention of the commune, such as the tax dispute of 1426, the relations between the Gattilusio and their compatriots in the Aegean were not marked by violence.¹⁴⁸ This apparent tranquility contrasts with the entanglement in conflict that arose from their affiliations both in Genoa itself and in the similarly violent and unstable milieu of Palaiologan dynastic politics.

Unlike their properties in Genoa, the Aegean interests of the Gattilusio also faced no threat from the communal authorities. Their position outside the reach of the commune's formal authority clearly helped to remove potential grounds for conflict.¹⁴⁹ However, for the most part violent clashes

¹⁴⁵ Ramon Muntaner, *Crònica*, ed. Editorial Barcino, 9 vols. (Barcelona 1927–52), vol. 6, pp. 91–4; Argenti, vol. 1, pp. 56–7; above, pp. 37, 65, 69, 72, below, pp. 192–4, 198–9.

¹⁴⁶ Stella, pp. 105–6; Gregoras, vol. 1, pp. 286–7.

¹⁴⁷ Enrico Basso has suggested that the Ghibellines of Pera connived at the Byzantine campaign against Martino Zaccaria in 1329, but this remains conjectural. Basso, 'Zaccaria', p. 60.

¹⁴⁸ See above, pp. 136–7.

¹⁴⁹ As has already been suggested with regard to Byzantium, loose integration into a network could enhance willingness to adhere to it, by removing the pressure to escape onerous obligations. See above, p. 92.

were also absent from the commune's relations with its own colonial possessions during the lifespan of the Gattilusio lordships. The major exception was the revolt of the Mahona of Chios against the French regime of Boucicault and its suppression by a Genoese expeditionary force in 1408–9. Even this exception tends to reinforce rather than undermine the general rule, since the authoritarian rigour of Boucicault's administration was starkly at odds with Genoese norms, and the defiance of Chios was at least in part a reaction against this unwonted stringency.¹⁵⁰ The attitude of the Gattilusio lords to this exceptional occurrence is of particular interest, as it must have set the Gattilusio lords' bonds with their nearest Genoese neighbours and leading trading partners against their links with the commune, family connections and relationship with Boucicault. That attitude however remains frustratingly uncertain.¹⁵¹

¹⁵⁰ Argenti, vol. 1, pp. 155–65; Basso, 'Boucicault', pp. 65–6.

¹⁵¹ Niccolò I Gattilusio is reported to have been at Chios shortly after the suppression of the revolt, where he apparently had dealings with Corrado Doria, the commander of the Genoese fleet. This is attested by a letter which Niccolò supposedly sent from Chios at Corrado's urging, relinquishing claims which he had against Giovanni de Lagneto, who was a relative of Corrado's. The matter is complicated by the fact that the authenticity of the letter was challenged in 1411 by Morruale Doria, who was pursuing these claims on behalf of the Gattilusio (Enrico Basso, 'Note su tre documenti inediti e una presunta lettera di Niccolò I Gattilusio, signore di Enos', *Λεσβιακά* 20 (2004), pp. 338–53 at pp. 342–8, 351–2 (no. 3)). If it was genuine, such dealings with Corrado could suggest that the Gattilusio had either actively assisted his forces or at least taken a neutral or mediating posture, a supposition reinforced by the lack of attested punitive action against them. The long-standing cooperation between the Gattilusio lords and Boucicault both before and after his appointment as governor of Genoa, and their apparent past interest in securing his goodwill and that of his master, the French king, would have inclined them to take his side (see below, pp. 332–3, 340–4). Standing outside the reach of communal authority, they were not implicated in the grievances brewing against him both in the colonies and in the metropolis. A further incentive to support the communal fleet on its arrival lay in family connection, as Corrado Doria was the nephew of Francesco II's wife Valentina Doria and had negotiated the marriage of one of Francesco's daughters (Latouche and Imbert, p. 38; Gioffredo, pp. 1001–2; Ganchou, 'Valentina', pp. 647–8, 670–3, 684). However, the closeness of their connections with Chios and the correspondence of their regional interests with those of the Mahona might reasonably be expected to have attracted their sympathy to the rebels. Supposing the letter to be genuine, the fact that at Corrado's urging Niccolò renounced rights which he had persistently pursued in the past, and which his heir Jacopo would soon take up again, may be taken as an expression of personal goodwill. However, it could very well have been an attempt to placate the commander of a powerful armed force who had reason to look askance at the attitude of the Gattilusio in the recent crisis. The fact that after the storm had passed the claims against Giovanni de Lagneto were revived and the letter repudiated as a forgery may suggest that it had been elicited under some degree of pressure. In the absence of positive evidence, the likeliest interpretation may be that the Gattilusio had taken the line of least resistance, maintaining normal relations with Chios after the rupture with Genoa but then actively or passively falling into line with the commune when its armed strength appeared in the Aegean, in a position

The more usual character of Genoese government gave its citizens who enjoyed governmental authority outside its structures little cause to fear that drawing too close to it might compromise their freedom of action. While the weakness of the Genoese commune weakened the forces actively integrating the dispersed community of the Genoese overseas, it also diminished the contrary incentives for those citizens to distance themselves from the commune so as to escape unwelcome control. This contrasts with the situation of Venice, whose more powerful institutions of central government encouraged many of its citizens who had acquired territorial authority overseas to take precautions to avoid coming under its jurisdiction. The Venetian lords who established themselves in the Cyclades after the Fourth Crusade adhered to the overlordship of the strongest of their number, the Sanudo Dukes of the Archipelago, who in turn became the vassals of the Latin Empire of Constantinople and later of the Principality of Achaia. Feudal dependence on these relatively weak superiors was preferred to submission to Venice's more effective and potentially overbearing authority.¹⁵² The Venetian government interfered in the affairs of these lordships and took advantage of opportunities arising from outside attack or internal strife to strengthen its hold over them, and occasionally to take direct possession of the islands they had ruled. The unwelcome effects of these efforts were of course offset to some extent by Venice's capacity to offer protection in an increasingly dangerous environment.¹⁵³ Whereas Venetian authority thus tended over time to encroach on the territorial possessions of its citizens, Genoa by contrast increasingly devolved power from the commune to other institutions or individuals. The unthreatening nature of communal authority removed perhaps the most pressing motive that might have inclined rulers like the Gattilusio lords to exercise caution in associating themselves with Genoa. The only serious negative pressure that remained was the wish to avoid the risks of being embroiled in Genoa's conflicts with other groups, chiefly the Venetians, a consideration which does seem to have had some

of some embarrassment which enabled Corrado Doria to exact concessions on behalf of Giovanni de Lagneto.

¹⁵² Guillaume Saint-Guillain, 'Les conquérants de l'archipel: l'Empire latin de Constantinople, Venise et les premiers seigneurs des Cyclades', *Quarta crociata: Venezia-Bisanzio-Impero Latino*, ed. Gherardo Ortalli, Giorgio Ravagnani and Peter Schreiner (Venice 2006), pp. 125–237 at pp. 156–69, 225–6; *idem*, 'Seigneuries', pp. 32–3.

¹⁵³ William Miller, *The Latins in the Levant* (London 1908), pp. 578–84, 587–8, 590–2, 594–7, 601–7; Dennis, 'Problemi', pp. 229–33.

purchase on the Gattilusio lords, but not to any decisive effect.¹⁵⁴ As in the case of Byzantium, the Gattilusio had little to lose from affiliation with such a loose-knit, associative network, leaving free rein for more positive considerations to encourage their willing integration.

The Alum Industry and Genoese Commerce

While Genoa itself did not exert strong negative pressure on the Gattilusio in the Aegean, their dwindling connections with the city suggests that links to the metropolis were not the fundamental basis of their enduring active attachment to the Genoese community. Rather than being simply spokes connected to a metropolitan hub, the Genoese establishments overseas were elements of a network in the East, with its own interests, interconnections and dynamics. The physical proximity of Chios, Lesbos and the two Phokaia and their position as successive ports of call on the main Genoese sea route through the Aegean promoted connections between them, reinforced by the ties of common interest. In their location, their semi-autonomous government, the orientation of their commercial interests and the character of Chios as an entire island under Genoese rule, the territories of the Mahona were the element of the contemporary Genoese world whose circumstances had most in common with those of the Gattilusio lordships. The preoccupations of the distant metropolis, or even of the colonies at Famagusta or in the Black Sea, might often be at variance with those of the Gattilusio, but their Aegean compatriots were always likely to share much of their outlook and many of their concerns. The integration of the Gattilusio lordships into the networks established by their regional partners endured without perceptible reduction and in some respects grew tighter with the passage of time.

The most fundamental of the pragmatic considerations which encouraged cohesion among Genoa's widely scattered citizens was their participation in the same commercial network. This was founded on the initiative of individuals and small groups, but economic and political cooperation on a large scale was often required to safeguard the interests of individual enterprises and frustrate their rivals. By far the most prominent and well-documented of the commercial activities involving

¹⁵⁴ See above, pp. 150–2.

the Gattilusio lordships, and the one most strongly identified with the Genoese community, was the mining, processing and export of alum.

The possession of Old Phokaia by the Gattilusio may have enabled them to benefit from the alum production of the area. Certainly the mineral was on occasion exported from the port, as surviving contracts demonstrate. Francesco Giustiniani chartered one Giorgio to load 490 *kantars* there for transport to Southampton in 1388 and Galeazzo de Levanto chartered Domenico de Bozollo de Levanto to take 2,300 *kantars* to Southampton and Sluys in 1398, while Tommaso Paterio exported a cargo in 1397.¹⁵⁵ A contract of 1453 arranging for the supply of alum to Rhodes from Old Phokaia as well as from New Phokaia, Chios and Mytilene indicates that the port continued to serve as a conduit for its export until the last years of Gattilusio rule.¹⁵⁶ From the point of view of the Gattilusio lords this would clearly have enhanced the revenues that could be derived from commercial taxation.¹⁵⁷ However, there is a conspicuous lack of documentary evidence that control of Old Phokaia brought the Gattilusio any stake in the production of alum from the mines of the region. Following the revolt of Leo Tsyvos in 1347, Old Phokaia had passed beyond Genoese control for a much longer period than the new town and would therefore presumably have played no part in the arrangements made by the government of Chios for the exploitation of the alum mines. By the time Old Phokaia came again into Genoese hands, whenever and however that occurred, there would have been no particular reason to change the existing order for the benefit of its rulers.¹⁵⁸ The Gattilusio connection with the great Genoese alum emporium therefore appears somewhat peripheral.

However, in other venues of alum extraction their role was more significant. Alum was produced in the hinterland of the port of Maroneia, on the Thracian coast west of Ainos, an industry which in the fifteenth century was farmed out to Genoese *appaltatores* who controlled alum mines elsewhere in the Aegean. Although there is little documentation directly relating to Maroneia, the balance of probability is that its alum concession

¹⁵⁵ Léone Liagre-de Sturler, *Les Relations Commerciales entre Gênes, la Belgique et l'Outremont: d'après les archives notariales génoises (1320-1400)*, 2 vols. (Brussels and Rome 1969), vol. 2, pp. 691-5 (no. 526); Gioffrè, 'Atti', pp. 382-4; Antonella Rovere, *Documenti della Maona di Chio (Secc. XIV-XVI)* (Genoa 1979) (ASLSP 93 (n.s. 19/2)), pp. 227-9 (no. 49).

¹⁵⁶ Zacharias Tsirpanlis, *Ανέκδοτα Εγγράφα για τη Ρόδο και τις Νότιες Σποράδες από το Αρχείο των Ιωαννιτών Ιπποτών 1421-1453* (Rhodes 1995), pp. 680-2 (no. 292).

¹⁵⁷ Cf. below, pp. 383-5.

¹⁵⁸ See below, pp. 407-10.

was under the control of the lordship of Mytilene.¹⁵⁹ Judging by the available price information, the alum produced there seems to have been of fairly poor quality.¹⁶⁰

It is to Lesbos that the bulk of the available evidence regarding the alum business in Gattilusio territory relates, and it is here that the changes that developed over time are most clearly visible. Solid evidence for the exploitation of the island's alum deposits in the period before the establishment of Gattilusio rule and for the early decades of the lordship of Mytilene is currently lacking.¹⁶¹ The first substantial indication of alum exports from Gattilusio Lesbos dates from 1393. Michele Lomellini, acting for Battista Lomellini, chartered the ship of Manuele Doria to load 3,500 or 4,000 *kantars* of alum or other cargo at any port of 'Turchia', including Mytilene but excluding the Anatolian anchorage of Scorpiata, and to carry this and a further cargo of wine from Crete to Southampton, for eventual sale in Sandwich or Sluys.¹⁶² More specific instances of alum export from Lesbos appear in documents of 1398, which report the loading of 2,500 *kantars* at the port of Kallone on Lesbos on a Genoese *cocha* travelling from Pera

¹⁵⁹ See below, pp. 419–21.

¹⁶⁰ Umberto Dorini and Tommaso Bertelè, *Il libro dei conti di Giacomo Badoer (Costantinopoli 1436–1440)* (Rome 1956), p. 642; cf. *ibid.*, pp. 442, 524; Joseph Müller, *Documenti sulle Relazioni delle Città Toscane coll'Oriente Cristiano e coi Turchi, fino all'anno MDXXXI* (Florence 1879), pp. 169–72 (no. 119).

¹⁶¹ The pilgrim Ludolf of Suchen, who visited the eastern Mediterranean between 1336 and 1341, refers in his account of his travels to an island close to the Aegean shore of Anatolia called 'Peyra', where alum abounded and from which it was exported far afield (Ludolf of Suchen, *Itinere Terrae Sanctae Liber*, ed. Ferdinand Deycks (Stuttgart 1851), *Bibliothek des literarischen Vereins in Stuttgart* 25, p. 26). It has been suggested that this is a reference to Lesbos, under the name of the town of Pyrrha on the Gulf of Kallone (Kimon Louizidis, *H Βυζαντινή Λέσβος (330–1355)* (PhD thesis, Ioannina 2003), p. 174). Ludolf states that the island had lately been seized and its diocese reformed by the Genoese, which could be a reference to the brief occupation of part of Lesbos by Domenico Cattaneo della Volta in 1335–6 (see above, p. 37). However, Ludolf's Genoese conquest is said to have been made at the expense of the Turks rather than Byzantium, while the island is said to have been connected to the mainland by a bridge, which Lesbos certainly was not! Pyrrha would have been an inconvenient location for loading alum from any of the known or likely alum mining areas, while the site was apparently uninhabited in the mid-fifteenth century (Leonardo of Chios, *De Statu Hominis*, Biblioteca del Seminario Vescovile, Albenga, MS Leonardo di Chio, f. 93). Even the gulf on which it lay was identified not with Pyrrha but with Kallone (Renée Doehaerd and Ch. Kerremans, *Les relations commerciales entre Gênes, la Belgique et l'Outremont d'après les archives notariales génoises 1400–1440* (Brussels and Rome 1952), pp. 514–520 (nos. 677, 688)). Hence the name of Pyrrha seems most unlikely ever to have been applied to Lesbos as a whole. It is therefore probable that Ludolf's information, if it is not simply garbled beyond recognition, relates to Old Phokaia, where a number of small islands are located very close offshore.

¹⁶² Liagre-de Sturler, *Relations Commerciales*, vol. 2, pp. 746–51 (no. 565).

to Alexandria via Lesbos and Chios, while the ships of Corrado Lomellini and Antonio Boccaccio were engaged to transport cargoes of alum supplied by Giuliano Gattilusio and Lorenzo de Cruce from Lesbos to Aigues Mortes and Porto Pisano.¹⁶³ In 1404 Michele Lomellini sold 1,000 *kantars* of alum to Paolo Lercario and chartered him to transport a further 3,000 *kantars* of his own from Kallone to Flanders; the following year, Tommaso Paterio sold 1,000 *kantars* of alum of Mytilene to Tommaso Squarciafico at Chios.¹⁶⁴ A voyage of 1409 by the ship of Antonio Bonaventura and Niccolò de Bracello from Lesbos to Sluys may reasonably be supposed to have been an alum shipment.¹⁶⁵ The same is true of a shipment from Kallone to Sluys on the ship of Enrico Lecanello in 1412.¹⁶⁶ The fact that many of these contracts were arranged on Chios reflects that island's role as the hub of Genoese business interests in the Aegean, and of the alum trade in particular.

However, while Genoese merchants seem to have overwhelmingly dominated the export of alum from Gattilusio territories, the extent to which that wider structure had penetrated the alum production industry in Lesbos is open to considerable doubt. Evidence of that industry's organisation comes from two contracts arranged by the brothers Gaspale and Michele Lomellini in 1412 and 1413 to export certain quantities of alum from particular production points on Lesbos over a period of three years. These agreements generated considerable controversy when Michele died and the trustees of his estate proved resistant to Gaspale's demands that they should honour his commitments. As the earlier shipments mentioned above also suggest, members of the Lomellini *albergo* were seemingly preeminent in the transportation of alum from Lesbos during this earlier period.¹⁶⁷

One of Gaspale and Michele's contracts, concluded in August 1413, involved a port called 'Marassi', which it treats as a site of alum production

¹⁶³ Gioffrè, 'Atti', pp. 370–2; ASG, NA 324 (Theramo de Maggiolo 6), ff. 153^{r-v}, 160, 162^v, 164, 166. Note that the earlier voyages to Lesbos which Michel Balard records in this context do not, contrary to his implication, relate to the transport of alum. Michel Balard, *La Romanie Génoise (XI^e–début du XV^e siècle)* (Rome 1978), p. 172, n. 263.

¹⁶⁴ Toniolo, pp. 126–9, 202–5 (nos. 76–8, 152–3); Doehaerd and Kerremans, pp. 13–7 (nos. 11–2).

¹⁶⁵ Gian Giacomo Musso, *Navigazione e commercio genovese con il Levante nei documenti dell'Archivio di Stato di Genova (secc. XIV–XV)* (Rome 1975), pp. 264–5 (no. 22); ASG, NA, 314 (Andreolo Caito 6), ff. 169^{r-v}, 171^{r-v}, 173.

¹⁶⁶ Doehaerd and Kerremans, p. 118 (no. 126).

¹⁶⁷ Marie-Louise Heers, 'Les Génois et le commerce de l'alun à la fin du Moyen Âge', *Revue d'Histoire Economique et Sociale* 32 (1954), pp. 31–53 at pp. 34–5.

as well as export.¹⁶⁸ It gives an indication of the scale of production there, since the deal guaranteed the brothers all the alum *minutum* (a relatively low-quality grade of the mineral) produced in the new alum works of Marassi over a period of three years, up to a maximum of 18,000 *kantars*, at a price of 5 *gigliati* per *kantar*. The figure of 6,000 *kantars* per year was therefore presumably around, but not far beyond, the high end of anticipated potential production. Furthermore, other exports from Marassi were underway: in August 1413 two ships commanded by Theramo Centurione were chartered to ship 6,000 *kantars* of alum from that port to Genoa for Battista Pessagno.¹⁶⁹ The contract involving Marassi was also to run simultaneously with an existing agreement made by the Lomellini brothers in December 1412 to purchase 21,000 *kantars* of alum from Lesbos over a period of three years, at a price of 6½ *gigliati* per *kantar*, to be supplied at the port of Parakella. What is more, this deal specified that the substance being supplied should be alum *de rocha*, the highest grade of the mineral.¹⁷⁰ These two agreements therefore envisaged an annual output from Lesbos in the region of 13,000 *kantars*. This is a substantial level of production when set beside Pegolotti's figures, which claim an annual output of 14,000 *kantars* at Koloneia and an equivalent amount at Phokaia, these the two most prominent alum production venues of the Mediterranean world at the time.¹⁷¹ Bearing in mind that much of this was of very high quality and that there may have been other quantities of alum being produced which had not been cornered by the Lomellini brothers, the productivity of Lesbos relative to the more famous alum extraction sites in Anatolia is striking.

Another significant element of these documents is the identity of the individuals from whom the Lomellini brothers bought their alum. The contract regarding Marassi was made with Antonio Aurigo de Portu, an individual uniquely characterised as a burgher of Mytilene, on behalf of Jacopo Gattilusio, lord of Mytilene. It is therefore evident that at this stage

¹⁶⁸ ASG, NA 603 (Giovanni Balbi 1), nos. 281, 288, 308.

¹⁶⁹ ASG, NA 603 (Giovanni Balbi 1), no. 305. This may well have been alum *minutum* acquired by Battista before the Lomellini contract came into force and so not obstructed by it, but as the quality is not stated it remains possible that this was alum of another grade, indicating that the volume envisaged by that contract does not represent the full amount being exported through Marassi.

¹⁷⁰ ASG, NA 603 (Giovanni Balbi 1), nos. 318, 322, 326, 336, 467, appendix G; Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, *La Pratica della Mercatura*, ed. Allan Evans (Cambridge, Massachusetts 1936), pp. 43, 368–9.

¹⁷¹ Pegolotti, p. 369.

the Gattilusio lords exploited at least part of the alum resources of Lesbos on their own account and sold the product themselves, rather than farming the business out to *appaltatores*. The seller involved in the Parakella contract was a Greek named Theodigis Kolyvas; he, or one of his relatives, would appear a decade later as one of the most important figures in the government of Lesbos.¹⁷² His ability to sell such quantities of alum to exporters strongly suggests that he was engaged in the extraction industry on a large scale. He was also evidently directly involved in the export trade, since Michele Lomellini agreed to an exemption from the contract which would enable Kolyvas to send 1,000 *kantars* of alum to Constantinople.¹⁷³ The reference in one document to the possibility that he would have to pay the *commerchium* of the lord of Mytilene establishes that, unlike de Portu, Kolyvas was not a procurator acting on Jacopo's behalf; nor was he an *appaltator* enjoying a complete tax exemption such as that conferred on the *appaltatores* of New Phokaia.¹⁷⁴ It may be that his involvement in the business arose out of ownership of the land from which alum was mined. In any case, the involvement of a Greek in the alum industry on such a grand scale stands in stark contrast with the situation on Chios and at New Phokaia. There, Greek commercial participation is unattested at any level in the alum trade, or indeed in the trades in any of the commodities over which the Mahona exercised a monopoly, which also included mastic, salt and pitch.¹⁷⁵

A peculiar facet of the involvement of the Gattilusio lords in the alum business is revealed by a document of 1414 from Chios. This records the arbitration of a dispute between the trustees of the estate of the late alum trader Tommaso Paterio, and Jacopo Gattilusio, lord of Mytilene, acting as heir of his late great-uncle Niccolò of Ainos.¹⁷⁶ The arbitrators concluded that Jacopo should pay the trustees 297 ducats, the amount still outstanding from Niccolò's half of the price of a cargo of alum from Scorpiata in Anatolia, which had been transported to Chios on the ship of Niccolò de Portufino. This is the only evidence so far identified of the Gattilusio lords being involved in any aspect of the trade in alum beyond the shores of their own territories; it is all the more remarkable in that this cargo did

¹⁷² See below, pp. 276–7.

¹⁷³ ASG, NA 603 (Giovanni Balbi 1), no. 326.

¹⁷⁴ ASG, NA 603 (Giovanni Balbi 1), appendix G.

¹⁷⁵ Michel Balard, 'The Genoese in the Aegean (1204–1566)', *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204*, ed. Benjamin Arbel, Bernard Hamilton and David Jacoby (London 1989), pp. 158–74 at p. 169.

¹⁷⁶ ASG, NA 603 (Giovanni Balbi 1), nos. 410, 427.

not originate from Gattilusio territory at all. It is intriguing that a member of a dynasty which possessed such an extensive alum industry in their own domains, but who are nowhere attested as shipping it abroad themselves, should invest in a venture to export that same commodity from somewhere else entirely.

In any case, this document, combined with the contracts of the Lomellini brothers, reveals the Gattilusio playing a role in the alum business very different from that presented by the material available for later decades. Rather than being simply *rentiers* of a business entrusted to Genoese mercantile enterprises, which at times cooperated or combined in pacts and associations centred on Chios, New Phokaia and Pera, in the early fifteenth century the Gattilusio lords took an active role in the business. They directly exploited at least part of the resources at their disposal and even involved themselves in the trade in alum from other sources. Furthermore, in contrast to other parts of the Genoese world, the alum business of Lesbos involved indigenous Greek businessmen at a high level. While the wide-ranging enterprises of Genoese groups such as the Lomellini largely monopolised export, the production and sale of alum remained to a considerable extent under local control. The integration of Gattilusio Lesbos into the Genoese structures which dominated this trade elsewhere in the eastern Mediterranean therefore appears decidedly incomplete. This was the case even sixty years after the Gattilusio acquisition of the island and even though this was the most quintessentially Genoese business of the time. This raises significant doubts as to the role of the Gattilusio regime as an agent of Genoese economic penetration of the family's territories.

While the available evidence regarding the places from which alum was exported derives from this earlier period, the principal piece of information on the location of the mines themselves comes from some decades later. In a consortium uniting Genoese alum interests formed in 1449, the industry on Lesbos was represented by a partnership headed by Marco Doria, which was said to hold the concession of the mines of Kontisia and Parakella.¹⁷⁷ These two sites, located not far from one another on the western side of the Gulf of Kallone, are both close to identified deposits of alum where evidence of mining survives, although there is evidence of more recent exploitation and the existing traces do not necessarily date

¹⁷⁷ ASG, NA 847 (Tommaso de Recco 1), no. 51; below, p. 181.

to this period.¹⁷⁸ Parakella, located near the coast, appears in the earlier documentation as the harbour where the refined alum was to be loaded, and was evidently the port for an identified mining site a short distance inland. A number of mining sites have been identified around Kontisia, which lies some way inland. Their produce must have been loaded at some other location. The harbour most readily accessible from the mines near Kontisia would have been Podaras. This place has been proposed as the location of the port of Marassi, with the suggestion that its name had become garbled as 'Porto Marassi'.¹⁷⁹ It is not clear whether the laborious process of refinement took place at the extraction sites, at the ports or at other locations. Stone-lined conical pits and ovens apparently for the refinement of alum have been identified near the port of Apothiki, on the coast between Podaras and Parakella, but this apparatus is of ancient origin and there is no indication of its continued or revived use in the medieval period.¹⁸⁰

Kallone also appears as a port from which alum was exported, in documents of 1398, 1404, 1412 and 1416.¹⁸¹ The modern town of that name lies a short distance inland, suggesting either that it has replaced a former settlement on the coast or that it possessed a closely associated port, perhaps

¹⁷⁸ Vasilis Koumarelas, 'Περί της λεσβιακής στυπτηρίας, τα ορυκεία στύψις στα χρόνια των Γατελούζων', *Λεσβιακά* 17 (1998), pp. 109–31 at pp. 117–20, 128.

¹⁷⁹ Koumarelas, pp. 122–8. Since some of the surviving traces of extraction lie roughly equidistant between Kontisia and Podaras, these could have been identified with either location. This may account for the fact that Marassi is not mentioned among the alum mining operations absorbed into the 1449 cartel: the mines described as those of Marassi in the Lomellini contracts may have been among those associated with Kontisia in 1449 (see below, p. 181).

An alternative theory suggests that Marassi is to be identified with Eressos, apparently on the basis of the approximate consonance of names (Jacoby, 'Production', p. 240). However, this port would not have been a convenient place for the processing or embarkation of alum from any of the places identified as mining sites by contemporary documentation or surviving workings. There are alum deposits at Chydera, which lies in the centre of the western lobe of the island and thus roughly equidistant from each of the surrounding coasts. However, due to the lie of the land by far the most convenient route to the sea would have been northwards to the vicinity of Antissa, where there was a fortified anchorage available, not south-west to Eressos. All other definite or likely mining sites would have been much more accessible from other harbours. Koumarelas, pp. 124, 129.

¹⁸⁰ Aglaia Archontidou, 'Un atelier de préparation de l'alun à partir de l'alunite dans l'île de Lesbos', *L'alun de Méditerranée*, ed. Philippe Borgard, Jean-Pierre Brun and Maurice Picon (Naples and Aix-en-Provence 2005), pp. 85–8; Aglaia Archontidou, Francine Blondé and Maurice Picon, 'Observations techniques et archéométriques sur l'atelier d'Apothika (Lesbos)', *ibid.*, pp. 89–95.

¹⁸¹ Gioffrè, 'Atti', pp. 370–2; Toniolo, pp. 126–9 (nos. 76–8); Doehaerd and Kerremans, pp. 118, 227–30 (nos. 126, 213).

in the vicinity of modern Skala Kallones.¹⁸² In any case, it would not have been an obvious location for the initial embarkation of alum from any of the sites known to have been exploited under Gattilusio rule.¹⁸³ However, it has been suggested that Kallone was the most suitable port for exporting alum from the mines near Stypsi, located in the north of Lesbos at some remove from the main concentration of deposits in the west, which may or may not have been in use in this period.¹⁸⁴ Alternatively, it is possible that Kallone served as a depot to which some of the alum produced in the western mining areas was brought by sea for refinement, or at any rate for storage and subsequent export.

It is not currently possible to trace the development of the alum industry of Lesbos over the years after the contracts of 1412 and 1413 due to lack of evidence, although the continuing export of alum is attested. Another large-scale export arrangement undertaken by members of the Lomellini *albergo* appears in 1414, when Gioffredo Lomellini chartered the ship of Matteo Calvo to transport 30,000 *kantars* of alum that year and the same amount the following year from Phokaia, Chios and Lesbos to Flanders.¹⁸⁵ While the cargo involved is not identified, other shipments arranged from places including Lesbos, Chios and New Phokaia to Flanders and England in 1414 and 1415 are likely to have involved alum.¹⁸⁶ Further shipments on the same lines followed in 1416, 1424 and 1431, the first specifying Kallone as the port on Lesbos where cargo was to be loaded, the others the Gulf of Kallone, where the alum port of Parakella was located as well as Kallone itself.¹⁸⁷ In 1438 the ship carrying Pero Tafur on his return from the Black Sea loaded with alum at Lesbos, while in 1446 Oberto Grimaldi shipped 8,404 *kantars*, 10 *rotuli* of alum *minutum* from Lesbos and a further 2,000 *kantars* from Phokaia to Flanders and England.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸² It has been proposed that medieval Kallone lay in a different location from the modern town, but that this was the site of the ancient *polis* of Arisve, slightly further inland than modern Kallone, where there are remains of a medieval settlement. Ioannis K. Moutzouris, 'Μεσαιωνικά κάστρα τῆς Λέσβου', *Λεσβιακά* 4 (1962), pp. 50–68 at pp. 61–3.

¹⁸³ Koumarelas, pp. 117–29.

¹⁸⁴ Jacoby, 'Production', p. 240. While the northern coast of the island is much closer to the Stypsi deposit than the Gulf of Kallone, reaching it would have required crossing a mountain ridge, whereas the route to the gulf would have been downhill. If the Stypsi deposit was exploited in the Gattilusio period, its omission from the 1449 contract may indicate that these mines had ceased to operate on a significant scale by that time.

¹⁸⁵ Doehaerd and Kerremans, pp. 160–3, 223–6 (no. 168, 211).

¹⁸⁶ Doehaerd and Kerremans, pp. 183–8, 218–22 (nos. 179, 208).

¹⁸⁷ Doehaerd and Kerremans, pp. 227–30, 345, 514, 520 (nos. 213, 319, 677, 688).

¹⁸⁸ ASG, *SGGAb* (Sala 14) 1552, ff. 121–3^v; Tafur, p. 143; Sandra Origone, 'Chio nel tempo della caduta di Costantinopoli', *Saggi e Documenti* 2 (1982), pp. 121–224, at pp. 127–9.

A new phase in the development of the alum industry is revealed by a document of November 1437. This records the sale by a group of Genoese alum contractors to two Florentine merchants of 16,250 *kantars* of alum of New Phokaia, for export to Tuscany over the next five years. The sellers are described as being 'appaltatorum aluminum totius Thurcie, Grecie et totius insule Mitheleni et Marronie partis Grecie'.¹⁸⁹ Evidently at some point after 1413 the alum mines of Lesbos had been granted in *appalto*. One of the *appaltatores* participating in this agreement was Marco Doria son of Francesco, who was probably the head of the group controlling the Gattilusio concession.¹⁹⁰

In April 1449 the organisation of the alum business was transformed by the formation of a single monopolistic consortium uniting Genoese interests, including the *appalto* of the mines of Kontisia and Parakella. By far the largest shareholder in the new organisation was the Pera-based Genoese businessman Francesco Draperio, who held the *appalto* of Greece and Turkey from the Ottomans, but its operations were based on Chios, along with many of the other investors. This cartel now controlled all facets of the Genoese alum business, embracing extraction, processing and export in all the concessions held by members of the community.¹⁹¹ The company hitherto holding the *appalto* of Kontisia and Parakella had been headed by Marco Doria, whose principal partners in the business were Pietro Doria, Bartolomeo Doria son of Jacopo and Domenico Doria son of Opicino. All now became shareholders in the new consortium. While Draperio's interests dwarfed all other participants in this organisation, holding fully half of the stock, Marco Doria was the second largest shareholder, reflecting the importance of the alum industry of Lesbos.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁹ Müller, pp. 169–72 (no. 119).

¹⁹⁰ This is likely to have included the mines of Maroneia in Thrace as well as those of Lesbos. See below, pp. 419–21.

¹⁹¹ ASG, NA 847 (Tommaso de Recco 1), no. 51; Giustina Olgiati, 'Il commercio dell'allume nei domini dei Gattilusio nel XV secolo', *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οι Γατελούζοι της Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 373–398 at pp. 391–2 (no. 1); Jacoby, 'Production', pp. 248–50; Heers, 'Génois', pp. 39–42.

¹⁹² ASG, NA 847 (Tommaso de Recco 1), no. 239. It is not entirely certain which Marco Doria this was. The individual in question was probably Marco Doria son of Francesco, in the light of his appearance as one of the *appaltatores* who had concluded the 1437 agreement, who included the holders of the Lesbos concession among them. However, in 1450, following the conclusion of the agreement to cease alum production by Gabriele de Rapallo on Dorino I Gattilusio's behalf, Marco Doria son of Oberto and Geronimo Rosso took over from Gabriele as Dorino's procurators on Chios. Marco was to be responsible for receiving the money to be paid to Dorino for the alum moratorium (ASG, NA 847 (Tommaso de Recco 1), no. 240; ASG, NA 765 (Bernardo de Ferrari 2), no. 188 bis). Involvement

As part of the reorganisation of the business by this new monopoly an agreement was reached with the lordship of Mytilene in January 1450, by which the latter would halt all extraction and processing of alum on Lesbos for ten years in exchange for an annual payment of 5,000 ducats.¹⁹³ Making such an arrangement had been stipulated as one of the immediate objectives of the new alum company on its formation. This move has been attributed to overproduction of alum and a glut on the market, which also accounted for the creation of Draperio's cartel.¹⁹⁴ However, the supposition that such a glut existed is based on only a very small amount of evidence, while other data give a rather contrary impression.¹⁹⁵ In any case, it seems likely that less strictly commercial factors were at work. Less than two months after the agreement was concluded, the Ottoman fleet attacked Lesbos, carrying off 3,000 prisoners and sacking Kallone.¹⁹⁶ The choice of target suggests that disrupting alum production on Lesbos may have been an Ottoman objective. This suspicion is reinforced by the assertion of Benedetto Dei that the final Ottoman conquest of Lesbos in 1462 was provoked by the covert processing and export of alum by its lord,

in these affairs raises the possibility that it was this Marco Doria who now held the Lesbos *appalto*. If so he would have been potentially subject to a conflict of interest, since Marco the *appaltator* was himself, as a member of the cartel, one of the contributors to this payment. However, it is possible that on the basis of their past association Dorino would have trusted him to ensure that his partners paid promptly.

Neither Marco was closely related to the groups of Doria with whom the Gattilusio lords had attested marital connections. While only very distantly related to one another, each of the two Marcos had close family ties to one of the other major participants in the Lesbos alum concession in 1449: Marco son of Francesco was Domenico Doria's uncle, while Marco son of Oberto was Bartolomeo Doria's nephew (Battilana, vol. 1, Doria section, pp. 46, 48–50). Long after the fall of the Gattilusio lordships, both men appear as associates of Dorino II Gattilusio, the former lord of Ainos: Marco son of Francesco acted as his procurator in a dispute in 1480, while Dorino transferred his claim to Lesbos and Old Phokaia to Marco son of Oberto in 1488 (ASG, NA 936 (Francesco Camogli 4), no. 292; ASG, NA 1002 (Lorenzo Costa 16), no. 468).

¹⁹³ ASG, NA 847 (Tommaso de Recco 1), no. 239.

¹⁹⁴ Heers, 'Génois', p. 39; Armando Saporì, 'Monopoli e pratiche capitalistiche: l'allume nel Quattrocento', *Studi di storia economica: secoli XIII, XIV, XV*, 3 vols. (Florence 1955–67), vol. 3, pp. 331–5 at pp. 333–4.

¹⁹⁵ Christopher Wright, 'Florentine alum mining in the Hospitaller islands: the *appalto* of 1442', *Journal of Medieval History* 36 (2010), pp. 175–91 at pp. 183–4; cf. Dorini and Bertelè, pp. 442, 524, 642.

¹⁹⁶ Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 5, pp. 350–2 (no. 39); Laonikos Chalkokondyles, *Laonici Chalcocondylae Historiarum Demonstrationes*, ed. Eugenius Darkó, 2 vols. (Budapest 1922–7), vol. 2, pp. 267–8; Tsirpanlis, *Ανέκδοτα Εγγράφα*, pp. 605–9 (no. 244); Doukas, p. 337; Iorga, 'Notes', vol. 8, p. 65.

in defiance of an agreement with the sultan.¹⁹⁷ It is far from implausible that the Draperio company should have acted on behalf of the Ottomans in this matter. The prosperity of the alum business depended heavily on the sultan's goodwill, and Francesco Draperio enjoyed the patronage of Mehmed II. Lesbos was the only major source of alum in the region which was not easily within the grip of the Ottomans and from whose exploitation they did not directly profit. As such, its elimination would significantly tighten the sultan's control over the industry. Nevertheless, the abandonment of production proved temporary. In October 1456, Domenico Gattilusio appointed Niccolò Doria to negotiate the concession of the Lesbos alum franchise to a company headed by the brothers Paride and Vesconte Giustiniani. This organization had been established on Chios in 1454, after disputes between Francesco Draperio and his associates had brought about the dissolution of his cartel.¹⁹⁸ The demise of the Draperio company was presumably considered to render the 1450 moratorium agreement null and void. Dei's testimony suggests that Mehmed either managed at some point to extract an equivalent agreement from the Gattilusio himself, with or without the payment of compensation, or else chose to regard the agreement with the Draperio company as remaining in force and took it upon himself to uphold it. This would not have been the first time Mehmed took the vindication of Francesco Draperio's interests into his own hands: in 1455, following the collapse of his cartel, the Ottoman fleet had tried to intimidate the Genoese of Chios into paying a large sum of money to Francesco. This was supposedly owed to him by his former associates in the alum business, and he was in need of it to enable him to pay his own debts to the sultan.¹⁹⁹

Thus in their later decades the Gattilusio lords no longer directly participated in the alum business as they had once done, nor did their Greek subjects any longer hold any stake in the industry, although at least one member of the Gattilusio *albergo* who held high office in the lordship of Mytilene was involved in the trade.²⁰⁰ The business had been moved progressively further from direct Gattilusio control, in a manner that bound them more tightly to enterprises elsewhere in the Genoese Aegean.

¹⁹⁷ Benedetto Dei, *La Cronica dall'anno 1400 all'anno 1500*, ed. Roberto Barducci (Florence 1985), p. 161.

¹⁹⁸ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene' pp. 50–2 (no. 17); ASG, NA 848 (Tommaso de Recco 2), no. XXXIII.

¹⁹⁹ Doukas, pp. 405–7, 411.

²⁰⁰ See below, pp. 197–9.

First their alum resources became the preserve of a company of *appaltatores* formed by Marco Doria and his partners, all members of the same *albergo*.²⁰¹ The selection of the Doria to take charge of the business is unsurprising, although evidence of significant Doria involvement in the alum trade from Gattilusio territories earlier in the century is lacking. This transition brought the Gattilusio alum industry closer to the patterns prevailing elsewhere in the Genoese East. This rendered it more susceptible to wider changes which were producing increasing strategic coordination of the business across the region, as witnessed by the 1437 contract with the Florentines. This process of consolidation reached its culmination in the formation of the Draperio consortium and later that of its successor headed by the Giustiniani brothers. With this unification of all Genoese alum interests in the hands of a single corporate organisation, the development of the alum industries in Gattilusio territories was entirely subordinated to the wider strategic priorities of that larger enterprise, which was based elsewhere and in which they were only one of a number of components.

This deepening economic integration may have had social and political consequences for the Gattilusio lords, suggested by a possible shift in emphasis in their marriage policy, discernible in the matches of the fourth generation from the lordships' foundation. Hitherto, when contracting marriages for their children with other Genoese families the Gattilusio lords had always chosen distinguished spouses from Liguria itself. In their selection of partners they were presumably guided by some combination of the influence these links would bring them in the affairs of the metropolis, and the consolidation of their prestige in the community both in Liguria and the East. Now they also began to intermarry with other Genoese established in the Aegean, specifically those involved with the alum industry. Domenico Gattilusio, lord of Mytilene, married Paride Giustiniani's daughter Maria, while his cousin Caterina supposedly married Marco Doria son of Oberto, who may have played a leading role in the alum *appalto* of Lesbos and the Draperio cartel.²⁰² With a key element in the financial base of the Gattilusio lordships now in their hands, and an imposing network of enterprises around the eastern Mediterranean, the leading members of the alum companies now held an

²⁰¹ ASG, NA 847 (Tommaso de Recco 1), no. 51.

²⁰² Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 5, pp. 363–4, 371–2 (nos. 58, 70); ASG, NA 765 (Bernardo de Ferrari 2), no. 188*bis*; above, p. 181n192.

unprecedented position of economic power which made it more desirable for the Gattilusio to seek personal affiliation with them.

In any case, the development of the alum industry suggests that while the connections between the Gattilusio and Genoa faded, their links with other Genoese in the Aegean not only endured but grew tighter. In this context, the continued commitment of the Gattilusio lords to solidarity with the wider community, which defied the doubts of the late 1420s and early 1430s, is highly comprehensible. Until the lordships sank into military dependency, continuing political, economic or sentimental links with Genoa itself were ultimately dispensable as a force for sustaining the adherence of the Gattilusio to that community: the enduring and deepening entanglement of the lords of Mytilene in the Genoese networks of the Aegean guaranteed their continuing commitment. No length of residence in the Aegean, no severing of links with Liguria, could diminish the bonds of cooperation and common interest that united the Gattilusio with their expatriate compatriots. The chief contributions of the Gattilusio to the Genoese system lay in their role as facilitators of Genoese exploitation of their territories' mineral resources, as sponsors of Genoese mercantile endeavours in their own territories and in the Turkish-ruled hinterlands of their ports, and as rulers whose alignment with Genoese interests put the resources of their domains to work in the service of those interests. For their part, until the crisis of their last years drastically increased the lordships' need for Genoese military and financial support, membership of the community was probably of use chiefly in making available skilled servitors and associates who were bound to them by common identity and common interest, and in giving access on advantageous terms to a commercial network which could help in the profitable exploitation of the resources at their disposal. It was the Aegean elements of the Genoese network that exerted the most enduring influence for the integration of the Gattilusio lordships, while the influence of the metropolis faded, and it is in their own Aegean context that the Gattilusio lordships and their significance for the wider Genoese world are best understood. Their involvement in the Genoese community was founded not on official connections or grand strategic schemes but on principles of voluntary association, resting on the influence of common identity, common interests, personal relationships and commercial connections which linked the Genoese within and beyond their home city horizontally to one another rather than vertically to a shared political institution. In this they are characteristic of the norms both of the Aegean world and of the Genoese community itself.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE LORDSHIPS AS A NETWORK: FAMILY AND ENTERPRISE

While the Gattilusio lordships formed a zone of intersection for a varied range of larger networks, they also constituted a small network in their own right. Just as such small domains were attracted into the orbit of larger groups and powers, so they themselves were governed through shifting patterns of devolution, subordination and association, their political configuration changing as territories were acquired and lost and as the dynastic circumstances of the ruling family changed. They were also linked to one another and to a range of other territories and communities by economic activities which radiated from them, shaping the movement of commodities through peaceful exchange and forcible seizure. The movements and enterprises of traders and marauders form a web of interactions spreading outwards from the lordships themselves. The pattern of these activities was both influenced by and an influence upon the relations between the lordships and other groups in the Aegean and the wider Mediterranean. It illuminates both commonalities and differences between the different components of the Gattilusio network. The Gattilusio lordships were both fragmented and integrated by geography. Like the wider maritime empires of Genoa and Venice, the residual holdings of Byzantium, the possessions of the Order of St. John or the Duchy of the Archipelago, the Gattilusio domains formed a cluster of islands and enclaves. They were divided into small coherent segments by the sea, but the ready accessibility of the sea also provided easy communication between and within these units. In this regard they exemplified the combination of fragmentation and connectivity which typified the Mediterranean in general and the Aegean world of this period in particular.¹ This natural discontinuity encouraged the emergence of divergences within a single network, with methods of government and patterns of external connection varying between different territories, according to the particular conditions of each territorial unit. At the same time, the ease of communication provided by the sea,

¹ Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, *The Corrupting Sea: a study of Mediterranean history* (Oxford and Malden, Massachusetts 2000), pp. 133–5, 224–30.

aided by the relatively compact distribution of the family's territories, supplied a degree of coherence and integration between these points and intensified their interactions with the wider world.

Dynastic Policy and the Distribution of Power

In common with normal Genoese practice, and increasingly that of Byzantium also, the political structure of the Gattilusio lordships was essentially an associative one. It was managed through cooperation between the leading members of a family rather than forming an organisational structure based on formal hierarchical institutions. The Gattilusio did not govern their domains as a single polity with Mytilene as its capital and a clear hierarchy of subordination embracing their other possessions, but neither did they establish permanent and officially distinct family inheritances in different territories. Gattilusio rulers in territories beyond Lesbos were not, or not always, mere representatives of the head of the family, but neither were they the masters of new discrete patrimonies of their own. These lordships were a family concern in which multiple members of the clan held an interest and enjoyed power in their own right but which was to be kept together and not allowed to fragment in the hands of separate lineages. In this it bore a considerable resemblance to the arrangements which emerged in Palaiologan Byzantium, where individual relatives of the emperor were entitled to expect great autonomous authority over portions of the empire but permanent dispersal of those possessions was avoided.² It lacked, however, the enduring monarchical ethos which counterposed this emerging model of shared power and which remained supreme and undiminished in the theory, if not the practice, of Byzantine government. The lord of Mytilene held a position of preeminence within the family and was the habitual point of contact with outside authorities, but he seems not to have been seen as an overlord enjoying formal supremacy over all the territories of his family and interposing between them and their imperial sovereign.

In the event Ainos, and only Ainos, came to enjoy durably a status comparable to that of Mytilene, having its own Gattilusio lord through most of its history under the family's control, being treated by other powers as a distinct entity for diplomatic and military purposes, and acquiring

² See above, pp. 82–3.

subsidiary territories of its own. However, this pattern does not seem to have been the product of a consistent structure or policy. Following the death without male issue of Niccolò of Ainos, his lordship passed in the first instance to his grand-nephew Jacopo, lord of Mytilene, who was probably the only adult male member of the family at the time.³ As Jacopo's brothers came of age each was assigned one of the other two territories held by the family at the time, Old Phokaia going to Dorino and Ainos to Palamede, a threefold split between formal equals which exploited the convenient match between dynastic and territorial circumstances.⁴

The independent standing of the lordship of Old Phokaia is established by its inclusion alongside Mytilene and Ainos in the Genoese treaties with

³ ASG, NA 603 (Giovanni Balbi 1), nos. 410, 427.

⁴ Jacopo was still lord of Ainos as well as Mytilene in April 1414 (ASG, NA 603 (Giovanni Balbi 1), nos. 410, 427). Palamede had become lord of Ainos by 1422/3 (Catherine Asdracha, 'Inscriptions de la Thrace orientale et de l'île d'Imbros (XII^e–XV^es.)', *Αρχαιολογικόν Δελτίον* 43/1 (1988), pp. 251–86 at pp. 264–7 (no. 34), plate 113b), and presumably by 1421, as there was a lord of Ainos in office at that date (ASV, *NCan* 26 (Niccolò Caucanigo, Gasparino Cauco), f. 77). The arrangement by which the lordship was reserved for him is oddly said to have been the enactment of Francesco II's will, not that of Niccolò (George T. Dennis, 'The short chronicle of Lesbos', *Λεσβιακά* 5 (1965), pp. 3–22 reprinted in *Byzantium and the Franks 1350–1420* (London 1982), I, p. 7). This might be taken to indicate that the lordship of Mytilene possessed some formal authority over that of Ainos, enabling the senior lord to determine the inheritance of any of the family's territories. However, on Palamede's own death, the succession to his territories was to be dictated by his will, with no reference to the involvement of the lordship of Mytilene. When Dorino II then seized power in defiance of his late father's wishes, the dispossessed turned for redress first to the lordship's own elite and then to its Ottoman overlord, with no indication that Mytilene had a part to play (Michael Kritovoulos, *Critobuli Imbriotae Historiae*, ed. Diether Roderich Reinsch (Berlin and New York 1983), *CFHB* 22, pp. 101–2).

Dorino I is first firmly attested as lord of Old Phokaia by an inscription of 1422/3 (F. W. Hasluck, 'Monuments of the Gattalusi', *ABSA* 15 (1908–9), pp. 248–69 at pp. 258). However, he had probably held the position since at least March 1416, when a lord of Phokaia is found travelling to Rhodes. (Peter Schreiner, *Die Byzantinischen Kleinchroniken*, 3 vols. (Vienna 1975–9), *CFHB* 12, vol. 1, pp. 223 (no. 31/2)). Since this individual is called the 'αὐθέντης' of Phokaia and seemingly stopped at Lesbos on his way to Rhodes, he was presumably the Gattalusio lord of Old Phokaia, not a *podestà* or *appaltator* of New Phokaia. Kofopoulos argues that this lord was Jacopo, still exercising control over all the family's lordships while his brothers remained minors, but it seems extremely unlikely that in this case he would have been identified by his title for Old Phokaia alone, without any mention of his principal lordship of Mytilene. (Savvas K. Kofopoulos, 'Ενα βραχύ χρονικό από τη Μυτιλήνη της εποχής των Γατελούζων', *Λεσβιακά* 16 (1996), pp. 305–9 at pp. 307–8.) Luttrell and Zachariadou's assertion that the individual in question was probably Giovanni Adorno, which ignores the title used and indeed the fact that there were two Phokaia, seems clearly unjustified (Anthony Luttrell and Elizabeth Zachariadou, *Sources for Turkish History from the Hospitallers' Rhodian Archive/Πηγές για την Τουρκική Ιστορία στα Αρχεία των Ιπποτών της Ρόδου* (Athens 2008), p. 79).

Aragon and Egypt in 1428 and 1431.⁵ These are the only recorded instances of a Gattilusio lordship besides those of Mytilene and Ainos being treated as a diplomatic entity in its own right. Other evidence corroborates this indication that Old Phokaia, like Ainos, was not at this time taken to be included under the aegis of a more senior lordship. Dorino struck his own coins in Old Phokaia and erected his own inscriptions naming him alone, revealing no notion of formal subordination to any ruler save the Byzantine Emperor whose emblems he displayed.⁶ Even after inheriting Lesbos, Dorino continued to be entitled on occasion as lord of Mytilene and Old Phokaia rather than simply of Mytilene or of Mytilene 'et cetera', reflecting the sense that he continued to hold two distinct inheritances.⁷

⁵ A. Luxuro and G. Pinelli-Gentile, 'Documenti riguardanti alcuni dinasti dell'Arcipelago, pubblicati per saggio di studi paleografici', *Giornale Ligustico di archeologia, storia e belle arti* 1 (1874), pp. 84–90, 217–221, vol. 2 (1875), pp. 86–93, 292–7, vol. 3 (1876), pp. 313–6, vol. 5 (1878), pp. 345–70 at vol. 1, pp. 220–1 (no. 10), vol. 2, pp. 86–7 (no. 11); Silvestre de Sacy, 'Pièces Diplomatiques tirées des Archives de la République de Gênes', *Notices et Extraits des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du Roi, et autres bibliothèques* 11 (1827), pp. 1–96 at pp. 71–4.

⁶ Giuseppe Lunardi, *Le Monete delle Colonie Genovesi* (Genoa 1980) (ASLSP 94/1 (n.s. 20/1)), pp. 133–6; S. Kofopoulos and A. Mazarakis, 'I Gattilusio: Revisioni Genealogiche e Numismatiche', *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οι Γατελούζοι της Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 399–434 at pp. 430–2; Hasluck, p. 258; William de Peyster, 'Un ducat inédit de Dorino Gattilusio, seigneur de Phocée (1400–1449)', *Revue Numismatique* 6th series 11 (1969), pp. 294–5. Dorino's production of his own coinage is all the more significant given that no coins clearly identifiable as issues of the lords of Ainos have been discovered. It casts doubt on Mazarakis's suggestion that the apparent failure of the lords of Ainos to issue coins reflects their inferior status to those of Mytilene, since in that case the same logic ought presumably to have applied to Old Phokaia. Andreas Mazarakis, 'Il contesto istituzionale della dominazione e l'amministrazione dei Gattilusio a Mitilene (1355–1462)', *Cercetari Numismatice* 12–13 (2006–7), pp. 249–69 at p. 258.

⁷ Dorino described himself as lord of Mytilene and Old Phokaia in a document of 14 October 1428, the government of Genoa referred to the lords of Mytilene, Ainos and Phokaia in the Egyptian treaty of 1431, Dorino was called lord of Mytilene and Old Phokaia in a note of an event in 1445 from Lesbos, and lord of Mytilene, Old Phokaia and Thasos in a document of 1450 (Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 2, pp. 86–7 (no. 11); Sacy, pp. 71–4; Paul Géhin, *Les manuscrits grecs datés des XIII^e et XIV^e siècles conservés dans les bibliothèques publiques de France. 2, première moitié du XIV^e siècle* (Paris 2005), p. 59; ASG, NA 847 (Tommaso de Recco 1), no. 239). This clearly invalidates Miller's suggestion that his brother Jacopo must still have been alive shortly before 11 May 1428. This was founded on the fact that a Genoese letter of that date was addressed to the lords of Mytilene, Ainos and Old Phokaia, and the supposition that this demonstrated that these lordships were therefore still held by three different individuals (William Miller, 'The Gattilusj of Lesbos (1355–1462)', *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 22 (1913), pp. 406–47, reprinted in *Essays on the Latin Orient* (Cambridge 1921, reprinted Amsterdam 1964), pp. 313–53 at p. 326; Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 1, pp. 219–20 (no. 9)). If Dorino's Phokaian lordship was still included amongst his titles many years after he had inherited Mytilene, and on occasion joined by Thasos, the wording of the letter of 11 May cannot be held to imply that Mytilene was still in Jacopo's hands. The *terminus post quem* for Jacopo's death cannot therefore be placed

Had it not been for the early death of Jacopo without male issue and the resulting reunion of Mytilene and Old Phokaia in Dorino's hands, there is no reason to suppose that a lordship of Old Phokaia would not have become as enduring an autonomous fixture as that of Ainos. The lordship of Dorino's son Francesco III on Thasos was presumably always intended to be temporary, since as the eldest son Francesco could be expected to inherit the lordship of Mytilene himself.⁸ The lordship later established for his youngest brother Niccolò on Lemnos, however, could well have become a durable unit if Ottoman power and popular unrest had not soon intervened to extinguish it.⁹

It would therefore seem wrong to regard the structure of the Gattilusio lordships as a hierarchy of clearly subordinated dependencies under the senior lordship at Mytilene, or as a stable duality between Mytilene and Ainos with the other territories arrayed as satellites around these two centres. There does not seem to have been any consistent, schematic method shaping the administrative disposition of the family's possessions. The endurance of certain patterns of administration may best be explained by contingency rather than conscious design or strategic logic. The Gattilusio were perfectly willing to distribute their holdings more widely as dynastic expediency dictated.

Distribution, however, did not amount to dispersal. This is suggested by the inheritance of Ainos on Niccolò I's death by his grand-nephew Palamede rather than descending to his daughter Orietta or her husband. The interests of the family as a group would have required that its territories should be retained in the hands of male members of the same immediate family, not passed through female lines of descent to outsiders.¹⁰ A deliberate policy of preserving the lordships as a coherent, close-knit group is to be seen more forcefully at work in the repeated efforts of Palamede and Dorino I to ensure that the next lord of Mytilene would

any later than shortly before 13 March 1426, the date of the latest known letter addressed to him.

⁸ Ciriaco of Ancona, *Cyriac of Ancona: later travels*, ed. Edward Bodnar and Clive Foss, (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts 2003), pp. 108–10, 134–40.

⁹ Doukas, *Ducas Istoria Turco-Bizantina (1341–1462)*, ed. and tr. Vasile Grecu (Bucharest 1958), p. 421.

¹⁰ In the event, Orietta married a member of the wider Gattilusio *albergo*, one Mariano, but it is quite likely that this marriage had not taken place when the inheritance question was agreed, since it was apparently already settled before the death of Francesco II in 1403, whereas Orietta was still alive and had two marriageable daughters in 1457. Ausilia Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene 1454–60', *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: atti rogati a Pera e Mitilene* (Genoa 1982), II, pp. 78–83 (no. 35).

have for his wife a daughter of the lord of Ainos, and thus a sister of the latter's successor. This policy was first manifested in the marriage of Francesco III to a daughter of Palamede. Following Francesco's death the high priority accorded to this goal was confirmed by the effort to replace this broken bond with a marriage between Domenico, now the heir to Mytilene, and another daughter of Palamede, an arrangement thwarted by the intervention of Lodovico Campofregoso.¹¹ The desire to reinforce the familial bonds between different lordships was a logical response to a problem that naturally arose from the distribution of territories between family members: the fact that the passage of time and generations would leave the common ancestry of the Gattilusio lords ever more distant. The absence of any known formal structure uniting the lordships or subjecting one to another would have increased the importance of familial solidarity in underpinning their cooperation and mutual support, a cohesion which this process would be likely to erode.¹² There is reason to suppose that the influences acting on the lordship of Ainos differed significantly from those affecting Mytilene, notably in their dealings with the Ottomans and with the Venetians.¹³ Such divergences would have increased the likelihood of the Gattilusio network's coherence fraying over time, strengthening the incentive to reinforce dynastic bonds.

The importance of maintaining the solidarity of the family is underlined by the fact that a total breakdown of harmony in the 1450s, accompanying the transfer of power to the fourth generation of Gattilusio lords, contributed so significantly to the demise of their lordships. However, rather than being imperilled by fading bonds between Gattilusio lines ruling different territories as Palamede and Dorino seem to have feared, the various recorded disputes within the family took place within individual lordships. Whereas the dispersal of members of the family to different

¹¹ ASG, AS 1785 (*Litterarum* 9), ff. 87–8 (no. 263); AS 1793 (*Litterarum* 17), f. 193 (no. 872); Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 5, pp. 346–7, 349 (nos. 34–5, 37); Giustina Olgiati, 'I Gattilusio', *Dibattito su famiglie nobili del mondo coloniale genovese nel Levante: Atti del Convegno Montoggio, 23 ottobre 1993*, ed. Geo Pistarino (Genoa 1994), pp. 85–99 at pp. 93–6; above, p. 168.

¹² The difficulties which could arise in such familial networks even between close relatives are illustrated by the periodic ructions within the dynasty of Aragon, which on its grander scale pursued a similar policy of distributing scattered territories to members of the family in hereditary possession, installing relatives of the Aragonese kings on thrones of their own in Majorca, Sicily and Naples, and which also made use of marriages within the family to knit these realms together. T. N. Bisson, *The Medieval Crown of Aragon: a short history* (Oxford 1986), pp. 69, 86, 89–93, 97, 101–2, 104–7, 126–7, 137–8, 144, 147.

¹³ See below, pp. 227–34, 325, 364–5, 384–5.

territories might potentially have led to them drifting apart, in the event tensions between those living in close proximity to each other and at odds over the same possessions proved a more dangerous source of familial dissension.

Palamede of Ainos stands apart from other Gattilusio lords who possessed both multiple territories and adult sons in his apparent failure to confer subordinate lordships on his offspring. His only known administrator of Samothrake and perhaps Imbros was the governor John Laskaris Rontakenos.¹⁴ The only territorial authority known to have been wielded by his sons Giorgio and Dorino was as joint administrators of Ainos while their father was elsewhere.¹⁵ Palamede's consolidated approach to his territories was continued in the arrangements he made for his inheritance, in which Ainos, Samothrake and Imbros were all left to the offspring of his elder son Giorgio, while the younger son Dorino received only Palamede's estates on Lesbos. Dorino's failure to secure a larger share of the inheritance directly contributed to his coup, which in turn led to Giorgio's widow Helena Notaras's appeal to Mehmed II and the Ottoman seizure of Ainos and its attendant islands.¹⁶ The common practice among the Gattilusio, as among the Palaiologoi, of assigning territorial units to members of the family must have encouraged among them a sense of entitlement to such a holding where it was available, and thus perhaps to Dorino's sense of grievance at his father's refusal to provide for him in this way.¹⁷

The original causes of the conflict in the lordship of Mytilene between Domenico and Niccolò II, which eventually culminated in Domenico's murder in late 1458, are not so well attested.¹⁸ However, Kritovoulos's

¹⁴ Ciriaco, p. 100; Asdracha, 'Thrace', pp. 282–4 (no. 46), plate 118b; Catherine Asdracha and Charalambos Bakirtzis, 'Inscriptions Byzantines de Thrace (VIII^e–XV^e siècles): édition et commentaire historique', *Αρχαιολογικόν Δελτίον* 35/1 (1980), pp. 241–82 at pp. 278–80 (no. 33), plate 78b; below, p. 282.

¹⁵ Ciriaco, p. 124.

¹⁶ Kritovoulos, pp. 101–3.

¹⁷ Palamede's policy may reflect the importance of these islands to the lordship of Ainos, which must have been greater than that of their equivalents under the lordship of Mytilene, given the greater size and resources of Lesbos. Another echo of this different balance is perhaps to be found in the limited evidence available concerning the residence of different lords. Palamede was absent from Ainos at the time of Ciriaco of Ancona's visit in 1445 because he was spending time on Samothrake, while Dorino II was overwintering there at the time of the Ottoman conquest in 1456 (Ciriaco, p. 124; Kritovoulos, pp. 106–7). Conversely, in the known sources there are no references to a lord of Mytilene residing in Gattilusio territories away from Lesbos.

¹⁸ Kritovoulos, pp. 129, 168–9; Laonikos Chalkokondyles, *Laonici Chalcocondylae Historiarum Demonstrationes*, ed. Eugenius Darkó, 2 vols. (Budapest 1922–7), vol. 2, p. 268;

account suggests that the quarrels began after the death of their father Dorino I, at a time when they were both on Lesbos and apparently both exercising some kind of authority there.¹⁹ Thus its origins are probably to be placed in the period after the loss of Niccolò's own lordship on Lemnos to the Ottomans and his consequent return to Lesbos in the spring of 1456. Like Dorino II in Ainos, Niccolò had seen his prospects of running his own self-contained territory denied, although for different reasons. His ambitions likewise could now only be pursued by contesting control of his father's principal inheritance.²⁰

The strife that accelerated the downfall of the lordships may to some extent reflect the disadvantages of the collaborative, familial approach to government which distributed authority to members of the dynasty in a flexible, discretionary manner. The expectations of autonomous power it raised, combined with the likelihood that internal policy decisions or adverse external circumstances would lead to these hopes being frustrated in some cases, increased the probability of resentments that could lead to conflict.

The Role of the Extended Family in the Lordships

While the most important family relationships of the Gattilusio lords were with their own immediate kin and the distinguished dynasties into which they married, the wider Gattilusio *albergo* was also an important resource. Members of the clan were drawn to the Aegean by the rich opportunities which Francesco I's success had opened up, and provided their lordly relatives with a source of assistants bound to them by particularly close ties of common identity and solidarity. The Gattilusio family had been much involved in commercial and diplomatic ventures in the eastern Mediterranean since at least the mid-thirteenth century, but had remained essentially based in Genoa.²¹ The acquisition of Lesbos and other territorial possessions had transformed the family's fortunes

Pope Pius II, *Enea Silvio Piccolomini, Papa Pio II: I Commentarii*, ed. Luigi Totaro, 2 vols. (Milan 1984), vol. 2, p. 1830; Doukas, pp. 433–5; below, pp. 390–1.

¹⁹ Kritovoulos, p. 129.

²⁰ Cf. below, pp. 389–91.

²¹ Laura Balletto, 'I Gattilusio fra economia e politica', *AALSL* 54 (1997), pp. 449–64 at pp. 449–55; Michel Balard, 'Les Génois en Roumanie entre 1204 et 1261: Recherches dans les minutiers notariaux génois', *Mélanges d'Archéologie et d'Histoire* 78 (1966), pp. 467–502; Giovanni Balbi and Silvana Raiteri, *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: atti rogati a Caffa e a Licostomo (Sec. XIV)* (Genoa 1973), pp. 56–63 (nos. 25–7).

and seemingly led to a general emigration of its members over the following decades. As has been discussed, the entire Gattilusio house appears to have deserted Genoa by the mid-fifteenth century, with the sole exception of those Gattilusio women who were sent from the Aegean as brides.²²

The Gattilusio lords who ruled territories in the Aegean were all descendants of Domenico Gattilusio, father of Francesco I and Niccolò I.²³ Their mother was one Soffredina, of unidentified family, and they appear to have had at least one other brother, named Antonio.²⁴ A possible fourth brother is Luchino Gattilusio, son of Domenico, who appears in the records of the *Compere e Mutui*, collecting the interest on an account of one Francesco Gattilusio in 1353.²⁵ Another indistinct figure in the early stages of the family's history in the Aegean is the nephew who supposedly accompanied Francesco I on Amadeo's crusade against Gallipoli in 1366.²⁶ However, no descendants of these immediate relatives are identifiable among the various Gattilusio who gathered in the Aegean to take advantage of the good fortune of Francesco, Niccolò and their respective descendants.

While the legitimate sons of the Gattilusio lords could expect to acquire territorial lordships of their own in due course, illegitimate sons also

²² See above, pp. 152–5, 159–60, 167–8.

²³ This identification is confirmed by accounts in the *Compera Magna Pacis* and the *Compera Nova Sancti Pauli de Octo pro Centenario* owned by Niccolò of Ainos. The owner was listed as 'Nicolaus Gateluxius quondam Dominici' (ASG, CM 732, f. 349^v). That this was indeed the same Niccolò Gattilusio who became lord of Ainos is established by the insertion of an order drafted at Ainos in 1398 which is identical to orders applied to other accounts whose owner is specifically identified as the lord of Ainos (e.g. ASG, CM 1376, f. 227^v; see above, pp. 163–5). This was perhaps the same Domenico Gattilusio who had supplied a galley for the fleet of Aitone Doria, the fleet whose mutiny while in French service ignited the revolution of 1339 in Genoa. Léone Liagre-de Sturler, *Les relations commerciales entre Gênes, la Belgique et l'Outremont: d'après les archives notariales génoises (1320–1400)*, 2 vols. (Brussels and Rome 1969), vol. 1, p. 118; Giorgio and Giovanni Stella, *Annales Genuenses*, ed. Giovanna Petti Balbi (Bologna 1975), *RIS* n.s. 17/2, pp. 128–32; Steven A. Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese 958–1528* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina and London 1996), pp. 203–5.

²⁴ ASG, CM 645, f. 284; CM 646, f. 265^v; CM 649, f. 250.

²⁵ ASG, CM 358, f. 84. It is not clear whether or not this Francesco was the man soon to become the first lord of Mytilene. It is notable that Luchino's father Domenico is not identified as being deceased by the term 'quondam' preceding his name, as standard practice would normally dictate if he were, whereas an account of Soffredina's indicates that her husband was dead by 1345 (ASG, CM 645, f. 284). However, such omissions were not unknown in these records; for example, when Petra Doria opened a new account in 1388, it named her simply as 'Petra filia domini Luciani de Auria', even though her father had been killed almost a decade earlier. ASG, CM 1346, f. 120; above, pp. 162–3.

²⁶ Jehan Servion, *Geste et Croniques de la mayson de Savoye*, ed. Frederic-Emmanuel Bollati, 2 vols. (Turin 1879), vol. 2, p. 139.

enjoyed positions of prominence and power. In Francesco Scalamonti's biography of Ciriaco of Ancona, Ciriaco is said to have been received in 1431 by Giorgio Gattilusio, 'praeses' of Mytilene.²⁷ This may simply be an error, as in the comparable oddity of Clavijo's reference to Francesco II as 'Johan'.²⁸ If not, this Giorgio may be identifiable with the illegitimate son of Francesco II, who had undertaken an embassy to Burgundy in 1397, and with the leader of the revolt on Thasos in 1414.²⁹ He may have been put temporarily in charge in Dorino's absence, just as Niccolò II was during Domenico's journey to the Ottoman court in 1455, or have held a subordinate place in the island's government. A prominent figure in the later years of the dynasty was Luchino Gattilusio, apparently the illegitimate son of a lord of Ainos, most probably Palamede, who colluded with Niccolò II in the murder of Domenico.³⁰ He commanded the outwork of Melanoudion during the Ottoman assault on Mytilene in 1462 and was accused by some sources of betraying the city.³¹ This may well have been the same Luchino Gattilusio who plays a prominent role in the *De Vera Nobilitate* of Archbishop Leonardo of Mytilene, written in 1446. He is presented as Leonardo's interlocutor in the dialogue, arguing the case for nobility as a familial inheritance.³² If this was the same man there may be some irony in this, given the circumstances of his birth.

During the century following Francesco's acquisition of Lesbos, numerous individuals from other branches of the *albergo* appear in documents

²⁷ Francesco Scalamonti, *Vita Clarissimi et Famosissimi Kyriaci Anconitani*, ed. and tr. Charles Mitchell and Edward W. Bodnar (Philadelphia 1996), pp. 63–4.

²⁸ Ruy Gonzales de Clavijo, *Embajada a Tamorlán*, ed. Francesco López Estrada (Madrid 1943), p. 27.

²⁹ See above, pp. 57–8, 101.

³⁰ Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, p. 275.

³¹ These accusations appear in the Hospitaller account and the Italian continuation of Doukas, but not in that of Archbishop Benedetto. The Hospitaller account claims he was then put in charge of Lesbos along with its Turkish governor, but according to Chalkokondyles and the continuation of Doukas, he was taken to Constantinople and perished there along with Niccolò II. Roberto Valentini, 'L'Egeo dopo la caduta di Costantinopoli nelle relazioni dei gran maestri di Rodi', *Bullettino dell'Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo e Archivio Muratoriano* 51 (1936), pp. 137–68 at p. 167 (no. 4); Doukas, pp. 435, 437; Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, pp. 275–6; Benedetto, Archbishop of Mytilene, 'Leonardi Chiensis [sic] de Lesbo a Turcis capta epistola Pio Papae II missa', ed. Carl Hopf, *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes inédites ou peu connues* (Berlin 1873), pp. 359–66, at p. 363.

³² Leonardo of Chios, 'Leonardi Chiensis, Archiepiscopi Mitilenaei, ex praedicatorum familia contra Carolum Poggium Florentinum De Vera Nobilitate Tractatus Apologeticus', ed. Michele Giustiniani, *Caroli Poggii De Nobilitate Liber Disceptatoris, et Leonardi Chiensis De Vera Nobilitate Contra Poggium Tractatus Apologeticus* (Abeilhan 1657), pp. 53–139 at pp. 54–5, 58–9.

in connection with the Aegean region, and with the Gattilusio lordships in particular. Some of these were clearly in the employ of their distinguished relatives or connected with them in business dealings. A number of the most prominent of these individuals can tentatively be identified as the descendants of Ugolino Gattilusio, an identification resting always on the assumption that individuals of the same name operating in a similar context during the same period are the same person. In 1395 Battista Gattilusio son of Ugolino drew letters of exchange in Genoa based on a payment in Pera, on behalf of Francesco II of Mytilene.³³ In 1388 a Battista Gattilusio transported alum and other cargo from Pera and Anatolia to Genoa and grain from Sicily to Genoa; an individual of that name categorised as a burgher of Pera was to be found on Chios in 1394, and also had business in Famagusta at that time.³⁴ This mobile businessman also acted as guarantor for a letter of exchange for Pera which his brother Giuliano had sold at Mytilene, also in 1394.³⁵ Being active at Mytilene in the 1390s, this Giuliano may reasonably be identified with the Giuliano Gattilusio who in 1398 exported a cargo of alum from Lesbos to Porto Pisano on the ship of Corrado Lomellini, with the man of the same name was involved in the sale of a consignment of grain at Mytilene in the same year, and with the merchant of that name who in 1397 lent 4,060 ducats to the ransomed leaders of the Crusade of Nikopolis.³⁶ This Giuliano thus emerges as a figure of significant wealth, residing in Mytilene and involved in activities closely associated with its lords. His brother, while based at Pera and engaging in business across the Genoese world, apparently at times acted on behalf of the lord of Mytilene.

This Giuliano may well also be the same Giuliano Gattilusio who was the father of a second Battista Gattilusio.³⁷ This Battista was one of the

³³ ASG, NA 324 (Theramo de Maggiolo 6), f. 85^{r-v}. A summary of these documents has been published (Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 1, pp. 89–90 (no. 5)) but erroneously dated to 1400.

³⁴ ASG, NA 323 (Theramo de Maggiolo 5), ff. 147^{r-v}, 150, 151^v; ASG, AC 20 (*Massaria Communis Ianue* 1388), f. 83; Michel Balard, *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: atti rogati a Chio da Donato di Chiavari (17 febbraio–12 novembre 1394)* (Genoa 1988), pp. 238–40 (nos. 91–2).

³⁵ Balard, *Notai*, pp. 232–3 (no. 87).

³⁶ ASG, NA 324 (Theramo de Maggiolo 6), f. 153; Domenico Giofrè, 'Atti rogati in Chio nella seconda metà del XIV secolo', *Bulletin de l'Institut Historique Belge de Rome* 34 (1962), pp. 319–404 at pp. 401–3; Joseph Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient au XIV^e siècle: Expéditions de Marechal Boucicaut*, 2 vols. (Paris 1886), vol. 2, pp. 91–3 (no. 23); below, p. 373.

³⁷ ASG, NA 848 (Tommaso de Recco 2), no. CXXXIII; Philip Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese and their Administration of the Island 1346–1566: described in*

most senior officials of the lordship of Mytilene in the mid-fifteenth century, engaged in the collection of revenues. Like his putative father he was clearly also involved in the alum business, since when he fell on hard times in 1450 he secured a loan against his portion of several cargoes of the mineral.³⁸ Like his putative uncle and namesake he had interests distributed across the Genoese East, holding investments in the *compere* of Pera and Caffa, which the same troubles induced him to liquidate.³⁹ Shortly before the fall of Constantinople, he was one of a group of Genoese who lent money to Loukas Notaras, who was acting on behalf of the emperor.⁴⁰ The careers of this mercantile family offer a counterpoint to those of their princely relatives, while being closely entangled with their affairs and benefiting greatly from their good fortune.

They were also dependent on their goodwill. In an extensively documented but still ambiguous incident, in 1450 Battista was obliged to flee from Lesbos to Chios. He had been placed under house arrest while his property was expropriated by Domenico and Niccolò Gattilusio, the sons of Dorino, lord of Mytilene.⁴¹ The existence of an undated and uncompleted quittance document absolving Battista of any misappropriation of funds while serving Dorino as 'gubernator generalis insule Mitelinis' suggests that accusations of embezzlement contributed to Domenico and Niccolò's aggression.⁴² This is reinforced by a document issued shortly after Battista's flight to Chios in which he laid his grievances before the vicar of Mytilene Gabriele de Rapallo. In this he referred to just such a quittance, which he had received from Dorino regarding his conduct of the 'gubernata de introytibus' of Mytilene, and offered to vindicate himself in court and make whatever payment was adjudged to be owed.⁴³ The fact that the quittance document focused heavily on guarantees that Dorino's sons would not pursue Battista suggests that he had anticipated his tribulations.

contemporary documents and official dispatches, 3 vols. (Cambridge 1958), vol. 3, pp. 767–9 (no. 276).

³⁸ Argenti, vol. 3, pp. 604–7 (nos. 135–6).

³⁹ ASG, NA 847 (Tommaso de Recco 1), nos. 343, 351.

⁴⁰ Ausilia Roccatagliata, 'Nuovi documenti su Pera genovese', *SG* 11 (1990), pp. 127–43 at p. 143.

⁴¹ Giustina Olgiati, 'Il commercio dell'allume nei domini dei Gattilusio nel XV secolo', *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οι Γατελούζοι της Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 373–398 at pp. 392–5 (no. 2); Argenti, vol. 2, pp. 577–8 (no. 172).

⁴² ASG, NA 847 (Tommaso de Recco 1), appendix II L.

⁴³ ASG, NA 847 (Tommaso de Recco 1), no. 354.

Following his flight, Battista was seemingly accommodated in the house occupied by Marco Doria son of Oberto, Dorino's representative on Chios, and he was soon entrusted with receiving the first payment from the alum cartel for the cessation of production on Lesbos.⁴⁴ This suggests that some sort of rapprochement had been achieved with remarkable speed; the financial responsibilities now conferred on Battista are the more startling given the nature of the allegations against him. However, Battista seems to have lived on Chios for the rest of his life, never returning to the home from which he had been forced to flee.⁴⁵ This implies that he had not been so far reconciled to his relatives and former employers as to be willing to place himself in their power again. The identification of Dorino's sons as his persecutors, the fact that the quittance document sought to secure Battista against them through Dorino's authority, and the fact that they moved against him around the time that Domenico took over governmental responsibility from his ailing father all suggest that Battista's difficulties were with Domenico and Niccolò alone, not with Dorino.⁴⁶ Hence it seems likely that his renewed employment, now as agent on Chios, was the result of Dorino's intervention on his behalf. Given the latter's failing health and his own recent alarming experience, it would have been most imprudent for Battista to return to Lesbos, even if continuing goodwill between himself and the senior lord meant that he was able to resume a position of service to the lordship of Mytilene as long as Dorino was alive. Battista's son was another Giuliano, the notorious pirate.⁴⁷ The lack of evidence for any connection between Giuliano's activities and the Gattilusio lords is a further indication that this family rupture had lasting effects.⁴⁸

While no other group of Gattilusio offer such a well-documented insight into the opportunities provided by the lordships and the perils of their politics as the descendants of Ugolino, a number of other members of the family appear at some point in connection with the Gattilusio lords or their territories. Mariano Gattilusio married Niccolò of Ainos's daughter Orietta.⁴⁹ In 1428 Giovanni Gattilusio, an inhabitant of Mytilene, witnessed

⁴⁴ ASG, NA 847 (Tommaso de Recco 1), nos. 340, 343, 351, 354; ASG, NA 765 (Bernardo de Ferrari 2), no. 188*bis*, above, pp. 182–3.

⁴⁵ ASG, NA 848 (Tommaso de Recco 2), nos. LXXXXVIII, LXXXXVIII, CXXXIII, CLXVIII, CLXVIII; Argenti, vol. 3, pp. 767–9 (no. 276).

⁴⁶ Doukas, pp. 411–3; above, p. 65*n*77.

⁴⁷ ASG, NA 848 (Tommaso de Recco 2), no. LXXXXVIII; Argenti, vol. 3, pp. 575–6, 767–9 (nos. 94, 276).

⁴⁸ See below, pp. 237–8.

⁴⁹ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 62–4 (no. 24).

the appointment of procurators by Dorino I.⁵⁰ Melchione Gattilusio made a purchase at Mytilene on behalf of Dorino's son Niccolò in 1456.⁵¹

Niccolò Gattilusio *olim* de Porta, his brother Giovanni and their respective sons, seemingly members of a separate family which had at some point been absorbed into the Gattilusio *albergo*, were prominent merchants in the Aegean region in the mid-fifteenth century. The notarial collection from Mytilene contains a number of documents relating to the activities there of Baldasare Gattilusio *olim* de Porta, who was also to be found on Lemnos.⁵² His brother Lodisio was perhaps the same Lodisio Gattilusio who was engaged in minor administrative functions in Mytilene in 1456.⁵³ The assistance provided by another brother, Percivale, to Manuel Dromokaïtes, son of the former governor of Imbros George Dromokaïtes Palaiologos, when he was arrested on Chios in 1454, may reflect some prior acquaintance and involvement with Imbros.⁵⁴ However, the Gattilusio lordships played a less prominent part in this family's extensive recorded activities than Chios or Pera and there is no clear evidence of close connections between them and the Gattilusio lords.⁵⁵

The Doria relatives of the Aegean Gattilusio were also a potential source of assistants. As well as his involvement in managing Gattilusio interests in the West, Morruale Doria was active in Gattilusio business in the Aegean, operating jointly with Giuliano Gattilusio in the sale of grain in 1398 and witnessing one of the contracts between Jacopo of Mytilene's representative and the Lomellini brothers in 1413.⁵⁶ Morruale was also to be found acting in conjunction with Giuliano Gattilusio and with the lords of Mytilene and Ainos in making loans to the captured leaders of the Crusade of Nikopolis, and personally assisted them while they were in captivity.⁵⁷ The residence of his son Giovanni in Mytilene in the 1450s

⁵⁰ Luxuro and Pinelli Gentile, vol. 2, p. 86–7 (no. 11).

⁵¹ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 78–82 (no. 35).

⁵² Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 41–2, 47–8, 54–6, 62–4, 71–2, 87–8, 97–8, 136–7 (nos. 10, 15, 20, 24, 31, 38, 44, 61).

⁵³ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 44–5 (no. 12).

⁵⁴ Ausilia Roccatagliata, *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: atti rogati a Chio (1453–1454, 1470–1471)* (Genoa 1982), pp. 108–10 (no. 72).

⁵⁵ Roccatagliata, *Chio*, pp. 10–3, 22–4, 30–7, 43–56, 57–63, 108–10, 122–3, 135–6, 143–4 190–2 (nos. 6–7, 18, 22–6, 31–7, 39–40, 72, 77, 84, 87, 110); *idem*, 'Pera 1408–1490', *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: atti rogati a Pera e Mitilene* (Genoa 1982), I, pp. 80–4, 89–92, 101–2, 103–5, 115–9, 142–4, 146 (nos. 20, 23–4, 30, 32, 38, 56, 58).

⁵⁶ Gioffre, 'Atti', pp. 401–3; ASG, NA 603 (Giovanni Balbi 1), no. 281; above, pp. 166, 168, 170n151, below, pp. 372–3.

⁵⁷ Delaville, *France en Orient*, vol. 2, pp. 92–3 (no. 23).

indicates that this branch of the relatives by marriage of the Gattilusio had, like so many members of their own *albergo*, decamped to the Aegean to take advantage of the opportunities which the family's territorial acquisitions offered.⁵⁸

Commercial Connections

Unsurprisingly for members of a mercantile community like the Genoese, the careers of these relatives of the Gattilusio lords are known primarily through evidence relating to their commercial activities. The prominence of connections between relatives in these activities is also to be expected: in Genoese society familial bonds were inextricably entangled with economic ones.⁵⁹ Perhaps more unexpectedly, little evidence has been found of the direct participation of the Gattilusio lords themselves in trade, while those activities which are known relate largely to the alum business. Trade played a fundamental part in the integration of the Gattilusio lordships into the wider world of the Aegean and beyond, and one which entangled them with a wide range of neighbouring groups. It was probably also of key importance, alongside family connections, in tying the different components of the lordships together into a network. In Kritovoulos's description of the sources of the wealth of Ainos, he remarks that it benefited greatly from trade with the nearby islands, including Lemnos and Imbros.⁶⁰ While these particular places were extremely late additions to the possessions of the Gattilusio lords, the same kind of bonds must have applied to Samothrake and perhaps Thasos, with a comparable connection between Lesbos and Old Phokaia. Where the natural economic symbiosis between islands and the principal ports of the opposite mainland was combined with common political control, the two forms of integration would presumably have reinforced one another. However, their differing roles in trade also reveal some marked divergences between the various possessions of the Gattilusio. While connections with one another or with common trading partners could bring parts of the family's territorial network closer together, varying connections with such partners could also draw them apart.

⁵⁸ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 96–7, 113–5 (nos. 43, 53).

⁵⁹ Jacques Heers, *Gênes au XV^e Siècle: activité économique et problèmes sociaux* (Paris 1961), pp. 204, 544–9, 564–83.

⁶⁰ Kritovoulos, p. 103.

As a constellation of islands and coastal enclaves, the Gattilusio lordships' connections with one another and with the wider world were naturally dominated by sea travel. Even within their largest landmass, the island of Lesbos, seaborne communications must have played an important role in internal movements of people and goods. Movement by land would have been obstructed by the mountainous terrain of the interior, while the long and convoluted coastline created by the gulfs of Kallone and Gera greatly lengthens the land routes connecting many locations. The same features ensure that no part of the island is more than a few miles inland, thus easing access from the sea.

As for the major nodes of traffic by sea, on Samothrake the port of Palaïopolis and the nearby anchorage of Kamariotissa necessarily remained the focal points, though landings could obviously be made on the open beaches elsewhere, for instance by Ciriaco of Ancona on his arrival.⁶¹ On Thasos the ancient capital Limenas was evidently still the main port. The family's first foothold on Lemnos at Kotzinos appears to have been the focus for some maritime commercial activity, while the short-lived acquisitions of the 1450s brought control of the island's other significant port at Palaïokastro, along with Imbros and its port of Kastro.⁶² These ports were evidently also a major focus for the defence of the islands, though their role may have been less predominant than that of the coastal settlements on Lesbos. Most of the sizeable fortifications on Lesbos attested as being in use under Gattilusio rule are in coastal locations, often accompanying ports.⁶³ Here the inclination of the Gattilusio regime, building on the existing Byzantine defensive system, seems to have been to protect population

⁶¹ Ciriaco, pp. 98–100.

⁶² Véronique François, *La céramique byzantine à Thasos* (Athens 1995), p. 148; below, pp. 416–8.

⁶³ See Map 3 for fortified locations on Lesbos. Ioannis Moutzouris, 'Μεσαιωνικά κάστρα τῆς Λέσβου', *Λεσβιακά* 4 (1962), pp. 50–68; S. I. Charitonidis, 'Οικοδομικές φάσεις τοῦ κάστρου τῆς Μυτιλήνης', *ibid.*, pp. 69–75; Vassilis Petrakos, 'Το κάστρον τῆς Μυτιλήνης', *Αρχαιολογικόν Δελτίον* 31 (1971), pp. 152–65; Robert Koldewey, *Die antiken Baureste der Insel Lesbos* (Berlin 1890), plates 1–8, 13; E. Patsourakos, 'Τρεῖς πύργοι τῶν Γατελοῦζων', *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οἱ Γατελοῦζοι τῆς Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 17–34 at pp. 17–25, 31–3; Hector Williams, 'The Castle of the Gattelusii at Mytilene', *ibid.*, pp. 49–58; Andreas Mazarakis, 'Το Μελανούδη', *ibid.*, pp. 93–116; Athina-Christina Loupou, 'Ἡ Μήθυμνα καὶ τὸ κάστρο τοῦ', *Λεσβιακά* 18 (2000), pp. 174–92; Hasluck, pp. 259–65; Paolo Stringa, *Genova e la Liguria nel Mediterraneo: insediamento e culture urbane* (Genoa 1982), pp. 270, 290, 302, 314–9, 328–9; Johannes Koder, *Aigaion Pelagos (die nördliche Ägäis)* (Vienna 1998), *Tabula Imperii Byzantini* 10, pp. 139–40, 162, 184, 200, 203, 229, 233, 245, 255, 258, 271, 277, 294, plates 94–6, 99, 103–5, 117–20, 156–9.

centres and maintain access to the sea, opposing attackers in the productive but exposed lowlands, rather than taking refuge in the heights.⁶⁴ On each of the smaller and more rugged islands of Samothrake and Thasos the Gattilusio lords did extensive work on the fortifications of the principal port, but each also had at least one significant fortified centre in the mountainous interior, Kastro in the case of Thasos and Chora in that of Samothrake.⁶⁵ This may reflect a less assertive approach to the defence of less valuable territories with more modest military resources, and perhaps the lesser importance of the sea to islands which seem to have been significantly less commercially active than Lesbos. Nonetheless, at the time of Ciriaco's visits in 1444 the capital of Thasos was the port of Limenas, where Francesco III resided in the castle on the acropolis.⁶⁶ However, Chora on Samothrake, which he identified as a Gattilusio foundation, may have been the main seat of government there.⁶⁷ If so, this was probably the only important administrative centre in the lordships without direct access to the sea.⁶⁸ As the only settlement to have been apparently

⁶⁴ All the attested instances of the defence of fortifications during attacks on Lesbos relate to coastal sites (see above, pp. 71, 74–5, below, pp. 369, 389–90).

⁶⁵ The significance of Kastro is indicated by the presence of the inscription erected by Oberto Grimaldi in 1434, which may well have been set up as a result of building work on the fortifications, as was the case with such plaques in other Gattilusio territories (Alexander Conze, *Reise auf den Inseln des Thrakischen Meeres* (Hannover 1860), plate 3, no. 4; Koder, *Aigaion Pelagos*, p. 242, plate 153; cf. Charalambos Bakirtzis, 'Trois inscriptions de Kastro (Thasos)', *Bulletin de Correspondence Hellénique Supplément* 5 (1979), pp. 455–66); below, pp. 278–9, 415–6. Ciriaco of Ancona refers to Francesco III Gattilusio's refurbishment of his capital at Limenas, probably including repairs to its ancient city wall as well as work on the castle on the acropolis (Ciriaco, pp. 108–10; Stringa, pp. 329–31; Koder, *Aigaion Pelagos*, pp. 221–2, plates 156–9). The work done by the Gattilusio authorities on the fortifications of Palaïopolis and Chora on Samothrake is clearly attested by their own inscriptions as well as by Ciriaco (Ciriaco, p. 100; Asdracha and Bakirtzis, pp. 271–80 (nos.30–3), plates 76–8; Stringa, p. 327; Koder, *Aigaion Pelagos*, pp. 154, 248–9; plates 103–7, 117–20). They may also have been responsible for the watchtower at Phonias in north-eastern Samothrake (Patsourakos, 'Τρεῖς πύργοι', pp. 26–30, 34; Koder, *Aigaion Pelagos*, pp. 261–2).

⁶⁶ Ciriaco, pp. 108–14, 136.

⁶⁷ This is suggested by the fact that it was here that Ciriaco was received by the island's governor (Ciriaco, p. 100).

⁶⁸ There is little evidence available for the very brief period of Gattilusio rule on Lemnos and Imbros. However, the evidence that the family held the castle of Kotzinos both before gaining and after losing the rest of Lemnos suggests that it may well have been the centre of their rule there in the intervening period. Kritovoulos's account of the Lemnians' second pro-Ottoman revolt indicates that Kotzinos and Palaïokastro, both coastal locations, were the sites of the Latin garrisons and presumably the key locations for control of the island (see below, pp. 416–8; Koder, *Aigaion Pelagos*, pp. 202, 247). On Imbros, both the port of Kastro and the inland city of Palaïokastro were the site of fortification works by Palaïologan governors, particularly in the 1440s, but the surviving inscription

founded or refounded by the family its location has a particular significance. The main consideration was clearly military, the town occupying a strong defensive location with its castle perched on top of a crag, but its positioning on the western shoulder of the island's central ridge would have offered an optimum balance between protective inaccessibility and connections with the island's sole port and principal area of lowland.

On Lesbos Mytilene was clearly the chief port for most purposes, although the fact that nearly all Latin sources apply its name to the island as a whole creates obvious difficulties in determining whether particular ships visited the capital or some other part of Lesbos. The major exception to its preeminence was the alum trade: as has been discussed, the mineral was exported directly from harbours near the extraction sites, located on the Gulf of Kallone or the south-western coast of Lesbos.⁶⁹ Mytilene and Methymna were the obvious ports of call for traffic along the Anatolian littoral passing between the islands and the continent. Given the continued dominance of the islands by the ports facing the mainland during this period, this eastern route was presumably the most popular choice for ships making this passage, but it was certainly not an invariable one. Ships also made the transit by the western route, where the havens best placed to act as stops along the way were Sigri and perhaps Eressos. For instance, Sigri was used as an anchorage by Paganino Doria's Genoese fleet on its way to Constantinople in 1351.⁷⁰ In 1398 a large ship travelling from Pera was halted at Sigri by contrary winds for eighteen days; it then proceeded to Kallone, where it spent three days loading with alum but had to remain for a total of twelve, again owing to unfavourable weather, before continuing its journey to Alexandria.⁷¹ In 1460 a galley of the Genoese commune spent almost a month at 'Lariso', identifiable either as Eressos or as Larissos at the northern end of the Gulf of Gera. During this stay the crew were able to buy wine from other ships using the harbour as well as food supplies from the shore.⁷² Besides inhabited ports, less formal havens

proclaiming the authority of the island's Gattilusio governor was found in Kastro. Ciriaco, p. 96; Asdracha, 'Thrace', pp. 273–84 (nos. 38–46), plates 114–8; Koder, *Aigaion Pelagos*, p. 250, plates 49–51.

⁶⁹ See above, pp. 174–80. Kallone was also the port to which Ciriaco made a difficult crossing from Chios in the face of adverse weather. Ciriaco, pp. 228–36.

⁷⁰ Michel Balard, 'A propos de la bataille du Bosphore: l'expédition génoise de Paganino Doria à Constantinople (1351–1352)', *Travaux et Mémoires du Centre de Recherche d'Histoire et Civilisation Byzantines* 4 (1970), pp. 431–69, reprinted in *La mer Noire et la Roumanie génoise (XIII^e–XV^e siècles)* (London 1989), II, p. 463, plate.

⁷¹ Gioffrè, 'Atti', pp. 370–2.

⁷² ASG, AC 754 (*Galearum Marinariorum Introitus et Exitus* 1460–1), ff. 7^v–8^v, 12, 28^v–9. The possible identification with Eressos is suggested by Buondelmonti's transliteration

could also be habitual stops for maritime traffic: a notarial act of 1459 was concluded at an anchorage at the southern end of the Gulf of Gera which was in common use.⁷³

The delays suffered by the ship halted at Sigri and then at Kallone reflect the everyday difficulties of seafaring, which could on occasion take a more drastic form, even in the apparent protection of a port. In 1395 the erstwhile master of a ship appointed agents to recover whatever could be salvaged of the sails, anchors and other gear of his vessel, which had been wrecked in the harbour of Mytilene.⁷⁴ The hazards of navigation could offer opportunities as well: in 1426 a cargo of wine salvaged from a Venetian ship wrecked on the shores of Tenedos was consigned to some passing vessels of Mytilene to carry to the safety of their home port, no doubt for a suitable consideration.⁷⁵

A salvage opportunity of a different kind was presented by a Venetian victory over the Ottoman fleet off Gallipoli in 1416. After the battle the Venetians sold wooden and metal components retrieved from galleys which had been destroyed after capture, some at Constantinople and some to the lord of Mytilene.⁷⁶ Jacopo's interest in acquiring such materials raises the possibility that he was directly involved in shipbuilding. It is not certain that ships were built at Mytilene, but they were undoubtedly fitted out there, not only for the Gattilusio lords or their subjects but on behalf of other paymasters including the Byzantine Emperor.⁷⁷ In the Mytilene notarial collection one man, the *magister* Varazino, is identified as a *magister axie*, a shipwright or carpenter.⁷⁸ Lesbos was well provided with raw material, as its uplands were thickly wooded with pines, cypresses and oaks.⁷⁹ Ainos also possessed a shipyard during the late medieval period.⁸⁰

of that name as 'Leriso'. Cristoforo Buondelmonti, *Description des Iles de l'Archipel par Christophe Buondelmonti: version grecque par un anonyme*, ed. Emile Legrand (Paris 1897), plate 39.

⁷³ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 141–3 (no. 64).

⁷⁴ ASG, NA 324 (Theramo de Maggiolo 6), ff. 92, 191^{r-v}.

⁷⁵ ASV, DC 1/13 (*Diversorum Locorum* 1426–7), ff. 38–40^v.

⁷⁶ Antonio Morosini, *Il Codice Morosini: il mondo visto da Venezia (1094–1433)*, ed. Andrea Nanetti (Spoleto 2010), p. 680. This opportunity may have been brought to Jacopo Gattilusio's attention thanks to the chance presence on the scene of a vessel from Lesbos, whose approach from Constantinople had inadvertently helped precipitate the fight. Doukas, p. 147; Morosini, p. 670.

⁷⁷ Morosini, p. 977.

⁷⁸ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', p. 107 (no. 49).

⁷⁹ Cristoforo Buondelmonti, *Christoph. Bondelmontii, Florentini, Liber Insularum Archipelagi*, ed. G.R.L. de Sinner (Leipzig and Berlin 1824), p. 116.

⁸⁰ Paul Lemerle, André Guillou, Denise Papachrysanthou and Nicolas Svoronos, *Actes de Lavra*, 4 vols (Paris 1970–82), *Archives de l'Athos* 5, 8, 10, 11, vol. 3, pp. 177–9 (no. 166).

Besides whatever profits they may have derived from supplying the means of maritime transport, the wealth of the lordships was certainly underpinned by trade itself, both in terms of handling goods in transit and exporting their own produce. The early direct participation of the Gattilusio lords in the alum industry and their later leasing of the monopoly has already been discussed.⁸¹ They also commanded a considerable income from another industrial business involving mineral extraction and refinement, the lucrative salt pans of Ainos.⁸² The exploitation of such locally distinctive fixed resources was an obvious focus for the attention of a ruler, even one otherwise uninterested in commerce. In other trades the hand of the Gattilusio lords themselves is very seldom to be seen in the sources, and it may reasonably be doubted whether they played much part in purely commercial enterprises, in contrast to the behaviour of their relatives and associates. Nevertheless, even without such direct participation trade must have been a significant source of income for the regime through commercial taxation. The Gattilusio lords levied the *com-merchium*, the standard sales tax of Byzantium and the Latin East, which on Lesbos in 1412 stood at a rate of 7%.⁸³

The situation of the continental ports, which naturally offered them a role as a point of interchange between the sea and an extensive continental hinterland, differed markedly from that of the islands. The latter would be more likely to export primarily their own produce and import largely for their own consumption, although island ports could also act as redistribution points for goods from elsewhere, as Chios did in the alum trade. This would seem likely to expand the potential scale of trades conducted through the ports opening into Europe and Asia, in comparison with those allowing direct access only to relatively small islands. Ainos and Old Phokaia, together with New Phokaia, occupied a distinctive position as isolated Christian trading ports adjoining a Muslim hinterland. During this period within the Aegean proper only Thessalonike at times occupied a comparable position, though other such ports were present in the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea.⁸⁴ Provided intercourse with the hinterland

⁸¹ See above, pp. 172–84.

⁸² See below, pp. 207–8.

⁸³ ASG, NA 603 (Giovanni Balbi 1), appendix G.

⁸⁴ David Jacoby, 'Foreigners and the urban economy in Thessalonike, ca. 1150–ca. 1450', *DOP* 57 (2003), pp. 85–132, reprinted in *Latins, Greeks and Muslims: encounters in the eastern Mediterranean, 10th–15th centuries* (Farnham 2009), VII, pp. 102–16. The perennially embattled situation of the Christian foothold in the port of Smyrna obstructed its use as a base for commercial interaction with the interior.

was not interrupted by conflict, this situation offered them particular opportunities to attract business. Continental ports under Christian rule had the potential to be congenial bases for access to the extensive and expanding Turkish sphere for the Christian merchants and shippers who overwhelmingly dominated Mediterranean maritime trade. Islands could offer comparable benefits when the adjoining continental areas had passed under Muslim rule, but they did not afford the same direct access as continental enclaves and were abundant in the Aegean, placing the Gattilusio possessions in competition with more important commercial centres like Chios and Negroponte.⁸⁵

Yet in fact not one but two of the main export trades from the Gattilusio continental enclaves were in local produce rather than commodities drawn from the wider hinterland: the alum of Phokaia, discussed previously, and the salt of Ainos.⁸⁶ The salt pans of Ainos were described by Kritovoulos as the greatest and finest anywhere, and he and other writers regarded them as the most important contributor to the revenues of the port's Gattilusio lords.⁸⁷ Their produce was evidently exported both inland and overseas. Kritovoulos says that their exploitation brought in a profusion of gold and silver from all across Thrace and Macedonia.⁸⁸ Ainos is also known to have exported both salted fish and salted meat by sea, although the identified references involve only small quantities.⁸⁹ Kritovoulos mentions that the prosperity of Ainos was enhanced by the fertility of its hinterland and the abundance of fish found in its waters and birds in the marshes, which were presumably also the site of its salt pans.⁹⁰ Ciriaco of Ancona also alludes to the wealth in fish of the waters of Ainos.⁹¹ Clearly the potential of these resources was greatly increased

⁸⁵ Cf. David Jacoby, 'Greeks in the maritime trade of Cyprus around the mid-fourteenth century', *Cipro-Venezia: comuni sorti storiche (Atti del simposio internazionale, Atene 1-3 marzo 2001)*, ed. Chryssa Maltezou (Venice 2002), pp. 59-83, reprinted in *Latins, Greeks and Muslims: encounters in the eastern Mediterranean, 10th-15th centuries* (Farnham 2009), XII, pp. 59-62.

⁸⁶ See above, p. 173.

⁸⁷ Kritovoulos, pp. 104-5; Tursun Beg, *The History of Mehmed the Conqueror by Tursun Beg*, tr. Halil Inalcik and Rhoads Murphy (Minneapolis and Chicago 1978), pp. 37-8; Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, p. 237.

⁸⁸ Kritovoulos, p. 104.

⁸⁹ Gioffrè, 'Atti', pp. 403-4; Nicolai Iorga, 'Notes et extraits pour servir à l'histoire des Croisades au XV^e siècle', *Revue de l'Orient Latin* 4, (1896), pp. 226-320, 503-622, vol. 5 (1897), pp. 108-212, 311-88, vol. 6 (1898), pp. 50-143, 370-434, vol. 7 (1899), pp. 38-107, 375-429, vol. 8 (1900-1), pp. 1-115 at vol. 8, p. 65.

⁹⁰ Kritovoulos, pp. 103-4.

⁹¹ Ciriaco, p. 142.

by the availability close at hand of an abundant source of salt which could be used to preserve fish and flesh for transport over long distances, turning them from produce suitable only for local consumption into a widely marketable commodity. The importance of fishing to the economy of Ainos is suggested by the presentation of fishermen as the most prominent element in the local militia, though farmers are also mentioned.⁹² In so far as it was conducted from boats, fishing is likely to have aided the commercial development of Ainos: vessels primarily employed for fishing could also be used for transporting cargo, while it could underpin a more dedicated merchant marine by supporting a population skilled in seafaring and the craftsmen and facilities needed for building and maintaining small craft. It is striking how thoroughly and in how many ways the wealth of Ainos was founded on its position at the mouth of the Maritza, which made it the interchange point between the sea and the chief corridor for the inland trade of Thrace, and gave rise to the marshy delta that supplied both salt and birds.⁹³

The emphasis placed by Kritovoulos on the export of the salt of Ainos inland rather than overseas may reflect the extent to which this lordship, whose survival was dependent on the consistent indulgence of successive sultans, was integrated into the Ottoman network of power. The extraction by the Ottomans of a considerable proportion of the lordship's revenues shows a large degree of control over the regime's financial affairs.⁹⁴ In such a context it is reasonable to suppose that the Ottomans would have had a say in the marketing of this salt, a substance that was so often the subject of government monopolies, and they may well have preferred to direct the lion's share of this important commodity towards the demands of their own provinces. Thus the obvious influence exerted by the rulers of the interior over the hinterland trade of maritime enclaves, and the mutually reinforcing forces of political and economic interconnection, may have extended into the trade in such an enclave's own produce as well.

⁹² Demetrios Kydones, *Demetrius Cydones Correspondance*, ed. Raymond-Joseph Loenertz, 2 vols. (Vatican 1956–60), vol. 2, pp. 127–8 (no. 231).

⁹³ Cf. Horden and Purcell, pp. 195–7. The coasts of Macedonia and Thrace did feature numerous saltworks in the Byzantine period, but it seems reasonable to suppose that the apparently unusual level of productivity of the Ainos pans was related to their situation. George C. Maniatis, 'Organization and modus operandi of the Byzantine salt monopoly', *BZ* 102 (2009), pp. 661–96 at pp. 669–70.

⁹⁴ Kritovoulos, p. 105. Tursun Beg even presents the situation as the assignment to the lord of Ainos of a portion of local Ottoman revenues, Tursun Beg, pp. 37–8; below, p. 384.

The commodity from their broader hinterlands most often found passing through Ainos and Phokaia was grain, unsurprisingly given the significance of Thrace and western Anatolia as cereal-producing areas.⁹⁵ In 1389 a ship leaving Candia, the principal port of Venetian Crete, loaded 913 measures of grain of Ainos.⁹⁶ The export of grain to Crete, underway in the early years of Gattilusio rule in Ainos, was still going on at least as late as 1450.⁹⁷ Anatolian grain was exported through Phokaia to markets including Cyprus, Rhodes, Constantinople, Coron, Ragusa, Venice and Genoa, although the sources in question do not usually draw the distinction between the two Phokaiaes so it is uncertain whether these shipments passed through Gattilusio territory or not.⁹⁸ The same is true of the export of considerable quantities of cotton through Phokaia to western Europe.⁹⁹

A variety of other goods were also shipped from Ainos at various times during the period of Gattilusio rule. A shipment of wax, honey, biscuit and salted meat from Ainos in 1398 is notable as a rare case of recorded participation in trade by the Gattilusio lords. The goods themselves were owned by other Genoese, but the vessel itself, a small craft commanded by Eliano Doria, was the property of Niccolò I Gattilusio.¹⁰⁰ Hides and leather were exported to Crete.¹⁰¹ Cloth was shipped from Ainos to Constantinople and figs may have been another export.¹⁰² These commodities may have come

⁹⁵ Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, 'Prix et marchés des céréales en Roumanie (1343–1405)', *Nuova Rivista Storica* 61 (1977), pp. 291–305, reprinted in *Romania and the Turks (c. 1300–c. 1500)* (London 1985), IX, pp. 291–300; Kate Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade in the Early Islamic State: the merchants of Genoa and Turkey* (Cambridge 1999), pp. 63–7; Michel Balard, *La Roumanie Génoise (XI^e–début du XV^e siècle)* (Rome 1978), pp. 752–7.

⁹⁶ ASV, DC 11/11 (*Actorum* 1390–1), ff. 31–2.

⁹⁷ Iorga, 'Notes', vol. 8 (1900–1), p. 65.

⁹⁸ ASG, *SGCanc* (Sala 34) 590/1268 (*Famagusta Massaria* 1391), ff. 28, 160, 168^{r-v}; ASG, NA 931 (Antonio Leardo 1), no. 369; ASV, DC 15/2 (*Bandi* 1356–74), f. 44^{r-v}; Chryssa A. Maltezos, *Ο Θεσμός του εν Κωνσταντινουπόλει Βενέτου Βαΐλου (1268–1453)* (Athens 1970), pp. 229–31; Zacharias Tsirpanlis, *Ανέκδοτα Εγγράφα για τη Ρόδο και τις Νότιες Σποράδες από το Αρχείο των Ιωαννιτών Ιπποτών 1421–1453* (Rhodes 1995), pp. 366–8 (no. 103); Bariša Krekić, *Dubrovnik (Ragusa) et le Levant au Moyen Age* (Paris 1961), pp. 225, 230–1, 236 (nos. 371–2, 405, 410, 439); Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade*, pp. 62–7.

⁹⁹ ASG, NA 931 (Antonio Leardo 1), no. 369; Umberto Dorini and Tommaso Bertelè, *Il libro dei conti di Giacomo Badoer (Costantinopoli 1436–1440)* (Rome 1956), pp. 442, 451, 524, 638, 642, 754; Federigo Melis, *Documenti per la storia economica dei secoli XIII–XVI* (Florence 1972), pp. 298–302 (no. 86).

¹⁰⁰ Gioffrè, 'Atti', pp. 403–4.

¹⁰¹ ASV, DC 11/18 (*Actorum* 1414–5), f. 53; ASV, *NCan* 245 (Andrea Sevasto), f. 237^v.

¹⁰² Dorini and Bertelè, p. 221; Hippolyte Noiret, *Documents Inédits pour servir à l'histoire de la domination vénitienne en Crète, de 1380 à 1485* (Paris 1892), p. 161; Freddy Thiriet,

from the immediate environs of the port, from its Thracian hinterland or further afield.

Slaves also passed through Ainos and Old Phokaia to destinations overseas, although the recorded instances involve only small numbers of individuals. A Bulgarian slave brought from Ainos to Candia on a vessel from Ainos is attested in 1415, and in 1420 a Venetian sent a number of Bosnian slaves from Ainos to a relative of his on Crete.¹⁰³ In the 1350s various slaves, including Greeks and Turks, said to have been bought from the Turks at Phokaia or specifically at Old Phokaia, had been brought to Candia by both Phokaiaans and Cretans.¹⁰⁴ Others, mostly Bulgarians but including also a Greek from Epiros and an Abkhaz, arrived in Candia from Phokaia in the 1400s and slaves were shipped from Phokaia to Sicily in 1439, although it is not specified whether they passed through the old or the new town.¹⁰⁵

Little is known of the commercial connections of the smaller islands under Gattilusio rule, a dearth of evidence which may reflect a relative lack of activity. This is consistent with the picture earlier in the medieval period.¹⁰⁶ In 1397 a *griparia* (a small or medium-sized vessel) was loaded at Lemnos with a varied cargo including modest quantities of grain, flour, tallow, hides, figs and carpets on behalf of a group of Jewish merchants from Chios, but this glimpse of commercial activity involving these islands, itself preceding the very brief interlude of Gattilusio rule on Lemnos by over half a century, is exceptional.¹⁰⁷ Another possible export of Lemnos was *terra Limnia*, an ochre-laden earth believed to have medicinal properties, whose extraction, confined to one day a year, is attested in antiquity and after the Ottoman conquest but seems to have continued during the intervening period. This mineral deposit was located around Moschylos in the immediate hinterland of Kotzinos, which was therefore the port for its export, and it could be that the desire to benefit from this trade

Duca di Candia: Ducali e Lettere Ricevute (1358–1360, 1401–1405) (Venice 1978), pp. 172–3 (no. 163).

¹⁰³ ASV, DC 11/18 (*Actorum* 1414–5), f. 119, DC 11 *bis*/21 (*Actorum* 1420), f. 19.

¹⁰⁴ ASV, DC 10 *bis*/6 (*Actorum* 1355–7), ff. 18, 20^v, 58, 59^v, 70, 85^v, 89, 125.

¹⁰⁵ ASV, DC 11/14 (*Actorum* 1405–6), f. 42, DC 11/15 (*Actorum* 1408), f. 8; Dorini and Bertelè, p. 499.

¹⁰⁶ Elisabeth Malamut, *Les Iles de l'Empire Byzantin*, 2 vols. (Paris 1988), vol. 2, p. 561.

¹⁰⁷ Giofrè, 'Atti', pp. 348–9. In Giofrè's edition, as in the original document, the starting point of this shipment is identified as 'Stalimini partium Grece', Stalimini being the standard contemporary Latin rendering of Lemnos. In his summary Giofrè replaces this with 'Salamina', i.e. Salamis, but there seems to be no compelling reason for rejecting the name that appears in the text.

played a part in attracting the Gattilusio to the locality.¹⁰⁸ Jacopo Badoer received some wool at Constantinople from one Mavrodes of Lemnos, but it is unknown where this cargo came from.¹⁰⁹ In the fifteenth century ceramics from Lemnos were exported in considerable quantities to Thasos and Samothrake.¹¹⁰ Lemnos was described by Buondelmonti as abounding in grain, and Samothrake in honey and goats. He also stressed the high population and fertility of Thasos, which he described as being greater than that of the other islands.¹¹¹ The crops grown there are known to have included olives, vines and almonds.¹¹²

The lack of commercial evidence is perhaps unsurprising with regard to Samothrake, whose geography rendered it so unwelcoming to shipping.¹¹³ It is more perplexing in the case of Thasos. It shared with Samothrake

¹⁰⁸ Pierre Belon, *Voyage au Levant: les observations de Pierre Belon du Mans de plusieurs singularités et choses mémorables, trouvées en Grèce, Turquie, Judée, Egypte, Arabie et autres pays étranges* (1553), ed. Alexandra Merle (Paris 2001), pp. 114, 121–5; Heath Lowry, 'The island of Limnos: a case study on the continuity of Byzantine forms under Ottoman rule', *Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society: papers given at a symposium at Dumbarton Oaks in May 1982*, ed. Anthony Bryer and Heath Lowry (Birmingham 1986), pp. 235–59 at pp. 239–41; F. W. Hasluck, 'Terra Limnia', *ABSA* 16 (1909–10), pp. 220–31; Michael D. Higgins, *A Geological Companion to Greece and the Aegean* (London 1996), p. 124.

¹⁰⁹ Dorini and Bertelè, p. 490.

¹¹⁰ The fifteenth-century pottery found on Thasos is mostly of a type produced on Lemnos, otherwise attested only on Samothrake apart from one find from Rhodes. This is in contrast to finds from the fourteenth century, which correspond to types found elsewhere across Anatolia and the northern Balkans, and from the thirteenth century, when they match those from Syria and Palestine. The shift apparently reflects a progressive narrowing of commercial horizons (François, pp. 148–9). This distribution pattern has been connected to these islands' common experience of Gattilusio rule (*ibid.*, pp. 144–5). However, this interpretation does not address the lack of finds from Lesbos or the vicinity of Old Phokaia, territories more closely associated politically with Lemnos than was Samothrake, or from the area of Ainos. It also fails to take into account the very brief duration of Gattilusio control of Lemnos, the actual venue of production, although the family may have held Kotzinos, through which the ceramics were apparently exported, for slightly longer (see below, pp. 416–8). It seems much more likely that, if this pattern was indeed shaped by political links rather than merely by proximity, the regime in question was that of Byzantium, which seems to have had direct control of all three islands in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. This would account for the failure of this pottery to appear in those territories which were already held by the Gattilusio at the beginning of the fifteenth century. This pattern does however cast some light on the commercial context of Gattilusio rule on these islands, seeming to indicate a limited and declining involvement in medium or long-range trade networks in this period, in marked contrast to Lesbos and the continental ports under Gattilusio rule.

¹¹¹ Buondelmonti, ed. de Sinner, pp. 125–7.

¹¹² Lemerle *et al.*, pp. 71–2 (no. 137); Vassiliki Kravari, *Actes du Pantocrator* (Paris 1991), AA 17, pp. 95–102, 103–8 (nos. 10–1).

¹¹³ See above, p. 19.

a location which placed it off the main corridors for traffic to and from the straits, but at a more local level its ready access to the best natural harbours on the Aegean coast of Thrace and convenience for entry to the Nestos and more distantly the Strymon could have made it the focus for the trade of a considerable continental hinterland.¹¹⁴ Its mineral deposits could also have given it distinctive commodities of its own for export. At least one of its main marble-mining areas had permanently fallen out of use in the seventh century, and in medieval Byzantium reduced demand and reuse of ancient masonry seem to have meant that there was minimal trade in marble, which throughout the empire was apparently quarried only on a modest scale for local use.¹¹⁵ However, the metal resources of Thasos should still have been significant, and the island's fertility could also have offered opportunities for the export of agricultural produce.

In commercial matters as in so much else, the best documented of the Gattilusio possessions is Lesbos. Its range of recorded exports is much wider than those of the continental ports, and while most of these goods were certainly or probably produced on the island, it also re-exported commodities from the Anatolian mainland. These included grain and slaves; the prominence of these two commodities among those brought in from the continental hinterland and then exported through Gattilusio territory parallels the cases of Ainos and Old Phokaia. During the crisis in the Aegean grain supply caused by Bayezid's embargo in the 1390s the Mahona of Chios were able to acquire Anatolian grain on Lesbos.¹¹⁶ Slaves acquired through trade or violence were exported throughout the period of Gattilusio rule. During the 1350s and 1360s various slaves who had been bought on Lesbos were brought to Crete by inhabitants of both islands and of Old Phokaia. These slaves included Greeks originating from Christoupolis, Thessalonike and Thebes, and Turks from Ottoman territory and elsewhere. Some of them had originally been purchased at Old Phokaia, New Phokaia and Pergamon.¹¹⁷ Slaves of this sort were not exported to Crete from Lesbos in later years, in accordance with a

¹¹⁴ See above, pp. 18–9.

¹¹⁵ Jean-Pierre Sodini, 'Marble and stoneworking in Byzantium, seventh-fifteenth centuries', *The Economic History of Byzantium*, ed. Angeliki E. Laiou, 3 vols. (Washington D.C. 2002), vol. 1, pp. 129–46.

¹¹⁶ Giofrè, 'Atti', pp. 401–3; below, pp. 372–3. Note that although Giofrè's introduction to this document implies that this was grain of 'Romania', it is clear from the text that it was the *modii*, the units in which the quantity of grain was measured, that were 'de Romania'.

¹¹⁷ ASV, DC 10 bis/6 (*Actorum* 1355–7), ff. 57^v, 58^v, 59^v, DC 11/9 (*Actorum* 1368), f. 75^v.

general shift in Mediterranean trade away from Greek and Turkish slaves acquired from the Turks to slaves originating from the shores of the Black Sea, often via the markets of Constantinople.¹¹⁸ Reflecting this trend, in 1390 a *griparia* of Lesbos carried a group of Abkhaz, Circassian and Tartar slaves bought in Constantinople to Candia, while in 1423 an Abkhaz slave bought at Mytilene was taken to Crete.¹¹⁹ The piratical activities focused on Lesbos inevitably fed its slave market.¹²⁰ The Gattilusio lords were themselves involved in the trade, Domenico of Mytilene selling fifteen slaves to a crusading captain in 1457.¹²¹

Lesbos is also likely to have exported some portion of its own produce. The island had a diverse agricultural economy; according to Benedetto Dei, it abounded in grain, meat, fruit, raisins, timber, wine and silk. Besides this produce of the land, Dei also cited salt and fish as significant products of Lesbos, echoing their importance at Ainos.¹²² The supplies and other gifts given to the Ottoman admiral Hamza on his visit to the island in 1455 included oxen, sheep, wine, bread, biscuit, cheese, fruit and garments of silk and wool, as well as cash.¹²³ The Mytilene notarial collection contains transactions referring to a number of vineyards, to the cultivation of olives and figs in various parts of the island, and to herds of cattle and goats.¹²⁴ Describing the lands passed through by the characters of his *De Statu Hominis*, Leonardo of Chios mentions arable fields in the vicinity of Moria, Lampou Myloi and Vasilika and in the plain adjoining the Gulf of Kallone, vineyards around Mytilene, Moria and the Gulf of Gera, and the cultivation of olives near Kerameia and Pyrrha, apples near Kerameia and unspecified fruit near Mytilene and around the Gulf of Gera. He also mentions herds of cattle and flocks, perhaps of sheep or goats, in the lands adjoining the gulfs of Kallone and Gera. The streams flowing into the Gulf of Kallone are described as abounding in fish, and the gulf itself in both fish

¹¹⁸ Cf. Balard, *Romanie*, pp. 788–801.

¹¹⁹ ASV, DC 11/11 (*Actorum* 1390–1), ff. 29v–31, DC 11 bis/22 (*Actorum* 1423–4), f. 1.

¹²⁰ Mikel de Epalza, 'Dos textos moriscos bilingües (arabe y castellano) de viajes a Oriente (1395 y 1407–1412)', *Hesperis Tamuda* 20–1 (1982–3), pp. 25–112 at pp. 92–7; Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, p. 268.

¹²¹ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 94–5 (no. 42); below, p. 354.

¹²² Benedetto Dei, *La Cronica dall'anno 1400 all'anno 1500*, ed. Roberto Barducci (Florence 1985), p. 161.

¹²³ Doukas, p. 405.

¹²⁴ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 38–40, 65–9, 78–85, 108–10, 112–3, 127–35 (nos. 8, 26, 28–9, 35–6, 50a–b, 52, 59a–c); below, pp. 262–4.

and shellfish.¹²⁵ A note thought to come from Lesbos in the second half of the fourteenth century offers a glimpse of the provisioning of Mytilene from the closest areas of the island. This appears to record the storage in Mytilene of substantial quantities of wheat grown around Moria and Gera, along with much smaller amounts of barley and pulses, and the availability of further quantities of wheat on the peninsula south of the capital.¹²⁶ Later but much more comprehensive and quantitative information comes from an Ottoman survey of 1548. This indicates that at that time cereal production was the largest component of the agrarian economy of Lesbos, widespread throughout the island but particularly predominant in its dry western parts. There was also extensive production of wine, concentrated chiefly in the north and east, while olives and other fruits were grown on a much more limited scale, as were flax and cotton.¹²⁷

It is not clear how many of these commodities were commonly traded overseas, but the Hospitallers seeking grain on Lesbos in 1439 may have had local produce in mind, while wax was evidently exported from both Lesbos and Phokaia to Crete, and thence to Venice.¹²⁸ Another important export to Venetian Crete was horses. The movement of imported horses within Crete was subject to licencing in the mid-fourteenth century, and a sizeable proportion of the licences which survive from the 1320s–1360s relate to horses identified as being from Mytilene. These animals are categorised as rouncies, a type of riding horse.¹²⁹ The lordship's leading role in supplying Crete with mounts is confirmed by a proclamation of 1369 prohibiting the import of horses or mules from Lesbos and certain other,

¹²⁵ Leonardo di Chios, *De Statu Hominis*, Biblioteca del Seminario Vescovile, Albenga, MS Leonardo di Chio, ff. 1^v–107^v at ff. 68, 73, 84^v, 89^v, 93, 107^v.

¹²⁶ Peter Schreiner, *Texte zur späthbyzantinischen Finanz- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte in Handschriften der Biblioteca Vaticana* (Vatican 1990), pp. 245–7 (no. 49).

¹²⁷ Dimitris N. Karydis and Machiel Kiel, *Μυτιλήνης Αστυγραφία και Λέσβου Χωρογραφία (15^{ος}–19^{ος} αι.)* (Athens 2000), pp. 90–1, 138, 146–50; Kimon Louizidis, *Η Βυζαντινή Λέσβος (330–1355)* (PhD thesis, Ioannina 2003), pp. 165–71. It is sometimes stated that the Gattilusio lords introduced commercial olive or vine cultivation, but evidence for these assertions is hard to identify. E.g. Thanasis Kizos and Maria Koulouri, 'Agricultural landscape dynamics in the Mediterranean: Lesvos (Greece) case study using evidence from the last three centuries', *Environmental Science and Policy* 9 (2006), pp. 330–42 at p. 334; Laura Balletto and Geo Pistarino, 'Genova ed il suo sistema politico-militare nell'Egeo (secoli XIV–XV)', *AALSL* 53 (1997), pp. 461–72 at p. 471.

¹²⁸ Tsirpanlis, *Ανέκδοτα Εγγραφα*, pp. 366–8 (no. 103); Noiret, p. 107.

¹²⁹ ASV, DC 10/2 (*Actorum* 1326–9), ff. 12^v, 13, 39^v, 70, DC 10 bis/6 (*Actorum* 1355–7), ff. 70, 79, DC 10 bis/7 (*Actorum* 1359–60), ff. 6^v, 16, 16^v, 50, 87^v; cf. Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade: Venetian Crete and the emirates of Menteshe and Aydin (1300–1415)* (Venice 1983), pp. 165–6.

unnamed islands, for unspecified reasons.¹³⁰ When this ban was cancelled a year later, Lesbos was again the only island singled out by name.¹³¹ This trade continued in later decades, as attested by the arrival in Candia of fifty animals from Mytilene and New Phokaia in 1394, and of twenty rouncies from Mytilene in 1419.¹³²

While recorded exports from Gattilusio territory, apart from alum, mostly went at least initially to nearby destinations, many of the known imports to Lesbos came from western Europe, particularly Italy. In characteristic Mediterranean fashion, these included basic agricultural commodities which were also produced on the island itself.¹³³ Besides the grain supplied from Anatolia, wine was imported from Crete.¹³⁴ Both wine and olive oil were brought from Naples and Gaeta in about 1381.¹³⁵ Other imports were characteristic of the kind of manufactured goods and metals that dominated exports carried by the Genoese and others from the West to the eastern Mediterranean.¹³⁶ Such cargoes included silverware taken from Genoa to Lesbos in 1377 and soap from Gaeta to a number of destinations in the eastern Aegean including Lesbos in the same year.¹³⁷

The most conspicuous import was cloth, the most important export of western Europe. Cargoes of cloth came from Genoa in 1376 and 1377, from Pisa and Naples in 1384.¹³⁸ A shipment over a shorter distance was arranged from Chios in 1400.¹³⁹ The first of these cargoes had been manufactured in Beauvais, but where the notarial documents from Mytilene identify the provenance of cloth it was invariably English, either from London or from Essex.¹⁴⁰ While the recorded shipments came from Italian ports, it seems

¹³⁰ ASV, DC 15/2 (*Bandi* 1356–74), f. 165^v.

¹³¹ ASV, DC 15/2 (*Bandi* 1356–74), f. 186.

¹³² Balard, *Notai*, pp. 160–2 (no. 59); ASV, DC 30 *ter*/30 (*Memoriali* 1415–7), f. 184.

¹³³ Horden and Purcell, pp. 151–2, 194–5, 342–4.

¹³⁴ ASV, *NCan* 26 (Niccolò Caucanigo, Gasparino Cauco), f. 29.

¹³⁵ ASG, NA 322/I (Theramo de Maggiolo 3), f. 124^v.

¹³⁶ Eliyahu Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages* (Princeton 1983), pp. 152–6, 200–16; Balard, *Romanie*, pp. 833–48; Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade*, pp. 23–7, 95–7, 102–7, 112–4.

¹³⁷ ASG, NA 322/II (Theramo de Maggiolo 4), f. 36; Gian Giacomo Musso, *Navigazione e commercio genovese con il Levante nei documenti dell'Archivio di Stato di Genova (secc. XIV–XV)* (Rome 1975), pp. 232–3 (no. 2).

¹³⁸ ASG, NA 380 (Giovanni Bardi 2), f. 20^{r-v}; ASG, NA 322/II (Theramo de Maggiolo 4), f. 36; ASG, NA 323 (Theramo de Maggiolo 5), ff. 237–8.

¹³⁹ Renée Doehaerd and Ch. Kerremans, *Les relations commerciales entre Gênes, la Belgique et l'Outremont d'après les archives notariales génoises 1400–1440* (Brussels and Rome 1952), pp. 2–3 (no. 2).

¹⁴⁰ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 38–40, 47–8, 62–4, 68–9, 97–8 (nos. 8, 9, 15, 24, 29, 44).

reasonable to suppose that some of these cloth imports arrived on the return voyages of the ships which carried alum from Lesbos and neighbouring territories directly to the cloth-working centres of England and Flanders.¹⁴¹

A side-effect of this direct long-range trade is perhaps to be seen in the presence on Gattilusio Lesbos of individuals who came from the northern European cloth-working regions. People from other parts of northern Europe are not in general encountered there, except as participants in crusading expeditions, and the appearance of these individuals may have owed something to contacts with the region established through the alum and cloth trades. However, while the cloth that found its way to Mytilene from those parts seems to have been predominantly English, the men were from the Low Countries and neighbouring areas. A Picard soldier was to be found in the service of the lord of Mytilene in the late fourteenth century.¹⁴² A Bernard de Brabant and a Giles de Ghent witnessed notarial acts in Mytilene in the 1450s.¹⁴³ In 1464 Giles de Ghent, described as a Fleming who had lived on Lesbos for many years in the service of the lord of Mytilene and married there, was on Rhodes. He received a letter of recommendation from the Order of St. John to help his search for assistance in ransoming his wife and children, who had been captured in the Ottoman conquest of Lesbos in 1462.¹⁴⁴

An inventory of goods imported to Phokaia for Francesco Draperio in the 1440s included soap, cloth, paper, wine, cotton and mastic, mostly carried by *griparias* and other relatively small craft. It is not specified which of the two Phokaia was involved in any of these shipments, though it is likely that it was chiefly the new town, focus for the alum industry which was Draperio's prime concern in the area.¹⁴⁵ Carpets, grain, rice, beans and gall-nuts also featured among the imports of New Phokaia during the same period.¹⁴⁶ These may give some indication of the nature of imports into the old town, though in this regard as in others it may have been less active than its neighbour.¹⁴⁷ The import of grain to what was itself a grain-exporting area probably reflects variations in production from year

¹⁴¹ Cf. Balard, *Romanie*, pp. 834–9, 866–7.

¹⁴² Kydones, vol. 2, pp. 127–8 (no. 231).

¹⁴³ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 67–8, 115–6 (nos. 28, 54).

¹⁴⁴ AOM 374 (*Libri Bullarum* 59), f. 232.

¹⁴⁵ ASG, NA 931 (Antonio Leardo 1), no. 369.

¹⁴⁶ ASG, NA 764 (Bernardo de Ferrari 1), no. II/14 (187).

¹⁴⁷ See above, p. 173.

to year; the appearance of cotton travelling in both directions may indicate the export of raw fibre and import of finished textiles.

The available evidence shows a sharp contrast between long-range trade linking the Gattilusio lordships with western Europe and commercial exchanges within the Aegean. All of the identified voyages to or from Italy, Flanders or England were conducted by Genoese ships, carrying cargoes belonging to Genoese merchants. The vessels employed on these ventures were almost all large round ships, categorised either as *naves* or as *coche*, the great ships based on adaptation of the northern European cog which became the mainstay of Mediterranean heavy shipping. They were characteristic of Genoese commerce in particular, with its emphasis on bulk cargoes to which they were suited by the economies of scale they provided.¹⁴⁸ Occasionally galleys were also used; notably, one of these carried silverware as part of its cargo, reflecting the general association of galleys with high-value, small-volume loads for which they offered greater speed and security, although this pattern was less pronounced in Genoese than Venetian trade.¹⁴⁹

Trading within the Aegean was a much more variegated affair. Big ships are very occasionally found taking part in shipping between the Gattilusio lordships and their immediate neighbours; again, these were invariably controlled by Italians, in this context including Venetians as well as Genoese.¹⁵⁰ These ships are not described as belonging to Gattilusio ports, nor are any of their masters (*patroni*) identifiable as inhabitants of the lordships or associates of their lords. The ships involved in regional transactions evidently included some of those plying the long-distance routes. Thus whereas in 1393 Manuele Doria's *cocha* the *Santa Maria* was chartered at Genoa to load alum at Chios, Lesbos or Phokaia and wine at Candia for transportation to England or Flanders, in 1394 he was hired at Old Phokaia to ship animals from Lesbos and animals and stone from New Phokaia to Candia for a Venetian merchant from Crete, a contract which he failed to fulfil.¹⁵¹ However, the more local voyages attested in the available sources were largely the preserve of a wide range of smaller

¹⁴⁸ Richard W. Unger, *The Ship in the Medieval Economy 600–1600* (London 1980), pp. 183–7, 216–21; Heers, *Gênes*, pp. 267–80; Balard, *Romanie*, pp. 555–7, 562–7.

¹⁴⁹ ASG, NA 322/II (Theramo de Maggiolo 4), f. 36; Unger, pp. 40, 152, 176–8.

¹⁵⁰ ASV, DC 11 bis/22 (*Actorum* 1423–4), f. 11; Balard, *Notai*, pp. 160–2 (no. 59).

¹⁵¹ Liagre-de Sturler, *Relations commerciales*, vol. 2, pp. 746–51 (no. 565); ASG, NA 322/II (Theramo de Maggiolo 4), ff. 112^v–3; Balard, *Notai*, pp. 160–2 (no. 59).

craft, both with and without oars. By far the most common type was the *griparia*, while the *lignum*, *fusta*, *pamphylos* and barque also appear.¹⁵² The masters of these smaller craft came from a variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds. Genoese and Venetian skippers were involved, but the most frequently attested group, particularly among those involved in the trade of Ainos, were Greeks, who were frequently identified as inhabitants of the Gattilusio territories to and from which they carried cargo. The ships they commanded were also on occasion said to belong to Gattilusio ports. Merchants doing business in the Gattilusio lordships or exporting goods from them to Aegean ports were a more diverse group again, including Jews and Turks as well as Italians and Greeks.¹⁵³

This contrast between large-scale, long-range trade, dominated by Latin maritime communities, and trade conducted on a smaller scale over shorter distances by a more variegated range of participants, including many Greeks, is in keeping with the general picture of Mediterranean trade in this period.¹⁵⁴ The endurance, or even expansion, of trade conducted by non-Latin local people under the rule of the Gattilusio lordships reflects the limits of Genoese commercial penetration. The manner in which their rule affected such local trade seems to have varied significantly from one lordship to another.

Divergent Patterns of Trade

The variations in the commercial development of the different Gattilusio lordships are revealing of the interplay between their relations with other

¹⁵² Cf. Christiane Villain-Gandossi, 'Typologie des navires utilisés sur les routes de l'Orient Méditerranée', *Maritime Aspects of Migration*, ed. Klaus Friedland (Cologne and Vienna 1989), pp. 45–69 at pp. 56–9; Balard, *Romanie*, pp. 558–62, 567–72.

¹⁵³ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 46–8 (nos. 14–5); Epalza, pp. 95–6.

¹⁵⁴ Angeliki E. Laiou, 'The Byzantine economy in the Mediterranean trade system; thirteenth-fifteenth centuries', *DOP* 34–5 (1980–1), pp. 177–222 at pp. 187–212; David Jacoby, 'Changing economic patterns in Latin Rumania: the impact of the West', *The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World*, ed. Angeliki E. Laiou and Roy Parviz Mottahedeh (Washington, D.C. 2001), pp. 197–233, reprinted in *Commercial Exchange Across the Mediterranean: Byzantium, the Crusader Levant, Egypt and Italy* (Aldershot 2005), IX, pp. 229–33; Balard, *Romanie*, pp. 334–8; Nicolas Oikonomides, *Hommes d'affaires grecs et latins à Constantinople (XIII^e–XV^e siècles)* (Montreal and Paris 1979), pp. 83–92; Julian Chrysostomides, 'Symbiosis in the Peloponnese in the aftermath of the Fourth Crusade', *Byzantium State and Society: in memory of Nikos Oikonomides*, ed. Anna Avramea, Angeliki E. Laiou and Evangelos Chrysos (Athens 2003), pp. 155–67 at pp. 165–6.

networks of power and the tensions between solidarity and divergent interests within the network of lordships itself. The evidence regarding the relationship of the Gattilusio with the Venetians and with their colony of Crete in particular reveals significant contrasts between Ainos and the lordships of Mytilene and Old Phokaia. These differences in their dealings with the arch-rivals of the Genoese imply considerable variation in the degree to which different parts of the Gattilusio network were integrated into the Genoese community and reshaped by it. Candia was the one trading centre outside the Genoese world from which substantial evidence of trade with the Gattilusio territories has emerged. As such, its records provide a unique insight into the affairs of lordships whose commercial affairs are usually examined from the perspective of the Genoese trade network. The official transactions recorded in the *Actorum* of the Duca di Candia are particularly valuable in this regard, notably the licences to hold or sell slaves and the guarantees given by residents of Candia on behalf of the masters of ships leaving the port that they would not remove people from the island besides their registered crew. From 1349 these pledges were required under a law intended to prevent the removal of slaves or villeins from Crete, extending a decree of 1313. Masters of departing ships now had to secure a resident guarantor for their compliance, who would suffer the consequences if they were found to have transgressed.¹⁵⁵ Although individual entries offer little information in themselves, the fact that they relate to a standardised procedure applying to those leaving the port enables significant quantitative information to be gleaned from them. Licences for recently imported slaves which record the port from which they were brought provide some additional data, although this is less useful statistically as by its nature it records incoming ships incidentally rather than systematically. Even though the surviving registers cover only scattered fragments of the period, there are enough extant to provide some impression of variations over time.

The evidence of the *Actorum* can be supplemented by data from the registers of the notaries of Candia, in particular the numerous sea-loan contracts that appear in some of them, which record the intended destinations of the voyages in question. While often covering longer continuous chronological spans, the appearance of voyages in these records is

¹⁵⁵ Paola Ratti Vidulich, *Duca di Candia: Quaternus Consiliorum (1340–1350)* (Venice 1965), pp. 8, 129–32 (nos. 8, 233).

Duca di Candia, *Actorum*: Sailings from Candia to Sometime Genoese Ports in the Aegean¹⁵⁶

Date range	Days of data	Lesbos	Phokaia	Chios	Total L/P/C	Ainos
1355–60	1,053	4 (+ 1)	15 (+ 1)	8 (+ 1)	25 (+ 3)	0
1368	65	0	1	1	2	0
1390–1	518	2 (+ 1)	1	0	3 (+ 1)	3
1403–8	331	2	1 (+ 2)	6 (+ 5)	6 (+ 7)	3
1410–7	249	1	0	2	2	11
1420–30	638	0 (+ 1)	2	2	3 (+ 1)	6 (+ 2)
1443–7	322	0	0	1	1	0
1457–63	123	0	0	0 (+ 1)	0 (+ 1)	0

inevitably far more haphazard than that of the guarantees in the *Actorum*. Since in general only ship owners and merchants based in Crete entered into sea-loan agreements there, those based in other ports are absent from the record, while only a portion of the voyages undertaken even by Cretans over a given period would generate transactions recorded by a particular notary.

This documentation indicates that the trade between Lesbos and Crete was conducted for the most part in small vessels. Throughout the period, the masters of these craft who are identified as inhabitants of Mytilene were all Greeks, while the other skippers involved in the trade between the two islands were a mixture of Greeks and Italians. A broadly similar pattern appears with regard to the two Phokaia, although with a few bigger vessels and a slightly larger number of Italians involved. A considerable proportion of the registers from the years between 1355 and 1360 survives, recording fifteen sailings from Candia to the two Phokaia, compared with only four to Lesbos. Later clusters of surviving documentation, from the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, reveal a drastic reduction

¹⁵⁶ Data from ASV, DC 10 *bis* (*Actorum* 1355–60), 11 (*Actorum* 1368–1415), 11 *bis* (*Actorum* 1416–80). Numbers in brackets record arrivals of vessels from these ports attested through licences for imported slaves. 'Days of data' records the number of days covered by the surviving documentation during the years identified under 'Date'. 'Total L/P/C' records the total number vessels departing for Lesbos and/or Phokaia and/or Chios; note that since some vessels were to visit more than one of these destinations, a single sailing recorded here may appear more once under the individual headings.

in the number of voyages to Phokaia. This diminished the volume of traffic to a similar level to that with Lesbos, which remained broadly consistent, at least until the second decade of the fifteenth century. Thereafter guarantees for vessels departing for Lesbos disappear from the record entirely, with only one arrival attested through a slave licence, although the small absolute number of references at any time precludes any firm conclusions from this. For the most part, individual skippers are not recorded as making repeated voyages to these destinations, but one inhabitant of Candia does display a persistent involvement with this trade: this was Iohannes Chartophylakes, who made guarantees for two voyages to Phokaia and two to Lesbos in the 1350s and 1360s; he is elsewhere attested contributing a sea-loan for another voyage to Phokaia in 1369.¹⁵⁷

These patterns may be compared with those relating to Chios. Here the ships involved were mostly commanded by Genoese, indicating a swifter and deeper penetration of the island's trade than was the case on Lesbos. The trend over time in the number of sailings was similar to that for Lesbos, with a reasonably consistent level from the mid-fourteenth to the early fifteenth century, but an apparent drop after about 1420. However, whereas the fourteenth-century voyages mostly involved small craft presumably engaged in voyages within the Aegean, by the fifteenth century some larger vessels are found leaving Crete for Chios, while a number of Genoese *coche* are attested as arriving in Candia from Chios or departing

Notai di Candia (selected notaries): Sailings from Candia to Sometime Genoese Ports in the Aegean¹⁵⁸

Date range	Days of data	Lesbos	Phokaia	Chios	Total L/P/C	Ainos
1369–72	1,033	2	6	8	9	0
1389–91	720	1	0	1	1	0
1411–7	1,649	3	3	16	16	2

¹⁵⁷ ASV, *DC 10 bis/6* (*Actorum* 1355–7), ff. 80, 122^v, *DC 10 bis/7* (*Actorum* 1359–60), f. 62^v; ASV, *NCan 1* (Giorgio Aymo), f. 13^v.

¹⁵⁸ Data from ASV, *NCan 1* (Giorgio Aymo); *NCan 24* (Iohannes Catacolo); *NCan 245* (Andrea Sevasto). See above, p. 220n156 for conventions.

for Flanders.¹⁵⁹ It is known from other sources that Genoese ships heading from Chios to the West sometimes stopped at Candia to load cargoes of wine.¹⁶⁰

The register of Giorgio Aymo, from 1369–72, contains numerous sea-loan contracts, including nine for voyages visiting Lesbos, Phokaia or Chios.¹⁶¹ These acts record multiple destinations far more frequently than the *Actorum*. All of the vessels going to Lesbos and all but one of those going to Phokaia were also bound for Chios, while none are recorded as going to Chios alone. The Anatolian ports of Theologo (Ephesos), Palatia (Miletos) and Smyrna were also variously combined with these destinations in some itineraries. All of the vessels involved, like most of those mentioned in this register, were *ligna*. At least half of the skippers responsible were Greeks, while two of these, Stamati Vergizi and Nicholas

¹⁵⁹ ASV, DC 10 bis/6 (*Actorum* 1355–7), ff. 35, 49^v, 52^v, 56, 85, 118^v, 119, 123^v, DC 10 bis/7 (*Actorum* 1359–60), ff. 10, 16, DC 10 bis/8 (*Actorum* 1360), f. 2, DC 11/9 (*Actorum* 1368), ff. 75, 78, DC 11/12 (*Actorum* 1403), ff. 3^v, 10, 11, 13, DC 11/13 (*Actorum* 1403), f. 2, DC 11/15 (*Actorum* 1408), ff. 2^v, 5, 6^v, 7, 8, DC 11/18 (*Actorum* 1414–5), f. 64^v, DC 11 bis/21 (*Actorum* 1420), f. 2^v, DC 11 bis/22 (*Actorum* 1423–4), f. 22^v, DC 11 bis/25 (*Actorum* 1445–7), ff. 22^v, 43^v, DC 11 bis/26 (*Actorum* 1457), f. 14^v. These documents cover the period until 1463; in the next cluster of surviving material, from 1468, the number of sailings to Chios explodes, with six sailings within a month (ASV, DC 11 bis/28 (*Actorum* 1468), ff. 106^{r-v}, 108, 111^{v-2v}). The increased occurrence of notarial documents from Chios involving contacts with Crete in these years corroborates the impression of an upsurge in activity (Laura Balletto, 'Tra la isola di Creta e la "Communitas" genovese nel XV secolo', *AALSL* 50 (1994), pp. 463–75; Geo Pistarino, 'Tra Chio e Creta negli anni cinquanta del secolo XV', *AALSL* 52 (1996), pp. 237–49). This abrupt change may be a result of the disruption of former trading patterns by the violent upheavals of the period, with secure and stable Crete providing a substitute for traditional destinations now rendered less accessible or productive by Ottoman aggression. It has been suggested that the shattering of the Genoese alum industry by the loss of Phokaia and Lesbos and the opening of the mines of Tolfa led to a dramatic increase in the amount of Cretan wine carried to the West by Genoese ships in need of another heavy bulk cargo. Frederic C. Lane, *Venice: a maritime republic* (Baltimore and London 1973), p. 379.

¹⁶⁰ David Jacoby, 'Creta e Venezia nel contesto economico del Mediterraneo Orientale sino alla metà del Quattrocento', *Venezia e Creta. Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Studi Iraklion-Chania, 30 settembre–5 ottobre 1997*, ed. Gherardo Ortalli (Venice 1998), pp. 73–106 at pp. 93–4.

¹⁶¹ This data has been published, with some inaccuracies, by Silvano Borsari (Silvano Borsari, 'I movimenti del porto di Candia AA. 1369–1372 (dal repertorio del notaio Giorgio Aymo)', *Università di Macerata Annali della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia* 30–1 (1997–8), pp. 323–46). With regard to the Gattilusio territories it should be noted that the voyage of Nicholas Vastaterra recorded in May 1370 was to visit only Chios, Phokaia and Palatia before returning to Candia, not Mytilene and Smyrna as well (ASV, *NCan* 1 (Giorgio Aymo), f. 35), while that of Stamati Vergizi recorded in March 1371 was to visit Mytilene after its stop at Phokaia (*ibid.*, f. 86^v). For the financial character and context of these contracts, see Mario Gallina, *Una società coloniale del Trecento: Creta fra Venezia e Bisanzio* (Venice 1989), pp. 111–26.

Vastaterra, each made two trips involving these destinations.¹⁶² Stamati Vergizi is also attested in the *Actorum* as travelling to Phokaia in 1368.¹⁶³ The comparison between the nine voyages to the Genoese ports of the Aegean which happen to have been recorded by this single notary in 1369–72 and the twenty-five entered in the more comprehensive *Actorum* over a period of almost identical duration in 1356–60 suggests that the relatively high level of activity discernible in the late 1350s was generally holding up, but implies that the level of traffic with Phokaia was by then declining relative to that with Chios.

By contrast, the register of Ioannes Katakolon, spanning almost two years in 1389–91 and containing numerous sea-loan contracts, presents only one voyage to any of the Genoese-ruled ports, visiting Chios and Lesbos.¹⁶⁴ In a third register abounding in such contracts, that of Andreas Sevastos containing acts from 1400, 1411 and 1412–7, the frequency of voyages to Lesbos and Chios is very similar to that found in Giorgio Aymo, but the level of recorded traffic with Phokaia has halved, a pattern consistent with that found in the *Actorum*.¹⁶⁵ Of the sixteen voyages visiting Chios, eleven were to stop there en route to Constantinople.¹⁶⁶ This tendency for fifteenth-century voyages linking Crete and Chios to be merely part of journeys to more distant destinations reinforces the pattern suggested by the *Actorum*. The appearance of a number of Greek names in connection with the voyages to Gattilusio territories is significant, given that the ten different *patroni* found travelling to Constantinople via Chios, and those investing in their voyages, are mostly identifiably Latin.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶² Both also made other journeys to various destinations. ASV, *NCan* 1 (Giorgio Aymo), ff. 2, 9^v, 13^v–4, 26, 27, 35, 86^v, 143^{r–v}, 146; Borsari, 'Movimenti', pp. 339–46.

¹⁶³ ASV, *DC* 11/9 (*Actorum* 1368), f. 80.

¹⁶⁴ ASV, *NCan* 24 (Iohannes Catacolo), f. 7.

¹⁶⁵ ASV, *NCan* 245 (Andrea Sevasto), ff. 44^v, 50, 144^v, 217.

¹⁶⁶ ASV, *NCan* 245 (Andrea Sevasto), ff. 23^v, 24^v, 26, 46, 74, 135^v, 141, 148, 284, 288, 289. All the vessels involved are listed as *coche*, but the same is true of all vessels mentioned in sea-loan contracts by this notary, suggesting that he may have used the term indiscriminately.

¹⁶⁷ The Cretan *patroni* visiting Phokaia or the other Gattilusio ports included Giorgio Bono, whose voyage in 1415 is also recorded in the *Actorum*, and Niketas Zanughi, who appears in the *Actorum* visiting Chios, Lesbos and Phokaia in 1408. ASV, *NCan* 245 (Andrea Sevasto), ff. 44^v, 50, 144^v; ASV, *DC* 11/15 (*Actorum* 1408), f. 7.

Notai di Candia (selected notaries): Details of Voyages from Candia to Lesbos, Ainos or Phokaia¹⁶⁸

Name of <i>patronus</i>	Destination(s)	Date of trip(s)	Type of vessel(s)	Investor(s)
Stamati Vergizi	Chios-Phokaia-Smyrna; Chios-Phokaia; Chios-Phokaia-Lesbos	July 1369; Oct 1369; Mar 1371	Lignum; lignum; lignum	Francesco de Nobile, Loukas Metopa; Ioannes Ialina, Nicolaus Saculis, Giovanni Foscolo, Giovanni Galino
Nicholas Rethimnoti Vastaterra	Phokaia-Chios; Chios-Phokaia, Palatia	Sep 1369; Mar 1370	Lignum; lignum	Andrea Cortese, Giorgio Cortese, Iohannes Chartophylakes, George Machitari
?	Thebes-Phokaia-Palatia	Oct 1369	?	?
Michael Zachinos	Chios-Phokaia <i>or</i> Smyrna <i>or</i> Palatia <i>or</i> Coron	Jan 1370	Lignum	Guillelmo Gallo, John Dimitrielo, Michael Rodinos, Francesco Gradenigo, Giorgio Pisa
Niketas Kazomata	Canea-Chios-Lesbos	Feb 1372	Lignum	Iohannes Salagari, Iohannes Calavio
Nicholas Tornari	Chios-Phokaia-Lesbos	Mar 1372	Lignum	Phylippus Vastaterra
Bertus de la Porta Niketas Zanughi	Chios-Lesbos Chios-Lesbos-Ainos; Chios-Lesbos-Phokaia	June 1389 Feb 1413; Mar 1413	Cocha Cocha; cocha	Andrea Cauco, <i>notaries</i>
Giorgio Bono	Chios-Phokaia-Lesbos	Mar 1415	Cocha	Andrea Bono
Luradus Vasilios	Chios-Ainos	Apr 1415	Cocha	George Vlagha, John Zachinos
Francesco de Segala	Chios-Phokaia-Modon-Venice	Mar 1416	Cocha	Niccolò de Segala, Andrea Zapareno

The evidence of these collections suggests that in the sphere of short-range trade within the Aegean, traffic between Crete and the ports under Genoese rule remained stable or deteriorated after the mid-fourteenth century. However, Candia remained firmly linked to Chios by their role as ports of call for big ships travelling to and from western Europe or the straits. The sharp decline in voyages linking the two Phokaia with Crete seems likely to reflect the influence of the close connection with

¹⁶⁸ Data from ASV, *NCan* 1 (Giorgio Aymo); *NCan* 24 (Iohannes Catacolo); *NCan* 245 (Andrea Sevasto).

Chios established after 1346. Chios was the centre of Genoese enterprise in the Aegean, and indeed the principal junction point of the Genoese commercial network across the entire eastern Mediterranean, owing to its location near the confluence of the routes linking Genoa to Pera and the Black Sea with those leading to Cyprus, Syria and Egypt.¹⁶⁹ The two Phokaiaes would have been particularly susceptible to commercial subordination to Chios, given their location and the authority of the Mahona over the new town. The preponderance of Chios would have drawn Phokaian trade away from other Aegean markets, as the island took on the role of a hub to which the exports of other ports under Genoese rulers were concentrated and from which their imports emanated, replacing direct connections with other regional centres like Candia. This shift entailed a reduced role for Greek seafarers and small vessels and the increased predominance of long-distance transit by large ships under Italian control, reflecting the deepening integration of these territories into a Genoese trade network.

Duca di Candia, *Actorum*: Details of Voyages from Candia to Lesbos, Ainos or Phokaia¹⁷⁰

Name of <i>patronus</i>	Destination(s)	Dates of trip(s)	Type of vessel(s)	Guarantor(s)
Sargata Bembo of Old Phokaia	Old Phokaia	Oct 1355; Jul 1356	Griparia; ?	?; ?
Challo Muselle	Old Phokaia	Nov 1355	Lignum	George Stratege
? (Venetian)	Old Phokaia	Jan 1356	Barque	?
Manuel of Thessalonike	Old Phokaia	Feb 1356	Griparia	Ia_us of Negroponte
Andreas Mazamurdi	Phokaia	Sep 1356	Griparia	Nicholas Mazamurdi
Michael Modoni of Phokaia	Phokaia	Sep 1356	Griparia	Iohannes Chartophylakes
Manuel Monemvasiotes of Phokaia	Phokaia	Sep 1356	?	Iohannes Chartophylakes
Theodore Mitilineo	Lesbos	Nov 1356	?	?
Iohannes Dasce	Phokaia	Jun 1357	Griparia	? Kastrophylakes
Theodore Quisiano	Lesbos?	Sep 1359	Lignum	Iohannes Chartophylakes
Manuel Alicasto of Mytilene	Lesbos	Nov 1359	Griparia	Cristoforo Balbi
Michael Kalamara	Phokaia	May 1359	?	Tommaso Nani

¹⁶⁹ Heers, *Gênes*, pp. 388–406; Musso, pp. 63–8, 119–24; Laura Balletto, 'Commerci e rotte commerciali nel Mediterraneo orientale alla metà del Quattrocento: l'importanza dell'isola di Chio', *Money and Markets in the Palaiologan Era/Χρήμα και αγορά στην εποχή των Παλαιολόγων*, ed. N. G. Moschonas (Athens 2003), pp. 97–112.

¹⁷⁰ Data from ASV, *DC 10 bis* (*Actorum* 1355–60), 11 (*Actorum* 1368–1415), 11 *bis* (*Actorum* 1415–80).

(cont.)

Name of <i>patronus</i>	Destination(s)	Dates of trip(s)	Type of vessel(s)	Guarantor(s)
Antonio de Montello	Phokaia	Sep 1359	Lignum	Marco Ferazo
Andrea Visto	Phokaia	Feb 1360	Navis	Giorgio de Abbatis
Francesco Blanco	Old Phokaia	Feb 1360	Lignum	Michael Melissenos
Leo Venduco of Mytilene	Lesbos	Aug 1360	?	Iohannes Chartophylakes
Stamati Vergizi	Phokaia	Jun 1368	Griparia	Varangus M
Giorgio Adano Adano	Ainos	Apr 1390	Griparia	Pietro Polino
Michael Karivari	Ainos	Apr 1390	Griparia	George Kapadoka
Michaletto Ussio	Phokaia	Oct 1390	Cochina	Franco de Bartolomei
Xenophon of Ainos	Ainos	Mar 1391	Griparia	Giovanni Murello, <i>calegarius</i>
Giovanni Murello	Lesbos	Mar 1391	Griparia	Iohannes Vlachos
Iannino Magno	Lesbos	May 1391	Griparia	Giovanni Murello
Costas Gharificati of Ainos	Ainos	Apr 1403; May 1414	Griparia; griparia	Giovanni Mariella; Giovanni Antelami, <i>preco</i>
Giorgio Nergio	Chios-Lesbos	May 1403	Griparia	Antonio Caradino, <i>speciarius</i>
Constantine Scarpa	Ainos	Feb 1408; May 1408; Jun 1423	Griparia; cocha	Daniele Rolino, <i>draperius</i> ; Iohannes
Niketas Zanughi	Chios-Lesbos- Phokaia	Apr 1408	Pamphylos	Andrea Cauco, <i>notaries</i>
Theodore Armenopoulos of Ainos	Ainos	Apr 1414; May 1415	Griparia; lignum	Giovanni Antelami, <i>preco</i> ; George Sevastos
Niketas Marmara of Ainos	Ainos	Apr 1414; Jul 1415	Griparia; griparia	Theodore Polites of Tenedos; Ianoulios Papadopoulos
Ioannes Amiralì of Ainos	Ainos	May 1414; Apr 1420	Barque; griparia	Giorgio Torello; Giovanni Antelami, <i>preco</i>
Micaletto Turxenus	Ainos	Jun 1414	Griparia	Giovanni Antelami, <i>preco</i>
Demetrios Stavrinos of Ainos	Ainos	1414; May 1420; May 1423	Griparia; griparia; fusta	George Sevastos; George Sevastos; George Sevastos
Giorgio Bono	Chios-Lesbos	Mar 1415	Cochina	Andrea Bono
Mosco Zuonid of Ainos	Ainos	May 1415	Griparia/ lignum	Manoulios Papadopoulos
Costanda Christopolites	Ainos	May 1415	Griparia	Manuel Manglavites
Costas Machedo	Ainos	May 1415	Lignum	Manuel Candochiti, <i>aurifex</i>
Giorgio Cotti	Ainos	May 1420	Griparia	Nicholas Armiriotes
Anastasios Christopolites	Ainos	May 1423	Fusta	Giovanni Antelami, <i>preco ad officium advocatorum comunis</i>
Mangaphas Balfaea	Chios-Phokaia	Nov 1423	?	Giorgio Rosso

Candia's traffic with Lesbos, which would have been susceptible to some of the same pressures but was less closely associated with Chios, does not show the same pattern of rapid decline. However, the tendency of vessels going to Lesbos to be bound for Chios or Phokaia as well, found even in the *Actorum* where in almost all other entries only one destination was recorded, emphasises the closeness of the commercial bonds between them. Significantly, all the recorded fifteenth-century departures for Lesbos were also bound for Chios. This and the apparent decline after 1420 may reflect a process of subordination similar to that affecting Phokaia but occurring later. Such a pattern of development would be consistent with the deepening integration of the alum industry on Lesbos into a Genoese system focused on Chios around the same time.¹⁷¹

The evidence for the trade between Ainos and Candia presents a marked contrast to that relating to Lesbos and Phokaia. Instead of a relatively high level of activity in the 1350s–70s there is a total absence of references in the notaries surveyed and in the surviving registers of the *Actorum* from the mid-fourteenth century. This silence regarding Candia does not necessarily indicate a lack of commercial relations with the Venetians in general, as there is evidence of significant Venetian commercial activity in Ainos during the early fourteenth century, which may well have continued in later decades. When in 1315 the Venetian consul at Thessalonike was transferred to Ainos he was assigned no new salary, on the basis that he would be sufficiently compensated by the profits to be had there.¹⁷² In a catalogue of Venetian complaints to the Byzantine government in 1320, Ainos was singled out together with Constantinople, Thessalonike and some unspecified islands as a place where Venetians had been prevented from residing in peace by the violence of imperial officials.¹⁷³ This connection was perhaps associated with trade following the route used by the Venetians around the European shore of the Aegean, with its focus at Negroponte, although the existence of this commerce may well also have

¹⁷¹ See above, pp. 181–4.

¹⁷² Freddy Thiriet, 'Les Vénitiens à Thessalonique dans la première moitié du XIV^e siècle', *Byzantion* 22 (1952), pp. 323–32, reprinted in *Etudes sur la Romanie greco-vénitienne (X^e–XV^e siècles)* (London 1977), I, pp. 325–6.

¹⁷³ George Martin Thomas, *Diplomatarium Veneto-Levantinum: sive acta et diplomata res venetas, Graecas atque Levantis illustrantia*, 2 vols. (Venice 1880–99, reprinted New York 1966); vol. 1, pp. 164–8 (no. 80).

contributed to the later emergence of a trade linking Ainos directly with Crete.¹⁷⁴

Rather than remaining steady or tailing off after the installation of a Genoese regime as was the case elsewhere in the Aegean, trade with Candia seems to have begun to flourish only after the establishment of the Gattilusio lordship in Ainos. The surviving data from the late fourteenth and early fifteenth century reveals a dramatic increase, peaking in the 1410s and 1420s. Six sailings are recorded in the summer of 1414, five in 1415, three in 1420, and three in 1423.¹⁷⁵ The total number of visits to Candia by vessels from Ainos attested in this collection between 1400 and the fall of the lordship in 1456 is several times the number by those from Mytilene or the Phokaias. It is also larger than the number from Chios, although on average the ships involved were smaller. This comparison is remarkable, considering the greater proximity of these other places to Crete and the far greater importance of Chios in international trade.

This evidence for a tight commercial connection between Venetian Crete and Gattilusio Ainos is reinforced by a variety of other documentary references. Grain of Ainos was available at Candia in 1389.¹⁷⁶ In 1398 the *griparota* of Eliano Doria, owned by Niccolò Gattilusio of Ainos himself, took on additional cargo at Crete prior to a visit to Chios.¹⁷⁷ During the unrest following Boucicault's clash with the Venetians in 1403, a *griparia* of Ainos loaded with figs was seized by a vessel of Candia while passing through the Archipelago.¹⁷⁸ In the spring of 1402 two skippers from Ainos, Manuel Kalogenites and Costas Karchias, visited Candia bearing not only cargo but intelligence of the activities of Bayezid and Timur.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁴ Doris Stöckly, *Le système de l'incanto des galées du marché à Venise (fin XIII^e–milieu XV^e siècle)* (Leiden 1995), pp. 101–19. Venetian influences on the architecture of a medieval church in Ainos have also been hypothesised, although this is doubtful and the work cannot be closely dated. Cyril Mango, *Byzantine Architecture* (New York 1976), pp. 275–6; Robert Ousterhout, 'The Byzantine church at Enez: problems in twelfth-century architecture', *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik* 35 (1985), pp. 261–80.

¹⁷⁵ ASV, DC 11/11 (*Actorum* 1390–1), ff. 31, 65, DC 11/12 (*Actorum* 1403), f. 12, DC 11/15 (*Actorum* 1408), ff. 1^v, 10, DC 11/18 (*Actorum* 1414–5), ff. 45^v, 47, 48, 50^v, 53^v, 113, 113^v, 121, DC 11 bis/21 (*Actorum* 1420), ff. 6^v, 9, 19^v, DC 11 bis/22 (*Actorum* 1423–4), ff. 3^v, 11, 30^v.

¹⁷⁶ ASV, DC 11/11 (*Actorum* 1390–1), ff. 31–2.

¹⁷⁷ Gioffrè, 'Atti', pp. 403–4.

¹⁷⁸ Thiriet, *Duca*, pp. 172–3 (no. 163).

¹⁷⁹ George T. Dennis, 'Three reports from Crete on the situation in Romania, 1401–1402', *Studi Veneziani* 12 (1970), pp. 243–65, reprinted in *Byzantium and the Franks 1350–1420* (London 1982), XVII, pp. 246–8 (nos. 2–3). In the aftermath of the Battle of Ankara later that year, the Venetian captain Marco Grimani went to Ainos seeking intelligence, on the basis that news from Gallipoli might be found there. This suggests that Ainos, as a

Continuing traffic in later decades is attested in 1450, when further intelligence, this time of an Ottoman attack on Lesbos, was brought to Candia by the master of a ship which arrived from Ainos with a load of grain and salt fish.¹⁸⁰ In addition to Candia, there seems to have been direct traffic between Ainos and the lesser Cretan port of Rethimnon, attested in 1411.¹⁸¹

Most of the skippers involved were Greeks, many of them specifically identified as inhabitants of Ainos.¹⁸² The trip to Candia appears to have been a regular part of their activities: five of those appearing in the *Actorum* are recorded as departing for Ainos on two separate occasions during these years and another, Demetrios Stavrinos, on three. The identities of the inhabitants of Candia who made the guarantee on their behalf also reveal continuities: Giovanni Antelami stood as pledge for five different individuals commanding on voyages to Ainos, while George Sevastos did so for two, including Demetrios Stavrinos on all three of his trips. This would seem to imply that the presence of traders from Ainos in Candia was not a matter of occasional visits but a regular and firmly established commerce involving a consistent community of merchants and shippers in both cities enjoying ongoing commercial relationships. This impression of regularity and consistency is reinforced by the seasonal clustering of voyages: all vessels whose arrival in Candia from Ainos is dated reached Crete in March or April, while all but one of the licences for departure from Candia for Ainos were issued between the second half of April and the first half of July. This contrasts with voyages linking Candia with Lesbos, Phokaia or Chios, which were scattered throughout the year.

Besides the visits of their ships, other references attest to the activities of merchants from Ainos in Candia. For example, in 1402, in reprisal for attacks by Vastralites, a Greek pirate from Ainos, the government of Crete seized money belonging to a number of subjects of the lord of Ainos on the island.¹⁸³ In the 1410s, at the peak of the maritime activity revealed in the *Actorum*, Greeks from Ainos appear selling hides and leather to Jewish merchants of Candia, who continued to trade in these exports of

Christian port near the heart of Ottoman power, was valued as a listening post at times of turmoil. Morosini, p. 242.

¹⁸⁰ Iorga, 'Notes', vol. 8, p. 65.

¹⁸¹ ASV, DC 30 bis/29 (*Memoriali* 1411–3), f. 71^{r-v}.

¹⁸² This predominance helps to explain the comparatively small number of sea-loan contracts for voyages to Ainos recorded by the notaries of Candia, given that these contracts pertain almost exclusively to ships based in Crete. ASV, NCan 245 (Andrea Sevasto), ff. 44^v, 149^v.

¹⁸³ Thiriet, *Duca*, pp. 62–3 (no. 72).

Ainos in the 1430s.¹⁸⁴ During the same period other inhabitants of Ainos pursued debts in both Candia and Rethimnon.¹⁸⁵ Connections in the other direction are suggested by the intervention of an inhabitant of Candia in support of an associate who had been detained by the lord of Ainos in 1421.¹⁸⁶

It is conceivable that the newly flourishing trade between Crete and Ainos under Gattilusio rule could have been stimulated by the arrival of a regime headed by commercially sophisticated Italians bringing new economic techniques and by the removal of constraints on trade which had existed under Byzantine administration. Such a model has been put forward with regard to other Latin territories in the Aegean at an earlier period.¹⁸⁷ However, a significant Greek commercial community appears to have been based in Ainos before the establishment of Gattilusio rule and the growth of trade with Crete. For instance, in 1360 Greek merchants from Ainos were doing business with Genoese shippers at Kilia and Licostomo near the mouth of the Danube.¹⁸⁸ The expansion or redirection of trade manifested in the strengthening connection with Crete did not follow obvious Genoese channels. Nor was it apparently driven by Italian settlers with native traders trailing in their wake: the vast majority of the captains and merchants mentioned as being involved in the trade of Ainos were identifiably Greek. While a number of the captains were clearly Italian, some of these were identifiably Venetian. The only definitively Genoese voyages with a discernible connection with Ainos are that of Eliano Doria in 1398 and that of Giovanni de Rapallo, who was detained at Modon by the Venetians during the troubles of the early 1400s. The latter, a factor of Niccolò of Ainos, could well have been on a diplomatic rather than a commercial errand.¹⁸⁹ It is notable that both of these cases involved

¹⁸⁴ ASV, DC 11/18 (*Actorum* 1414–5), f. 53; ASV, NCan, 104 (Niccolò Gradenigo), f. 79^v; NCan 245 (Andrea Sevesto), f. 237^v.

¹⁸⁵ ASV, DC 11/18 (*Actorum* 1414–5), f. 53^{r-v}; ASV, NCan 26 (Niccolò Caucanigo, Gasparino Cauco), f. 104^v; NCan 245 (Andrea Sevesto), f. 158.

¹⁸⁶ ASV, NCan 26 (Niccolò Caucanigo, Gasparino Cauco), f. 77.

¹⁸⁷ David Jacoby, 'Italian migration and settlement in Latin Greece: the impact on the economy', *Die Kreuzfahrerstaaen als multikulturelle Gesellschaft: Einwanderer und Minderheiten im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert*, ed. Hans Eberhard Mayer and Elisabeth Müller-Luckner (Munich 1997), pp. 97–127.

¹⁸⁸ Michel Balard, *Gênes et l'Outre-Mer: Actes de Kilia du notaire Antonio di Ponzo 1360* (Paris 1980), pp. 183–4, 186–7 (nos. 115, 117). This involvement with the Black Sea may have continued under Gattilusio rule; a Greek from Ainos, master of a *griparia*, shipped cargo from Tana to Constantinople in 1439. Dorini and Bertelè, p. 416.

¹⁸⁹ C. N. Sathas, *Μνημεία Ἑλληνικῆς Ἱστορίας: Documents inédits relatifs à l'histoire de la Grèce au Moyen Âge*, 9 vols. (Paris 1880–90), vol. 2, p. 127 (no. 350); Noiret, p. 161.

vessels owned by the lord of Ainos himself, diminishing their significance as evidence of a substantial Genoese commercial presence in the city.

One explanation for the marked contrast between the commercial evolution of Ainos and that of the other Gattilusio possessions and their Genoese neighbours would be that Genoese settlement there was much more limited than that which took place along the Anatolian littoral, where the great Black Sea route ran, where the export trades of Anatolia and the islands were major foci of Genoese activity, and where the Genoese had been deeply involved even many decades before the territorial gains of the mid-fourteenth century. Around that time the tendency for the maritime routes of the Aegean to divide it into a zone in the east dominated by the Genoese and a Venetian zone in the west and south solidified.¹⁹⁰ Although Genoese trade did reach along the northern shore to Thessalonike, this coast was more associated with the Venetian sphere, a situation which seems to have exerted a significant influence on the development of the lordship of Ainos despite the Genoese origins and affiliations of its rulers.¹⁹¹

Some corroboration of this pattern is offered by Genoese records of the sailors employed by individual galleys in communal service, since the names of many of these men contain or are accompanied by a toponym.¹⁹² Since these galleys were fitted out in Liguria, the vast majority of sailors whose place of origin is noted were from Italy, but the small minority of sailors with a background in the eastern Mediterranean is still large enough to give an indication of the relative likelihood of men from particular ports or islands in that region finding their way onto such Genoese crews. Unsurprisingly, the principal Genoese colonial emporia of all feature prominently: Pera and Caffa were the most prolific sources, with large numbers also from Chios and Famagusta. Mytilene contributed somewhat smaller numbers than Chios, but more than Famagusta. Outside the Genoese sphere, Candia and Rhodes were important sources, while somewhat lesser numbers came from Constantinople and Thessalonike. Thus all the major sources of men in the East were important ports under

¹⁹⁰ Michel Balard, 'The Genoese in the Aegean (1204–1566)', *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204*, ed. Benjamin Arbel, Bernard Hamilton and David Jacoby (London 1989), pp. 158–74 at pp. 159–61.

¹⁹¹ Heers, *Gênes*, pp. 389–90; Jacoby, 'Foreigners', pp. 114–6.

¹⁹² The statistical import of this data is obviously qualified by the vagaries of circumstance surrounding the manning of the particular galleys whose records have survived, and by the inconsistency with which toponymical identifiers are or are not applied to individual sailors in different registers.

Christian rule, all but one of them situated along the main Genoese trade routes leading to the Black Sea and the south-eastern Mediterranean. The place occupied by Lesbos is hence very much what one would expect. The two Phokaïas are a somewhat smaller presence, but still a notably substantial one, especially considering that their population must have been quite modest compared with the cities and islands making larger contributions. By contrast, Ainos is conspicuous by its complete absence, even though the significant number of sailors from Thessalonike shows that men from the northern shore of the Aegean were making their way into the pool of seamen recruited for the Genoese galleys. This absence is all the more striking given that much of the data is derived from the very period when the seafarers of Ainos appear most prominently in the sources from Crete. This suggests that, in contrast to Lesbos and Phokaia, the vigorous maritime activity of the people of this lordship was concentrated in channels which kept them largely outside the Genoese sphere.¹⁹³

The strong commercial ties between Venetian Crete and Gattilusio Ainos may have had political implications, helping to account for the conspicuously friendly attitude towards the lordship which is sometimes discernible in Venetian policy. In spring 1405 the Venetian government ordered its representatives in Candia and in Coron and Modon to release subjects of the lord of Ainos detained during the recent troubles with Genoa and to return their property with apologies.¹⁹⁴ This amounted to privileged treatment for Niccolò Gattilusio's representative Giovanni de Rapallo, who was released while other Genoese prisoners were sent on to Venice. The order specified that his release should go ahead even in the event of fresh hostilities involving the lord of Ainos himself. This special consideration was explained on the basis of past good relations with Niccolò. The order to Coron and Modon referred to his excellent disposition towards

¹⁹³ Data from ASG, AC 629–30, 632–4, 636–7, 639–40, 642–5, 647–9, 651–5, 657, 662–3, 665, 668–9, 671, 674, 676–8, 685, 687–8 (*Galearum Marinariorum Rationes* 1351 (x2), 1354 (x3), 1356, 1357, 1362, 1365, 1367 (x3), 1369, 1372 (x2), 1375, 1378, 1389, 1394 (x3), 1395, 1402, 1407 (x2), 1408 (x2), 1409, 1410 (x2), 1411, 1413, 1421, 1426, 1427); AC 718, 739, 742–3, 745 (*Galearum Marinariorum Introitus et Exitus* 1378–80, 1413, 1417, 1418 (x2)). For a wider view of the evidence from this material for the origins of galley crew, see Geo Pistarino, 'Gente del mare nel Commonwealth genovese', *Le gente del mare Mediterraneo*, ed. Rosalba Ragosta, 2 vols. (Naples 1981), vol. 1, pp. 203–90 at pp. 277–81; Michel Balard, 'Les équipages des flottes génoises au XIV^e siècle', *ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 511–34 at pp. 518–26; *idem*, *Romanie*, p. 881. For present purposes the eastern Mediterranean is understood to exclude the Adriatic, as being essentially part of the Latin West although physically situated in the sea's eastern basin.

¹⁹⁴ Sathas, vol. 2, p. 127 (no. 350); Thiriet, *Duca*, pp. 172–3 (no. 163).

Venice and its subjects. That to Candia was more fulsome, saying that Niccolò 'laudabiliter et multum curialiter se gessit et gerit in sustinendo nostros subditos et fideles in locis et partibus quibuscumque': he laudably and attentively worked to support Venice's subjects and adherents in all places and regions. This is a remarkable way for the Venetian government to speak of a Genoese lord, particularly at such a time of tension and violence. It is all the more striking against a recent background of piracy: besides the activities of Vastralites, Ainos was a base for *azabs*, marauders who had been engaged in piracy in the vicinity of Crete for years and in 1398 had mounted major raids against the island.¹⁹⁵ The apparent willingness of the Venetian government to trust and seek favour with a Genoese lord implicated in hostile actions against Venetians becomes more comprehensible if it can be placed in the context of a flourishing and mutually beneficial commercial relationship.

Occasional references in later years hint at Venetian involvement in Ainos and congenial relations with the lordship, continuing beyond Niccolò's reign into that of his successor Palamede. In 1427 a Venetian embassy seeking to negotiate peace with Murad II was ordered that if the *subaşı* at Gallipoli would not grant safe-conduct it should be sought directly from the sultan. The expedition should meanwhile withdraw to one of two safe ports in the region: the traditional Venetian anchorage of Tenedos, or Ainos.¹⁹⁶ Clearly the Venetians had no fear of foul play from Palamede Gattilusio, a Genoese lord and Ottoman tributary, even at a time of conflict with the Ottomans and heightened tensions with Genoa.¹⁹⁷ A Venetian government loan to the Emperor John VIII was negotiated in Ainos at some point before 1442.¹⁹⁸

Thus, just as there are indications that the lordship of Ainos was more deeply entangled with Ottoman power and correspondingly more divorced from the crusading movement than that of Mytilene, it seems that it was also much more involved with the Venetian network and correspondingly less tightly bound to the structures and priorities of the Genoese.¹⁹⁹ A smaller Genoese presence in this lordship, more removed from the main routes and venues of Genoese enterprise in the Aegean, had perhaps

¹⁹⁵ See below, pp. 235–6.

¹⁹⁶ Josephi Valentini, *Acta Albaniae Veneta: saeculorum XIV et XV*, 25 vols. (Rome 1967–79), vol. 13, pp. 33–6 (nos. 319–20).

¹⁹⁷ See above, pp. 136–7.

¹⁹⁸ Valentini, *Acta*, vol. 17, p. 460 (no. 4079).

¹⁹⁹ See below, pp. 325, 364–5, 384–5.

diluted the impact of that community's predilections on its development. Local circumstances could lead to diverging external alignments and affiliations even within the possessions of a single family, illustrating the diversity and complexity of the ways in which overlapping networks of influence interacted with the fractured polities of the Aegean.

Piracy

Complex and often contradictory entanglements between political and economic interests also characterised another economic activity which linked together many different places and peoples in a far-reaching web of interactions: trade's violent counterpart, piracy. Francesco I himself was described by Gregoras as a successful and prosperous pirate, and as early as 1357 the Pope was relaying to Genoa the complaints that he had received from King Hugh IV of Cyprus (1324–59) that his lands and shipping were being preyed upon by pirates from Mytilene.²⁰⁰ Piracy based in Gattilusio territory continued until the very end of the lordships: in 1460 the Venetian government was confronted with extensive damage done in Tenos and Mykonos by the raids launched by Turks, Catalans and galleys of Mytilene.²⁰¹ The activities of pirates based in Gattilusio territory apparently formed part of the asserted grounds for the Ottoman conquest of Ainos in 1456 and the attack on Lesbos in 1457, and were central to the pretext for the final assault on that island in 1462.²⁰²

The pirates who found shelter in harbours under the family's control exemplified the ethnic diversity of those involved in the region and in the regime. Only one captain based in Gattilusio territory and apparently involved in piracy is definitively identifiable as a Genoese. This was Oberto Grimaldi, a captain in the service of Jacopo of Mytilene who seized some cloth from a Venetian vessel at Rhodes in 1411, subsequently claiming that he had believed it to be Florentine property.²⁰³ Others included Greeks, Basques and Catalans. The inclusion of the latter, who are found operating from the lordship of Mytilene during its last years, is the most

²⁰⁰ Nikephoros Gregoras, *Nicephori Gregorae Historiae Byzantinae*, ed. Immanuel Bekker and Ludwig Schopen, 3 vols. (Bonn 1829–55), *CSHB* 12, 14, 15, vol. 3, p. 554; *ASVat*, *RV* 240, f. 9^{r-v}.

²⁰¹ Valentini, *Acta*, vol. 24, p. 178 (no. 6924).

²⁰² Tursun Beg, pp. 37–8; Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, pp. 268, 271, 273; Kritovoulos, pp. 129–30, 169.

²⁰³ Sathas, vol. 3, pp. 24–5 (no. 563).

striking, given the habitual antipathy between Catalans and Genoese, including clashes involving the Gattilusio of Mytilene, and in particular the fact that Genoa was engaged in full-scale war with Aragon in the late 1450s. It also presents a clear contradiction with the obligation imposed on Mytilene by the Ottomans to patrol against pirates, said to have been directed against Catalans specifically.²⁰⁴ In 1456 Catalans were the most prominent element among the group of pirate vessels said to have joined Trevisan's fleet at Lesbos, though it is uncertain whether they operated from the island, or were even based in the Aegean.²⁰⁵ It was also Catalans, along with pirates from the Cyclades, whose attacks based on Lesbos drew Mehmed's ire in 1462. However, while he was accused of taking a share in the proceeds of their raids, Niccolò II claimed that he had only allowed the pirates to use his territory under duress, for fear of their depredations being turned against Lesbos.²⁰⁶

The most enigmatic pirates associated with the Gattilusio lordships are the 'asapi' who operated from the lordships and other Latin territories in the late fourteenth century. In 1389 a *lignum* of theirs based at Ainos, having captured a vessel travelling from Theologo to Rhodes with Turkish passengers and taken this prize to Crete, was seized and its crew fined by the Venetian authorities because they had previously pillaged Karpathos.²⁰⁷ In 1398 they launched a major raid on Crete from bases at Ainos, Lesbos, Chios and Rhodes.²⁰⁸ The term *azab* commonly refers to irregular infantry and sailors enlisted in the service of the Ottomans or the Anatolian emirates on a short-term basis.²⁰⁹ However, direct identification with such forces would sit oddly with the fact that the reported bases of these *azabs* were exclusively in Christian hands, and especially with the inclusion of Hospitaller Rhodes among them. In cases where individual *azabs* acting as pirates in this period can be identified by name, it is clear that these

²⁰⁴ Doukas, pp. 415–7.

²⁰⁵ Doukas, p. 423; below, pp. 354–5.

²⁰⁶ Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, p. 273.

²⁰⁷ Julian Chrysostomides, *Monumenta Peloponnesiaca: documents for the history of the Peloponnese in the 14th and 15th centuries* (Camberley 1995), pp. 137–41 (no. 68); Thomas, vol. 2, pp. 222–3 (no. 134).

²⁰⁸ Thiriet, *Duca*, pp. 61–2, 140–1 (nos. 71, 132); Noiret, pp. 127–8.

²⁰⁹ Jacopo Promontorio-de Campis, *Die Aufzeichnungen des Genuesen Iacopo de Promontorio-de Campis über den Osmanenstaat um 1475*, ed. Franz Babinger (Munich 1975), pp. 55, 61; Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire 1300–1650: the structure of power* (Basingstoke and New York 2002), pp. 259–60; Halil İnalcık, 'The rise of the Turcoman maritime principalities in Anatolia, Byzantium and the Crusades', *Byzantinische Forschungen* 9 (1985), pp. 179–217 at pp. 180–1.

were eastern Christians, not Muslims.²¹⁰ It seems that the term could also apply to paid Christian troops in the service of Christian regimes on land, whose status as irregulars may have been the characteristic connecting them with their Turkish counterparts.²¹¹ It may therefore be supposed that the *azabs* operating from Ainos, Lesbos and nearby Latin territories were predominantly Christian pirates, probably of Greek origin.

Despite their diverse origins, the selection of victims known to have been harmed by pirates operating from Gattilusio territory suggests that their activities were influenced by the parameters of Gattilusio policy and alliances. There is no known instance of Byzantine shipping or territory suffering from their depredations, and little reliable evidence of harm done to other Genoese. In his efforts to bring an end to Venetian reprisals for the actions of Vastralites in 1402, Niccolò of Ainos claimed that this Greek pirate had not only attacked Venetian shipping but also that of other Christians, including the Genoese. However, under the circumstances his claims must be regarded with a degree of scepticism, while he also claimed that Vastralites had abandoned Ainos to throw his lot in with the Turks.²¹² In 1413 the Hospitallers, accused by the government of Chios of attacking Genoese craft, insinuated that the culprits were in fact from Mytilene. Given the self-exculpatory aim of this accusation, and the Knights' simultaneous grievance against Jacopo Gattilusio for the imprisonment and torture of the crew of one of their vessels, this testimony is still more dubious.²¹³ The only clear case of pirates associated with the Gattilusio harming other Genoese is the robbery of the ship of Alberto Cicogna by Pedro de Larraondo at Scorpiata in 1408; even then, the ship and those aboard were able to depart unharmed. Furthermore,

²¹⁰ Three men imprisoned by the authorities in Crete in connection with an *azab* pirate attack in 1386 all had Greek names; one of them was from Phokaia (ASV, DC 29 bis–30/20 (*Memoriali* 1386), f. 30^{r-v}). In 1429 the Venetian government intervened on behalf of some *azabs*, also with Greek names, who were based in Thessalonike and had complained at the taxes imposed on them by the local authorities, commending the usefulness of their depredations against the enemies of Venice (ASV, SMisti 57, f. 97).

²¹¹ The Genoese authorities in Famagusta employed guards, whose names suggest that they were of Greek or Armenian origin, designated as 'asapus' or 'azapus'. They included a Greek from Lesbos. These *azabs* received pay, but less than the normal soldiers of Famagusta, which may be a reflection of irregular status (e.g. ASG, *SGCanc* (Sala 34) 590/1268 (*Famagusta Massaria* 1391), ff. 364–5^v, 368). The *azabs* of Famagusta may also have operated at sea, as an *azab lignum* was captured nearby in 1379 by a Venetian fleet campaigning against the Genoese (Daniele da Chinazzo, *Cronica de la guerra da Veniciani a Zenovesi*, ed. Vittorio Lazzarini (Venice 1958), p. 218).

²¹² Thiriet, *Duca*, pp. 62–3 (no. 72).

²¹³ Luttrell and Zachariadou, pp. 143–4 (no. 13); below, pp. 350–1.

in the course of an ensuing legal dispute between Cicogna and merchants whose interests had been harmed by his hasty departure from Scorpiata it was argued that it would be quite safe for the ship to return there to pick up abandoned cargo, since the Basques had never been known to harm Genoese, in contrast to their antipathy towards the Catalans.²¹⁴ While groups aligned with the Gattilusio thus seem to have largely escaped harm, the groups most liable to attack from their territories were Venetians, Catalans and Muslims, whether subjects of the Turks or of the Mamluks. It was the enemies of Christendom and the maritime rivals of Genoa who had most to fear from piracy emanating from Gattilusio lands. This pattern implies that the Gattilusio lords were closely enough connected with these pirates to channel their activities in ways which conformed with their own attitudes and interests.

The most notorious pirate associated with the family was Giuliano Gattilusio, who in the 1450s and 1460s ravaged both the eastern and western Mediterranean. His depredations caused a series of diplomatic incidents whose repercussions extended as far as England and had serious implications for Genoese commerce.²¹⁵ However, it is unlikely that there was any direct connection between the Gattilusio lordships and Giuliano's activities. As has been argued, it seems that a lasting estrangement resulted from the rupture between the Aegean lords and Giuliano's branch of the Gattilusio *albergo*, hitherto closely connected with one another, when Giuliano's father Battista was forced to flee to Chios.²¹⁶ Despite the extensive documentation regarding Giuliano's depredations, and the close and

²¹⁴ Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, 'Incidència del cors en les relacions catalanes amb l'Orient (segles XIII–XV)', *Els catalans a la Mediterrània oriental a l'edat mitjana* (Barcelona 2003), pp. 259–307 at pp. 301–5 (nos. 1–2); ASG, NA 603 (Giovanni Balbi 1), nos. 63, 66, 72–3, 78, 84.

²¹⁵ Enrico Basso, 'Pirati e pirateria nel Mediterraneo medievale: Il caso di Giuliano Gattilusio', *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οι Γατελούζοι της Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 342–72; *idem*, 'La presenza Genovese in Inghilterra e le relazioni commerciali anglo-genovesi nella seconda metà del XV secolo', *Giovanni Caboto e le vie dell'Atlantico Settentrionale: Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi, Roma, 29 settembre–1 ottobre 1997*, ed. Marcella Arca Petrucci and Simonetta Conti (Genoa 1999), pp. 17–37 at pp. 22–34; Geo Pistarino, 'Giuliano Gattilusio corsaro e pirata greco-genovese del secolo XV', *Miscellanea Storica*, ed. Maria de Bernardis (Pietrabissara 1992), *Biblioteca dell'Accademia Olubrense* 12, pp. 63–77; *idem*, 'I signori del potere: mercanti e diplomatici, uomini di guerra e di ventura nel medioevo genovese', *I signori del mare* (Genoa 1992), pp. 301–76 at pp. 333–47; Stuart Jenks, *Robert Sturmy's commercial expedition to the Mediterranean (1457/8) with editions of the trial of the Genoese before king and council, and of other sources* (Bristol 2006).

²¹⁶ See above, pp. 198–9.

enduring association of the Gattilusio lords with piracy, no evidence has been found to connect his career with the lordships. It is on Chios after Battista fled there that Giuliano's presence is first attested and that island appears to have been the focus of his activities in the Aegean.²¹⁷ Successive Hospitaller complaints about attacks he mounted in the Aegean against members and subjects of the Order in the late 1450s were directed only to the *podestà* and Mahona of Chios, not to Giuliano's relatives on Lesbos. Likewise, the Order's reprisals for his attacks were to be taken only against Chian property on Rhodes, not that of the lord of Mytilene or his subjects.²¹⁸ Giuliano's attack on the ships of the Bristol merchant Robert Sturmy in 1458 led to English reprisals against Genoese merchants, which prompted the Genoese to seek to dissociate themselves from Giuliano. They identified him as Greek and stressed his connection to Lesbos, emphasising that the island was not subject to Genoese authority, while mentioning that the master of Giuliano's second ship, Pietro Bulgaro, originated there as well. Even these assertions, however, related only to Giuliano's origins, claiming no present association with the island.²¹⁹ While the family tradition of collusion in piracy may have influenced his choice of career, it is hard to connect Giuliano's rampages directly with the history of the Gattilusio lordships.

The most prominent pirate actually operating in close association with the Gattilusio lords was therefore not their infamous kinsman but the Basque Pedro de Larraondo. He operated out of Lesbos in the early fifteenth century and preyed extensively and extremely lucratively upon Catalan and Muslim shipping, attracting the explosive ire of kings of Aragon and Mamluk sultans alike.²²⁰ Mytilene was not the only port to which he repaired, since he is known to have sold captives on the slave market of Naxos, and was also thought to be linked with Chios.²²¹ The authorities in both Chios and Mytilene were accused of complicity in his

²¹⁷ Argenti, vol. 3, pp. 575–6 (no. 94); Pistarino, 'Giuliano', p. 77.

²¹⁸ AOM 366 (*Libri Bullarum* 51), f. 163; AOM 367 (*Libri Bullarum* 52), ff. 190^v–1.

²¹⁹ Jenks, pp. 52, 55, 66, 76–7; Basso, 'Pirati', pp. 367–8 (no. 2); ASG, NA 795 (Andrea de Cario 1), no. 10; below, pp. 309–10.

²²⁰ Emmanuel Piloti, *Traité d'Emmanuel Piloti sur le passage en Terre Sainte (1420)*, ed. Pierre-Herman Dopp (Louvain and Paris 1958), p. 201; Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, 'Una flotta catalana contro i corsari nel Levante (1406–1409)', *Oriente ed Occidente tra Medioevo ed Età Moderna: studi in onore di Geo Pistarino*, ed. Laura Balletto (Genoa 1997), pp. 325–55; *idem*, 'Pedro de Larraondo, un corsario Vizcaíno en el Mediterráneo oriental (1405–11)', *Corsarios Castellanos y Vascos en el Mediterráneo Medieval* (Barcelona 2000), pp. 243–331 at pp. 258–331; *idem*, 'Incidència', pp. 290–3, 301–7.

²²¹ Piloti, p. 201; Ferrer i Mallol, 'Pedro', pp. 260–9, 282–4.

attacks on vessels of Rhodes in 1406, at which time he commanded a considerable squadron.²²² However, it is with Mytilene that he was usually associated, and it is clear that rather than simply being a captain who periodically put into the port to replenish his supplies or sell his loot and captives, he was a substantial figure firmly allied with the Gattilusio lords. Archbishop Benedetto's account of the fall of Mytilene refers to a fortified tower which Larraondo had built on the harbour, clearly the action of a man who had put down roots and come to a firm accommodation with the local rulers.²²³ When Larraondo was finally captured by the Catalans and then handed over to the Mamluks in 1411, the Gattilusio captain Marino Usodimare sought without success to negotiate his release, in exchange for a captured Mamluk officer.²²⁴ While Larraondo's career was at an end, the association between the Gattilusio and Basque pirates continued: in the 1420s, further attacks on Mamluk subjects were attributed to 'dominus Mitileni sive nave Biscainorum apud Mitilenum armatum'.²²⁵

The case of Oberto Grimaldi also directly connects the Gattilusio lords with piratical activities, since the Venetians described him as a captain in the service of the lord of Mytilene.²²⁶ Other more ambiguous notices may also indicate the direct participation of the Gattilusio lords or their employees in piracy. In 1431 and 1434 Alfonso V of Aragon turned to the Genoese government for redress on behalf of his subjects after the seizure of a Catalan galley at Mytilene by Dorino I. However, the Genoese responded that according to their information it was the Catalan vessel which had been engaged in piracy, in spite of favourable treatment on previous visits to Mytilene, and that it was only after sustained provocation and the failure of efforts to resolve the matter peacefully that Dorino had regretfully been forced to act.²²⁷ In 1438 Jacopo Badoer faced a claim on the insurance he had provided on a consignment of slaves, who were being shipped from Constantinople to Phokaia and thence to Saragossa, but who had been seized en route by the lord of Mytilene; it is unclear

²²² AOM 333 (*Libri Bullarum* 18), f. 128^v. Larraondo's forces at this time are said to have amounted to four ships and three galliots. At this time he was acting in conjunction with another Basque, Juan Pérez de Casa. Ferrer i Mallol, 'Pedro', pp. 303–4 (no. 6).

²²³ Archbishop Benedetto, p. 362; Andreas Mazarakis, 'Το προάστιο της Μυτιλήνης στα μέσα του 15ου αιώνα', *Ιστοριογεωγραφικά* 9 (2002), pp. 381–98 at pp. 393–4.

²²⁴ Ferrer i Mallol, 'Pedro', pp. 326–8 (no. 27).

²²⁵ Laura Balletto, *Liber Officii Provisionis Romanie (Genova, 1424–1428)* (Genoa 2000), pp. 74–5 (no. 60).

²²⁶ Sathas, vol. 3, pp. 24–5 (no. 563).

²²⁷ ASG, AS 1783 (*Litterarum* 7), ff. 9^v–10^v; AS 3026 (*Diversorum Comunis Ianue* 6), no. 388.

whether or not there was some legal basis for this action.²²⁸ Badoer managed to negotiate their restitution shortly afterwards, giving in exchange a gift of spices and other goods to Dorino Gattilusio's ambassador.²²⁹ In such cases of direct seizure, the profits presumably went directly into the regime's coffers. Pirates not directly employed by the regime might hand over a share of their takings in exchange for the provision of a secure base, as the Ottomans alleged in 1462. Even the plunder which the pirates kept for themselves could benefit the Gattilusio, since its sale in the markets of their territories would provide a boost to the local economy and to their revenues from taxation. This loot could on occasion be on a phenomenal scale: a single Catalan ship which was captured and brought to Lesbos for sale in about 1405 was valued with its cargo at 60–70,000 ducats.²³⁰

Clearly sponsoring piracy could deliver great benefits to rulers such as the Gattilusio, but it could also have damaging implications when it led to reprisals. This was a baleful permutation of far-reaching networks of influence, since those enjoying some sort of practical or titular authority over pirates, or those who gave them sanctuary or traded with them, could be held responsible by their victims. Political fragmentation and decentralised government reduced the scope for rulers to restrain the predatory activities of their subordinates and clients, while widespread interconnection left them susceptible to implication in those activities. Large groups with widely dispersed interests were sometimes more readily identifiable and more easily targeted than local rulers like the Gattilusio who might be more closely connected with specific acts of piracy. Mercantile communities and powers were particularly vulnerable to reprisals due to their reliance on the goodwill of rulers in whose territories their people and interests were distributed. The principle of guilt by association could cast an extremely wide net. In 1424 Venetian merchants in Egypt were arrested and Venetian ships and cargoes seized as part of the Mamluk government's reprisals for attacks against the merchants of Damietta which had been launched from Mytilene.²³¹ Though the pirates might be Basque and their patrons Genoese, though Genoa and Venice might be perennial and deadly rivals, a common Latin Christian identity was enough to lay the Venetians open to the sultan's retaliation. The Venetians were also anxious to deflect Ottoman displeasure at the case of some Turks who

²²⁸ Dorini and Bertelè, pp. 45, 371.

²²⁹ Dorini and Bertelè, p. 498.

²³⁰ Ferrer i Mallol, 'Pedro', pp. 297–300 (no. 3).

²³¹ ASV, *SMisti* 55, f. 59v; Iorga, 'Notes' vol. 5, pp. 176–7.

were captured in 1389 by *azabs* from Ainos and sold as slaves on Crete. Although in this case there were at least rational grounds for grievance against the Venetians, they were successful in persuading Bayezid not to act against them.²³²

However, it was the Genoese who had most cause to fear loss of goodwill and material harm through being associated with pirates linked to the Gattilusio. When in 1411, after years of planning and abortive preparations, the King of Aragon finally launched a retaliatory expedition aimed against Pedro de Larraondo and his allies in Mytilene it was actually Chios which fell victim to the Catalan fleet's attentions.²³³ In 1415 the Genoese consul at Alexandria was held accountable by the Mamluk sultan for 33,000 gold bezants said to have been stolen from a Turk by the lord of Mytilene.²³⁴ Genoese merchants suffered alongside the Venetians from the Egyptian reprisals of 1424 and the government of the commune feared that Famagusta might be targeted by Mamluk retaliation. It warned the colonial administration there to be watchful and to ensure that those responsible for the attacks found no shelter or sustenance in their port.²³⁵ Cyprus, whose inhabitants had also recently provoked the Mamluks by piratical raids, was in fact devastated by Mamluk attacks in 1425 and 1426, which sacked Nikosia and captured King Janus.²³⁶

Defensive arguments would not always be available or efficacious, and in self-defence it was necessary for a community such as Genoa to disown its associates when their activities attracted a hostile response. In order to avoid any repetition of the reprisals of 1424, when Genoa concluded a treaty with the Mamluks in 1431 it stipulated that the Genoese commune and its subjects were not to be held responsible for any damage done by Dorino Gattilusio or his subjects.²³⁷ Like the recourse to reprisals against those associated with pirates or in a position to put pressure on them, such efforts at dissociation by those same groups were a standard feature of the repercussions arising from piracy. The fact that Genoa could make such an arrangement reveals one of the advantages of the city's relatively tenuous connections with the Gattilusio: while this diminished the commune's capacity to control their activities, it also provided a more

²³² Chrysostomides, *Monumenta*, pp. 137–41 (no. 68); Thomas, vol. 2, pp. 222–3 (no. 134).

²³³ Stella, pp. 304–6; Ferrer i Mallol, 'Pedro', pp. 284–9, 327–8 (nos. 27–8).

²³⁴ Morosini, p. 599.

²³⁵ Balletto, *Liber*, pp. 74–5 (no. 60).

²³⁶ George Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, 4 vols. (Cambridge 1948–52), vol. 2, pp. 471–95.

²³⁷ Sacy, pp. 71–4.

credible basis for disowning them. The later use of Giuliano Gattilusio's association with the emigrant dynasty of Mytilene and its Greek affiliations as grounds for distancing Genoa from his crimes is a further illustration of these benefits.²³⁸ The Gattilusio and their lordships, acclaimed as inherently and irreducibly Genoese when it suited the government of the commune, could also be presented as thoroughly foreign, as convenience dictated.

Other Genoese, and Latins beyond the Genoese community, were seemingly more likely to fall victim to indiscriminate reprisals from rulers whose domains were remote from the bases used by pirates. Rulers such as the Mamluk sultans could only strike against targets in the Aegean with considerable difficulty. There was therefore a strong temptation for them to apply pressure by attacking those whose connection with the pirates was remote, but who presented easily accessible targets. Besides the steps taken against merchants in Egypt itself, Genoese anxiety about the possibility of an attack on Famagusta during the reprisals of the mid-1420s is a reflection of this fact. While there is no evidence that Cyprus played any parts in the Basque depredations which had enraged the Mamluks, it was a much more convenient target than Lesbos, as the following events showed. The divisions between Christianity and Islam in the Mediterranean may also have played a part: the greater the cultural distance between the perpetrators and victims of piracy, the less discriminating the latter were likely to be in choosing targets for retaliation. Remoteness may also have made some contribution to the seemingly somewhat indiscriminate reactions of the Aragonese crown, reflected in the apparent misdirection of the Catalan fleet's bombardment of Chios in 1411. Later demands from Alfonso V of Aragon for compensation for the capture of a Catalan galley were directed to the Genoese commune, on the basis that Dorino I of Mytilene was subject to Genoese jurisdiction; the wording suggests that Alfonso had or affected to have only a vague idea of the nature of Dorino's position in Lesbos and was oblivious to its independence from Genoese authority.²³⁹

Those nearer at hand were more likely to pursue the Gattilusio and their subjects with greater precision. Merchants directly connected with Gattilusio territories were more likely to be present in their own ports and

²³⁸ E.g. Jenks, pp. 52, 55, 66, 76–7; Basso, 'Pirati', pp. 367–8 (no. 2); ASG, NA 795 (Andrea de Cario 1), no. 10.

²³⁹ ASG, AS 3026 (*Diversorum Communis Ianue* 6), no. 388. The letter refers to 'Durinum Gateluzo cuius esse dicitur Civitas et Insula Mitalini'.

Gattilusio holdings were more conveniently located for attacks or credible threats of attack. Venetian reprisals for the piracy of Vastralites in 1402 targeted the subjects of the lord of Ainos on Crete. In 1395 the commune of Ragusa outfitted a galley to hunt down a brigantine from Lesbos which had preyed on Ragusan shipping, while also seeking restitution by remonstrating directly with the lord of Mytilene. Three years later a group of Ragusans appointed a Genoese procurator to secure the return of goods pillaged by a galliot from Lesbos.²⁴⁰ Although the Ottomans threatened the Venetians regarding the capture of Turks by a vessel of Ainos in 1390s, this was due to the fact that these captives had been sold on Crete. In 1407, a group of Muslims whose ship had been captured by pirates and brought to Lesbos managed to get news of their plight to the Ottomans, whose threats secured the captives' release.²⁴¹

Nevertheless, Ottoman subjects continued to be targeted by pirates operating from Gattilusio territory and collusion with them was cited by Mehmed II as a pretext for his attacks on both Ainos and Lesbos; according to Kritovoulos the pirates based on Lesbos ravaged the Anatolian shore opposite the island and the coasts of the Gallipoli peninsula, Thrace and Macedonia.²⁴² This illustrates most vividly the severe disadvantages of sponsoring piracy in an environment transformed by Ottoman hegemony. The Gattilusio might be able and willing to divert harm from their immediate allies and direct it against their enemies, but seemingly they failed to block attacks on Ottoman subjects at this time. They can scarcely have been blind to the perils of this. While the Turks might be natural targets for any Christian corsair, the growth of Ottoman supremacy meant that their capacity for retaliation against those raiders' hosts now extended far beyond the arrest of merchants or the confiscation of their property. The failure of the Gattilusio lords to restrain their piratical associates from continuing to attack Ottoman subjects may have been the result of inability to control them, as Niccolò claimed, or of an unwillingness born of desperate need for the wealth that piracy could bring in, owing to the dire financial straits of the dynasty during its last years.²⁴³ In the latter case, the debilitating impact of Ottoman aggression would seem to have pushed the Gattilusio towards expedients which themselves made further aggression more likely.

²⁴⁰ Krekić, pp. 239–40, 244 (nos. 457–9, 461, 485).

²⁴¹ Epalza, pp. 95–7.

²⁴² Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, p. 273; Tursun Beg, pp. 37–8; Kritovoulos, pp. 129–30, 169.

²⁴³ See below, pp. 258–9.

For the Gattilusio, as for any maritime power, pirates based in their territories could be an economic resource, a naval asset and a diplomatic liability. The usefulness of pirates combined with their potential to create embarrassment meant that their association with any network was fraught with ambivalence. Political authorities sought to retain pirates' identification with them in order to benefit from their capabilities and channel their activities towards their enemies and away from their friends, while at the same time seeking to avoid being identified with them by other rulers who might take reprisals. In their mobile, predatory autonomy and oscillation between licit and illicit activities, pirates embodied the fragmentation of authority and an openness to constant adjustment in the face of a diverse range of opportunities and unstable circumstances. At the same time, the far-reaching and often tenuous affiliations which might be invoked in responding to their attacks are expressive of how pervasive interconnection and association could be even in the face of such individual independence. Their far-flung and unpredictable depredations constituted the widest fringe of the Gattilusio network, which drew in useful individuals from across cultural divides with conspicuous even-handedness, forged firm associations with even the most improbable partners and adjusted itself to the diverse conditions of its individual constituents. In this regard it behaved in a manner to which the standardisation of a consistent structure, whether that of one of the wider networks to which the Gattilusio belonged or one formulated by themselves, was alien. Here, as in so much else, the Gattilusio lordships exemplified the characteristic qualities of a fragmented, unstable, diversely interconnected and interpenetrating Aegean world of overlapping networks.

CHAPTER FIVE

INSIDE THE LORDSHIPS: COMMUNITIES AND GOVERNMENT

In their internal affairs, in their employment of servants and clients and their allocation of the resources and power at their disposal, regimes such as those of the Gattiluso replicated in miniature many of the patterns which characterised the larger networks operating around them. Just as they were themselves drawn by various means into the orbit of larger networks, so they had to attract by some combination of incentive, persuasion and coercion a network of active servitors to uphold their government, while assuring at least the acquiescence of the wider population. Beyond the core of support provided by their extended family, the Gattiluso lords had to draw other Latins and Greeks into their orbit by means of direct rewards and wider opportunities for advancement and enrichment, combined with sentimental and ideological considerations. These would have included appeals to common identity and collective interests in the case of the Genoese and the authority conferred by Byzantium in that of the Greeks. From these clients and employees they had to assemble an administrative system suited to the conditions of each individual territory.

They had also to develop responses to one of the basic issues facing all Latin regimes in the Aegean world, the religious and cultural divide between rulers and ruled. Both Latin and Greek populations had to be managed satisfactorily and offered resources and skills critical to their survival. The traditions, institutions and practices of each group represented both realities to be accommodated and resources to be drawn upon. The potential of sectarian resentment to undermine governmental authority and social harmony, the balance to be struck between the respective demands and interests of indigenous and immigrant groups, the repercussions of upholding or eroding distinctions between these groups, the calling of their own religious convictions and the expectations placed on them by their co-religionists were all considerations bearing upon Latin rulers in the region. The ways in which they responded to these were of key importance in determining the character and fortunes of the regimes they created and the societies which those regimes helped to shape around them.

Inhabitants of the Lordships

The size of the population under their authority was of significance in determining the scale both of the productive activities available for the lordships to tax, and of the most readily available and controllable reserves of manpower on which they could draw. Conversely, it also determined the scale and sophistication of the administrative and military apparatus required to govern. In comparison with the preceding period the populations under Gattilusio rule would have been much reduced by the plague, whose first catastrophic outbreak had struck Europe a few years before the establishment of the lordship of Mytilene. Recurrences of the plague were probably responsible for epidemics known to have afflicted Mytilene in 1423–4 and Old Phokaia in 1443.¹ A more consistent restraint on population growth in some areas was malaria, which was endemic in the marshy land around Kerameia and Larissos on the Gulf of Gera in Lesbos.² Comparison with other Aegean islands both large and small suggests that the impact of Turkish slave-raids would have significantly diminished both the size of the population and the prosperity of the economy, although evidence for attacks on territories under Gattilusio rule before the 1450s is sparse.³ However, Turkish conquests and Ottoman expansion may also have had a countervailing effect on the population, swelling it by the flight of refugees from territories overrun by the Turks to places

¹ Peter Schreiner, *Die Byzantinischen Kleinchroniken*, 3 vols. (Vienna 1975–9), *CFHB* 12, vol. 1, p. 224 (no. 31/6); *idem*, 'Eine Obituarnotiz über eine frühgeburt', *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik* 39 (1989), pp. 209–16 at p. 210; cf. Marie-Hélène Congourdeau, 'Pour une étude de la Peste Noire à Byzance', *Εὐψυχία: Mélanges offertes Hélène Ahrweiler*, 2 vols. (Paris 1998), vol. 1, pp. 149–63 at p. 159.

² Leonardo di Chios, *De Statu Hominis*, Biblioteca del Seminario Vescovile, Albenga, MS Leonardo di Chio, ff. 1^v–107^v at f. 68.

³ David Jacoby, 'The demographic evolution of Euboea under Latin rule 1205–1470', *The Greek Islands and the Sea: proceedings of the first international colloquium held at Royal Holloway, University of London, 21–22 September 2001*, ed. Julian Chrysostomides, Charalambos Dendrinos and Jonathan Harris (Camberley 2004), pp. 131–79 at pp. 171–8; John Haldon, 'Limnos, monastic holdings and the Byzantine State: ca. 1261–1453', *Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society: papers given at a symposium at Dumbarton Oaks in May 1982*, ed. Anthony Bryer and Heath Lowry (Birmingham 1986), pp. 161–215 at pp. 181–5; Anthony Luttrell, 'The Latins and life on the smaller Aegean islands: 1204–1453', *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204*, ed. Benjamin Arbel, Bernard Hamilton and David Jacoby (London 1989), pp. 146–57 at pp. 148, 151–2; Guillaume Saint-Guillain, 'Seigneuries insulaires: les Cyclades au temps de la domination latine (XIII^e–XV^e siècle)', *Medievales. Langue, textes, histoire* 47 (2004), pp. 31–45 at pp. 36–7.

still under Christian control.⁴ George Pachymeres reports the presence on Lesbos at the beginning of the fourteenth century of refugees from the Turkish conquests, who had first taken refuge at Assos on the Anatolian coast opposite and later fled to the island.⁵ According to Promontorio's admittedly much later and chronologically inaccurate account, Lesbos was one of the main destinations for people fleeing the wars associated with the rise of Ottoman power in Anatolia in the later fourteenth century.⁶ Further possible evidence of refugee populations in the period of Gattilusio rule comes from a Hospitaller document of 1366, agreeing to provide land on Kos to a group of Armenians at that time living on Lesbos, who had been driven from their homeland by enemies and had appealed to the Order for resettlement.⁷ As lands under Christian rule in easy reach, Gattilusio possessions naturally attracted escaped slaves fleeing Ottoman territory, a phenomenon attested as a bone of contention in the case of both Ainos and Lesbos.⁸

The combination of all these factors of instability means that populations must have fluctuated widely over the period of more than a century in which the Gattilusio lords ruled in the Aegean, so that even if it were possible to establish reliably the number of inhabitants of a given area at a certain time, within a few years it might have changed considerably. Any conclusions as to total numbers must therefore be regarded as indicative rather than prescriptive. A number of population figures

⁴ Such a pattern of refugee influxes partially offsetting losses to the existing population is attested elsewhere in the Aegean islands in this period, notably on Euboia. Jacoby, 'Demographic evolution', pp. 157–8, 171–3, 176–7.

⁵ George Pachymeres, *Relations Historiques*, ed. Albert Failler, 5 vols. (Paris 1984–2000), CFHB 24, vol. 4, p. 481.

⁶ Jacopo Promontorio-de Campis, *Die Aufzeichnungen des Genuesen Iacopo de Promontorio-de Campis über den Osmanenstaat um 1475*, ed. Franz Babinger (Munich 1975), p. 73.

⁷ AOM 319 (*Libri Bullarum* 4), f. 274^v. It is not clear whether these were long-standing residents who had for some reason been forced out of Lesbos or recent refugees from Anatolia who preferred not to settle on that island or were prevented from doing so; the former possibility is raised by indications of a possible Armenian presence on Lesbos in earlier centuries. Kimon Louizidis, *H Βυζαντινή Λέσβος (330–1355)* (PhD thesis, Ioannina 2003), p. 194.

⁸ ASG, NA 847 (Tommaso de Recco 1), unnumbered document dated 9 Dec 1448; Laonikos Chalkokondyles, *Laonici Chalcocondylae Historiarum Demonstrationes*, ed. Eugenius Darkó, 2 vols. (Budapest 1922–7), pp. 268, 272–3; Aşıkpaşazade, *Vom Hirtenzelt zur Hohen Pforte: Frühzeit und Aufstieg des Osmanenreiches nach der Chronik "Denkwürdigkeiten und Zeitläufte des Hauses 'Osman" vom Derwisch Ahmed, genannt 'Asik-Pasa-Sohn*, tr. Richard F. Kreutel (Graz 1959), pp. 202–4; Tursun Beg, *The History of Mehmed the Conqueror by Tursun Beg*, tr. Halil Inalcik and Rhoads Murphy (Minneapolis and Chicago 1978), pp. 37–8.

for Gattilusio territories are available, virtually all relating to the last few years of the lordships or the following decades. Trumpeting the success of Trevisan's fleet in a series of letters in 1456–7, Callixtus III alluded to the supposed number of inhabitants of the islands it had liberated. These figures, intended more as a rhetorical flourish than a sober assessment, are mutually contradictory: in one letter the combined population of Lesbos, Thasos and Lemnos was put at over 100,000, in another at 60,000, and in a third, bizarrely, that of Thasos and Lemnos alone at over 100,000.⁹ Writing some decades later, Stefano Magno put the population of Lesbos in 1462 at 55,000.¹⁰ Doukas states that during the siege in 1462 the city of Mytilene contained 5,000 men under arms and 20,000 non-combatants.¹¹ All of these figures are almost certainly significantly too high, on the basis of comparison with more dependable sources.

The most trustworthy evidence by far for the population of Lesbos derives from Ottoman tax surveys taken some decades after the conquest. These figures cannot be read back directly into the Gattilusio period due to the severe losses inflicted when the lordship of Mytilene was destroyed. However, combined with indications of the scale of those losses they offer an approximation of the number of inhabitants under Gattilusio rule. The earliest surveys recorded only non-Muslims, those liable for the *kharadj*. Figures from 1490 for the Ottoman *vilâyet* of Mytilene, comprising the island of Lesbos, suggest a total non-Muslim population for the island of somewhat over 20,000.¹² This corresponds closely with a figure given by

⁹ ASVat, *Armadio XXXIX*, 7, ff. 58, 59, 62^v.

¹⁰ Stefano Magno, *Annali Veneti*, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna, MSS. 6214–6217, 6239–6340 at MS. 6216, f. 151.

¹¹ Doukas, *Ducas Istoria Turco-Bizantina (1341–1462)*, ed. Vasile Grecu (Bucharest 1958), p. 435. This seems an improbably large number to have been accommodated within the fortified *kastron* of Mytilene even under siege conditions. However, it may give an impression of the kind of numbers inhabiting the city and the eastern part of Lesbos from which people might in theory have gone to take refuge within the walls. The other identified places which were defended and sheltered rural people in 1462 were in the west and north-west of the island, leaving a large area for which Mytilene was the most accessible fortified settlement. Benedetto, Archbishop of Mytilene, 'Leonardi Chiensis [*sic*] de Lesbo a Turcis capta epistola Pio Papae II missa', ed. Carl Hopf, *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes inédites ou peu connues* (Berlin 1873), p. 364.

¹² Nikolai Todorov and Asparuh Velkov, *Situation démographique de la Péninsule balkanique (fin du XV^e s.–début du XV^e s.)* (Sofia 1988), p. 284. The figures recorded were 4,952 non-Muslim households and 581 widows carried over from the previous assessment, numbers which had grown to 5,287 and 620 respectively at the time of the 1490 survey. The estimate above, and the others given here from the Ottoman surveys, is based on a multiplier of four people per household. Such multipliers are inevitably somewhat arbitrary, but this

Benedetto Dei, writing in the 1470s following travels in the Aegean before 1467. He reports that 22,000 people were liable for payment of the head tax immediately after the conquest of Lesbos in 1462. It is not entirely clear whether this number relates to the size of the population before or after the mass enslavement and deportation accompanying the conquest.¹³

The evidence for the scale of the losses inflicted in the 1450s and 1460s suggests that the population must have been considerably higher in the years preceding 1450. In that year 3,000 people were reportedly carried off as slaves during the attack which destroyed Kallone, in addition to an unknown number killed at that time.¹⁴ The attack of 1457 must have inflicted further losses, albeit much smaller. The most catastrophic blows followed the surrender of the island in 1462. The inhabitants of Mytilene and those who had taken refuge there were divided into three groups, of which one was taken to Constantinople by Mehmed to help repopulate the city, another enslaved and distributed as gifts to the sultan's officers or sold to the common soldiers, and the rest left in place. According to Archbishop Benedetto, who was among them, those removed numbered more than 10,000.¹⁵ Across the rest of the island the inhabitants were initially left in place apart from the arrest of some leading figures, but later many of them were also forcibly transplanted to Constantinople.¹⁶ After a failed Venetian attempt to capture Lesbos in 1464 many of the inhabitants

seems a reasonable figure to employ on the basis of evidence for the size of late Byzantine households and the characteristics of the Ottoman tax records. Angeliki E. Laiou, *Peasant Society in the Late Byzantine Empire: a social and demographic study* (Princeton 1977), pp. 225–47; Vasilis Panagiotopoulos, *Πληθυσμός και οικισμοί της Πελοποννήσου 13^{ος}–18^{ος} αιώνας* (Athens 1985), pp. 118–21.

¹³ Benedetto Dei, *La Cronica dall'anno 1400 all'anno 1500*, ed. Roberto Barducci (Florence 1985), p. 161.

¹⁴ A. Luxuro and G. Pinelli-Gentile, 'Documenti riguardanti alcuni dinasti dell'Arcipelago, publicati per saggio di studi paleografici', *Giornale Ligustico di archeologia, storia e belle arti* 1 (1874), pp. 84–90, 217–221, vol. 2 (1875), pp. 86–93, 292–7, vol. 3 (1876), pp. 313–6, vol. 5 (1878), pp. 345–70 at vol. 5, pp. 350–2 (no. 39).

¹⁵ Michael Kritovoulos, *Critobuli Imbriotae Historiae*, ed. Diether Roderich Reinsch (Berlin and New York 1983), *CFHB* 22, p. 172; Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, pp. 273–4; Doukas, pp. 435–7; Magno, MS. 6216, f. 151; Archbishop Benedetto, pp. 364–5; Tursun Beg, pp. 49–50; Roberto Valentini, 'L'Egeo dopo la caduta di Costantinopoli nelle relazioni dei gran maestri di Rodi', *Bullettino dell'Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo e Archivio Muratoriano* 51 (1936), pp. 137–68 at p. 167 (no. 4).

¹⁶ Archbishop Benedetto, p. 364; Kritovoulos, p. 172.

left with their fleet.¹⁷ According to a Venetian chronicle, the number of people evacuated to Euboia on this occasion was 10,000.¹⁸

Despite the likely exaggeration of these figures, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the cumulative losses from the various reductions of the population in the 1450s and 1460s stretched well into the thousands.¹⁹ Even allowing for some demographic recovery in the intervening decades, it seems likely that the population before 1450 had been substantially higher than that recorded by the earliest Ottoman surveys.²⁰ Taking all the available information into account, a figure in the range of 30,000 may tentatively be advanced for the years preceding the final crises of the Gattilusio regime.²¹ How this population level corresponded to that of earlier decades is most uncertain due to the demographic instability already noted.²²

¹⁷ These people are described as the inhabitants of two towns which had come over to the Venetian side during the unsuccessful siege of Mytilene. Kritovoulos, pp. 191–2.

¹⁸ Nicolai Iorga, *Notes et Extraits pour servir à l'histoire des Croisades au XV^e siècle*, 6 vols. (Bucharest 1915), vol. 4, p. 204 (no. 136).

¹⁹ The apparently extreme impact of Mehmed II's deportations on the size of the population of Samothrake suggests that their potential scale should not be underestimated. See below, p. 252.

²⁰ The selective nature of the mass enslavement carried out by the Ottomans would presumably have retarded recovery, since its victims would have been predominantly children and young adults, diminishing the remaining population's childbearing capacity relative to its size.

²¹ Cf. Louizidis, pp. 191–3, for an alternative estimate of 50,000 or more, based on the Ottoman data but using a multiplier of five people per household and positing a larger demographic impact for the events of the 1450s and 1460s.

²² As a comparison, on the basis of a subsequent Ottoman survey conducted in 1521, the total population of the island at that time has been estimated at 36–37,000 (Dimitris N. Karydis and Machiel Kiel, *Μυτιλήνης Αστυγραφία και Λέσβου Χωρογραφία (15^{ος}–19^{ος} αι.)* (Athens 2000), p. 34). This figure would equate to a population density of over 22 people per km², notably high when compared with figures for other islands, also based on early Ottoman surveys. This reinforces the supposition that Lesbos could support a large population by comparison with its neighbours (Johannes Koder, *Die Lebensraum der Byzantiner: Historisch-geographischer Abriss ihres mittelalterlichen Staates im östlichen Mittelmeerraum* (Graz, Vienna and Cologne 1984), p. 153). This survey also gives the earliest evidence for the distribution of population within Lesbos. It records the presence of 455 Christian and 308 Muslim households in Mytilene, amounting to a likely total population of over 3,000 (Karydis and Kiel, p. 47). The relative importance of other urban settlements is conveyed by the figures for Methymna, with 437 Christian and 6 Muslim households, and Eressos, with 343 Christian households and only a single Muslim one, suggesting over 1,700 and over 1,300 inhabitants respectively (Karydis and Kiel, pp. 108, 115). Despite the recovery of the general population level over the six decades since the conquest, the fact that the Christian population of the capital was scarcely greater than that of Methymna may indicate that the impact of the deportations had had a lasting effect on Mytilene's demographic development; however, if Methymna and Eressos are identified with the two

Figures for the *vilâyet* of Ainos in the 1490 survey suggest a total in the range of 2,500.²³ However, this may well have been considerably less than the population of the town and its environs under Gattilusio rule. Ainos had suffered less than Lesbos from Ottoman aggression, avoiding bloodshed by surrendering in the face of Mehmed's offensive and losing only 150 children through enslavement, although others chose to leave to escape the Ottomans.²⁴ However, in 1469 it was stormed by the Venetians and subjected to a particularly brutal sack. Many people were killed and 2,000 reportedly carried off as captives.²⁵ While there may well have been some recovery in the intervening years, it is once again difficult to read back confidently from the Ottoman figures to the Gattilusio period.

Specific figures are not available from the early Ottoman surveys for the smaller islands at this time.²⁶ However, a Venetian source provides data regarding the islands from a period closer to that of Gattilusio rule. This is a list of population figures for the numerous islands then under Venetian sovereignty in all parts of the Aegean, dating probably to 1470 or 1471. It gives the population of Lemnos as 6,000, that of Imbros as 3,000.²⁷

towns whose inhabitants are said to have emigrated *en masse* in 1464 this would have had a countervailing effect on the balance between the different settlements.

²³ The survey reported figures of 581 non-Muslim households and 174 widows carried over from the prior survey, changing by the end of the survey year to 626 and 161 respectively. Todorov and Velkov, p. 230; cf. above, p. 248n12. The boundaries of the Ottoman province of Ainos may well have differed from those of the Gattilusio lordship. However, some continuity between the two is suggested by the fact that in Promontorio's survey the *kharadj* of Ainos is said to have been farmed together with the *commerchium*, salt revenues and other income from that area, separately from the provisions made for the *kharadj* across the Ottoman territories in Europe generally. Equivalent arrangements applied to the two Phokaia, another long-standing Christian enclave annexed decades after the surrounding area had come under Ottoman rule, and to the recent Ottoman acquisition of Negroponte (Promontorio, pp. 62–7). Thus it seems that these areas for some time remained administrative anomalies, somewhat distinct from the regular organisation of the longer-established Ottoman provinces surrounding them. Hence it appears likely that the Ottoman *vilâyet* adhered to the boundaries of the Gattilusio lordship.

²⁴ Kritovoulos, pp. 106–7; Aşıkpaşazade, pp. 202–4. According to Stefano Magno, Mehmed had to be persuaded not to order a general massacre of the inhabitants (Magno, MS. 6216, f. 92^v).

²⁵ Marcantonio Sabellico, *Historiae Rerum Venetarum ab Urbe Condita* (Venice 1487, new ed. Venice 1718), pp. 733–4.

²⁶ Thasos, Samothrake, Lemnos and Imbros were all included within the *vilâyet* of Gallipoli, which also included that port and the peninsula on which it stands; Old Phokaia was similarly included within a much larger province. Todorov and Velkov, p. 10.

²⁷ Peter Topping, 'Latins on Lemnos before and after 1453', *Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society: papers given at a symposium at Dumbarton Oaks in May 1982*, ed. Anthony Bryer and Heath Lowry (Birmingham 1986), pp. 217–34 at pp. 231–2, 234.

These figures may be regarded as a fair approximation of the situation under Gattilusio rule, and are broadly proportional to the figures given for other islands of similar size by the same source.²⁸ A report to the Council of Basle on the Orthodox Church hierarchy written in 1437 claims that Lemnos contained two not very large cities, thirty *castra* and 140 villages, while Imbros had one small city, five *castra* and twenty villages.²⁹

The Venetian survey gives the population of Samothrake as a mere 200, the lowest population density on the whole list.³⁰ This is probably a result of the mass deportation of the population to Constantinople when the island was retaken by the Ottomans from the forces of Calixtus III, a fate which also befell Thasos.³¹ It seems reasonable to suppose that the population density of Samothrake and Thasos under Gattilusio rule would have been broadly consistent with that of Lemnos and Imbros. Buondelmonti's impressionistic description indicates that in the early fifteenth century Samothrake was significantly more densely populated than Imbros, and Thasos more populous still.³² Such comparisons suggest that the population of Thasos under Gattilusio rule is likely to have been at least comparable with that of 1519, when an Ottoman survey indicates over 2,700 people.³³ However, it may be significant for the demographic condition of Samothrake that Buondelmonti singled out honey and goats as abounding there: beekeeping and goatherding are hardly labour-intensive forms of production.³⁴

Ramon Muntaner gives a figure of 3,000 for the population of Phokaia in 1307, but even if accurate this figure is of very little use in discerning the population of Old Phokaia under Gattilusio rule, owing to the foundation

²⁸ See Patrice Brun, *Les Archipels Egéens dans l'Antiquité Grecque (V^e–II^e siècles av. notre ère)* (Paris 1996), pp. 28–9, for area measurements for the Aegean islands.

²⁹ Spyridon P. Lampros, 'Υπόμνημα περὶ τῶν ἐλληνικῶν χωρῶν καὶ ἐκακλησίων κατὰ τὸν δέκατον πέμπτου αἰῶνα', *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 7 (1910), pp. 360–71 at pp. 362–3.

³⁰ Topping, 'Latins on Lemnos', p. 234.

³¹ Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, pp. 225–6; Kritovoulos, p. 150. By contrast, Imbros had never been occupied by the papal fleet, while Lemnos was restored to Ottoman control by the actions of the inhabitants; they thus avoided such treatment. Kritovoulos, pp. 115–6, 133–6.

³² Buondelmonti describes Samothrake as 'habitata satis' and Thasos as 'habitata valde', whereas of Imbros he says that 'pauci habentur in ea'. Cristoforo Buondelmonti, *Christoph. Bonelmontii, Florentini, Liber Insularum Archipelagi*, ed. G.R.L. de Sinner (Leipzig and Berlin 1824), pp. 126–7.

³³ This is calculated from a figure of 681 households. Karydis and Kiel, p. 179; cf. above, p. 248n12.

³⁴ Buondelmonti, ed. de Sinner, pp. 126–7.

of New Phokaia, the impact of the plague and the other upheavals of the fourteenth century.³⁵

The figures outlined above suggest that the population of Lesbos was an order of magnitude greater than those of each of the family's other individual possessions, and larger than their combined total even at the height of the lordships' territorial expansion. While Lesbos was much larger in extent than the other territories, the data also implies a population density greater than any of the islands mentioned in the Venetian text, and at least equal to those attested for other major Aegean islands.³⁶ Only after the catastrophic impact of the Ottoman deportations did the concentration of people on Lesbos drop to a level closely comparable to most Aegean islands. This high level of settlement must in part reflect a general, though not entirely consistent, tendency for larger islands to be more thickly peopled than smaller ones.³⁷ Its demographic preponderance emphasises both the centrality of Lesbos within the family's network of territories and the degree of variation between their individual possessions. The high population density of Lesbos may have contributed to a more diversified economy and increased the availability of workers for non-agricultural activities such as mining. Combined with the natural resources from which they profited, the extent of the human resources available to them helps to account for the wealth which the Gattilusio lords were able to amass in their heyday.

³⁵ Ramon Muntaner, *Crònica*, ed. Editorial Barcino, 9 vols. (Barcelona 1927–52), vol. 6, pp. 91–4.

³⁶ In size and density Rhodes, where the 6,312 households recorded by the Ottomans may equate to a population of around 25,000 in the years after the conquest of 1522 and its associated losses, in an area somewhat smaller than Lesbos, offers probably the closest comparison (Anthony Luttrell, 'Greeks, Latins and Turks on late medieval Rhodes', *BF* 11 (1987), pp. 357–74 at p. 360). A visitor to Euboia in 1395 estimated its population at 14,000 households, amounting to perhaps 50–60,000 people in an area more than twice that of Lesbos (L. Le Grand, 'Relation du pèlerinage à Jérusalem de Nicolas de Martoni, notaire italien (1394–1395)', *Revue de l'Orient Latin* 3 (1895), pp. 566–69 at p. 654; Jacoby, 'Demographic evolution', p. 178). The population of Chios has been variously estimated at around 10,000 and 13,000 on the basis of a survey of 1395 (Philip Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese and their Administration of the Island 1346–1566: described in contemporary documents and official dispatches*, 3 vols. (Cambridge 1958), vol. 2, p. 148; Michel Balard 'The Genoese in the Aegean (1204–1566)', *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204*, ed. Benjamin Arbel, Bernard Hamilton and David Jacoby (London 1989), pp. 158–74 at p. 166; Geo Pistarino, 'Duecentocinquanti anni dei Genovesi a Chio', *Genovesi d'Oriente* (Genoa 1990), pp. 243–80 at pp. 250–1).

³⁷ Cf. Luttrell, 'Smaller Aegean islands', pp. 146–7.

Financial Resources

The extent of the financial resources at the disposal of the Gattilusio regime was one of the basic factors determining their capacity to attract and provide for servitors and clients, and of fundamental importance to their capabilities more generally. As discussed elsewhere, the Gattilusio lords controlled lucrative natural resources such as the alum deposits of Lesbos and the salt-pans of Ainos, and had access to considerable revenues from trade passing through their territories and from the proceeds of piracy, as well as scope for general taxation of the productive economy of their possessions, and the proceeds of the family's private estates and of investments such as shares in the Genoese public debt.³⁸

There are a number of partial indications of the scale of the financial resources of the Gattilusio lordships. Kritovoulos reports that Demetrios Palaiologos, who received a number of former Gattilusio territories shortly after their seizure by the Ottomans, drew an annual income of 300,000 silver coins from Lemnos, Imbros, Thasos and Samothrake, and another 300,000 from Ainos, where he is said to have held the same revenues as Palamede Gattilusio had. The revenues of Thasos and Samothrake had however been drastically diminished since the end of Gattilusio rule, since as Kritovoulos noted their population had mostly been deported.³⁹ Kritovoulos, as an associate of Demetrios who had helped him secure possession of Lemnos and Imbros, was well placed to know the state of his revenues.⁴⁰ In a survey of Ottoman income and expenditure in 1475,

³⁸ See above, pp. 157–61, 172–84, 205–18, 238–40; below, p. 263.

³⁹ Kritovoulos, p. 150. Kritovoulos calls these silver coins 'κέρμα νενομισμένον βασιλικόν'. The term 'κέρμα' indicates a small denomination. Production of the Byzantine silver coin called the *basilikon*, exchanged at a rate of about 24 to the Venetian ducat, had ceased some decades earlier (Cécile Morrisson, 'Byzantine money: its markets and circulation', *The Economic History of Byzantium*, ed. Angeliki E. Laiou, 3 vols. (Washington D.C. 2002), vol. 3, pp. 909–66 at pp. 926, 933–4). The most likely candidate for the small silver coin in question here is probably the Ottoman asper, in widespread use in the region and exchanged at roughly 34 to the ducat; another possibility would be the Byzantine asper, at about 48 to the ducat (Kate Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade in the Early Islamic State: the merchants of Genoa and Turkey* (Cambridge 1999), pp. 142–4; Cécile Morrisson and Jean-Claude Cheynet, 'Prices and wages in the Byzantine world', *The Economic History of Byzantium*, ed. Angeliki E. Laiou, 3 vols. (Washington D.C. 2002), vol. 2, pp. 815–78 at p. 817; Morrisson, 'Byzantine money', p. 927). Thus the income from each of these two sources would probably have been somewhere in the range of 6–9,000 ducats, a sum comparable to Promontorio's figure for the revenues of Ainos under Ottoman rule, though somewhat smaller.

⁴⁰ Kritovoulos, pp. 134–6. Chalkokondyles reports a sum of 600,000 silver coins for Demetrios's income from Ainos alone, but the equivalence of this to the total of Kritovoulos's

Jacopo Promontorio reported that the *commerchium* (sales tax), *kharadj* (tribute paid by non-Muslims) and salt production revenues of Ainos were leased to tax-farmers for 11,000 ducats a year.⁴¹ Even allowing for the tribute payments extracted from the Gattilusio by the Ottomans, which according to Kritovoulos amounted to two thirds of the annual revenue in the case of Ainos, such sums are considerable.⁴² Promontorio also states that the *commerchium* and *kharadj* of Old and New Phokaia combined were farmed for 10,000 ducats and their alum revenues for another 10,000.⁴³ This is less helpful than the figures from Ainos as an indication of the revenues available to the Gattilusio. It is likely that during the period of Gattilusio rule in Old Phokaia the bulk of the revenues of the alum business accrued to the rulers of the new town; on the other hand, during the years between the Ottoman seizure of the two Phokaia in 1455 and Promontorio's survey the market for their alum had been diminished by the opening of the great mines of Tolfa in central Italy.⁴⁴ Global figures of this sort are not available for the revenues of Lesbos under Gattilusio rule, although limited indications of the scale of the income available from alum production come from the export contracts of the early fifteenth century, and from the annual payment of 5,000 ducats agreed in 1450 for shutting down the industry.⁴⁵

The extent of the lordships' resources is also illuminated by their demonstrated capacity for expenditure. In the autumn of 1403 the lords of Mytilene and Ainos had each contributed a galley and a galliot to Boucicault's fleet, while Francesco II had set off for Lemnos with two galleys and five galliots and sent a sixth to look for Boucicault, amounting to a total of at least four galleys and eight galliots on active service at once, although it is possible that some of these belonged to John VII.⁴⁶ By way of comparison, the budget for operating the guard galley of Chios in 1373

two figures suggests a misunderstanding of the same data on Chalkokondyles's part, and the testimony of the much better-informed Kritovoulos is certainly to be preferred. Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, p. 237.

⁴¹ Promontorio, p. 64.

⁴² Kritovoulos, p. 105; below, pp. 384–5.

⁴³ Promontorio, p. 67.

⁴⁴ David Jacoby, 'Production et commerce de l'alun oriental en Méditerranée, XI^e–XV^e siècles', *L'alun de Méditerranée*, ed. Philippe Borgard, Jean-Pierre Brun and Maurice Picon (Naples and Aix-en-Provence 2005), pp. 219–67 at pp. 254–6; above, p. 173.

⁴⁵ See above, pp. 175–6, 182.

⁴⁶ Ruy Gonzales de Clavijo, *Embajada a Tamorlán*, ed. Francesco López Estrada (Madrid 1943), pp. 27–8; Denis Lalande (ed.), *Le livre des faits du bon Messire Jehan le Maingre, dit Bouciquaut, Mareschal de France et Gouverneur de Jennes* (Geneva 1985), pp. 219, 282.

was £1,319 per month in Genoese money of account.⁴⁷ At such a rate, the monthly cost of the forces put to sea by the Gattilusio in 1403 may have reached 8,000 Venetian ducats or more.⁴⁸ The quality of their coinage also offers some reflection of their financial position. A Genoese decree of 1428 forbidding the circulation of gold coins of low value identified Mytilene along with Turkish territory as a source of such currency.⁴⁹ However, their surviving coins and other evidence reveal a sustained capacity to issue gold coinage of good weight at a high level of purity, although they did not do so consistently and perhaps not in large volumes.⁵⁰

The most striking evidence for the wealth of the Gattilusio lords is the contribution of Francesco II and Niccolò I to the ransom of the leaders of the Crusade of Nikopolis in 1397. In June 1397 the crusade leaders received pledges from a number of wealthy individuals to advance portions of the 200,000 ducats demanded for their ransom within the next eight months, and undertook to reimburse these sums in due course. Francesco committed himself to pay up to 110,000 ducats and Niccolò 40,000. They were relieved of the need to find part of this sum when the Knights of St. John deposited plate worth more than 29,000 ducats at Mytilene, while other contributors added more, but still had to pay 75,000. This expenditure was supplemented by a separate payment of 8,500 ducats for the ransom of a prisoner who had been released early to help organise the ransom.⁵¹ In addition to the ransom payments themselves, the Gattilusio lords advanced other sums for the benefit of the crusade leaders. Loans to the Count of Nevers totalling at least 15,000 ducats from Niccolò and 2,500 ducats from Francesco are also attested, while Boucicault had raised loans

⁴⁷ Antonella Rovere, *Documenti della Maona di Chio (Secc. XIV–XVI)* (Genoa 1979) (ASLSP 93 (n.s. 19/2)), pp. 141–2 (no. 18).

⁴⁸ At this time one ducat was typically roughly equivalent to 25 Genoese *soldi*. Jacques Heers, *Gènes au XV^e Siècle: activité économique et problèmes sociaux* (Paris 1961), pp. 51–2.

⁴⁹ ASG, AS 512 (*Diversorum Registri* 17), f. 2^v.

⁵⁰ Ernest Oberländer-Târnoveanu, “Immo verius sub ducati Venetiarum communis proprio stigmatē” La question des émissions d’or de Francesco I^{er} Gattilusio, seigneur de Metelino (1355–1384), *Revue Numismatique* 160 (2004), pp. 223–40 at pp. 236–8; Andreas Mazarakis, ‘An unpublished ducat of Dorino Gattilusio, Lord of Mytilene (1428–1455)’, *Νομισματικά Χρόνικα* 22 (2003), pp. 73–7 at pp. 73–4, 77; *idem*, ‘Some new evidence regarding the numismatic system of the Gattilusii, lords of Lesbos’, *Νομισματικά Χρόνικα* 9 (1990), pp. 141–54 at pp. 147–8.

⁵¹ Jean Froissart, *Oeuvres de Froissart*, ed. Joseph M. B. C. Kervyn de Lettenhove, 29 vols. (Brussels 1870), vol. 16, pp. 39–40, 261–3; Joseph Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient au XIV^e siècle: Expéditions de Marechal Boucicaut*, 2 vols. (Paris 1886), vol. 2, pp. 34–5, 43–5, 47–8 (nos. 10, 14, 16).

of 36,000 francs from Francesco and the merchants of Mytilene.⁵² Their request for repayment from the Duke of Burgundy included a loss of 5,000 ducats on an exchange transaction and 15,000 in expenses, although these may constitute disguised interest.⁵³ Thus the total expended in the captives' cause was about 150,000 ducats, while what they had pledged neared 200,000. This takes no account of the provisions and gifts given to the captives or the cost of entertaining them in suitable style during a six-week stay in Mytilene.⁵⁴ Most or all of the money was paid out within a period of less than eighteen months. While the bulk of this expenditure was in theory to be repaid eventually, the capacity of the Gattilusio lords to commit such an immense sum of money at short notice is eloquent testimony to the extent of their resources.

In the event the Gattilusio lords certainly had difficulty securing what they were owed and probably never retrieved much of the money they had advanced. In discussions with Francesco II's ambassador Ansaldo Spinola in 1400, the duke acknowledged that 75,000 ducats of the Gattilusio ransom contribution remained to be paid, while other loans, expenses and interest raised the total debt to 108,500 ducats. At this time 7,000 ducats of this amount were paid to Spinola.⁵⁵ However, in 1405 the lord of Mytilene had Ansaldo's property seized by the Genoese commune, in response to his misappropriation of a considerable amount of money. It seems possible that this money came from the Duke of Burgundy's debt repayment.⁵⁶ After Spinola's mission repayments seem to have ceased altogether. In 1408 Jacopo Gattilusio sent a fresh embassy to Burgundy to discuss the repayment of the outstanding debt, which still stood undiminished at 101,500 ducats.⁵⁷ The ambassadors Morruale and Giovanni Doria remained at the duke's court until 1410, but there is no indication that they received any further payment of the money owed to their employers.⁵⁸ Thus their contribution to the ransom effort seems to have resulted in an immense financial loss for the Gattilusio lords.

⁵² Delaville, *France en Orient*, vol. 2, pp. 33–5, 91–3 (nos. 9–10, 23); Lalande, pp. 122–3; Froissart, vol. 16, pp. 38, 48–50.

⁵³ Delaville, *France en Orient*, vol. 2, pp. 34–5 (no. 10). Interest is not otherwise mentioned in the account of the outstanding debt presented to the Duke of Burgundy, and it seems unlikely that the Gattilusio would have lent such huge sums without the expectation of some financial recompense.

⁵⁴ Delaville, *France en Orient*, vol. 2, p. 33 (no. 9); Froissart, vol. 16, pp. 48–50.

⁵⁵ Delaville, *France en Orient*, vol. 2, pp. 34–5 (no. 10).

⁵⁶ ASG, NI L, no. 74.

⁵⁷ ADN, B1277, no. 13670.

⁵⁸ ADCO, B1560, f. 101^v; B1562, f. 40^{r-v}.

Despite their earlier wealth, it is clear that during the last years of their regime the Gattilusio lords were afflicted by an acute shortage of money. It seems that the combined impact of repeated devastation of parts of Lesbos, the loss of the family's other territories, disrupted trade and the escalating costs of tribute left the lordship of Mytilene impoverished by the late 1450s. The tribute of Lesbos was set in 1450 at an annual rate of 2,000 ducats.⁵⁹ After the fall of Constantinople this was raised to 3,000.⁶⁰ In 1455 the precondition for recognition of Domenico as lord of Mytilene, along with the cession of Thasos, was an increased tribute of 4,000 ducats, while a proposal to raise it to 6,000 was only averted by pleas of penury.⁶¹ It may have been raised later to 7,000, perhaps following the attack on Methymna in 1457.⁶² Before their loss to the Ottomans, Lemnos had incurred a tribute of 2,350 ducats and Imbros 1,200, in addition to the more long-established tributes of Ainos and Old Phokaia, while the short-lived acquisitions of Skyros, Skiathos and Skopelos were liable for 300 ducats.⁶³ Further expense was incurred by the need for more informal payments to placate Ottoman commanders: the gifts given to the admiral Hamza when his fleet stopped at Lesbos in 1454 amounted to 6,000 silver coins, silk and wool garments, 20 oxen, 50 sheep, over 800 measures of wine, 2 *modioi* of biscuits, 1 *modios* of bread, over 1,000 litres of cheese and a quantity of fruit.⁶⁴ Whatever the expense of paying off Ottoman aggression, failure to do so could have still more costly consequences. According to Domenico

⁵⁹ Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, p. 267. The term used by Chalkokondyles is *stater*, an ancient Greek gold coin evidently invoked here as a classicising affectation. The actual coins in question were presumably ducats, the standard gold coinage of the time and the denomination minted in the Gattilusio lordships (see above, pp. 117–20).

⁶⁰ Doukas, pp. 411–3. Here and elsewhere Doukas refers only to generic gold coins; again, it may be assumed that these were ducats.

⁶¹ Doukas, pp. 413–5.

⁶² This figure, specifically enumerated in Venetian ducats, is given by Archbishop Benedetto in his account of the fall of Mytilene. He claims that it had been paid at this level for seven years, that is since 1455. This large discrepancy with the figure of 4,000 ducats given by Doukas at that time is peculiar: with his instrumental role in the negotiations and ensuing payments, Doukas can hardly be mistaken, but the archbishop should also have been well-informed about the current situation in 1462. The likeliest explanation seems to be a further increase between 1455 and 1462. Since he did not become Archbishop of Mytilene until late 1459 Benedetto may well have been mistaken about the level of tribute paid before that date. Archbishop Benedetto, pp. 359–66 at p. 361.

⁶³ Doukas, p. 411; Alfonso Assini, 'La "compera Metilini" e la difesa genovese del Gattilusio dopo la caduta di Costantinopoli', *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οι Γατελούζοι της Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 223–80 at pp. 259–61 (no. 4).

⁶⁴ Doukas, p. 405.

Gattilusio's plea for help, the Ottoman attack of 1450 had inflicted over 150,000 ducats' worth of damage on Lesbos.⁶⁵ The ransom paid in August 1456 for the release of forty prisoners taken in the fall of Lemnos earlier that year amounted to 1,000 gold coins.⁶⁶

The impact of Ottoman military pressure was clearly crippling. In October 1456 Domenico was still willing to spend up to £10,000 on his sister's dowry, but other evidence suggests that the lordship was having increasing difficulty meeting its costs.⁶⁷ On his mission to seek help from the West in 1456, Archbishop Leonardo's protestations of Domenico's poverty were underlined by his request for the commune to make representations to Venice about its seizure of Skyros, Skiathos and Skopelos. Domenico sought the return of the islands to his control, but failing that he was prepared to settle for the reimbursement of the 300 ducats which he had paid the sultan in tribute for them.⁶⁸ His concern with such a sum of money is suggestive of financial weakness. The repeatedly renewed Genoese arrangement to pay for 200 or 300 infantry to help in the defence of Lesbos from 1456 may also be a sign that the lordship of Mytilene was having difficulty in financing armed forces of its own.⁶⁹ More direct evidence of this appears in July 1456, when the will of a crossbowman in Domenico's service contained the sum of 400 florins which he was owed by the lord of Mytilene: his wages, several years in arrears.⁷⁰ Still more revealing were the abject straits of Leonardo's embassy of 1459: while sending the most distinguished envoy available to him to appeal to western rulers for help, Niccolò of Mytilene was apparently unable to fund this vital mission adequately. On Leonardo's arrival, the Genoese government reported to the pope that he was accompanied only by a single servant and asked that the Church should provide him with a retinue more suited to his station.⁷¹ The financial impact of Ottoman pressure had clearly undermined the Gattilusio regime by sapping its capacity to secure service and support those who provided it.

⁶⁵ Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 5, pp. 350–2 (no. 39).

⁶⁶ Doukas, p. 423.

⁶⁷ Ausilia Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene, 1454–60', *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: atti rogati a Pera e Mitilene* (Genoa 1982), II, pp. 52–3 (no. 18).

⁶⁸ Assini, pp. 259–61 (no. 4).

⁶⁹ See above, pp. 70, 72, 74.

⁷⁰ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 32–3 (no. 4).

⁷¹ Assini, pp. 264–6 (no. 8). In Brussels several months later, the archbishop received money from the Duke of Burgundy to help pay for his return journey. ADN, B2034, f. 186^{r-v}.

Latin Settlement

The circumstances shaping the Gattilusio regime varied considerably between the various domains which came under their rule. Variations in extent, population density, insular or continental position and the balance between town and country would all bear on the precise problems posed by their administration and the responses made to these. In particular, there were almost certainly marked differences in the extent to which the predominantly Greek native population were joined by Latin immigrants, before or during the period of Gattilusio rule. The presence of sizeable numbers of Latins, and of Genoese in particular, would increase the availability of servitors whose loyalties were reinforced by a common identity, not complicated by religious and cultural divides between them and their rulers. On the other hand, the existence of a large Latin community might provoke more serious sectarian tensions than a Latin dynasty accompanied by only a handful of co-religionists. Besides directly undermining the goodwill of the native population towards the regime, such tensions might increase the pressure on the dynasty to take sides in religious disputes, compromising their ability to appeal for loyalty across communal divides.

On Lesbos the Gattilusio had the task of administering one of the largest and most populous islands in the Aegean, in which an extensive rural hinterland was combined with a number of substantial towns. Francesco I originally had to establish his regime there without the benefit of any existing territorial holdings on which to draw for personnel, resources or experience. It is also quite possible that he had to do so without the help of an existing Genoese population. Genoa had received a concession in Mytilene, as in many other Byzantine ports, under the Treaty of Nymphaion of 1261.⁷² However, it has been suggested that the downfall of the Zaccaria in 1329 led to the extinction of the Genoese presence on Chios, with effects lasting until the return of Genoese rule through the invasion of 1346, and it may be speculated that Domenico Cattaneo della Volta's bid to seize Lesbos in 1335–6 could have had a similarly damaging effect on Genoese penetration of Lesbos.⁷³

⁷² Dino Puncuh, Antonella Rovere, Sabina Dellacasa, Elisabetta Madia, Maria Bibolini and Eleonora Pallavicini, *I Libri Iurium della Repubblica di Genova*, 8 vols. (Rome 1992–2002), vol. 4, pp. 271–85 (no. 749).

⁷³ Michel Balard, *La Romanie Génoise (XI^e–début du XV^e siècle)* (Rome 1978), p. 259. The continuator of Jacopo da Varagine states that the Genoese were expelled from Chios

The small size of Francesco's initial following and the lack of confiscated land to distribute would have ruled out the kind of means used to establish Genoese settlement on Chios after 1346, while the fact that his rule had been established by consent reduced the impulse to make such efforts.⁷⁴ On the other hand, Lesbos was attractive to the Genoese on account of its proximity to Chios and Phokaia, its position on the Anatolian littoral route and its natural resources, especially alum. These advantages provided ample incentive for the community to seize upon the opportunity presented by the island's acquisition by a Genoese lord, by resuming or expanding business activities there and seeking profitable posts in Gattilusio service. The available evidence offers few indications of the number of Genoese and other Latin inhabitants, in absolute terms or in relation to the size of other groups. In 1459 the Venetian sea captain Polonio Macero claimed that the Greek population of Lesbos were outnumbered by the Genoese.⁷⁵ This can hardly be true, but the claim suggests that the island's Genoese population had become conspicuously sizeable by the end of the period of Gattilusio rule, and may indeed have approached a majority in Mytilene and perhaps in other important ports, the places most likely to be familiar to visiting sailors and merchants.

Given the commercial predilections of the Genoese, Latin penetration was presumably much more intensive in these urban centres, particularly Mytilene, than in the countryside. Such a pattern of largely urban settlement would be in conformity with the situation in other Genoese territories, and indeed across the Latin East.⁷⁶ Furthermore, unlike rulers

when it was retaken by Byzantium. Vincenzo Promis (ed.), 'Continuazione della Cronica di Jacopo da Varagine dal MCCXCVII al MCCCXXXII', *ASLSP* 10 (1874), pp. 493–511 at p. 510.

⁷⁴ Argenti, vol. 1, pp. 569–76; Balard, *Romanie*, pp. 225–7, 259–64; above, p. 811n10.

⁷⁵ Stuart Jenks, *Robert Sturmy's commercial expedition to the Mediterranean (1457/8) with editions of the trial of the Genoese before king and council, and of other sources* (Bristol 2006), p. 70.

⁷⁶ David Jacoby, 'Changing economic patterns in Latin Romania: the impact of the West', *The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World*, ed. Angeliki E. Laiou and Roy Parviz Mottahedeh (Washington, D. C. 2001), pp. 197–233, reprinted in *Commercial Exchange Across the Mediterranean: Byzantium, the Crusader Levant, Egypt and Italy* (Aldershot 2005), IX at pp. 209–12; *idem*, 'L'état catalan en Grèce: société et institutions politiques', *Els catalans a la Mediterrània oriental a l'edat mitjana*, ed. Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol (Barcelona 2003), pp. 79–101 at pp. 85–7; *idem*, 'Demographic evolution', pp. 140–8, 151–3, 167; Michel Balard, 'Habitat, ethnies et métiers dans les comptoirs génoises d'Orient (XIII^e–XV^e s.)', *D'une ville à l'autre: structures matérielles et organisation de l'espace dans les villes européennes (XIII^e–XV^e s.)*, ed. Jean-Claude Maire Vigueur (Rome 1989), pp. 107–32 at p. 129; Anthony Luttrell, 'Feudal tenure and Latin colonization at Rhodes: 1306–1415', *English Historical Review* 85 (1970), pp. 755–75, reprinted in *The Hospitallers in Cyprus, Rhodes, Greece and the West 1291–1440* (London 1970), III, pp. 767–8; Sally McKee,

who had gained their territories by force, and who on occasion confronted rebellions by the native landowning classes, the Gattilusio had no occasion to engage in the large-scale expropriation of property which would provide the wherewithal for a general distribution of land to their retinue.⁷⁷ There is no evidence that the allotment of land for service played any part in the governance of the Gattilusio lordships. None of the known documentary references to land tenure in their territories mention feudal relationships, while the references to soldiers relate only to militia or to salaried mercenaries, not to holders of western-style fiefs or of *pronoiai* in the Byzantine fashion.⁷⁸ Latins in the Gattilusio territories were therefore less likely than those elsewhere to be drawn out into the countryside by landowning interests. On the other hand, in an atmosphere less troubled by sectarian tension and resentment, there was less incentive for them to reside in the towns for reasons of personal security, a concern which was probably an important contributor to settlement patterns in other Latin territories.⁷⁹

By the 1450s numerous Genoese inhabitants of Lesbos had clearly acquired property from the local Greeks, not only in the city of Mytilene but also in the rural hinterland, as the notarial collection from Mytilene illustrates. For instance, Battista Usodimare lent money to a Greek neighbour whose vineyard in Thermi lay alongside his own. The legacy of Pietro Panisaro included vineyards and orchards of olives and figs in Akrotiri, while Argenta Rosello de Garessio left properties at 'Sulinaria' and Battista de Marinis gave lands at Parakella as well as goods and cash as part of his daughter's dowry.⁸⁰ Giovanni Lomellini left an extensive array of property in his will, including a number of fields in the vicinity of Kallone, 'Poligogni'

Uncommon Dominion: Venetian Crete and the myth of ethnic purity (Philadelphia 2000), pp. 58–61.

⁷⁷ E.g. David Jacoby, 'Social evolution in Latin Greece', *A History of the Crusades*, ed. Kenneth M. Setton, 6 vols. (Madison, Wisconsin 1969–90), vol. 6, pp. 175–221 at pp. 190–4, 216–7; *idem*, 'Etat catalan', pp. 86–9; Luttrell, 'Feudal tenure', pp. 757–66; Argenti, vol. 1, pp. 97–8, 101, 572–6, vol. 2, pp. 30–1, 34–5; McKee, pp. 30–8; Sivano Borsari, *Il dominio veneziano a Creta nel XIII secolo* (Naples 1963), pp. 27–30, 39–40, 45–7; Peter Lock, *The Franks in the Aegean 1204–1500* (London 1995), pp. 280–1.

⁷⁸ See below, pp. 283–6.

⁷⁹ David Jacoby, 'Les états latins en Roumanie: phénomènes sociaux et économiques (1204–1350 environs)', *Actes du XV^e Congrès International d'Etudes Byzantines Athènes—September 1976*, 2 vols. (Athens 1979), *Rapports et co-rapports*, vol. 1/3, pp. 3–51, reprinted in *Recherches sur la Méditerranée orientale du XII^e au XV^e siècle: peuples, sociétés, économies* (London 1979), V, pp. 19–20.

⁸⁰ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 38–40, 65–6, 67–8, 108–10, (nos. 8, 26, 28, 50a–b).

and 'Calicha', identifying the Greek tenants who worked several of these.⁸¹ Such holdings might be acquired by purchase or by intermarriage with the Greek population: Niccolò Moscatello acquired a vineyard from Maria Pamphylina as part of his wife's dowry.⁸²

Unsurprisingly, the Gattilusio lords themselves built up land-holdings on the island, whose rents or produce must have contributed to the resources at their disposal. Dorino I's properties included a country villa at Makri.⁸³ Land at Kamares was given to Domenico Gattilusio as a bequest by Giovanni de Roddo, who retained the use of it for his lifetime and would receive an annual ration of grain, wine and cheese in addition to a cash sum to settle a debt.⁸⁴ The possessions of Orietta Gattilusio, daughter of Niccolò I, included cultivated lands at Vasilika, Moria and Kerami and pastures with herds of cattle and goats near Vasilika and Pyrrha.⁸⁵ Palamede of Ainos also owned estates in Lesbos, including a property at Moria administered in 1445 by his *oikonomos* Giorgio Mamino.⁸⁶ According to Palamede's will, which passed his territorial holdings to the children of his deceased elder son Giorgio, his younger son Dorino was to receive his estates on Lesbos.⁸⁷ These were presumably substantial, since when in 1488 Dorino conceded his rights over the lordships of Mytilene and Old Phokaia to Marco Doria, he made a point of reserving the right to reclaim these lands.⁸⁸

The identifiable Latin-owned properties encountered in the notarial collection from Mytilene were distributed across a considerable part of the island, but clustered in the vicinity of Mytilene in the east of the

⁸¹ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 126–34 (nos. 59a–c); Andreas Mazarakis, 'Στοιχεία τοπογραφίας του κόλπου της Βυζαντινής Καλλονής', *Λεσβιακά* 18 (2000), pp. 193–6 at p. 194. 'Poligogni' is perhaps to be identified with Pligoni, south of Mytilene. Any firm identification of 'Calicha' is rendered unsafe by the number of locations in different parts of Lesbos with similar names, including Ano Chalikas and Kato Chalikas near Mytilene, Chalikas near Kontisia, Chalakas near Lampou Myloi and Chalakies near Nyphida.

⁸² Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 112–3 (no. 52).

⁸³ Leonardo, *De Statu Hominis*, f. 100^v.

⁸⁴ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 83–5 (no. 36). This arrangement resembles a secular version of the *adelphata* agreed between testators and Byzantine monasteries. Morrisson and Cheynet, pp. 870–1; Alice-Mary M. Talbot, 'Old age in Byzantium', *BZ* 77 (1984), pp. 267–78 at pp. 276–7.

⁸⁵ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 78–83 (no. 35); Andreas Mazarakis, 'Παραχωρητήριο της Domina Orietta Gattilusio και των δύο θυγατέρων της', *Λεσβιακά* 19 (2002), pp. 58–61; *idem*, 'Στοιχεία', pp. 195–6.

⁸⁶ Leonardo, *De Statu Hominis*, f. 84^v.

⁸⁷ Kritovoulos, pp. 101–2.

⁸⁸ Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 5, pp. 371–2 (no. 70).

island, and around the Gulf of Kallone in the centre.⁸⁹ The latter area was where the island's principal concentration of fertile low-lying land was to be found.⁹⁰ This distribution pattern would be consistent with the natural spread of a Latin presence focused on Mytilene and drawn to the most desirable land for investment. Besides their suitability for agriculture, the shores of the gulf must have offered greater security against raids than the exposed outer coasts of the island, owing to the encircling protection of the mountainous interior. Only the straits leading to the open sea and the narrow coastal plains on either side of them afforded ready access, and attackers who succeeded in entering the gulf would then have been in danger of becoming trapped there. The devastation wrought around Kallone by the Ottomans in 1450 shows the limitations of these natural defences in the face of a powerful fleet, but their daunting effect on smaller raiding parties must have increased the appeal of the region to those wishing to invest in land. Conceivably the attraction of Latins to areas connected with the alum industry also played a part in drawing them to the shores of the Gulf of Kallone.⁹¹

In any case, it is clear that the Latin settlers did not remain a purely urban presence, nor even confine their rural acquisitions to the immediate environs of the main commercial centres. By the last years of Gattilusio rule, Genoese settlers had become established as land-holders in both urban and rural Lesbos. They were thus embedded in a network of social and economic relationships which entwined their affairs and interests with those of the native Greeks and their Gattilusio rulers. Unfortunately, only the Mytilene notarial collection from the 1450s sheds light on these matters, so that it cannot be discerned how rapidly and deeply the process had taken hold on Lesbos, or whether corresponding processes of penetration and entrenchment by the Genoese took place in other Gattilusio territories.

⁸⁹ See Map 4 for the distribution of Latin-owned estates.

⁹⁰ The fertility of the central plain is remarked upon by Buondelmonti and Leonardo of Chios. Buondelmonti, ed. de Sinner, p. 116; Leonardo, *De Statu Hominis*, f. 93.

⁹¹ Mazarakis, 'Στοιχεῖα', p. 196. The possibility that this distribution is partly a product of the nature of the evidence must be acknowledged, since these documents are the acts of notaries based in Mytilene and the individuals involved are likely to have resided there or at least visited on business. The data is therefore liable to show a bias towards areas closer to the capital. Residents of more distant areas may have been served by notaries based in Methymna, Eressos or elsewhere.

The volume of documentary material available for Lesbos, which at least gives an impressionistic sense of the vigorous and variegated Latin presence there, is not matched by the other Gattilusio territories, leaving still greater grounds for uncertainty. The situation of Old Phokaia was most similar to Lesbos in terms of its role in the Genoese world and proximity to the community's existing possessions, while its urban character and ready accessibility by sea enhanced its prospects of attracting renewed Genoese settlement. Such settlement seems likely to have begun either during the period of Gattilusio rule or quite shortly beforehand. It seems unlikely that the port's Kalothetos lords would have permitted any significant Genoese settlement during their tenure, given the continuing Genoese claim to the place and their looming presence a few miles down the coast at New Phokaia and offshore on Chios. Some Latins may however have been established in Old Phokaia under the Kalothetoi.⁹² The apparent predominance of New Phokaia in the local alum industry, and the consolidation of a revived Genoese presence there while Old Phokaia was still held by the Kalothetoi, may also have diminished the old town's attractiveness for Genoese settlement once it passed into Gattilusio hands.

Ainos manifested another combination of circumstances. Like Old Phokaia this was an urban enclave with alluring natural resources nearby and a good location for trade with the continental hinterland, while its attractions were not impaired by a nearby competing focus for activity like New Phokaia. On the other hand, its role in the Genoese commercial network is less clear. There is a lack of clear evidence for serious Genoese involvement in Ainos before the time of the Gattilusio.⁹³ The limitations

⁹² See below, p. 409.

⁹³ One of the towns in which the Genoese were granted an establishment by the Treaty of Nymphaion is named as 'Anea' or 'Anneia' (Puncuh *et al.*, p. 274 (no. 749)). This has on occasion been identified as Ainos (e.g. Giustina Olgiati, 'I Gattilusio', *Dibattito su famiglie nobili del mondo coloniale genovese nel Levante: Atti del Convegno Montoggio, 23 ottobre 1993*, ed. Geo Pistarino (Genoa 1994), pp. 85–99 at p. 85; Geo Pistarino, 'La difesa genovese dell'Egeo nord-orientale nel tempo dei Gattilusio (1355–1462)', *Le Stelle e le Strisce: studi americani e militari in onore di Raimondo Luraghi*, 2 vols. (Milan 1998), vol. 2, pp. 51–64 at p. 53). However, in Latin documents the name of Ainos is almost invariably rendered as 'Enus', 'Ennus', 'Eney' or some similar form, evidently of phonetic derivation. The one exception is the spelling 'Aenus', probably a transliteration of the name as written in Greek. On no known occasion does it appear with a spelling whose pronunciation would be consistent with that in the Treaty of Nymphaion. The alternative identification of 'Anea' as the Anatolian port of Ania therefore seems much the more plausible. Cf. Laura Balletto, 'Ania-Anea tra Greci, Genovesi, Almogàveri e Turchi', *Cultura e società nell'Italia medievale*:

of the available evidence also leave open the question of how much settlement it attracted after the establishment of Gattilusio rule. While Genoese involvement in the Maroneia alum industry may have provided a spur to the community's commercial penetration of the area, the evidence for significant and intensifying links to Venetian trade networks under Gattilusio rule raise doubts as to the depth of Genoese involvement in Ainos.⁹⁴

Finally, the islands acquired during the course of the fifteenth century contained significant rural expanses as did Lesbos, but lacked commercial centres of the significance of Mytilene, while evidence for their integration into the wider Genoese trading sphere is sparse. Their lower population density may have been matched by lower economic productivity than that of islands such as Lesbos or Chios, diminishing their attractiveness to Genoese businessmen. It may reasonably be doubted how far any meaningful Genoese community existed on these islands under Gattilusio rule, still more so outside their principal ports.

Governmental Forms and Functionaries

The apparatus of government that the Gattilusio lordships developed could draw on individuals from each of their constituent communities and institutional forms from both Byzantine and Latin traditions. The Byzantine basis of their regime increased the likelihood that the Gattilusio would, at least initially, operate through the existing structures of government, and that they would feel able to rely on Greeks in positions of power. Even among Latin regimes established by force, Byzantine practices exerted a lasting influence on administration, particularly at a local level.⁹⁵ The republican institutions of the Genoese commune were less instantly

studi per Paolo Brezzi (Rome 1988), pp. 59–69; Chryssa A. Maltezou, “Ἕλληνες καὶ Ἱταλοὶ ἔμποροι στὴν Ἀναία τῆς Μικρᾶς Ἀσίας (ἀρχές 14^{ου} αἰ.),” *Porphyrogenita: Essays on Byzantine History, in honour of Julian Chrysostomides*, ed. Charalambos Dendrinos, Jonathan Harris, Eirene Harvalia-Crook and Judith Herrin (Aldershot 2003), pp. 253–63.

It has been suggested that the Genoese connections of John Livadarios, who seized control of Ainos in 1356, are a reflection of Genoese commercial interests there, but this remains conjectural. Thierry Ganchou, ‘Autonomie locale et relations avec les Latins à Byzance au XIV^e siècle: Iōannēs Limpidarios/Libadarios, Ainos et les Draperio de Pera’, *Chemins d’outre-mer: études d’histoire sur la Méditerranée médiévale offertes à Michel Balard*, ed. Damien Coulon, Catherine Otten-Froux, Paule Pagès and Dominique Valérian (Paris 2004), pp. 353–74 at pp. 370–3.

⁹⁴ See above, pp. 227–32; below, pp. 419–21.

⁹⁵ David Jacoby, ‘From Byzantium to Latin Romania: continuity and change’, *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204*, ed. Benjamin Arbel, Bernard Hamilton

applicable to government by an individual or family than the structures inherited from the Byzantine monarchy. However, it was the practices of the Latin world and of their Genoese compatriots in particular with which the new rulers would have been most familiar, while the administrative methods of the commune's colonial territories, the Mahona of Chios and earlier Genoese lords like the Zaccaria offered the most directly analogous precedents for them to follow. It would also have been natural for the Gattilusio to be particularly ready to rely on their fellow Genoese when seeking servitors. If they drew especially on those with prior administrative experience, this background would have shaped those individuals' influence on the government in which they served. Politically, there were benefits to be derived from satisfying the aspirations to power and status of leading figures on both sides of the cultural and religious divide. Thus while all Latin regimes in former Byzantine lands enlisted elements from both communities and traditions of government, the influences on the Gattilusio lordships were more than usually balanced. The outcome of these pressures was likely to vary between different territories, owing to the variations in geographical extent, economic development and Latin settlement already noted.

Given that the available indications suggest a considerable Genoese presence in Mytilene, it is unsurprising that both Genoese office-holders and governmental structures adopted from standard Genoese practice seem to have figured prominently there. The most conspicuous official in the sources was the vicar of the lord of Mytilene. Four different holders of this office, all of them Italians, are attested between 1424 and 1457: Antonio de Orvieto, Lodovico de Montegaldono, Gentile Marengo de Novi and Gabriele de Rapallo.⁹⁶ The office was a standard feature of Genoese administration, with both the rulers of the metropolis and the chief officials of its colonial establishments employing their own vicars.⁹⁷ The administrative and judicial capacities in which successive vicars of Mytilene appear, including presiding in the law-court, conducting contractual negotiations on the lord's behalf and disposing of the effects of

and David Jacoby (London 1989), pp. 1–44, reprinted in *Byzantium, Latin Romania and the Aegean* (Aldershot 2001), VII, pp. 10–22.

⁹⁶ Schreiner, *Kleinchroniken*, vol. 1, p. 224 (no. 31/6); Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 2, pp. 86–7 (no. 11), vol. 3, p. 315 (no. 29); ASG, NA 847 (Tommaso de Recco 1), nos. 235, 239–40, 312, 354, unnumbered document; Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 50–3, 96–7 (nos. 17–8, 43).

⁹⁷ Balard, *Romanie*, pp. 271, 378–9.

those who died intestate, suggest that they performed the usual range of functions of such officials.⁹⁸

Lodovico de Montegaldono, who was vicar of Mytilene in 1428, is probably to be identified with the Lodovico or Lodisio de Montegualdano attested as vicar of the *podestà* of Pera in 1402–3 and as vicar of the *podestà* of Chios in 1405 and 1407.⁹⁹ Gabriele de Rapallo, attested as vicar of Mytilene in 1450 and in 1456–7, may be the same as the man of that name who served as a Genoese ambassador to Florence in 1447 and 1451–4 and as *podestà* of Chios in 1454–6.¹⁰⁰ If such officials were being recruited from a pool of men who served the commune and the Gattilusio interchangeably, this would presumably have increased the influence of current practice in Genoese territories on the administration of the lordship.

Besides the vicar's court, the structures associated with the government and business affairs of the lordship of Mytilene included the lord's chancellery, a loggia and a 'domo dominacionis iuxta marinam', perhaps a customs house, forming a physical and institutional setting for public affairs consistent with Italian norms. The vicar's court, the chancellery, the loggia

⁹⁸ ASG, NA 847 (Tommaso de Recco 1), nos. 235, 239–40, 312, 354, unnumbered document; Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 41–2, 53–4, 62–4, 69–71, 107–8 (nos. 10, 19, 24, 30, 49).

⁹⁹ ASG, *SGCanc* (Sala 34) 590/1306 (*Pera Syndicamenta* 1402), ff. 1–3^v, 78–82; *SGCanc* (Sala 34) 590/1307 (*Pera Syndicamenta* 1403), ff. 3, 52^v–3^v; Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 2, pp. 86–7 (no. 11); Paola Piena Toniolo, *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: atti rogati a Chio da Gregorio Panissario (1403–1405)* (Genoa 1995), pp. 216–8, 223–5 (nos. 165, 169); ASG, NA 603 (Giovanni Balbi 1), nos. 27–30.

¹⁰⁰ ASG, AS 1778 (*Litterarum* 2, f. 328^v (no. 1303); AS 1783 (*Litterarum* 7), ff. 302^v, 383^v (nos. 845, 1127); AS 1794 (*Litterarum* 18), ff. 45^v, 47, 54^v–5^v, 204, 217^v–9, 309, 310^v, 318^v–9, 325, 596, 601, 603, 611, 640, 684^{r-v}, 698, 741^v, 761^v, 808^v, 868^v (nos. 204, 209, 240–1, 892, 936–7, 1297, 1302, 1344, 1376, 2460, 2476, 2482, 2516, 2527, 2657, 2849, 3115, 3229, 3446, 3742); AS 2707A (*Instructiones et Relationes* 1396–1464), no. 107; ASG, NA 847 (Tommaso de Recco 1), nos. 235, 239, 240, 312, 354; Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 50–3, 96–7 (nos. 17–8, 43). There are chronological difficulties with such an interpretation, as the recorded presence of Gabriele as vicar of Mytilene, attested on 22 October 1456 (Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 50–3 (nos. 17–8)), overlaps with the term of the man of the same name who was *podestà* of Chios. This Gabriele is attested as a candidate for *podestà* on 16 Aug 1454 (ASG, AS 1794 (*Litterarum* 18), f. 596 (no. 2460)), as *podestà* designate on 23 October (*ibid.*, f. 611 (no. 2527)) and as serving *podestà* on 10 December of that year (ASG, AS 1783 (*Litterarum* 7), f. 302^v (no. 845)). His term was ultimately extended to 26 months (ASG, AS 1778 (*Litterarum* 2), f. 328^v (no. 1303)), which would almost certainly have taken it beyond 22 October 1456, even if dated from his selection rather than his assumption of responsibility. He was referred to in Genoa as *podestà* on 27 November 1456 (ASG, AS 1794 (*Litterarum* 18), f. 808^v (no. 3446)), while his successor was still regarded by the Genoese government merely as *podestà* designate on 15 November of that year (*ibid.*, f. 805 (no. 3428)). However, it is conceivable that Gabriele, having secured future employment with his former master in Mytilene, had already begun to spend time and discharge duties there before his term in Chios came to an end.

and the piazza adjoining them were common locales for the transactions of the notaries. These were another standard element of Italian public life which was to be found operating in Gattilusio Mytilene, facilitating governmental business as well as personal and commercial contracts.¹⁰¹ While the vast majority of those attested as using the services of Italian notaries were Latins, they also very occasionally included the lordship's Greek subjects.¹⁰² Greek notaries were also active on Lesbos. An act concerning the alum contract between Theodore Theodigis Kolyvas and the Lomellini brothers was enacted in 1412 by the notary George Kaloides, perhaps a relative of Demetrios Kydones's friend of that name.¹⁰³ There is also a reference from 1371 to a *protonotarios*, although it is impossible to be certain whether he was a local official or was in imperial service.¹⁰⁴ The lordship's most prominent notarial practitioner was the chancellor of the lord of Mytilene. This office was at one time held by Lodovico Bartolomei de Massia, who is attested drafting important documents and appointing procurators for Francesco II, Jacopo and Niccolò I between 1388 and 1409.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 33–5, 41–2, 50–4, 64–5, 69–71, 76–8, 85–7, 94–7, 102–6, 108–10, 113–5, 118–9, 136–8 (nos. 5, 10, 17–9, 25, 30, 34, 37, 42–3, 48, 50a–b, 53, 56, 61–2); Makis Axiotis, 'Η loggia της Μυτιλήνης', *Λεσβιακά* 16 (1996), pp. 71–6.

¹⁰² Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 29–31 (nos. 2–3).

¹⁰³ ASG, *NA* 603 (Giovanni Balbi 1), nos. 318, 322, 326, 336, 467, appendix G; below, p. 304.

¹⁰⁴ Franz Miklosich and Joseph Müller, *Acta et Diplomata Graeca Medii Aevi: Sacra et Profana, Collecta et Edita*, 7 vols. (Vienna 1968), vol. 1, pp. 575–6 (no. 315); Venance Grumel, Vitalien Laurent and Jean Darrouzès, *Les Regestes des Actes du Patriarcat de Constantinople*, 7 vols. (Paris 1932–91), *Les Actes des Patriarches* 1, vol. 5, pp. 525–6 (no. 2623); below, p. 294.

¹⁰⁵ L. T. Belgrano, 'Seconda serie di documenti riguardanti la Colonia di Pera', *ASLSP* 13 (1877–84), pp. 931–1003 at pp. 953–65 (no. 8); Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 1, pp. 87–9 (no. 4); ASG, *NI* L, no. 74; ASG, *SGCol* 7671 (*Descriptionum Locorum* 1408), f. 12^v; ADN, B1277, no. 13670; Basso, 'Note', pp. 351–2 (no. 3); above, p. 170n151. Lodovico de Massia, attested in Mytilene as notary and chancellor in the service of the Gattilusio lords in 1388, 1398, 1405, 1406 and 1408, also appears with the office of chancellor in a letter of disputed authenticity which he apparently drafted for Niccolò I Gattilusio at Chios in 1409 (Enrico Basso, 'Note su tre documenti inediti e una presunta lettera di Niccolò I Gattilusio, signore di Enos', *Λεσβιακά* 20 (2004), pp. 338–53 at pp. 351–2 (no. 3); above, p. 170n151). Basso describes him as chancellor of Corrado Doria, *podestà* of Chios and commander of the Genoese expeditionary force there, who is said to have persuaded Niccolò to send this letter (Basso, 'Note', p. 345). However, the document does not specify whose chancellor he was and Basso offers no justification for his identification. Given Lodovico's longstanding service to the Gattilusio, still attested as recently as the previous year, it seems far more likely that he remained in that capacity and had accompanied Niccolò to Chios. Therefore this is probably not another case of Gattilusio officials occupying similar roles in Genoese colonial administration.

The other principal governmental office identifiable in the lordship of Mytilene is Battista Gattilusio's post of governor-general of the island, whose precise duties are unclear but certainly involved the collection of revenues.¹⁰⁶ An enigmatic reference to Giorgio Gattilusio as 'praeses' of Mytilene in 1431 may indicate that he held the same office.¹⁰⁷ There is very little evidence for the nature of local government within Lesbos.¹⁰⁸ The

¹⁰⁶ ASG, NA 847 (Tommaso de Recco 1), no. 354, unnumbered document. Andreas Mazarakis has argued that this post reflects a continuation of the Byzantine administrative system, corresponding directly to the office of *kephale*, the standard office of provincial administration under the Palaiologoi. Under this interpretation the governor-general was a senior *kephale* responsible for the whole island, corresponding to the general *kephalai* attested in Thessaly and the Morea, under whom were placed a number of more junior *kephalai* each governing a single town or city and its immediate hinterland (Andreas Mazarakis, 'Il contesto istituzionale della dominazione e l'amministrazione dei Gattilusio a Mitilene' (1355–1462), *Cercetari Numismatice* 12–13 (2006–7), pp. 249–69 at pp. 260–3; cf. Ijubomir Maksimović, *The Byzantine Provincial Administration Under the Palaiologoi* (Amsterdam 1988), pp. 128–45). However, the reference to Battista's conduct of the 'gubernata de introytibus' shows that revenue collection comprised at least part of his duties, and it is possible that this term referred to the responsibilities of the governor-general as a whole (ASG, NA 847 (Tommaso de Recco 1), no. 354). In the Byzantine system the post of *kephale* carried an essentially administrative and judicial remit, remaining distinct from the fiscal system, although holders of that office often also acquired fiscal responsibilities (Maksimovic, pp. 145–56, 184–5, 227–9).

An office formerly in charge of the whole island would presumably have been the most senior position in its government under the lord of Mytilene. Such prominence would sit oddly with the scarcity of source references to the post in comparison with the number of allusions to that of vicar of Mytilene, not only in documents relating to that office's particular functions but also in other contexts such as witness lists or narrative sources, in which the vicar's appearance derived from his general importance in the regime (Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 2, pp. 86–7 (no. 11); Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 50–3, 96–7 (nos. 17–8, 43); Doukas, p. 435). It seems plausible to imagine that the office had in fact been superseded by the creation of the lordship of Mytilene, its responsibilities being assumed by the lord himself. The general *kephalai* attested elsewhere appear to have been superseded in this fashion by appanage-holders, the closest parallel to the lord of Mytilene within the Byzantine mainstream (Maksimović, pp. 144–5). This pattern is suggested by a reference from 1424 to the responsibility of 'κεφαλαττεύων' in Mytilene being exercised by others because of Jacopo Gattilusio's absence from the city during a plague outbreak, implying that this was normally his own charge (Schreiner, *Kleinchroniken*, vol. 1, p. 224 (no. 31/6); below, p. 277n137). Hence there is reason to suppose that Battista's office was either a later revival of the position of general *kephale* of Mytilene, necessarily with a more limited remit than before, or an unrelated post created by the Gattilusio.

¹⁰⁷ Francesco Scalamonti, *Vita Clarissimi et Famosissimi Kyriaci Anconitani*, ed. and tr. Charles Mitchell and Edward W. Bodnar (Philadelphia 1996), pp. 63–4; cf. Mazarakis, 'Contesto', p. 261; above, p. 196. Mazarakis's suggestion that Agabito Spinola held the office of governor-general in 1456, based on the order in which the names of witnesses appear in a notarial act, seems to be invalidated by the appearance of the same names in a different order in the witness list of another act concluded on the same day. Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 50–3 (nos. 17–8).

¹⁰⁸ Mazarakis states that Leonardo of Chios refers in his *De Statu Hominis* to a *kephale* of Kallone. However, this reference is actually to a 'vir cognomento Cephalas Caloniensis';

only clearly identified administrator of a locality outside the capital was a Chian named Francesco Torello, described by Leonardo of Chios in 1445 as 'regente' for the lord of Mytilene in Vasilika.¹⁰⁹ It is possible that the Leontios apparently attested as responsible for some grain supplies on Lesbos, most probably on the peninsula south of Mytilene, was also a local government official.¹¹⁰

The degree of continuity from Byzantine governmental forms, especially at the local level, observable in territories where Latin rule was established by force suggests that the Gattilusio regime must have been all the more infused with Byzantine practice. However, those institutions whose character is discernible from the sources seem to have been shaped chiefly by Genoese norms and it is hard to identify particular elements of continuity from the former Byzantine administration. Nevertheless, it is clear that neither Lesbos nor the other Gattilusio territories were governed by an immigrant regime staffed in its upper ranks by Genoese and largely excluding the native population from positions of serious power. In most former imperial territories a stratum of Greek *archontes*, the old landowning and office-holding elite, continued to exist under Latin rule. Their employment in positions of high authority by Latin rulers was not unheard of. For instance, the former Byzantine governor of Chios Leo Tsyvos had been placed in charge of Phokaia by the Genoese conquerors in 1346, although his tenure there was extremely short, terminated by his offensive aimed at ousting the Genoese from Chios in 1347.¹¹¹ However, such cases were unusual, for reasons which the case of Tsyvos illustrates. This was a general pattern cutting across the diversity of governing structures in the Latin East. To varying extents in different territories, indigenous aristocrats came to be socially integrated into the elite milieu of the

that is, a man of Kallone with the surname Kephalas, not a holder of the office of *kephale*. Leonardo, *De Statu Hominis*, f. 93^v; Mazarakis, 'Contesto', p. 261.

¹⁰⁹ Leonardo, *De Statu Hominis*, f. 107^v. The *De Statu Hominis* presents its protagonists as travelling from the site of ancient Pyrrha via Makri to 'Vassilicata', which is described as a town beside the Gulf of Kallone with a tower in the middle of it and a church of St. Nicholas (*ibid.*, ff. 93^v, 100^v–1, 107^v). If Leonardo's 'Vassilicata' is to be identified with Vasilika, this combination of characteristics would suggest that the medieval settlement of that name was on the site of modern Skamioudi rather than that of modern Vasilika or, as has been proposed, that of ancient Pyrrha (Ioannis K. Moutzouris, 'Μεσαιωνικά κάστρα της Λέσβου', *Λεσβιακά* 4 (1962), pp. 50–68 at pp. 58–61; *idem*, 'Τα μεσαιωνικά Βασιλικά', *Λεσβιακά* 12 (1989), pp. 195–218 at pp. 207–8). The latter interpretation seems in any case to be invalidated by Leonardo's description of Pyrrha as a ruin.

¹¹⁰ Peter Schreiner, *Texte zur spätbyzantinischen Finanz- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte in Handschriften der Biblioteca Vaticana* (Vatican 1990), pp. 245–7 (no. 49).

¹¹¹ John Kantakouzenos, *Ioannis Cantacuzeni imperatoris historiarum libri IV*, ed. Ludwig Schopen, 3 vols. (Bonn 1828–32) *CSHB* 7, 8, 9, vol. 3, pp. 83–5.

Latin rulers, and in time a few individual families might acquire considerable political importance. However, in the structures of government the normal pattern, especially in the early decades of Latin rule in a particular area, was for Greeks to be restricted to junior or symbolic posts where they would have little opportunity to cause trouble.¹¹²

Given the consensual basis of the Gattilusio regime, it is unsurprising that the native elite retained an important role under their rule, although a degree of social detachment was maintained between them and the ruling dynasty. Unlike the families comprising the Mahona of Chios, the Gattilusio lords did not intermarry with local *archontes*.¹¹³ Their greater wealth and power as individuals and the heightened status they had gained through Francesco I's imperial marriage enabled them to set their sights higher. Where they intermarried with Orthodox families it was with the imperial dynasties of Byzantium and Trebizond, the preeminent princely house of Serbia and the most powerful family of the Byzantine aristocracy.¹¹⁴ Such lofty connections undoubtedly bolstered the Gattilusio regime by enhancing the family's prestige in the eyes of their subjects, but may have represented a barrier to direct affiliation with the leading native inhabitants, and perhaps distanced the ruling house from the *archontes* in other respects. The best-attested friendships between Gattilusio lords and Greeks were those between Francesco I and Demetrios Kydones, successively minister of John VI and of John V, and between Francesco II and his son-in-law the Emperor John VII.¹¹⁵ Even setting aside any sectarian obstacles, it is possible that their movement in these elevated circles

¹¹² Balard, *Romanie*, pp. 272–3; *idem*, 'The Greeks of Crimea under Genoese rule in the XIVth and XVth centuries', *DOP* 49 (1995), pp. 23–32 at pp. 25–7; *idem*, 'Genoese in the Aegean', pp. 169–70; David Jacoby, 'The encounter of two societies: western conquerors and Byzantines in the Peloponnesus after the Fourth Crusade', *American Historical Review* 78 (1973), pp. 873–906 at pp. 891–905; *idem*, 'Etat catalan', pp. 89–91, 95–7; *idem*, 'Demographic evolution', p. 134; *idem*, 'Thessalonique de la domination de Byzance à celle de Venise: continuité, adaptation ou rupture?', *Mélanges Gilbert Dagron*, ed. Vincent Déroche, Denis Feissel, Cécile Morrisson and Constantin Zuckerman (Paris 2002) (*Travaux et Mémoires* 14), pp. 303–18, reprinted in *Latins, Greeks and Muslims: encounters in the eastern Mediterranean, 10th–15th centuries* (Farnham 2009), VIII, pp. 306–11; Peter Topping, 'Co-existence of Greeks and Latins in Frankish Morea and Venetian Crete', *XV^e Congrès international d'études byzantines. I. Histoire Rapports* (Athens 1976), pp. 3–23, reprinted in *Studies on Latin Greece A.D. 1205–1715* (London 1977), XI, pp. 5–7, 12–7; Jean Richard, 'Culture franque et culture grecque: le Royaume de Chypre au XV^eme siècle', *BF* 11 (1987), pp. 399–415 at pp. 412–4; McKee, pp. 68–83; Lock, pp. 281–7.

¹¹³ Balard, *Romanie*, p. 321.

¹¹⁴ See above, pp. 48, 62, 102–3; below, pp. 375, 417–8.

¹¹⁵ See above, pp. 47–8, 51, 53–4, 97–100; below, pp. 296, 304–6.

encouraged the Gattilusio lords to regard the local Greek elite as being not only their political subordinates but decidedly inferior to them socially as well. Such an attitude would not have been untypical of the Byzantine high aristocracy of the period.¹¹⁶ However, it does seem likely that leading members of the Gattilusio *albergo* outside the immediate family of the lords intermarried with local people. The description of the mother of Giuliano Gattilusio as being from Lesbos in contradistinction to the Genoese identity of his father, the governor-general Battista, suggests that she was either Greek or of mixed parentage.¹¹⁷

In any case it is clear that Greek notables formed a part of the social milieu of the Gattilusio lords. One such *archon* was *kyr* (lord) Manuel Sophianos, who received a short letter in Greek from Domenico Gattilusio. Domenico addressed Manuel as his *oikeios*, a term denoting a member of an extended household with significant standing and personal links with its head, rather than a servant; the *oikeioi* of the Byzantine emperor were often holders of high office.¹¹⁸ Appearing among the principal *archontes* of the Morea in the thirteenth century, in the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries bearers of the Sophianos name also occupied high office in Constantinople, where some became prominent bankers.¹¹⁹ Sophianoï were also prominent in Phokaia and Chios in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, some of them gaining Genoese citizenship.¹²⁰ The kind of connections developed by these Sophianoï are reflected in the case of Alamano Sophianos of Old Phokaia, whose in 1414 was operating in partnership with a Turk, Hatip Paşa of Pergamon, in a cotton transaction. When a dispute arose over the sale, their interests were represented by Giovanni Paterio, a member of one of the families of the Mahona of Chios.¹²¹ The marriage between the daughter of the noble Paul Sophianos

¹¹⁶ Angeliki E. Laiou, 'The Byzantine aristocracy of the Palaeologan period: a story of arrested development', *Viator: Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 4 (1973), pp. 131–51 at pp. 138–40.

¹¹⁷ Jenks, p. 70; below, pp. 309–10.

¹¹⁸ Spyridon P. Lampros, 'Σύμμιχτα', *Νέος Ελληνομνήμων* 7 (1910), pp. 86–98 at p. 87; Jean Verpeaux, 'Les *oikeioi*. Notes d'histoire institutionnelle et sociale', *REB* 23 (1965), pp. 89–99.

¹¹⁹ Nicolas Oikonomides, *Hommes d'affaires grecs et latins à Constantinople (XIII^e–XV^e siècles)* (Montreal and Paris 1979), pp. 66–8, 121; Nevra Necipoğlu, *Byzantium between the Ottomans and the Latins: politics and society in the late empire* (Cambridge 2009), pp. 167, 202, 248, 263–5, 283–4, 302.

¹²⁰ Sandra Origone, 'Famiglie greche nel Levante genovese (Chio, secc. XIV–XVI)', *SG* 7 (1986), pp. 207–22 at pp. 215–6.

¹²¹ ASG, NA 603 (Giovanni Balbi 1), no. 421.

of Old Phokaia and the Genoese Jacopo de Murta in 1457 provides further evidence of the Sophianos family's connections with the Gattilusio regime as members of an ethnically mixed elite. Two of the witnesses to the payment of the 1,000-ducat dowry were the vicar of Mytilene Gabriele de Rapallo and the relative and associate of the Gattilusio lords Giovanni Doria son of Morruale.¹²²

The social relations between the Gattilusio lords and leading figures among their Greek subjects are further illustrated by their direct and intimate involvement in another marriage, in 1446. This was the wedding of Helena, daughter of *kyr* Andronikos Palaiologos and granddaughter of *kyr* Raoul Palaiologos, who are explicitly characterised as *archontes*, to an unidentified groom. A series of notes on family events kept by Helena's husband records that the marriage took place according to Dorino I's edict and that the latter's son Niccolò held the wedding crowns in the ceremony.¹²³ The Manuel Palaiologos whose son was taught by Manuel Kalekas during his residence on Lesbos, and who had also met Kalekas on Chios, may have been a member of the same family.¹²⁴

Their connections with local *archontes* may have entwined the Gattilusio in social networks extending beyond their own territories to connect them with prominent Greek subjects of other Aegean regimes. Such an association with leading Greek families in the eastern Aegean may be revealed by a Hospitaller document of 1412, relating to a lawsuit brought by John Kalothetos, burgher of Kos, against a Venetian citizen from Crete. When writing to the government of Crete in support of his petition it was noted that the Order had also written to the lord of Mytilene, urging him to give help and counsel to Kalothetos. Although he himself was associated with Kos, it is possible that this man belonged to the Kalothetos family of Chian *archontes* who had formerly ruled Old Phokaia, and that this connection lies behind his apparent friendship with the Gattilusio.¹²⁵ Such

¹²² Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene' pp. 96–7 (no. 43).

¹²³ Paul Géhin, *Les manuscrits grecs datés des XIII^e et XIV^e siècles conservés dans les bibliothèques publiques de France. 2, première moitié du XIV^e siècle* (Paris 2005), pp. 58–60 (no. 23); Stefanos Efthymiadis and Andreas Mazarakis, 'La chronique familiale du 'Parisinos Gr. 1601 et l'identité de son rédacteur', *BZ* 102 (2009), pp. 615–24.

¹²⁴ Manuel Kalekas, *Correspondance de Manuel Calécas*, ed. Raymond-J. Loenertz (Vatican 1950), pp. 303–4 (no. 87).

¹²⁵ AOM 339 (*Libri Bullarum* 24), f. 279^{r-v}. As an inhabitant of Hospitaller territory Kalothetos would not have had a claim on Jacopo Gattilusio's assistance as a subject from his lord. A reference to testimony supporting his case from the Genoese consul and Venetian *bailli* on Cyprus suggests that the dispute, which related to ownership of a ship, had arisen from events there, not in Gattilusio territory. Thus the most likely explanation

connections could have developed through Kalothetoi who were still resident in Old Phokaia; members of the family are attested there in the mid-fifteenth century.¹²⁶

It is likely that, as well as cultivating relations with the existing elite of *archontes*, the Gattilusio regime helped new families to rise through service. An instance of this may be found in the case of one 'Cuchavasili', mentioned in 1446 by Leonardo of Chios in his *De Vera Nobilitate* as an upstart who had risen from lowly origins to a position of high status among the *archontes* of Lesbos, outshining many of noble birth.¹²⁷ This man is perhaps to be identified with Alexios 'Cocovasili', who in 1457 witnessed a notarial act bequeathing land to Domenico Gattilusio, who was represented in this business by his procurator Archbishop Leonardo.¹²⁸ The fact that the Latin archbishop chose to cite the case of a Greek *archon* of Lesbos as exemplifying the heights to which a person of humble background could rise is itself highly suggestive of the status enjoyed by the native elite under Gattilusio rule.

The importance of leading Greeks was not limited to the retention or acquisition of wealth and social status. Within the lordship of Mytilene no Greeks are clearly attested as holding specific governmental offices, but the functions certain individuals performed entailed the exercise of power and responsibility at the highest levels.¹²⁹ The Greek employee of the family whose career is best attested is the historian Doukas, who

for the Knights' supposition that Jacopo would be interested in intervening in the case is that he had an existing cordial relationship with Kalothetos, and would wish to help him on that account. Iorga suggests that the 'familiaris' of Manuel II named Kalothetos who was captured by the Venetians when they attacked Boucicault's fleet off Modon in 1403 was the same man, but this seems extremely tenuous on the basis of a surname alone. Iorga, *Notes*, vol. 4, pp. 277–8.

¹²⁶ Peter Schreiner, 'Eine Obituarnotiz über eine frühgeburt', *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik* 39 (1989), pp. 209–16 at p. 210.

¹²⁷ Leonardo of Chios, 'Leonardi Chiensi, Archiepiscopi Mitilenaevi, ex praedicatorum familia contra Carolum Poggium Florentinum De Vera Nobilitate Tractatus Apologeticus', ed. Michele Giustiniani, *Caroli Poggii De Nobilitate Liber Disceptatoris, et Leonardi Chiensis De Vera Nobilitate Contra Poggium Tractatus Apologeticus* (Abeilhan 1657), pp. 53–139 at p. 90; below, p. 285.

¹²⁸ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 83–5 (no. 36). It seems reasonable to suppose that a Greek witness to such an act involving the lord of Mytilene's own interests would be a person of a certain social standing; the substantial witness list is otherwise composed entirely of Latins. The name is interpreted by Roccatagliata as 'Coconasili', but given the typical ambiguity between the letters 'u/v' and 'n' in documentary hands of the period, 'Cocovasili' seems the more likely rendering.

¹²⁹ Mazarakis states that Doukas held the office of chancellor of Mytilene, but without substantiation in evidence. Mazarakis, 'Contesto', p. 264.

carried out a series of diplomatic missions for Domenico of Mytilene, which he himself describes in his history. During the disastrous events of 1455–6, Doukas was charged with the delivery of Domenico's annual tribute to the sultan, the conduct of negotiations with the Ottoman court and greeting Ottoman admirals with gifts on their arrival at Mytilene.¹³⁰ His long-standing Genoese connections and his history of involvement in Ottoman diplomacy may well have commended him to the Gattilusio. In 1421 he had composed letters to Murad II and his subordinates on behalf of Giovanni Adorno, proposing an alliance against Mustafa and Juneid.¹³¹ Even so, the sensitivity of the missions with which Doukas was entrusted is striking. In effect, he was made responsible for Domenico's relations with his aggressive overlord. At a time when the attitude of the Ottomans was the most important element in the affairs of every Aegean polity, and those of the acutely exposed Gattilusio lordships in particular, this was the most vital job Domenico could entrust to anyone. Any ineptitude or betrayal on the part of his emissary, of the sort that the Gattilusio lords had seemingly suffered repeatedly at the hands of their Genoese representatives, was likely to bring disaster on Domenico and his family.¹³² Such faith in Doukas's discretion is a testimony to the trust the Gattilusio were willing to place in the Greeks whom they had attracted into their service, although it is true that Doukas was a supporter of the Union of Florence, removing the religious divide as a potential source of friction and suspicion in his case.¹³³

A still more striking example illustrating the importance of Greeks in the Gattilusio regime is that of *kyr* Theodore Theodigis Kolyvas. A Theodigis Kolyvas, either this man or one of his relatives, has already been encountered as a major participant in his own right in the alum trade of Lesbos in 1413, marking him out as a figure of very considerable substance.¹³⁴ Around this time a Theodigis Kolyvas was a pupil of John Chortasmenos in Constantinople. He was the son of another Theodigis Kolyvas resident on Lesbos, who is probably to be identified with the alum trader.¹³⁵ In 1423 an epidemic ravaging Mytilene induced Jacopo Gattilusio to leave

¹³⁰ Doukas, pp. 403–5, 409, 411–23.

¹³¹ Doukas, p. 211.

¹³² See above, pp. 161–5.

¹³³ Doukas, pp. 265–71, 315–9.

¹³⁴ See above, p. 177.

¹³⁵ John Chortasmenos, *Johannes Chortasmenos (ca. 1370–ca. 1436/37) Briefe Gedichte und Kleine Schriften Einleitung, Regesten, Prosopographie, Text*, ed. Herbert Hunger (Vienna 1969), pp. 186–7 (no. 37).

the city and withdraw to the hinterland of Lesbos, entrusting the government of the capital to two of his subordinates. One, unremarkably, was the vicar of Mytilene, Antonio de Orvieto; the other was Theodore Theodigis Kolyvas, who died on 8 January 1424, perhaps a victim of the same pestilence that Jacopo had fled.¹³⁶ As his fate suggests, responsibility for the government of a plague-ridden city was a dubious honour, but it nonetheless reflects the recipients' importance.¹³⁷ The selection of one Greek and one Latin may have been a deliberate choice, to provide each community with a representative at the summit of power. In any case, Kolyvas's selection as joint deputy suggests that he was regarded as being more important within government than almost any of the island's Latin inhabitants apart from the lord himself. Such eminence is the more significant in the light of the possibility that his family were not particularly sympathetic to Catholicism, unlike Doukas. John Chortasmenos was a significant anti-Unionist scholar, and the decision to send the younger Theodore Kolyvas to him for education may imply that the family were of a similar inclination.¹³⁸ If this is so, it further underlines the extent to which the government of Gattilusio Lesbos transcended cultural and sectarian divisions.

Thus, while the evidence for the governmental structures of the lordship of Mytilene implies that Gattilusio rule served as a conduit for Genoese influence in the administrative as well as in the commercial sphere, the nature of the network of aides which the lords of Mytilene drew around themselves presents a more complex impression. The regime appears to have rested on a governmental apparatus administered through a mixed elite, including Greeks as well as Latins at the very heart of power.

The evidence relating to the organisation and personnel involved in governing the subsidiary territories of the lordship of Mytilene is more limited. In Old Phokaia in the mid-fifteenth century officials termed

¹³⁶ Schreiner, *Kleinchroniken*, vol. 1, p. 224 (no. 31/6); Savvas K. Kofopoulos, 'Ένα βραχύ χρονικό από τη Μυτιλήνη της εποχής των Γατελούζων', *Λεσβιακά* 16 (1996), pp. 305–9.

¹³⁷ Kolyvas has been described as the general *kephale* of Mytilene on the basis of this notice (Mazarakis, 'Contesto', p. 261; Louizidis, p. 146 n. 1). However, it is clear from the wording that he was 'κεφαλαττεύων' in Mytilene jointly with the vicar and that this was the product of a temporary measure during Jacopo's absence, by which the lord transferred his own usual responsibilities to these two men for the duration, rather than an established office. Thus if the term does relate to the Byzantine office of *kephale*, rather than simply being a generic reference to supreme local authority, it would seem to indicate that the office had been superseded since 1355 by that of lord of Mytilene. See also above, p. 270n106.

¹³⁸ Chortasmenos, pp. 17, 69–70, 79–82, 92, 144–52, 161–2 (nos. II, 11).

gubernatores exercised responsibilities including paying the tribute the town owed to the Ottomans.¹³⁹ This term, in the plural, suggests a possible parallel with the *gubernatores* of Chios, two or three of whom at a time were employed by the Mahona in the administration of the island.¹⁴⁰ It may be, however, that the plural simply reflects the fact that more than one official held the post successively during the six-year period in question; the *gubernatores* of Chios held office for only one year.

The only putatively identified chief administrator of one of the dependencies of Mytilene who was not a member of the immediate family of Gattilusio lords was another Genoese, Oberto Grimaldi. The nature of his position and his relationship with the Gattilusio remains highly ambiguous. Only an inscription of 1434 in Greek and Latin carrying his name and the arms of the Grimaldi and Gattilusio families bears witness to his authority there and to his dependence on the Gattilusio, although the lord of Mytilene's authority over Thasos is attested in the Basle report of 1437.¹⁴¹ Since 1408 the Gattilusio had been connected by marriage to the Grimaldi of Boglio, but it is not known whether the Oberto employed by the Gattilusio was related to them through this connection.¹⁴² If he was, then his employment may have been an extension of the use of members of the family to govern subsidiary territories. Alternatively, he may simply have been a trusted and suitably experienced Genoese servant of the family.¹⁴³ Given the paucity of available evidence it is also impossible to be sure on what terms he exercised authority on Thasos, or for how long.¹⁴⁴ However, the island clearly did not descend to his heirs, since

¹³⁹ ASG, NA 764 (Bernardo de Ferrari 1), no. 14 (187).

¹⁴⁰ Argenti, vol. 1, pp. 381–90.

¹⁴¹ Alexander Conze, *Reise auf den Inseln des Thrakischen Meeres* (Hannover 1860), plate 3, no. 4; Lampros, 'Υπόμνημα', p. 366.

¹⁴² Pietro Gioffredo, 'Storia delle Alpe Marittime', *Monumenta Historiae Patriae* 3 (1890), pp. 1001–2; R. Latouche and L. Imbert, *Inventaire des Fonds "Citta e Contado di Nizza" des Archives d'Etat de Turin* (Cannes 1937), p. 38.

¹⁴³ Miller suggests that this Oberto may be the same individual as the captain in Gattilusio service who had seized goods from a Venetian merchant at Rhodes in 1411. However, the extreme frequency with which the name Oberto was used in the large Grimaldi *albergo* in this period precludes any identification of these individuals with one another in the absence of positive evidence. William Miller, 'The Gattilusj of Lesbos (1355–1462)', *BZ* 22 (1913), pp. 406–47, reprinted in *Essays on the Latin Orient* (Cambridge 1921, reprinted Amsterdam 1964), pp. 313–53 at p. 330; C. N. Sathas, *Μνημεία Ελληνικής Ιστορίας: Documents inédits relatifs à l'histoire de la Grèce au Moyen Age*, 9 vols. (Paris 1880–90), vol. 3, pp. 24–5 (no. 563).

¹⁴⁴ The inclusion of his own family arms alongside those of the Gattilusio on the inscription may be an indication that his position on the island in some sense belonged to him

by 1444 it was under direct Gattilusio rule in the person of Dorino's son Francesco III.¹⁴⁵

That young lord was then in the care of a preceptor addressed by Ciriaco of Ancona as 'Iwannem Pedemontanum'. The surname is clearly Italian, but the Christian name is given in the Greek form, incorporating Greek letters. This may have been some sort of affectation on the part of the antiquarian and Pedemontano may simply have been an Italian. However, it is not unrealistic to speculate that this was the form of name that he used himself and that his ancestry was partly Greek.¹⁴⁶ If so, his selection for a post of such responsibility with regard to Dorino's own family is perhaps a further illustration of the prominence of Greeks in the Gattilusio regime. For the lord of a territory where Genoese presence and influence was probably much more limited than on Lesbos, the guidance of an individual of mixed heritage might prove particularly valuable.

The evidence relating to the administration of the lordship of Ainos and its dependencies likewise suggests the existence of a compound elite drawn from both sides of the ethnic and religious divide. Here, however, aside from the lords of Ainos and their immediate family most of the individuals attested as possessing significant wealth or governmental responsibilities were Greeks. Similarly, whereas posts with Greek titles are attested there is a lack of evidence for the kind of standard Genoese institutions identifiable in the lordship of Mytilene. This apparent difference is surely at least in part a product of the different mix of sources available from the different territories. Nevertheless, the proportionately greater prominence of Greeks and Greek offices in the sources from Ainos and its dependencies may reflect a real divergence, something that would be in line with the other indications that the lordship of Ainos was less tightly integrated into the Genoese network than that of Mytilene.¹⁴⁷

The lords of Ainos did employ Latins in the kind of roles in which they might most be expected to predominate: seafaring and dealings with other Latins. Besides his use of Genoese associates on missions to Genoa, Niccolò employed Eliano Doria as a sea captain, while Giovanni

in a personal capacity, that he was not simply a Gattilusio hireling. It is conceivable that he held it as a fief or similar concession.

¹⁴⁵ Ciriaco of Ancona, *Cyriac of Ancona: later travels*, ed. Edward Bodnar and Clive Foss, (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts 2003), pp. 108–10, 134–40. It could be that the Carlo Grimaldi who acted as Ciriaco's guide on Thasos (pp. 110–2) was a relative of Oberto.

¹⁴⁶ Ciriaco, p. 140.

¹⁴⁷ See above, pp. 227–34.

de Rapallo undertook diplomatic missions to the Venetians for him.¹⁴⁸ In terms of internal administration, however, the only Latin functionary of the lordship of Ainos and its subsidiary territories who has been identified is Francesco Calvo, Palamede's secretary in 1444, probably the Genoese Carthusian monk of that name who was a correspondent of Leonardo of Chios around the same time.¹⁴⁹

Greeks in high places are somewhat easier to find. Here, as on Lesbos, an elite of *archontes* evidently continued to exist under Gattilusio rule, and there is evidence of the same families holding positions of prominence in different Gattilusio lordships. A letter to a recipient in Ainos mentioned that its author had sent a previous letter via the *archon* Kananos, one of the 'ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὑποχειρίων τοῦ αὐθέντου', the retainers and subordinates of the lord, presumably the lord of Ainos.¹⁵⁰ The foundation of churches by individual Greeks of Ainos in Palamede's time bears witness to a degree of wealth enjoyed by some Greeks within the lordship. The church of Chrysopege was founded in 1422/3 by Demetrios Xenos, whose foundation inscription specifically referred to Palamede; that of St. Nicholas had been established two years earlier by Augoustarikes Kanavoutzes.¹⁵¹ The latter was perhaps a relative of John Kanavoutzes, who wrote a Greek commentary on Dionysios of Halikarnassos dedicated to Palamede.¹⁵² The same family probably enjoyed a position of wealth and power on Lesbos: one Kanavoutzes, a holder of the Byzantine imperial office of *droungarios*, had founded a church there, dedicated to St. George, in the thirteenth or early fourteenth century.¹⁵³ A bearer of this name who was certainly connected with the Gattilusio of Mytilene was Demetrios Doukas Kanavoutzes of Old Phokaia, who was owed significant sums of money by some of the Giustiniani of Chios at the time of his

¹⁴⁸ Domenico Gioffrè, 'Atti rogati in Chio nella seconda metà del XIV secolo', *Bulletin de l'Institut Historique Belge de Rome* 34 (1962), pp. 319–404 at pp. 403–4; Freddy Thiriet, *Duca di Candia: Ducali e Lettere Ricevute (1358–1360, 1401–1405)* (Venice 1978), pp. 62–3 (no. 72); Sathas, vol. 2, p. 127 (no. 350); Dellaville, vol. 1, pp. 484–5, vol. 2, p. 189 (no. 37).

¹⁴⁹ Ciriaco, p. 104; Leonardo of Chios, *De Die Ultimi Iudicii sive eius Tempore*, Biblioteca del Seminario Vescovile, Albenga, MS Leonardo di Chio, f. 149^{r-v} at f. 149.

¹⁵⁰ Jean Darrouzès, 'Lettres de 1453', *REB* 22 (1964), pp. 72–127 at pp. 90–2 (no. 5).

¹⁵¹ Catherine Asdracha, 'Inscriptions de la Thrace orientale et de l'île d'Imbros (XII^e–XV^es.)', *Αρχαιολογικόν Δελτίον* 43/1 (1988), pp. 251–86 at pp. 261–3, 264–7 (nos. 32, 34), plates 112b, 113b; F. W. Hasluck, 'Monuments of the Gattalusii', *ABSA* 15 (1908–9), pp. 248–69 at pp. 254, 256.

¹⁵² See below, pp. 306–7, 312–3.

¹⁵³ Miklosich and Müller, vol. 1, pp. 115–8 (nos. 58–9); Grumel, *et al.*, vol. 5, pp. 87–9 (nos. 2117–8).

death. These debts were pursued by Dorino I, whom Demetrios had made his heir in a will drawn up at Kallone in 1448.¹⁵⁴ The presence in Kallone of an inhabitant of Phokaia involved in business with the Giustiniani suggests that the business in question was related to the alum trade; in any case, the legacy indicates that Demetrios was an associate of the lord of Mytilene. Ciriaco of Ancona attests to the presence of learned Greeks of the Kanavoutzes family at Phokaia and Chios, and they remained prominent among the Greeks of Chios into the sixteenth century.¹⁵⁵ Members of the Kanavoutzes family, like those of Kolyvas, Sophianos and Kalothetos, were clearly the holders of considerable wealth and status in the Aegean, closely connected with the Gattilusio lords and entwined in commercial dealings with other Genoese.

Inscriptions also offer evidence of the role of Greeks in administration under the lords of Ainos. Some are to be found serving in the relatively humble capacity of organising the construction of fortifications. One such was the 'μαίστωρ' Constantine, the supervisor of works who organised the construction of both of the churches in Ainos mentioned above on behalf of their Greek founders in the 1420s, and of fortifications at Chora on Samothrake on behalf of Palamede in the 1430s.¹⁵⁶ A similar inscription recording fortification work on Samothrake, in this case at Palaïopolis, names another supervisor, a 'δωμήτωρ', by the name of Stroilos.¹⁵⁷

At a more distinguished level of service, members of the native elite may have been employed by the lord of Ainos in the sphere of diplomatic relations with the Ottomans, suggesting a parallel with the employment of Doukas under Domenico of Mytilene. When the Gattilusio sought to acquire Imbros and Lemnos from Mehmed II, while Dorino I's embassy was led by one of his sons, Palamede's was headed by an *archon* described as one of his leading *oikeioi*.¹⁵⁸ More intriguing is the case of Demetrianos Trimon, an official identified in an inscription of 1421/2 from the fortifications of Ainos as holding the post of 'παραστεκάμενος'. An analogy has

¹⁵⁴ ASG, NA 847 (Tommaso de Recco 1), nos. 190, 312, unnumbered document.

¹⁵⁵ Ciriaco, p. 28; Origone, 'Famiglie', p. 215.

¹⁵⁶ Asdracha, 'Thrace', pp. 261–3, 264–7 (nos. 32, 34), plates 112b, 113b; Catherine Asdracha and Charalambos Bakirtzis, 'Inscriptions Byzantines de Thrace (VIII^e–XV^e siècles): édition et commentaire historique', *Αρχαιολογικόν Δελτίον* 35/1 (1980), pp. 241–82 at pp. 271–6 (nos. 30–1); Hasluck, pp. 254, 256.

¹⁵⁷ Asdracha and Bakirtzis, pp. 276–8 (no. 32), plate 78a. While this inscription is undated and carries no reference to the Gattilusio, the similarity of the architecture to the work at Chora suggests that it belongs to the same programme of work, and that Stroilos was another Gattilusio employee.

¹⁵⁸ Kritovoulos, p. 86.

been posited between this office and the Byzantine *parakoimomenos*, and the literal meaning of the term, 'one who stands alongside', may denote a personal aide closely attendant on his employer.¹⁵⁹ Whatever the precise nature of the position, it is significant that Gattilusio administration not only included posts with Greek titles, but that some such titles were apparently freshly coined. The development of original Greek terms implies a deeper engagement with the indigenous society and a more meaningful divergence from Latin norms than the potentially superficial adoption of existing terminology.¹⁶⁰

The most prominent official attested in the lordship of Ainos and its dependent territories was John Laskaris Rontakenos, who was governor of Samothrake when Ciriaco of Ancona visited in 1444 and still in office a decade later, by which time he probably also held a position of authority on Imbros.¹⁶¹ We therefore find a Greek in charge of at least one entire territorial component of the Gattilusio lordships. With Palamede governing Ainos directly, the administration of his other territory was surely the most far-reaching and responsible position of power in the gift of the lord of Ainos at that time, placing Rontakenos above any Latin servant of the lordship. The length of his service and apparent extension of his responsibilities after the acquisition of Imbros attests that he was a deeply embedded component of the Gattilusio regime. The appointment of a Greek to such a role may be connected with the fact that Samothrake probably lacked the kind of substantial Latin settlement found in places more closely wedded to Genoese commercial interests. Under such circumstances he would chiefly be exercising his authority over other Greeks rather than Latins. His position is nevertheless a further graphic illustration of the importance accorded to Greeks in the government of the Gattilusio lordships, and perhaps in the lordship of Ainos and its dependencies in particular.

¹⁵⁹ Catherine Asdracha, 'Γατελούζοι Αίνου, Σαμοθράκης και Ιμβρου από τις επιγραφές', *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οι Γατελούζοι της Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 59–64 at p. 60; *idem*, 'Les prétensions politiques de Palamède Gattilusio (1409–55), seigneur d'Ainos, d'Imbros et de Samothrace', *Oriente e Occidente tra Medioevo ed Eta Moderna: studi in onore di Geo Pistarino*, ed. Laura Balletto (Genoa 1997), pp. 41–5 at pp. 44–5.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Filip Van Tricht, *The Latin Renovatio of Byzantium: the Empire of Constantinople (1204–1228)* (Leiden and Boston 2011), pp. 172–83.

¹⁶¹ Ciriaco, p. 100; Asdracha, 'Thrace', pp. 282–4 (no. 46), plate 118b; Asdracha and Bakirtzis, pp. 278–80 (no. 33), plate 78b; cf. below, pp. 416–7.

Greeks were therefore to be found alongside Latins not only among minor functionaries, but among the ruling family's closest associates and the most senior and powerful officials of the Gattilusio lordships. There is however a marked dearth of evidence for Greek involvement in one key area of the regime's power structure: the military establishment. There was a general tendency in the Latin East for the elite minority to seek to maintain a preponderance of military power for the sake of security. The limited availability of Latin manpower ensured that Greek services were required for low-grade functions such as rowing galleys or forming a popular militia in case of attack, but well-armed military professionals were usually of Latin origin. In some areas native *archontes* were integrated over time into the lower echelons of a fief-holding military elite, while the mercenary forces of various regimes included a minority of Greek troops, but the regular military establishment was invariably dominated by Latins.¹⁶² In this regard the Genoese were no exception.¹⁶³ Given the consensual basis of the Gattilusio lordships and the level of trust conferred on Greek officials, it might be expected that Greek soldiers would have played a more prominent part in defence than was usual under Latin rule, but the available evidence offers only tangential evidence in support of such a supposition.

In the apparent absence of any feudal arrangements, the core of the armed forces of the Gattilusio consisted of salaried mercenaries, and all the individual officers and professional soldiers who have been identified to date were Latins. Greeks originating from Lesbos served as soldiers of the Genoese authorities in Famagusta, but no counterparts have been identified on their own island.¹⁶⁴ Apart from members of the ruling family a few other military commanders in Gattilusio service can be identified. In 1411 Jacopo entrusted command of the galley sent to join forces from Chios in pursuit of the Catalan fleet to Marino Usodimare, who later acted

¹⁶² Jacoby, 'Encounter', pp. 891–905; *idem*, 'Etats latins', pp. 23–34; *idem*, 'Etat catalan', pp. 90–2, 97; Topping, 'Co-existence', pp. 5–7, 12–5; Lock, pp. 280–4. The same pattern is found in the manning of Genoese war-galleys, on which Greeks and other native inhabitants of the eastern Mediterranean were a significant presence as rowers but soldiers were not only overwhelmingly Ligurian but very predominantly from the city of Genoa itself. Michel Balard, 'Les équipages des flottes génoises au XIV^e siècle', *Le gente del mare Mediterraneo*, ed. Rosalba Ragosta, 2 vols. (Naples 1981), vol. 1, pp. 511–34 at pp. 520, 524.

¹⁶³ Michel Balard, 'In extremo Europae: les soudoyers de l'Orient génois (XIV^e–XV^e siècles)', *Histoire et société: mélanges offerts à Georges Duby*, 4 vols. (Aix-en-Provence 1992), vol. 2, pp. 167–80 at pp. 168–70, 175–6, 178.

¹⁶⁴ E.g. ASG, *SGCanc* (Sala 34) 590/1268 (*Famagosta Massaria* 1391), ff. 240, 248, 300, 368; *SGCanc* (Sala 34) 590/1272 (*Famagosta Massaria* 1437), ff. 119, 141, 196^v.

as Jacopo's procurator on Chios and was involved in negotiating the sale of his Ligurian properties.¹⁶⁵ Giovanni Fontana, an inhabitant of Mytilene, and Spineta Colomboto, identified as a citizen of Noli in Liguria, were the joint commanders of the ill-fated expedition to pacify the Lemnian revolt in 1456 and were back in Mytilene the following year.¹⁶⁶

Some more junior soldiers are also attested by name. The 'bombardierius' (gunner or armourer) Giovanni de Colonia may have been in Gattilusio service during the uprising on Lemnos, in which he was captured by the Lemnians but subsequently ransomed.¹⁶⁷ In 1457 two inhabitants of Lesbos, Paolo de Zoalterio and Antonello Pissaro de Napoli, appointed a procurator to recover goods of theirs from Lemnos, including weapons. One of the witnesses to this act was Giovanni Fontana and it may be that these men were soldiers of the Gattilusio who had lost these possessions during the Lemnian revolt and took advantage of the restoration of Latin rule by the papal fleet to retrieve them.¹⁶⁸ An Italian crossbowman, Antonio Rosello de Garessio, made his will at Mytilene in 1456, leaving bequests including his crossbow and cuirass, and several years' arrears of pay from the lord of Mytilene, amounting to 400 florins.¹⁶⁹ Giovanni de Loreto, who had served the lord of Mytilene as a cavalryman, had returned home to Genoa by November 1459.¹⁷⁰ In the late 1450s a number of other individuals identified as 'coirassarius' (cuirassier) or 'balistrarius' (crossbowman or crossbow-maker) appear in the notarial collection from Mytilene.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁵ Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, 'Pedro de Larraondo, un Corsario Vizcaino en el Mediterráneo Oriental (1405–11)', *Corsarios Castellanos y Vascos en el Mediterraneo Medieval* (Barcelona 2000), pp. 243–331 at pp. 326–8 (no. 27); ASG, NA 603 (Giovanni Balbi 1), nos. 328, 410, 427.

¹⁶⁶ Doukas, p. 421; Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 87–8, 102–6 (nos. 38, 48).

¹⁶⁷ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 41–2 (no. 10). It must be supposed, however, that he was not a member of Fontana and Colomboto's expedition. The forty or so prisoners taken in their defeat were handed over by the Lemnians to the Ottomans and ransomed at Constantinople for a lump sum of 1,000 gold coins by Doukas, who had set out from Lesbos on this mission in August 1456. (Doukas, pp. 421–3). Yet by 3 August Giovanni de Colonia was already back in Mytilene, having been ransomed from the Lemnians on Lemnos by Baldasare Gattilusio *olim* de Porta for the equivalent of 14 ducats 8 gigliati. Possibly he had been a member of the garrison on Lemnos, captured at an earlier stage in the uprising and already released before the Ottoman fleet arrived.

¹⁶⁸ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 85–7 (no. 37).

¹⁶⁹ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 32–3 (no. 4).

¹⁷⁰ ASG, NA 855 (Lazzaro Raggi 1), no. 145. I am indebted to Thierry Ganchou for bringing this document to my attention.

¹⁷¹ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 32–3, 44–5, 69–71, 98–102 (nos. 4, 12, 30, 45–7). However, these men were not necessarily in Gattilusio service, given the presence during these years of the papal fleet and of the mercenaries hired by the Genoese commune to help

Another soldier of the Gattilusio was a peripatetic Picard mercenary, who served Francesco I of Mytilene and then the governor (‘ὕπαρχος’) of Ainos, before securing a letter of recommendation to Manuel II from Demetrios Kydones. He explained his wish to change employers in terms of the low social and military calibre of the troops alongside whom he was serving. As a man of aristocratic origins or pretensions, he objected to being placed among infantry and lightly-equipped troops and, worse yet, an unpaid militia of fishermen.¹⁷² These complaints seem to offer a glimpse of the nature of the Gattilusio military establishment beyond its probably rather small core of professionals. Unfortunately, it is not entirely certain whether the Picard’s period of employment in Ainos fell before or after its acquisition by the Gattilusio.¹⁷³

The case of the upstart *archon* Cuchivasili is one possible instance of Greek military service of a more elevated sort. Leonardo of Chios says disparagingly that Cuchivasili had risen from obscurity thanks to ‘mole magna corporis’.¹⁷⁴ The obvious way in which physical strength could be the basis of a rise to social eminence is through military employment. However, martial abilities could open up opportunities for elevation through enrichment gained in mercenary service to rulers elsewhere or by piracy as well as through service to the local regime. Thus the only definitively attested instance of Greeks serving the Gattilusio lords in a martial capacity is found in Jehan Servion’s description of Francesco I’s involvement in the crusade of Amadeo of Savoy. Leading the maritime element of the assault on Gallipoli, Francesco is said to have taken part ‘avec les grezoyz’.¹⁷⁵

Even if Greeks were not commonly present among the professional soldiery of the Gattilusio, this need not have been the product of perceived

defend Lesbos; members of both these forces appear as such elsewhere in the collection. Roccatagliata, ‘Mitilene’, pp. 33–5, 94–5 (nos. 5, 42).

¹⁷² Demetrios Kydones, *Demetrius Cydones Correspondance*, ed. Raymond-Joseph Loenertz, 2 vols. (Vatican 1956–60), vol. 2, pp. 127–8 (no. 231).

¹⁷³ The date of the letter is unknown, but tentatively attributed to 1380–2, which would place it around the time of the acquisition of Ainos by the Gattilusio. The fact that the Picard proceeded there from serving the Gattilusio on Lesbos suggests that he had simply transferred from the established Gattilusio lordship to the newly acquired territory. Ultimately, however, it is impossible to be certain whether the poorly equipped plebeian warriors whose comradeship the Picard found so far beneath his dignity were in the service of the Gattilusio or of the preceding regime, whether that of a Byzantine governor or an autonomous Greek lord (see below, pp. 413–4).

¹⁷⁴ Leonardo, ‘De Vera Nobilitate’, p. 90.

¹⁷⁵ Jehan Servion, *Geste et Croniques de la mayson de Savoye*, ed. Frederic-Emmanuel Bollati, 2 vols. (Turin 1879), vol. 2, p. 135.

political unreliability. The Byzantine Empire itself in its later centuries tended to rely heavily on foreign troops, among whom Latins figured very prominently, rather than drawing the core of its armed forces from among its own subjects.¹⁷⁶ Thus a basically Latin military establishment in the Gattilusio lordships need not have represented a sharp break with Byzantine precedent and could have been shaped by the same kind of considerations of effectiveness that influenced the imperial government's preferences rather than by sectarian concerns. Furthermore, whatever the scarcity of professional Greek soldiers in their service, it seems reasonable to suppose that Greeks exercising territorial authority, such as Rontakenos on Samothrake and Imbros, or Kolyvas temporarily on Lesbos, must have borne general responsibilities for the internal order and external defence of the territories they administered. Thus it seems that the Gattilusio lords were willing to entrust responsibility for managing armed force at least to particular trusted individuals from among the native population. This reflects the general impression of a mixed governing elite in which Greeks could hold responsibilities at the highest levels, a synthesis implicit in a Latin regime established under Byzantine auspices. The presence of such a composite elite, albeit one in which cultural and sectarian background remained a defining quality of individuals, is encapsulated in Doukas's account of Domenico being accompanied to Constantinople in 1455 by some of the *archontes* of both communities: 'μερικοῖς ἄρχουσι Λατίνοις τε καὶ Ρωμαίοις'.¹⁷⁷

Religious Institutions

The continued availability of positions of distinction and power to members of the native elite reflects the scope for trust and cooperation between leading members of the two confessional communities in the Gattilusio lordships. This sharing of power required a basic level of mutual respect and acceptance to be feasible. It must also have played a part in promoting such tendencies, by obliging leading members of the two groups to work together, and by giving a more influential voice to elements of the native population than was available under most Latin regimes. As has been discussed, the legitimization of Gattilusio rule by imperial authority would

¹⁷⁶ Mark Bartusis, *The Late Byzantine Army: arms and society, 1204–1453* (Philadelphia 1992), pp. 196–9.

¹⁷⁷ Doukas, p. 413.

seem to have been of key importance in defusing the potential for tension arising from the schism.¹⁷⁸ However, the religious divide remained a reality to which any Latin regime in Greek lands had to formulate a response. While the Gattilusio lordships' imperial foundations and mixture of servitors and influences from across the religious divide diminished the threat posed to their rule by sectarian resentments, in some ways these characteristics increased the complexity of the specifically religious questions they confronted. Efforts to conciliate the Orthodox population elsewhere in the Latin East were typically framed within a context of clear Catholic primacy, underpinned by Latin preponderance in government.¹⁷⁹ The clarity provided by such grounding assumptions was lacking in the case of the Gattilusio lords, who had to balance competing pressures from within the mixed ruling stratum and to offset the obligations implicit on them as representatives of Byzantine authority against the expectations of the wider community of Latin Christendom and the demands of their own beliefs.

As Latin rulers, the Gattilusio could scarcely be expected not to indulge the introduction of Catholic Church structures; however, there is also no firm evidence that before the Union of Florence there was any particular promotion of Catholic proselytising, although the lords of Mytilene did offer patronage to the Dominicans.¹⁸⁰ The available evidence indicates that Latin Archbishops of Mytilene had been appointed since the time of the Fourth Crusade, and under Gattilusio rule were presumably able to take up their sees; in 1374 a Catholic Bishop of Eressos was also appointed, perhaps more as an adjutant to the archbishop than an effective head of a separate see.¹⁸¹ This see had evidently ceased to operate by 1449, when Mytilene was without suffragans.¹⁸² However, the incumbents of this hierarchy prior to the Union of Florence have left little trace in the surviving sources. This obscurity contrasts with the years after the Union, illuminated by the celebrity of the distinguished scholar Leonardo of Chios,

¹⁷⁸ See above, pp. 105–27.

¹⁷⁹ See below, pp. 292–3.

¹⁸⁰ See below, pp. 289–92.

¹⁸¹ Conrad Eubel, *Hierarchia Catholica Medii Aevi*, 8 vols. (Münster 1913–29), vol. 1, p. 354, vol. 2, p. 219; Giorgio Fedalto, *La Chiesa Latina in Oriente*, 3 vols. (Verona 1973–8), vol. 2, pp. 160–1; Raymond-Joseph Loenertz, *La Société des Frères Pèrègrinants: études sur l'Orient Dominicain*, (Rome 1937), pp. 64–72; *idem*, 'Les missions Dominicaines en Orient au quatorzième siècle et la Société des Frères Pèrègrinants Pour le Christ', *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 2 (1932), pp. 1–83, vol. 3 (1933), pp. 5–55, vol. 4 (1934), pp. 2–47 at vol. 3, pp. 8–10, 40–5 (nos. 1–3).

¹⁸² ASVat, RV 389, f. 209^{r-v}.

who occupied the see of Mytilene between 1444 and 1459.¹⁸³ There was a Catholic bishopric for the two Phokaias, which until 1449 was under the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Genoa.¹⁸⁴ Some time before 1420, the pope assigned an additional office and its income to the incumbent of this see because he was unable to receive the revenues of his bishopric. Unfortunately it is not specified why this was.¹⁸⁵ It may be that the bishop had come into conflict with the secular authorities. Remarkably, in 1377 there still existed a number of Catholic monasteries of the Greek rite within the diocese of Imbros, presumably relics of the period of the Latin Empire over a century before, though these had apparently fallen on hard times.¹⁸⁶ Whether they survived into the period of Gattilusio rule is unknown.

A number of Catholic churches in Mytilene are recorded in the notarial collection, most apparently connected with either the lords of Mytilene, the Latin archbishopric or the Order of St. Dominic. No individual Latin churches elsewhere in the Gattilusio territories have been identified. Francesco I built a church dedicated to St. John the Baptist and was buried there together with his two elder sons in 1384.¹⁸⁷ Another Gattilusio possession was the church of St. Nicholas, but in the mid-1450s this church

¹⁸³ Luciano L. Calzamiglia, 'Un Maonese di Chio: Leonardo Giustiniani Garibaldo, O. P., Arcivescovo di Mitilene (1395–1459)', *SG* 12/1 (1991), pp. 61–71; Nikolaos S. Krousaloudis, 'Σχέσεις του Λατίνου Αρχιεπισκόπου Μυτιλήνης Λεονάρδου με τη Χίο', *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οι Γατελούζοι της Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 65–92.

¹⁸⁴ Aloysius L. Tautu, *Acta Eugenii Papae IV (1431–1447) e Regestis Vaticanis aliisque fontibus collegit notisque illustravit* (Rome 1990), *CICO* 15, p. 428 (no. 922); Eubel, vol. 1, pp. 252–3, vol. 2, pp. 171, 177; Fedalto, vol. 2, pp. 124–5.

¹⁸⁵ Aloysius L. Tautu, *Acta Martini P.P. V (1417–1431) e Regestis Vaticanis aliisque fontibus collegit notisque adornavit*, 2 vols. (Rome 1980), *CICO* 14, vol. 1, pp. 309–10 (no. 132).

¹⁸⁶ Aloysius L. Tautu, *Acta Gregorii P.P. XI (1370–1378) e Regestis Vaticanis aliisque fontibus collegit notisque adornavit* (Rome 1966), *CICO* 12, pp. 451–2 (no. 228).

¹⁸⁷ George T. Dennis, 'The short chronicle of Lesbos 1355–1428', *Λεσβιακά* 5 (1965), pp. 3–22, reprinted in *Byzantium and the Franks 1350–1420* (London 1982), I, p. 5; Eric A. Iverson, 'Funerary monuments of the Gattalusi at Mytilene', *ABSA* 87 (1992), pp. 423–37 at pp. 424–7. Note that Iverson's suggestion that the excavated church in the castle of Mytilene is that of St. John the Baptist, based on its location and plan (argued to be unsuitable for Orthodox practice of the period due to its lack of *prothesis* and *diakonion*), is undercut by the existence of another ruined church of similar plan at Mesa on the Gulf of Kallone (Robert Koldewey, *Die antiken Baureste der Insel Lesbos* (Berlin 1890), plate 19). No positive evidence has been found for a Catholic church or any Latin presence at Mesa, whereas an Orthodox church is attested there in 1445 (Géhin, pp. 58–60 (no. 23)). The ruined church at Mesa has been identified as a construction of the middle Byzantine period, succeeding to an early Christian basilica, with the presence of a coin hoard suggesting continued use in the years immediately preceding the establishment of Gattilusio rule (Johannes Koder, 'Die siedlungsentwicklung der Ägäis-Inseln im Mittelalter. Die Beispiele Lesbos und

and the estates belonging to it were held from the lord of Mytilene by Giovanni Lomellini.¹⁸⁸ The livings of two vacant churches, one dedicated to St. John the Baptist and the other to St. Michael, were turned over to the Archbishop of Mytilene in 1401.¹⁸⁹ The Catholic Cathedral of St. Anthony is attested in 1445, 1454 and 1456.¹⁹⁰ However, a notarial act of 1459 refers to it in terms which imply recent construction, suggesting that it may have been rebuilt.¹⁹¹ The existence of a Society of St. Anthony in Mytilene gives a glimpse of lay spirituality among the Latin population under Gattilusio rule.¹⁹² This is otherwise largely inaccessible through the available evidence except in the spiritual provisions of wills; these variously left money to pay for masses for the soul of the testator and donations to the poor.¹⁹³

The most prominent Catholic religious order in the Gattilusio lordships was that of the Dominican friars. A Carmelite friar died on Lesbos around 1388, but the remittance of his legacy to the Order's house in Genoa suggests that he was not part of a convent on the island.¹⁹⁴ The presence of the Carthusian Francesco Calvo as Palamede Gattilusio's secretary in Ainos could reflect the existence of a community there, but if so nothing

Chios', *Die byzantinische Stadt im Rahmen der allgemeinen Stadtentwicklung*, ed. Klaus-Peter Matschke (Leipzig 1995), pp. 75–91 at p. 86).

The dedication of the church at Mytilene, combined with a reference to John the Baptist, along with the Virgin Mary, as protector of Francesco III's regime in Thasos, may indicate that he was regarded as a particular patron of the family (Ciriaco, p. 108). However, the family's church in Sestri Ponente in Liguria, founded in the thirteenth century by Luchetto Gattilusio, of which the lords of Mytilene acted as patrons, was dedicated to St. James (ASG, NA 776 (Battista Parisola 10), no. 145; Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 1, pp. 218–9 (no. 8); Arturo Ferretto, *Annali storici di Sestri Ponente e delle sue famiglie (del secolo VII al secolo XV)*, (ASLSP 34 (1904)), pp. 176–7, 253, 281, 322, 326, 345 (nos. 626, 1000, 1162, 1387, 1413, 1508)). The name Jacopo was repeatedly given to their sons by Gattilusio lords whereas Giovanni and Battista were not, although these names do appear in other branches of the Gattilusio house.

¹⁸⁸ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 67–8, 127–35 (nos. 28, 59a–c).

¹⁸⁹ Aloysius L. Tautu, *Acta Urbani P.P. VI (1378–1389), Bonifacii P.P. IX (1389–1404), Innocentii P.P. VII (1404–1406) et Gregorii P.P. XII (1406–1415) e Registris Vaticanis et Lateranensibus aliisque fontibus collegit notisque adornavit* (Rome 1970), CICO 13/1, p. 224 (no. 108f).

¹⁹⁰ Leonardo, *De Statu Hominis*, f. 73^v; Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 27–9, 32–3, 38–9 (nos. 1, 4, 8).

¹⁹¹ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', p. 138 (no. 63).

¹⁹² Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 100–1 (no. 46).

¹⁹³ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 32–3, 36–40, 49–50, 56–8, 67–8, 74–8, 97–8, 100–1, 127–35 (nos. 4, 7–8, 16, 21, 28, 33–4, 44, 46, 59a–c); Geo Pistarino, 'Il secolo dei Gattilusio, signori dell'Egeo' *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οι Γατελούζοι της Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 281–306 at pp. 302–3.

¹⁹⁴ Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 1, pp. 87–9 (no. 4).

else is known of it.¹⁹⁵ The same may be said of the Augustinian canons: Jacopo Gattilusio sought permission to employ one of them, Michael of Aversa, as his confessor in 1425.¹⁹⁶ The Order of St. Dominic was a more forceful presence. The Dominicans possessed a convent dedicated to St. George outside the walls of Mytilene, attested in the 1450s.¹⁹⁷ The church of St. John the Evangelist, which belonged to the lords of Mytilene and seems to have served as the family chapel in later decades, was probably also a Dominican establishment.¹⁹⁸ The Gattilusio lordships, along with the colonial territories of the Genoese commune, fell under the jurisdiction of the *Societas Fratrum Peregrinantium*, the body entrusted with the Order's missionary activities in the East, and along with the mission to Armenia these places were the particular focus for its activities.¹⁹⁹ When in 1393 the Society's area of activity was divided, Lesbos, Chios and the two Phokaias were treated as a unit, being retained under

¹⁹⁵ Leonardo, *De Die Ultimi*, f. 149; Ciriaco, p. 104.

¹⁹⁶ Tautu, *Acta Martini V*, vol. 2, pp. 852–3 (no. 333).

¹⁹⁷ ASVat, *RV* 443, ff. 113^v–4^r; Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 54–6, 110–1 (nos. 20, 51).

¹⁹⁸ The relationship between this church and that of St. John the Baptist is ambiguous. The latter's use for the burial of Francesco I and his sons, attested by the short chronicle recording the lives of the early lords of Mytilene, implies that it was at that time the Gattilusio family chapel. A notarial act of 1457 refers to the 'eclexia Sancti Iohannis magnifici domini domini', suggesting that a church of one or other St. John was their chapel at that point (Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 90–1 (no. 40b)). Other references in the notarial collection to the church or chapel of St. John are also unclear as to the precise dedication (Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 119–27 (nos. 57a–58b)). However, in 1440 the pope gave Dorino I licence to employ three mendicant brothers of any order to serve the chapel of St. John the Evangelist near his palace, and exempted it from the archbishop's jurisdiction, provisions consonant with this being the particular church of the lord of Mytilene (Tautu, *Acta Eugenii IV*, p. 422 (no. 906)). The mendicants in question seem to have been Dominicans. The obituary of Manuel Kalekas, a member of the Order, indicates that he died at the chapel of St. John in Mytilene in 1410 (Kalekas, p. 337 (no. 10)). The church of St. John the Evangelist possessed a cloister and was the venue for a disciplinary proceeding against a Dominican friar for offences committed against another brother of the Order, conducted by Archbishop Leonardo, himself a Dominican (Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 110–1 (no. 51)). It may be that the lords of Mytilene had transferred their patronage from one church to another, in which case the vacant church of St. John the Baptist mentioned in 1401 may be the former Gattilusio chapel (Tautu, *Acta Urbani VI etc*, p. 224 (no. 108f)). Alternatively, the same church may have been rededicated, or the author of the short chronicle may even have erred in identifying the dedicatee of Francesco I's church.

¹⁹⁹ Claudine Delacroix-Besnier, *Les Dominicains et la Chrétienté grecque aux XIV^e et XV^e siècles* (Rome 1997), pp. 8–17, 61, 71–5, 122–9; Tommaso M. Violante, *La Provincia Domenicana di Grecia* (Rome 1999), pp. 145–79; Loenertz, *Société*, pp. 31–5, 38–76; *idem*, 'Missions', vol. 2, pp. 1–32.

the jurisdiction of Elie Petit, the former vicar-general of the Society.²⁰⁰ The vigour of Dominican activity relative to other branches of the Catholic Church in Gattilusio territories is suggested by the fact that the Order proved to be the most prolific contributor to their episcopal hierarchy. Of the ten identified Latin Archbishops of Mytilene during the Gattilusio period, four were Dominicans, including the most prominent, Leonardo of Chios.²⁰¹ The only recorded Catholic Bishop of Eressos for the period, Luca of Pisa, was also a member of the Order.²⁰² The spiritual prestige of the Dominicans among the Catholic inhabitants of Mytilene may be reflected in the popularity of their convent as a burial place: of the seven wills in the notarial collection stipulating where the testator should be buried, five specified the church of St. George.²⁰³

It is unknown how actively the friars sought to make converts among the local Greek population or what success they may have had. The prominence of the Dominicans of Lesbos was increased by the presence among them in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth century of the high-profile Greek converts Manuel Kalekas and Maximos Chrysoverges, who both joined the Order, but they had converted before their appearance on the island.²⁰⁴ An aggressive proselytising effort could have led to tension with the ruling family, given its potential to provoke Orthodox hostility and disrupt the balance of a regime which straddled the confessional divide to an unusual extent. Such difficulties occurred elsewhere in the Genoese East, producing an acrimonious struggle after the Union of Florence between the Dominican Bishop of Caffa Giacomo Campora and the Genoese authorities there, who sought to protect the Greek and Armenian communities from his interference and lobbied for his removal from the see.²⁰⁵ However, while there was significant friction between the Dominicans and the Gattilusio lords, the one attested instance of this relates to property with which the lords of Mytilene had endowed the convent of St. George. In 1456 Pope Calixtus III ordered the dismissal of

²⁰⁰ Thomas Kaeppli, *Registrum Litterarum Fr. Raymundi de Vineis Capuani Magistri Ordinis 1380–1399* (Rome 1937) (*Monumenta Ordinis Praedicatorum Historica* 19), pp. 224–5; Delacroix-Besnier, pp. 16, 135–41.

²⁰¹ Fedalto, pp. 160–1; Eubel, vol. 1, p. 354, vol. 2, p. 219.

²⁰² Loenertz, 'Missions', vol. 3, pp. 8–10, 40–5 (nos. 1–3); *idem*, *Société*, pp. 70–2.

²⁰³ Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 32–3, 36–40, 74–5, 100–1 (nos. 4, 7–8, 33, 46).

²⁰⁴ Kalekas, pp. 43–6, 57–63, 297–303 (no. 86); Delacroix-Besnier, pp. 189–97, 267–71; below, pp. 303–6, 309.

²⁰⁵ Delacroix-Besnier, pp. 96–105; Michel Balard, 'Les Orientaux à Caffa au XV^e siècle', *BF* 11 (1987), pp. 223–38 at pp. 235–6.

Francesco de Luca as vicar of the convent, owing to his mismanagement of this property. His successor Antonio de Cazolino had been recommended by Domenico Gattilusio and Calixtus stipulated that any future appointment to the post must be approved by the lord of Mytilene.²⁰⁶

Prior to the Union of Florence, the Orthodox hierarchy and monastic life seems to have continued to operate without interference under Gattilusio rule, to an extent most unusual in the Latin East. In the lands conquered at the time of the Fourth Crusade the Greek hierarchy was in general displaced and the parish clergy subjected directly to the management of Latin bishops. In many sees this was preceded by a transitional phase in which some sitting Greek prelates were allowed to remain in place and new appointments of Greeks were even occasionally made, but such allowances were invariably conditional on adherence to papal supremacy.²⁰⁷ The experience of Orthodox monasteries was mixed, with many surviving under varying degrees of Latin supervision, while others were taken over and their occupants expelled.²⁰⁸ This pattern applied, for example, on Venetian Crete and on Euboea, although even on Crete, where the attitude of the authorities was particularly unsympathetic to the native population, the office of *protopapas* was introduced to give Greek priests some representation, under Venetian supervision.²⁰⁹ While prestigious Orthodox monasteries such as St. Catherine in Sinai and St. John on Patmos were able to protect their Cretan possessions, many institutions were subject to harassment or the wholesale expulsion of their monks and their replacement by Latins.²¹⁰ Other regimes showed a more consistent willingness to allow the Greek clerics in their territories to be overseen by superiors of their own culture and rite, but all were obliged to acknowledge papal supremacy and detached from the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constantinople and the Byzantine Emperor. On Cyprus, conquered by the Latins before the great rupture of the Fourth Crusade,

²⁰⁶ ASVat, RV 443, ff. 113^v–4^v.

²⁰⁷ Jean Richard, 'The establishment of the Latin Church in the Empire of Constantinople (1204–1227)', *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204*, ed. Benjamin Arbel, Bernard Hamilton and David Jacoby (London 1989), pp. 45–62 at pp. 46–52.

²⁰⁸ Richard, 'Establishment', pp. 51–5.

²⁰⁹ McKee, pp. 104–7; Borsari, *Dominio*, pp. 105–8, 123–4; *idem*, *L'Eubea veneziana* (Venice 2007), pp. 59–63.

²¹⁰ Borsari, *Dominio*, pp. 117–25; Guillaum Saint-Guillain, 'L'Apocalypse et le sens des affaires. Les moines de Saint-Jean de Patmos, leurs activités économiques et leurs relations avec les Latins (XIII^e et XIV^e siècles)', *Chemins d'outre-mer: études d'histoire sur la Méditerranée médiévale offertes à Michel Balard*, ed. Damien Coulon, Catherine Otten-Froux, Paule Pagès and Dominique Valérian (Paris 2004), pp. 765–90 at pp. 771–9.

the Greek hierarchy fared better than in most places. The Greek archbishopric survived for some decades under Latin rule but after an earlier short-lived exclusion it was finally terminated in 1260. A much reduced Greek episcopate was retained but was subordinated to the Latin archbishop, and Greek clergy were subject to the visitations of Latin superiors.²¹¹ On Rhodes the Greek episcopate was excluded and ecclesiastical authority and assets were divided between the Catholic archbishop and the Order of St. John, whose Grand Master controlled Greek clerical appointments and benefices. However, a Greek *dichaïos* was appointed to supervise the native clergy.²¹²

The Genoese were not untypical in their religious policy. On Chios they initially left the Orthodox metropolitan in place. However, following the conspiracy of 1347 against Genoese rule, which had been led by the metropolitan, they forbade future prelates from taking up their seats on the island. The guidance of the Orthodox Church there was instead entrusted to a *dichaïos* whose appointment required the approval of the Mahona. Some Greek monks were also driven from their monasteries and replaced by Latins, while Greeks were subject to inquisitions carried out by Latin clergy.²¹³

The situation in Gattilusio territories differed markedly from the conduct of Latin regimes elsewhere. Lesbos was divided between two Orthodox metropolitan sees, at Mytilene and Methymna. Around the time of Francesco I's acquisition of the island in 1355 a new metropolitan, Joseph, was appointed to the see of Mytilene, replacing the recently deceased Marcian.²¹⁴ His successors included Malachai, attested in 1370, Jeremiah in 1389, and Dorotheos, who participated prominently in the Council of Ferrara-Florence and whose death led to the appointment of

²¹¹ Chris Schabel, 'The status of the Greek clergy in Early Frankish Cyprus', *Sweet Land...: lectures on the history and culture of Cyprus*, ed. Julian Chrysostomides and Charalambos Dendrinos (Camberley 2006), pp. 165–207, reprinted in *Greeks, Latins and the Church in Early Frankish Cyprus* (Farnham 2010), I; Nicholas Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus, 1095–1312* (Aldershot 1997), pp. 252–317.

²¹² Luttrell, 'Greeks, Latins and Turks', pp. 364–5; *idem*, 'The Greeks of Rhodes under Hospitaller rule: 1306–1421', *Rivista di studi bizantini e neoellenici* n.s. 29 (1992), pp. 193–223, reprinted in *The Hospitaller State on Rhodes and its Western Provinces* (Aldershot 1999), III, pp. 207–16.

²¹³ Balard, *Romanie*, pp. 322–7; Laura Balletto, 'Religione e potere politico negli insediamenti genovesi del Vicino Oriente', *Studi in memoria di Giorgio Castamagna*, ed. Dino Puncuh (Genoa 2003) (*ASLSP* 93 (n.s. 43/1)), pp. 107–16 at pp. 113–5.

²¹⁴ Miklosich and Müller, vol. 1, pp. 432–3 (no. 185); Grumel *et al.*, vol. 5, pp. 226–7, 233–6, 316–7 (nos. 2280, 2289, 2381).

Leonardo of Chios to succeed him in 1444.²¹⁵ In 1365 the see of Methymna was combined with that of Vizye to boost the revenues of Metropolitan Neophytos, but soon the two posts were separated again. Subsequent incumbents included Chariton, attested in 1370–1, and one Xanthopoulos, on whose death the province was amalgamated with Mytilene.²¹⁶

It is clear that these prelates were not titular appointees but continued to occupy and exercise effective control over their provinces. The surviving documentation relating to their activities before the Union pertains almost exclusively to the internal affairs of the Orthodox Church rather than to difficulties with the Latin hierarchy or population or with the Gattilusio regime. The later fourteenth century seems to have presented the Orthodox metropolitan sees with difficulties in maintaining their revenues, but these were the product of internal developments rather than Latin encroachment. In 1370 Metropolitan Chariton of Methymna petitioned the patriarch to order the restitution of properties which had been assigned by his predecessors to support priests serving churches in the diocese. These had become hereditary possessions of the priests' families and passed to laymen or to priests who refused to discharge the obligations attached to the properties. With the help of a decree of the patriarchal synod some of these inheritors were induced to surrender their holdings to the metropolitan, but a year later Chariton complained that others were proving recalcitrant, in particular the *protonotarios* who had inherited a substantial endowment which had originally been assigned to a deceased *oikonomos* of Methymna. He secured a fresh edict backed by punitive sanctions.²¹⁷

As well as these difficulties with the families of its own deceased clergy, the Orthodox hierarchy on Lesbos was embroiled in recurrent disputes over control of the island's monasteries; over twenty such institutions, of which little or nothing is otherwise known, are mentioned in this connection.²¹⁸ In 1331 the Metropolitan of Methymna had secured a

²¹⁵ Miklosich and Müller, vol. 1, pp. 531–2, vol. 2, pp. 116–29 (nos. 276, 404); Grumel *et al.*, vol. 5, pp. 477–8 (no. 2569), vol. 6, pp. 139–44 (no. 2847); above, pp. 63–4; below, p. 314.

²¹⁶ Miklosich and Müller, vol. 1, pp. 463, 515–6, 575–6 (nos. 206, 263, 315); Grumel *et al.*, vol. 5, pp. 403, 487–8, 525–6 (nos. 2482, 2577, 2623); Ioannis K. Moutzouris, 'Επίσκοπος κατάλογος Μηθύμνης στα Βυζαντινά χρόνια', *Λεσβιακά* 17 (1998), pp. 197–202; below, pp. 314–5.

²¹⁷ Miklosich and Müller, vol. 1, pp. 515–6, 575–6 (nos. 263, 315); Grumel *et al.*, vol. 5, pp. 487–8, 525–6 (nos. 2577, 2623).

²¹⁸ These were, in the province of Mytilene the monasteries of Osios Gregory at Gera, the Holy Fathers at Daphnea, Ariston, St. Andrew at Glistra, St. Menas at Kato Ptomaia, St. Michael at Vasilika (known as the Akronesiotou) and the Hodegetria, and in the province

decree of the patriarchal synod reinstating him in possession of a range of monasteries in his province which had been illegitimately appropriated by others, the chief offenders apparently being the monastic houses of Constantinople.²¹⁹ The part of this document relating to the Constantinopolitan houses is seemingly a forgery, although this need not mean that the disputes involved were not real; the genuine section of the document relates to the encroachments of the monastery of Kroitzos, near Magnesia in Anatolia.²²⁰ The problems posed to the see of Mytilene by the local representatives of patriarchal interests seem to have been much more persistent. As early as the 1250s, the Metropolitan of Mytilene had complained of efforts by patriarchal exarchs to assert the direct jurisdiction of the see of Constantinople over the erstwhile dependencies of the defunct monastery of St. George, as well as over various other monasteries on Lesbos. A series of decrees had been elicited from the patriarch and his synod in 1256 and 1261 confirming that these houses came under the authority of Mytilene.²²¹ However, fresh interference from exarchs led to the issue of further decrees renouncing all claims on the part of Constantinople over convents including the former dependencies of St. George's in 1324.²²² In 1395 the controversy over the former dependencies of St. George's flared up once again as a result of the actions of the patriarchal exarch, who was also a monk of the monastery of the Holy Fathers, one of the houses in question. He had secured a patriarchal decree declaring that monastery to be under direct patriarchal jurisdiction,

of Methymna the monasteries of St. Nicholas, Kale Langas, Xerokastron, Myrsine, Kryokopos, St. Theophano, Kryon Neron, Klemation, Kerameon, the Agioi Theodoroi, those of St. John the Theologian and Christ the Saviour at Korax, and those of the Hodegetria inside the *kastron* of the Agioi Theodoroi and the Bourkos and the Five Saints outside it. Miklosich and Müller, vol. 1, pp. 111–24, 164–7 (nos. 58–9, 73), vol. 2, pp. 264–6 (no. 500); Grumel *et al.*, vol. 4, pp. 162–4 (nos. 1358–60), vol. 5, pp. 87–9, 122–4 (nos. 2117–8, 2164), vol. 6, pp. 280–1 (no. 3015); cf. Ioannis K. Moutzouris, *Ο Μοναχισμός της Λέσβου: συμβολή στην ιστορία και μοναστηριολογία* (Mytilene 1989), pp. 87–90, 95–7, 108–9, 120, 130–2, 137, 140–1, 144–5, 148–54, 165–8.

Leonardo of Chios describes attending the festival at the Greek monastery of Agia Sion at Agiassos, and mentions the monasteries of St. John at 'Sellinis' and of the Prodomos at Kerameia, as well as the Five Saints. Leonardo, *De Statu Hominis*, ff. 33, 37–8, 61, 68.

²¹⁹ Miklosich and Müller, vol. 1, pp. 164–7 (no. 73); Grumel *et al.*, vol. 5, pp. 122–4 (no. 2164); cf. Moutzouris, *Μοναχισμός*, pp. 65–7.

²²⁰ Herbert Hunger and Otto Kresten, *Das Register des Patriarchats von Konstantinopel*, 3 vols. (Vienna 1981–2001), *CFHB* 19, vol. 1, pp. 60–4.

²²¹ Miklosich and Müller, vol. 1, pp. 118–24 (no. 59); Grumel *et al.*, vol. 4, pp. 130–1, 135–7, 162–5 (nos. 1326, 1331, 1358–60); cf. Moutzouris, *Μοναχισμός*, pp. 60–2.

²²² Miklosich and Müller, vol. 1, pp. 111–8 (no. 59); Grumel *et al.*, vol. 5, pp. 87–8 (no. 2117); cf. Moutzouris, *Μοναχισμός*, pp. 62–4.

but this was soon rescinded when the Metropolitan of Mytilene drew the patriarch's attention to the previous verdicts on the matter.²²³

One should not read too much into the nature of the preoccupations reflected in the limited surviving documentation. However, the interminable continuity of internal squabbles over the same prerogatives across many decades both before and after the establishment of Gattilusio rule offers no evidence of any great disruption of the life of the Orthodox Church on Lesbos by the arrival of Latin lords and a Catholic ecclesiastical hierarchy. An examination confined to the Orthodox sources alone would reveal scarcely any indication that there was a Catholic Church establishment in the Gattilusio territories before the Union of Florence at all.

A letter written by Demetrios Kydones from Lesbos to Patriarch Neilos (1379–88) in the 1380s, early in the reign of Francesco II, is particularly revealing of the operation of the island's Orthodox hierarchy and its relations with the lord of Mytilene. Following the death of the Metropolitan of Methymna the *oikonomos* of Eressos had been chosen to succeed him and dispatched to Constantinople to secure the patriarch's endorsement of his election and receive consecration. The very fact that the appointment was to be made in this fashion illustrates the fundamental distinction between the lordship of Mytilene and other Latin territories, where the authorities in Constantinople were denied such a role and Greek clergy were subordinated to a hierarchy descending from Rome. The nominee bore a letter of recommendation, which Kydones had been asked by the islanders to write in support of their choice. Kydones claimed that he had been reluctant to do so, but had been persuaded by the islanders and their lord. This was due to his sense of obligation towards the inhabitants, who had accepted him as one of their own, and towards the memory of the recently deceased Francesco I, who had always encouraged Demetrios to help his people and respond favourably to their petitions. While clearly unimpressed with the intellectual credentials of the *oikonomos*, Kydones commended his integrity, liturgical competence and reasonable disposition. Despite his own seemingly somewhat tepid enthusiasm for the candidate, Demetrios urged the patriarch to confirm him on pragmatic grounds, observing that he was popular with the inhabitants and they would gladly obey him, whereas if another were appointed instead the

²²³ Miklosich and Muller, vol. 2, pp. 264–6 (no. 500); Grumel *et al.*, vol. 6, pp. 264–6 (no. 3015); cf. Moutzouris, *Μοναχισμός*, pp. 64–5.

interloper might be unable to impose his authority.²²⁴ The impression conveyed here is of a self-confident local church able to direct its own affairs and impose its own preferences. Francesco II clearly endorsed this candidature and it is possible that Kydones tactfully veiled the extent of this Latin lord's say in Orthodox affairs. It is not inconceivable that his warning of the risk that an appointee imposed from outside by the patriarch would be left as metropolitan in name only was related to potential interference from Francesco. Nevertheless, in his account as it stands the emphasis is firmly on the wishes of the Orthodox community themselves, and this may well be a true reflection of the situation. The impression given is that the Gattilusio lords took an active interest in the affairs of the local Orthodox Church, but in a manner that went with the grain of its internal dynamics rather than seeking to subvert them.

During the fourteenth century Old Phokaia had become the effective seat of the Metropolitan of Smyrna, who was unable to reside in his titular see.²²⁵ It is likely that, as on Lesbos, the Orthodox hierarchy continued to operate under Gattilusio rule. The authority of an archbishop named Metrophanes, perhaps the Metropolitan of Smyrna, was acknowledged in Old Phokaia in 1435 and 1443.²²⁶ Thasos and Lemnos were the seats of Orthodox archbishoprics, as was Imbros, where the see had been established in 1397.²²⁷ In 1440 the Metropolitan of Drama Dositheos was overseeing the see of Thasos as exarch.²²⁸ It is otherwise unknown whether these sees continued to operate under Gattilusio rule, but in the light of the attitude displayed by the Gattilusio lords on Lesbos it is likely that they did so. The best indication of the status of Samothrake comes from the order of 1369 which assigned the revenues of patriarchal possessions there to the Metropolitan of Ainos.²²⁹ If this arrangement continued thereafter, it would have corresponded neatly with the political bond between the two places when the island was later acquired by the Gattilusio lords of Ainos.

²²⁴ Kydones, *Correspondance*, vol. 2, pp. 228–9 (no. 307).

²²⁵ See below, p. 411.

²²⁶ Schreiner, 'Obituarnotiz', pp. 210–1.

²²⁷ Miklosich and Müller, vol. 2, pp. 272–3 (no. 508); Grumel *et al.*, vol. 5, pp. 89–90, vol. 6, pp. 296–7 (nos. 219, 3034); Lampros, 'Υπόμνημα', pp. 362–3, 366.

²²⁸ Giovanni Mercati, Pius Franchi de' Cavalieri, Robert Devreesse, Ciro Giannelli, Paul Canart, Peter Schreiner and Salvatore Lilla, *Codices Vaticani Graeci*, 9 vols. (Vatican 1923–96), vol. 7, p. 358 (no. 1858).

²²⁹ Grumel *et al.*, vol. 5, p. 466 (no. 2552).

Whereas Kroitzos in Anatolia and a number of the monasteries of Constantinople seem to have had important interests on Lesbos in the early fourteenth century, the attested affiliations of the islands and shores of the northern Aegean with the grander parts of the Orthodox monastic world were largely with the great houses of Mount Athos. The surviving archives of those institutions have revealed considerable interests in this region but not in Phokaia nor, with the exception of an uncertainly identified *praktikon* for an estate apparently at Agiassos belonging to the Grand Lavra, on Lesbos.²³⁰ By contrast, the monasteries of the Grand Lavra, Vatopedi, Philotheou and Dionysiou all possessed extensive estates on Lemnos, while those of Kutlumas, the Pantokrator, Xenophon and St. Paul also owned property there.²³¹ The Grand Lavra also had properties on Imbros and Thasos, and in the immediate vicinity of Ainos.²³² When Ciriaco of Ancona travelled to Athos in 1444 he arrived with letters of introduction from Francesco III Gattilusio of Thasos and Palamede of Ainos, which were favourably received by the abbot of the Grand Lavra.²³³ The monastery of the Pantokrator had been endowed with estates on Thasos by its founders, the brothers Alexios and John who had ruled the island in the later fourteenth century. These were of special importance, since besides an estate at Kakirachi in the west of the island they included most of the area within the ancient walls of the capital Limenas, including the harbour though excluding the acropolis with its castle, and virtually the whole of the small alluvial plain around it.²³⁴ Such

²³⁰ Paul Lemerle, André Guillou, Denise Papachrysanthou and Nicolas Svoronos, *Actes de Lavra*, 4 vols (Paris 1970–82), AA 5, 8, 10, 11, vol. 2, pp. 154–6 (no. 101).

²³¹ Haldon, pp. 168–75; Lemerle *et al.*, vol. 1, pp. 362–4 (Appendix 2), vol. 2, pp. 5–11, 16–27, 33–43, 69–76, 124–7, 142–54, 173–7 (nos. 71, 73–4, 76–7, 89, 95–6, 99–100, 106), vol. 3, pp. 1–8, 28–35, 57–66, 74–82, 85–8, 122–4, 140–2, 167–9, 194–5, 212–3 (nos. 118, 125–7, 136, 139, 141, 152, 157, 164, 172, Appendix 14), vol. 4, pp. 134–48; Jacques Bompaire, Jacques Lefort, Vassiliki Kravari, Christophe Giros and Kostis Smyrlis, *Actes de Vatopedi*, 2 vols. (Paris 2001–6), AA 21–2, vol. 1, pp. 37, 368–76 (nos. 67–8), vol. 2, pp. 39–43, 216–23, 257–63, 281–4, 289–91, 322–5, 33–40 (nos. 98, 108, 114, 117, 125, 128); W. Regel, E. Kurtz and B. Korabiev, *Actes de Philothée* (Amsterdam 1975), *Actes de l'Athos* 6, pp. 27–33 (no. 10); Nicolas Oikonomides, *Actes de Dionysiou* (Paris 1968), AA 4, pp. 47–50, 62–3, 86–9, 122–8 135–54, 157–9, 161–2, 187–9 (nos. 3, 5, 12, 21–2, 25–6, 28, 30, 40); Paul Lemerle, *Actes de Kutlumas* (Paris 1988), AA 2/2, pp. 314–5, 363–4 (no. 24); Vassiliki Kravari, *Actes du Pantocrator* (Paris 1991), AA 17, pp. 15–8, 39–43, 109–12, 120–4, 140–56, 166–75, 189–96 (nos. 12, 15, 20–2, 25–6).

²³² Lemerle *et al.*, vol. 3, pp. 67–74, 149–53, 178–9 (nos. 137–8, 160, 166), vol. 4, p. 149; Grumel *et al.*, vol. 5, p. 252 (no. 2310).

²³³ Ciriaco, p. 128.

²³⁴ Kravari, pp. 7–15, 36–9, 95–108, 124–34 (nos. 10–1, 16–7); Grumel *et al.*, vol. 6, pp. 36–9, 43, 101–2 (no. 2800); above, pp. 89–90. It is likely that much of the area within the great fortified circuit was not built up, and it may well be that the population was concentrated

possessions would naturally have been of great significance to the government of the island. In explaining his bequest the *megas primikerios* John cited his desire to preserve his and his brother's achievements in relieving the island of Turkish raids and restoring the fortunes and defences of the capital, and enjoined the monastery to protect the interests of his retainers against any encroachments by later rulers of the island.²³⁵ However, there is no indication of the extent of the prerogatives actually exercised by the monastery in the Gattilusio period. Ciriaco's description of Limenas makes no mention of the Pantokrator and quotes an inscription ascribing recent restoration work there to Francesco III, besides alluding to Francesco's adornment of the harbour.²³⁶ The Grand Lavra's Thasian estates were in the vicinity of the important settlements of Neokastron, Potamia and Kinara.²³⁷ Another major monastic establishment with interests in the area was the monastery of St. John on Patmos, which had a *metochion* on Lemnos.²³⁸ The contrast in the pattern of monastic affiliations between these territories and Lesbos may to some extent reflect the vagaries of the survival of documents. However, it is likely to reveal a real regional divergence, reflecting proximity and a further expression of the patterns of interconnection discernible in commercial affairs. Here too, Ainos and the northern islands tended to have stronger ties with the western and southern Aegean, while Lesbos was more closely associated with the Anatolian littoral area and the route along it to the straits and Constantinople.²³⁹

The only one of the Gattilusio territories that presents evidence of possible obstruction of the normal functioning of the Orthodox hierarchy is Ainos. Here again the late fourteenth century saw financial difficulties, but again these cannot be attributed to Latin interference, as they predated the establishment of Gattilusio rule. By 1370 the patriarch was forced to take steps, details of which do not survive, to remedy the impoverishment of the metropolitan see of Ainos, owing to the gradual alienation

on the slopes around the castle; this may be the implication of Ciriaco's reference to looking down from near the castle on the 'vastae' space of the ancient city below. Ciriaco, p. 112.

²³⁵ Kravari, pp. 95–108 (nos. 10–1); cf. Michael D. Higgins, *A Geological Companion to Greece and the Aegean* (London 1996), p. 119.

²³⁶ Ciriaco, pp. 108–10.

²³⁷ Lemerle *et al.*, vol. 3, pp. 67–72 (no. 137).

²³⁸ Miklosich and Müller, vol. 2, p. 159 (no. 429); Grumel *et al.*, vol. 6, p. 186 (no. 2902).

²³⁹ See above, pp. 218–34.

of its properties.²⁴⁰ Already in 1369 Metropolitan Dionysios of Ainos had been granted the revenues of all patriarchal properties on Samothrake to supplement his income, but evidently these were not sufficient to resolve the problem.²⁴¹ It is unknown whether the renewed efforts made in 1370 restored the province's finances or whether its penury continued into the period of Gattilusio rule.

However, in 1400 Patriarch Matthew I of Constantinople (1397–1410) wrote to Niccolò I Gattilusio, asking for his cooperation in the appointment of a new Metropolitan of Ainos to fill a vacancy which had already existed for some years. The patriarch complained that Niccolò had not responded to three previous letters on this subject.²⁴² This reluctance to see a replacement installed suggests an effort on Niccolò's part to obstruct the operation of the Orthodox hierarchy in his territory. However, there is no indication of Niccolò's motives and his lack of cooperation may have stemmed from considerations unconnected with the schism. It need not have been the product of a consistent line of policy pursued from the outset of his rule in Ainos, since there is some evidence that the appointment of a Metropolitan of Ainos had been enacted at some point between 1389 and 1395, while Niccolò was ruling there.²⁴³ The lack of any reference in the patriarchal letter of 1400 to any similar difficulties regarding an earlier vacancy may indicate that the appointment had on that occasion taken place without interference on Niccolò's part. The vacancy may have been filled by 1423/4, by which time Niccolò had been succeeded by Palamede,

²⁴⁰ Miklosich and Müller, vol. 1, pp. 513–4 (no. 261); Grumel *et al.*, vol. 5, pp. 486–7 (no. 2576).

²⁴¹ Grumel *et al.*, vol. 5, p. 466 (no. 2552).

²⁴² Miklosich and Müller, vol. 2, pp. 338–9 (no. 540); Grumel *et al.*, vol. 6, p. 350 (no. 3095).

²⁴³ In November 1381 one Mark is attested as Metropolitan of Ainos (Miklosich and Müller, vol. 2, pp. 37–9 (no. 353); Grumel *et al.*, vol. 6, pp. 44–5 (no. 2728)). The office may well have become vacant by September 1389, since at that time the *sakelliou* of Ainos was mandated by the patriarchal synod to administer the rights of the see (Miklosich and Müller, vol. 2, p. 140 (no. 415.1); Grumel *et al.*, vol. 6, pp. 162–3 (no. 2873)). This might be taken as an indication that the metropolitan was unable to reside in his diocese to fulfil responsibilities which would normally have been in his purview. However, such responsibilities would presumably have been for the metropolitan himself to delegate, not the patriarch. This act may therefore imply that there was no metropolitan in office at that time. In February 1395 there was a Metropolitan of Ainos, who at that time was entrusted with the administration of the metropolitan see of Philippi, while he was already administering the neighbouring see of Drama as *proedros*. Thus it may be inferred that an appointment to the see had been made between 1389 and 1395. Miklosich and Müller, vol. 2, p. 234 (no. 480); Grumel *et al.*, vol. 6, p. 250 (no. 2981).

in the light of an inscription in the Orthodox church of Chrysopege in Ainos. This may be reconstructed as acknowledging the authority of a bishop named John, perhaps the Metropolitan of Ainos.²⁴⁴ The description of Orthodox Church organisation produced for the Council of Basle in 1437 also reported Ainos among the places with metropolitans or archbishops appointed from Constantinople, although its reliability is dubious.²⁴⁵

The episode attested in the patriarch's letter to Niccolò thus remains enigmatic, but seems more likely to have been the product of specific circumstances of the moment than of a general policy of undermining the Orthodox hierarchy. A possible analogy may be seen in the case of the Metropolitan of Smyrna in 1363, when it was anticipated that the port's Kalothetos ruler might obstruct the metropolitan from taking up residence in Old Phokaia.²⁴⁶ Such difficulties with an Orthodox Byzantine governor, but one enjoying effective autonomy and at odds with the current regime in Constantinople, is suggestive of how political tensions could lead to such obstruction even in the absence of sectarian considerations. The most obvious explanation for such a scenario in the case of Ainos would lie in the acrimonious atmosphere prevailing between Manuel II and the Gattilusio lords in this period, owing to their support for John VII. In this case the patriarch's fresh effort to resolve the vacancy in 1400 may have been a response to the events of late 1399, when John had been reconciled with his uncle and entrusted with the administration of the empire during Manuel's mission to the West, thus removing the tension that dynastic strife had introduced into Gattilusio relations with Constantinople.

Overall, as Catholics themselves, accompanied by an important Latin community the Gattilusio lords naturally facilitated the installation of a Catholic establishment in their territories to serve the needs of that population, but there is little sign that they encouraged or oversaw any further encroachments at the expense of the Orthodox Church. Their own imperial mandate to rule and Orthodox dynastic connections, the benefits of securing the cooperation of the native population and the apparently

²⁴⁴ Asdracha, 'Thrace', pp. 267–8 (no. 35).

²⁴⁵ Lampros, 'Υπόμνημα', p. 366. This report also claims that such appointments were made to the sees of Rhodes and Chios, each of which was in fact administered by a *dichaios* approved by the respective Latin rulers, who forbade the residence of Orthodox metropolitans. However, the report is clearly not simply recording the appointment of titular prelates regardless of such obstructions, since it does explicitly exclude Cyprus, Crete, Corfu and other Venetian and Genoese territories.

²⁴⁶ See below, p. 411.

powerful position occupied by leading Greeks in the society and administration of the lordships all militated against such a policy.²⁴⁷

High Culture, Community Relations and the Union

Despite the particular advantages enjoyed by the Gattilusio lordships in handling the difficulties presented by the schism, the potentially inflammatory fault-line it created in their society could only be eliminated by its final resolution, a goal which was in any case seen in the Catholic world as desirable for its own sake. Any prospects of such an outcome were bound up with that portion of Orthodox society sympathetic to the Latin position on principled or pragmatic grounds, sometimes to the extent of converting to Catholicism. It was natural that leading exponents of such views should be favoured by the Gattilusio lords, and that they in turn should be attractive to such individuals as friends and patrons. Sharing connections on both sides of the divide and an interest in religious peace, the Gattilusio lords of Mytilene in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries developed relationships with various leading Greek intellectuals of pro-Latin sympathies, some of whom resided for a time on Lesbos.

Such sympathies were most prominent among the scholarly elite, who are also obviously more likely than others to have left surviving evidence of their opinions and personal connections. Growing admiration for Latin intellectual accomplishments and disenchantment at the triumph of Palamism in the mid-fourteenth century controversies within the Orthodox Church were chiefly concentrated in that stratum.²⁴⁸ While the environment created by the Gattilusio regime may have been particularly congenial to those who sought, in their own lives and as a matter of public policy, to overcome the divide between Greek and Latin, the evidence for a Greek Unionist milieu relates to individuals originating elsewhere, within the imperial mainstream. There is little evidence for the ready availability of advanced Greek education within the Gattilusio

²⁴⁷ A more acrimonious interpretation of confessional relations has previously been proposed. Ioannis K. Moutzouris, 'Ο Καθολικισμός και η Ορθοδοξία στη Λέσβο επί Γατελούζων', *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οι Γατελούζοι της Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 117–30.

²⁴⁸ Norman Russell, 'Palamism and the circle of Demetrius Cydones', *Porphyrogenita: Essays on Byzantine History, in honour of Julian Chrysostomides*, ed. Charalambos Dendrinos, Jonathan Harris, Eirene Harvalia-Crook and Judith Herrin (Aldershot 2003), pp. 153–74; Delacroix-Besnier, pp. 189–97, 277–85.

lordships. A similar dearth is observable in earlier centuries in the Aegean islands generally, with the exception of Rhodes, although in the thirteenth century Nikephoros Blemmydes did select Lesbos as a place where he might pursue his studies in peace.²⁴⁹ A hint of the standard of Greek learning acquired by the Gattilusio lords themselves is offered by Domenico's short letter to Manuel Sophianos, which it has been argued he composed himself. It is written in a colloquial form apparently reflecting local dialect and containing what are either errors or unusual dialectical variations, perhaps indicating that this lord of Mytilene was not educated to a high level in the Greek language.²⁵⁰ Some caution should nonetheless be exercised in drawing firm conclusions from what is a very brief and thoroughly practical note, for which the refined language appropriate to a more formal letter may have simply seemed unnecessary.

The literary figures who came to be associated with the Gattilusio disparaged the inhabitants of Lesbos as dull, uneducated and speaking a barbarous vernacular far removed from the refinement of Greek as they themselves knew it. Writing from Lesbos to friends in Constantinople, Demetrios Kydones repeatedly lamented the general lack of urbane or scholarly company on the island and the incomprehensibility of the Greek inhabitants' speech.²⁵¹ Regarding them, in 1397 Manuel Kalekas wrote dismissively of the 'νησιωτῶν ἀπαιδευσίας', the lack of education of the islanders.²⁵² At the time of writing, Kalekas had never actually visited Lesbos, although he may have drawn on reports of friends and correspondents like Kydones and Maximos Chrysoverges, who were familiar with the island.²⁵³ None of these assessments can be taken at face value: haughty or horrified metropolitan disdain for the rusticity of provincial language and education was a perennial trope of Byzantine literary culture, and one in rude health in this period.²⁵⁴ Kydones himself made

²⁴⁹ Elisabeth Malamut, *Les Iles de l'Empire Byzantin*, 2 vols. (Paris 1988), vol. 2, pp. 573–5; Nikephoros Blemmydes, *Autobiographia sive Curriculum Vitae necnon Epistula Universalior*, ed. Joseph A. Munitiz (Turnhout 1984), *Corpus Christianorum Series Graeca* 13, p. 20.

²⁵⁰ Panagiotis Parakevaidis, *Η Μυτιλήνη επί Γατελούζων* (Mytilene 1970), pp. 16–7; above, p. 273.

²⁵¹ Kydones, *Correspondance*, vol. 2, pp. 4–5, 7–8, 78–80 (nos. 135, 138, 202).

²⁵² Kalekas, pp. 189–90 (no. 17).

²⁵³ Kalekas, pp. 53–9.

²⁵⁴ E.g. Manuel II Palaiologos, *Letters of Manuel II Palaeologus*, ed. George T. Dennis (Washington, D.C. 1977), *CFHB* 8, pp. 86–9 (no. 32); Mazaris, *Journey to Hades: or interviews with dead men about certain officials of the imperial court*, ed. John Barry, Michael Share, Andrew Smithies and Leendert Westerink (Buffalo 1975), p. 64.

similar remarks about the Peloponnese.²⁵⁵ Nevertheless, the more specific evidence available does little to contradict them. In his letter of recommendation for the *oikonomos* of Eressos, Kydones emphasised the cleric's lack of an advanced education.²⁵⁶ Among the *archontes'* sons of Lesbos, the younger Theodigis Kolyvas was able to secure an education from a distinguished teacher, as was the son of Manuel Palaiologos. However, the former did so in Constantinople, while the latter's teacher was Manuel Kalekas, who had settled on Lesbos but generally refused requests to teach there.²⁵⁷ Among the circle of Greek intellectuals known to have been associated with Lesbos in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries only one may have been a native. This was Kaloïdes, a correspondent of Demetrios Kydones who had some personal dealings with Francesco I, with whom Kydones interceded to help Kaloïdes secure some property.²⁵⁸ Even in his case there is no positive evidence of a local origin.

Notes regarding the production and ownership of Greek manuscripts do give some glimpses of cultural interests in the Gattilusio territories, as well as religious practice. Liturgical texts were copied in 1436 by Thetokes, an *anagnostes* of the see of Ainos, while a monk from Lesbos named Michael copied a commentary on the Gospels in the fourteenth century.²⁵⁹ Other manuscripts attest to secular interests: during the fifteenth century one Michael of Lesbos commissioned the copying of a compilation of medical texts, while George Rales of Mytilene possessed a manuscript of plays by Aristophanes and in the fourteenth century or later the *sakelliou* of Ainos Manuel made a note in a manuscript containing works of classical drama and poetry.²⁶⁰ It has been proposed that the Phlamoulios whose wife's death in 1416 appears in a short chronicle from Lesbos, and who may have written part of it, is to be identified with Phlamoulios Kontostephanos, who copied and annotated various theological and other

²⁵⁵ Kydones, *Correspondance*, vol. 1, p. 26 (no. 4), vol. 2, pp. 250–1 (no. 322).

²⁵⁶ Kydones, *Correspondance*, vol. 2, pp. 228–9 (no. 307).

²⁵⁷ Chortasmenos, pp. 186–7 (no. 37); Kalekas, pp. 297–304 (nos. 86–7); below, p. 309.

²⁵⁸ Kydones, *Correspondance*, vol. 1, pp. 163–4 (no. 127); Kalekas, pp. 334–5 (no. 8).

²⁵⁹ E. Martini, *Catalogo di manoscritti greci esistenti nelle biblioteche italiane*, 2 vols. (Milan 1893–1902), *Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione Indici e Cataloghi* 19, vol. 2, pp. 83–4 (no. 49); Hermann von Soden, *Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments in ihrer ältesten erreichbaren Textgestalt*, 2 vols. (Berlin 1902–13), vol. 1/1, p. 267.

²⁶⁰ Henry Stevenson, *Codices Manuscripti Graeci Reginae Suecorum et Pii PP. II Bibliothecae Vaticanae* (Rome 1888), pp. 12–35 (no. 182); Aimilianos Tsakopoulos, *Περιγραφικός κατάλογος τῶν χειρογράφων τῆς Βιβλιοθήκης τοῦ Οἰκουμενικοῦ Πατριαρχείου*, 3 vols. (Istanbul 1953–6), vol. 1, pp. 213–4 (no. 156); Mercati, *et al.*, vol. 7, p. 244 (no. 1824).

texts in surviving manuscripts.²⁶¹ Eleutherios of Elis, who copied some astrological manuscripts in Mytilene in 1388–9, was probably an associate of Andronikos IV's court astrologer John Avramios, suggesting the possibility that he was connected with the Gattilusio court through John VII's alliance with Francesco II. However, there is no direct evidence of this, and Eleutherios was also active at Negroponte and on Rhodes in the 1380s and 1390s, suggesting that his presence on Lesbos may well have been of short duration and not signify any close relationship with its rulers or other inhabitants.²⁶²

In any case, it is chiefly among Latinophile scholars of a metropolitan background, and especially the circle of Kydones and Kalekas, that the Gattilusio lordships' links with the more refined reaches of Greek intellectual life are to be found. The central figure in that connection was Demetrios Kydones himself. The precise circumstances under which he became friends with Francesco I of Mytilene are unknown, but the emotional bond established between them was stout enough to survive the unhappy circumstances of Kydones's two known visits to Lesbos.²⁶³ He encouraged the tendency for other prominent Byzantine scholars to become acquainted with the Gattilusio lords. Learning that George Gavrielopoulos was to visit Lesbos he wrote to express his pleasure that Francesco I would at last meet a man he had long wished to get to know and that Gavrielopoulos would see for himself Francesco's virtues and the excellence of his rule, which in a well-worn cliché he likened to that of the philosopher-king of Plato's *Republic*.²⁶⁴ While Kydones's relationship with Francesco II was more problematic, when Manuel Kalekas planned

²⁶¹ Schreiner, *Kleinchroniken*, vol. 1, p. 223 (no. 31/3); Mercati *et al.*, vol. 2, p. 491 (no. 579); Giovanni Mercati, *Notizie di Procoro e Demetrio Cidone, Manuele Caleca e Teodoro Meliteniote ed altri appunti per la storia della teologia e della letteratura bizantina del secolo XIV* (Vatican 1931), p. 68; Raymond-Joseph Loenertz, *Les recueils de lettres de Démétrius Cydonès* (Vatican 1947), pp. 18–9.

²⁶² Alexander Turyn, *Dated Greek Manuscripts of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries in the Libraries of Italy*, 2 vols. (Urbana, Illinois 1972), vol. 1, pp. 250–1, vol. 2, plates 208, 262c–d; *idem*, *Codices graeci Vaticani: saeculis XIII et XIV scripti annorumque notis instructi* (Vatican 1964), pp. 171–2, 177, plates 150, 157, 203c–d; David Pingree, 'The astrological school of John Abramius', *DOP* 25 (1971), pp. 191–215 at pp. 202–4. Pingree argues that the particular selection of manuscripts copied by Eleutherios indicates that Avramios was also on Lesbos at this point, and that both may have spent much of their time after Andronikos's defeat in the civil war of 1376–81 on the island. However, Pingree appears to have been unaware of Eleutherios's other travels.

²⁶³ See above, pp. 97–100.

²⁶⁴ Kydones, *Correspondance*, vol. 1, pp. 166–7 (no. 130).

to travel to Lesbos in 1396 Demetrios armed him with letters of recommendation to Francesco and another acquaintance, perhaps Kaloïdes.²⁶⁵

Though Kalekas did not make his trip to Lesbos in 1396, he emigrated there permanently following his open conversion to Catholicism. The hostility attracted by this embrace of the Latin Church encouraged him to leave Constantinople and seek a more congenial location in which to pursue his intended religious vocation. He went first to Pera but soon moved on to Lesbos, where he had entered the Dominican convent by 1404 and enjoyed the favour of the Gattilusio.²⁶⁶ He lived there until his death in 1410.²⁶⁷ While on Lesbos he completed his tract *Adversus Graecos*, asserting the Latin position on the questions at issue in the schism.²⁶⁸ Maximos Chrysoverges, another Greek intellectual convert to Catholicism and Dominican friar, and another member of the same social network, seems to have spent some time on Lesbos, although he did not take up residence there.²⁶⁹

After the passing of this particularly pro-Latin network of thinkers it is less clear what form ongoing scholarly links took, but it is evident that later Gattilusio lords did continue to have some involvement with Greek intellectual circles. One indication of intellectual interests in this later period comes from John Kanavoutzes's Greek commentary on Dionysios of Halikarnassos, dealing with that ancient historian's treatment of Samothrake, which he dedicated to the island's ruler Palamede Gattilusio.²⁷⁰ In explaining his decision to produce this work Kanavoutzes stated that he had been told that the lord of Ainos eagerly attended to learned discussions and ancient history, and compared him to Plato's philosopher-king.²⁷¹ However, the work goes on to expound at length on the practical utility

²⁶⁵ Kalekas, pp. 230–1 (no. 45).

²⁶⁶ Kalekas, pp. 297–303 (no. 86).

²⁶⁷ Kalekas, p. 337 (no. 10).

²⁶⁸ Delacroix-Besnier, pp. 267–71; Thomas Kaeppli, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi*, 4 vols. (Rome 1970–93), vol. 3, pp. 102–4.

²⁶⁹ Kalekas, pp. 59, 230–1 (no. 45), 323–4 (no. 4).

²⁷⁰ John Kanavoutzes, *Ioannis Canabutzae Magistri ad Principem Aeni et Samothracas in Dionysium Halicarnasensem Commentarius*, ed. Maximilian Lehnerdt (Leipzig 1890), pp. 1–3; Aubrey Diller, 'Ioannes Canabutzes', *Byzantion* 40 (1970), pp. 271–5; *idem*, 'Ioannes Canabutzes and Michael Chrysococces', *Byzantion* 42 (1972), pp. 257–8; Efthymiadis and Mazarakis, pp. 620–4.

²⁷¹ Kanavoutzes, pp. 2–3. The composition of this work cannot be dated precisely, though it must fall after the Gattilusio acquisition of Samothrake. Kanavoutzes's interlocutor the *magister* Zoanes is mentioned as visiting Ainos by Leonardo of Chios, in a text written after his appointment as Archbishop of Mytilene in 1444 (Leonardo, *De Die Ultimi*, f. 149). It may well be that the production of a work focusing on Samothrake was a

of philosophy and the benefits of wisdom and scholarship to rulers, in a manner that smacks strongly of an application for patronage.²⁷² In this context it is hard to be sure how much credit to accord to Kanavoutzes's acclamation of Palamede's intellectual curiosity: it may reflect the rhetorical device of praising as a virtue in the recipient some quality which the panegyrist wishes the recipient to display.

A cryptic trace of the climate of ideas in Palamede's Ainos may be gleaned from a letter in which George Scholarios described the career of one Juvenal, perhaps a disciple of George Gemistos Plethon, whom Scholarios accused of promoting paganism and who was eventually executed for this offence in the Peloponnese. According to Scholarios, at some point prior to the Union of Florence Juvenal had been active in Ainos, where he had won over many people to his way of thinking. Prompted by appeals from some of the other inhabitants, Scholarios had written to Palamede, urging him to put a stop to these activities. The heretic had consequently been expelled from the lordship.²⁷³ Given that such alleged efforts to revive ancient paganism had a natural association with classical scholarship, Juvenal's success in gaining adherents in Ainos may reflect a thirst for learning among the population, though whether due to a vigorous intellectual environment or a shortage of alternative tuition must be a matter for speculation. The fact that the complainants had felt the need to appeal to an imperial official and that Palamede had acted only at Scholarios's prompting suggests that he himself showed a degree of ambivalence towards Juvenal's activities.

Another of Scholarios's letters hints at continuing connections between the lordship of Mytilene and Byzantine intellectual life in the mid-fifteenth century. This was written in 1435/6 to his pupil John, who appears to have been visiting Lesbos and the court of Dorino I Gattilusio at the time. In this Scholarios praised the lord of Mytilene for the favour he showed towards scholarship and remarked that this attitude was in accordance with the precedent set by Dorino's ancestors, who had themselves been patrons of learning.²⁷⁴ Thus it seems that congenial relations with pro-Union Greek

congratulatory response to Palamede's recent acquisition of the island, which would place the text's composition probably in the 1420s or early 1430s.

²⁷² Kanavoutzes, pp. 3–12. Perhaps significantly, seafaring figures prominently among the areas in which Kanavoutzes asserts that philosophy has made important practical contributions, along with fields such as medicine and chemistry.

²⁷³ George Scholarios, *Oeuvres complètes de Georges Scholarios*, ed. Louis Petit, Xenophon Siderides and Martin Jugie, 8 vols. (Paris 1928–36), vol. 4, pp. 476–89 (no. 2).

²⁷⁴ Scholarios, vol. 4, pp. 412–3 (no. 4).

intellectuals, a category to which Scholarios at this time belonged, may have endured into the later decades of Gattilusio rule.²⁷⁵

Such individuals may also have had dealings with Latin humanists under the auspices of the Gattilusio regime, although there is little positive evidence for this. In 1444 the lordship of Mytilene acquired its own Italian humanist writer in residence, Leonardo of Chios, who may well already have frequented Lesbos before his appointment as its archbishop.²⁷⁶ He and Kanavoutzes had a mutual friend in the *magister* Zoanes, the physician of the lord of Mytilene and an acquaintance of Palamede of Ainos.²⁷⁷ Palamede's secretary Francesco Calvo and his estate manager Giorgio Mamino, a former teacher, were also members of this circle of educated Latins.²⁷⁸ It may well be that Francesco III's preceptor John Pedemontano was associated with the same milieu.²⁷⁹

Friendships and other cordial dealings between the Gattilusio lords and cosmopolitan Greek intellectuals who were either Catholic converts or at least favourably disposed towards the Latins can hardly be considered strong evidence for amicable confessional relations under Gattilusio rule. However, such individuals' references to their experiences on Lesbos do provide glimpses of the prevailing climate, which suggest that conditions were indeed relaxed. Kydones claimed proudly that the islanders had accepted him as a fellow-citizen, in his letter recommending the proposed successor to the late Orthodox Metropolitan of Methymna, written at the behest of the inhabitants and in spite of his apparent personal reservations about the candidate.²⁸⁰ His involvement in local ecclesiastical affairs

²⁷⁵ Marie-Hélène Blanchet, *Georges-Gennadios Scholarios (vers 1400–vers 1472): un intellectuel orthodoxe face à la disparition de l'Empire byzantin* (Paris 2008), pp. 281–314.

²⁷⁶ Ciriaco of Ancona probably encountered Leonardo at Dorino's court in Mytilene shortly before his elevation to the archbishopric (Ciriaco, p. 26). A particular attraction of the island for Leonardo may have been its medicinal springs, whose beneficial effect on his ailments he praises in his *De Statu Hominis*. Leonardo, *De Statu Hominis*, ff. 16^{r-v}, 26^v, 77.

²⁷⁷ Kanavoutzes, pp. 2–3; Leonardo, *De Die Ultimi*, f. 149. A number of other medical professionals, present in Mytilene in the 1450s, appear in documents of the notarial collection: the surgeons Jacopo de Itro and Baldasare Pavone and a physician, the *magister* Gabriele. Pavone's possessions included fifteen books and pamphlets, chiefly on on medical and surgical subjects. Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene', pp. 58–9, 116–8 (nos. 22, 55).

²⁷⁸ Leonardo, *De Die Ultimi*, f. 149; *idem*, *De Statu Hominis*, f. 84^v; Ciriaco, p. 104.

²⁷⁹ Ciriaco, pp. 26–8, 104, 140–2; above, p. 279.

²⁸⁰ Kydones, *Correspondance*, vol. 2, pp. 228–9 (no. 307); above, pp. 296–7. Mazarakis has suggested that the status of 'συμπολίτης' of Mytilene which Kydones says he was accorded by the inhabitants amounted to membership of a council of notables advising the lord of Mytilene (Mazarakis 'Contesto', pp. 266–7). However, it should be noted that Kydones elsewhere uses the term 'πολίτης' to denote the common people of a city, in explicit contrast from its *archontes* (e.g. Kydones, *Correspondance*, vol. 2, pp. 94, (no. 216)).

might have produced a considerably less welcoming attitude if his pro-Latin opinions and associations had been regarded with hostility by the Orthodox population. More dramatically, in 1404 Manuel Kalekas, having been induced to emigrate to the island by hostility resulting from his conversion to Catholicism, mentioned in a letter that since his arrival he had been besieged by requests from local Greeks to teach their children.²⁸¹ The presence of a scholar of Kalekas's stature must have been an enticing rarity in the provincial conditions of Lesbos which Kydones had bemoaned. Nevertheless, it is striking that numerous Greek parents were so eager to entrust their children's education to a man who had renounced the Orthodox tradition, undeterred by the fear that they might be led astray. Such behaviour is very difficult to reconcile with an atmosphere of sectarian tension. Rather than provoking resentment, half a century of Latin rule seems if anything to have soothed relations between the religious communities. This achievement is presumably to be attributed in large part to the propitious context for interaction provided by a Latin regime legitimised by Byzantine authority which afforded Greeks important roles in government and society.

The sources offer little trace of the cultural content of everyday life in spheres such as manners and physical culture, although the fact that the Gattilusio lords presented the leaders of the Crusade of Nikopolis with fine garments in Greek fashion when they stopped at Mytilene on their way home may hint at the style of their court.²⁸² The perceptions of some outside observers are suggestive of how the society of Lesbos appeared from a distance. Genoese efforts to deny responsibility for Giuliano Gattilusio's pillaging of English merchants by characterising him as Greek are too self-serving to be taken seriously. However, their alternative description of him as being of 'nationis Metilinensis' hints at the perception, at least from the outside, of a local hybrid identity uniting the Greek inhabitants with at least the longer-established and more culturally acclimatised Latins.²⁸³ Another piece of testimony on the subject of Giuliano's nationality presented to the English authorities was that of Polonio Macero, the master of a Venetian carrack who claimed to have known Giuliano for about five years. When asked whether the latter was Greek or Genoese, Macero said

²⁸¹ Kalekas, pp. 297–303 (no. 86).

²⁸² Froissart, vol. 16, pp. 49–50. Of course, this choice of gifts may very well merely reflect a preference for what would be exotic souvenirs for the French visitors over more 'ordinary' western garb.

²⁸³ ASG, *NA* 795 (Andrea de Cario 1), no. 10; above, pp. 155, 238.

that Giuliano's father was Genoese but characterised his mother as 'vero de insula Meteline'. His preference for a geographical identifier over the two cultural categories proposed to him again hints at the idea of a local identity which involved some degree of synthesis between the two. The emergence of such a geographically framed compound identity would be in keeping with developments discernible in other formerly Byzantine territories ruled and settled by Latins, notably Crete, Cyprus and the Morea.²⁸⁴ Most startlingly, despite claiming that the inhabitants of Lesbos included more Genoese than Greeks, and despite identifying Giuliano's father Battista Gattilusio as Genoese, Macero said that the lord of Mytilene was a Greek. Oddly, he seems to have made no reference to the latter's family relationship with Giuliano. His description, coming from an observer whose testimony shows no inclination to support the Genoese effort to disown Giuliano, is a striking indication of the degree of acculturation a Latin outsider might perceive in the Gattilusio lords.²⁸⁵

For the Gattilusio regime there was less incentive to encourage the development of identities focused on locality than there was for other Latin rulers in the empire's former territories. As imperial representatives, the older patterns of identity and authority, at least in their political dimension, worked in the lordships' favour rather than against them. Nevertheless, there are some hints that the Gattilusio lords sought to promote and associate themselves with local pride in their individual territories as a supplementary means of legitimation and perhaps a means of transcending the sectarian divide.²⁸⁶ In an epigram addressed to

²⁸⁴ Teresa Shawcross, *The Chronicle of Morea: historiography in crusader Greece* (Oxford 2009), pp. 190–259; Gill Page, *Being Byzantine: Greek identity before the Ottomans* (Cambridge 2008), pp. 177–242; McKee, *passim*.

²⁸⁵ Jenks, pp. 70–1.

²⁸⁶ It has been suggested that the creation of the seal published by Schlumberger as that of the city of Mytilene reflects such an effort (Gustave Schlumberger, 'Sceau de la ville de Mételin sous la domination génoise au Moyen Age', *Revue Archéologique* n.s. 35 (1878), pp. 368–70; Pistarino, 'Secolo', pp. 289–90; Mazarakis, 'Contesto', pp. 265, 269). However, Schlumberger's identification is clearly erroneous: the provenance of the seal is unknown and its imagery does not correspond to anything else produced by the Gattilusio or associated with them. The only basis for Schlumberger's interpretation is the presence in its Latin inscription of the name 'Mutiliana', read by him as Mytilene. This, however, is quite unlike any identified rendering of that name, but corresponds exactly to a known Latin form of the name Modigliana (Johann G. T. Grässe, Friedrich Benedict, Helmut Plechl and Sophie-Charlotte Plechl, *Orbis Latinus: Lexikon lateinischer geographischer Namen des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit*, 3 vols. (Braunschweig 1972), vol. 2, p. 645). The seal must therefore be supposed to be a product of that Italian town, with no connection to the Gattilusio lordships.

Francesco III, Ciriaco expressed an improbable hope for the restoration of Thasian rule over former dependencies on the mainland which had been subjugated by barbarous tyranny.²⁸⁷ Though the antiquarian was presumably aware of the rule of ancient Thasos over its continental *peraia*, this seems more likely to be an allusion to the fourteenth-century lordship of Alexios and John.²⁸⁸ This suggests that that regime, also an autonomous government under Byzantine sovereignty and perhaps remembered fondly by the inhabitants, was seen as a precursor and exemplar for Francesco's own rule. This would show the Gattilusio bolstering their authority in particular places by drawing on particular local traditions with no applicability elsewhere in their territories.

The same agenda, here reaching back to a much more distant past, may be reflected in the Francesco's erection at the entrance of the harbour of Limenas of a classical statue, which Ciriaco of Ancona described as representing a personification of the council of the island's ancient *polis*.²⁸⁹ The same can perhaps be said of the sentiments expressed in an inscription quoted by Ciriaco in which the citizenry thanked Francesco for his restoration of walls and buildings, which presented this work with reference to the city's glorious past.²⁹⁰ An inscription erected for Palamede on Samothrake includes 'φιλόπολις' among the honorific attributes it assigns him.²⁹¹ While this evidence remains tenuous, the idea of civic pride as a useful focus for loyalty would have come naturally to the citizens of an urban commune.

Francesco III's employment of ancient statuary may also be an indication that identification with the heritage of antiquity formed part of the Gattilusio regime's self-image and self-presentation. In the era of the Italian Renaissance, classical culture offered a point of contact between members of the elite from different ethnic and religious backgrounds. Reused ancient relief carvings of gladiators and beast-fighters were displayed prominently, below a plaque carved with the regime's own symbols, on the central tower of the inner defensive circuit of the castle of Mytilene.²⁹² This was a particularly significant location, since this compact inner stronghold was probably the chief residence of the lords of

²⁸⁷ Ciriaco, pp. 136–8.

²⁸⁸ See above, pp. 89–90.

²⁸⁹ Ciriaco, p. 110.

²⁹⁰ Ciriaco, p. 108.

²⁹¹ Asdracha and Bakirtzis, pp. 273–6 (no. 31), plate 77; Conze, plate 3, no. 7.

²⁹² S. I. Charitonidis, 'Οἰκοδομικὲς φάσεις τοῦ κάστρου τῆς Μυτιλήνης', *Λεσβιακά* 4 (1962), pp. 69–75 at plate 4, no. 7.

Mytilene.²⁹³ The decorative employment of these reliefs may have been an almost incidental by-product of the widespread reuse of ancient masonry in the construction of the castle.²⁹⁴ However, in the light of the case of Thasos it seems quite possible that such a gesture reflects a deliberate effort by the Gattilusio lords to associate themselves with the lustre of antiquity, and perhaps specifically with the locality to whose ancient inheritance these remains belonged.²⁹⁵ The reuse of relief carvings by the main entrance of the castle at Ainos could also form part of such a pattern, although the work into which they are incorporated does not necessarily date from the Gattilusio period.²⁹⁶ Francesco II's choice of the name Palamede for his third son may reflect a verbal equivalent of such visual symbolism, since the ancient hero Palamedes was supposed to have been buried on Lesbos.²⁹⁷

Among the cultural production of the Gattilusio lordships, the most concerted effort to enlist the classical tradition in bridging the cultural divide and glorifying the regime is found in the work of John Kanavoutzes. His commentary on Dionysios of Halikarnassos takes its cue from the ancient Greek author's stated aim of refuting the widespread Greek dismissal of the politically ascendant Romans as barbarians, an outlook with clear

²⁹³ Dennis, 'Short chronicle', pp. 5–6. From the point of view of an observer inside the castle, this tower formed the visual centrepiece of the inner stronghold, and contained its entrance (it is the location numbered 8 on Hasluck's plan (Hasluck, p. 259, fig. 10)). It was thus the most prominent site for display in the location most closely associated with the lordship of Mytilene, a fact reflected in the siting of the regime's own symbolic plaque and perhaps also in the fact that, uniquely among the castle's towers, its top is ringed by stone corbels for supporting an overhang or gallery (cf. Paolo Stringa, *Genova e la Liguria nel Mediterraneo: insediamento e culture urbane* (Genoa 1982), pp. 105–7, 149, 207, 274, 295, 380–1). Such corbels are also to be found on a tower-house which has been attributed to the Gattilusio period near Thermi on Lesbos and on one of the Gattilusio towers at Palaïopolis on Samothrake, but the absence of this feature from the other towers of the castle of Mytilene suggests that the function of the structure they supported here was chiefly aesthetic (E. Patsourakos, 'Τρεις πύργοι των Γατελούζων', *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οι Γατελούζοι της Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 17–34 at pp. 22–3, 32–3; Johannes Koder, *Aigaion Pelagos (die nördliche Ägäis)* (Vienna 1998), *Tabula Imperii Byzantini* 10, plates 117–8, 120).

²⁹⁴ Caroline Williams, 'Hellenistic and Roman buildings in the medieval walls of Mytilene', *Phoenix: Journal of the Classical Association of Canada* 38 (1984), pp. 31–70.

²⁹⁵ The decorative reuse of classical carvings was also a metropolitan Genoese practice, as seen for example in the incorporation of Roman sculptural elements into the façade of the Doria family church of San Matteo (Edoardo Mazzino, Teofilo Ossian di Negri and Leonard von Matt, *Il Centro Storico di Genova* (Genoa 1969, 4th ed. 1978), pp. 100, 120–3, 134–6). The reuse of sculptural fragments, probably without calculated intent, can be seen elsewhere on Lesbos, in the medieval church of the Panagia Troulloti.

²⁹⁶ Stringa, p. 285; above, p. 135n13.

²⁹⁷ Stratis Molinos, *Μυτιλήνη, χάρτες και τοπωνύμια* (Athens 1981), p. 32.

contemporary resonances.²⁹⁸ The Romans are certainly to be equated with the Latins here: in invoking the Eusebian theory of the providential purpose of Roman power, Kanavoutzes clearly identifies the inheritor of the ancient empire's cosmic significance as the Church of Rome, not the continuation of the empire itself in Byzantium.²⁹⁹ The text rehearses a number of Dionysios's themes: his exegesis of the supposed Greek origin of the Trojans and Trojan origin of the Romans, his conclusion that the Romans therefore shared Hellenic identity, and his acclamation of their virtues.³⁰⁰ Samothrake is tied into this transmission of Hellenism through the story of the Palladium, the talisman of Troy, supposed to have been brought from Greece by the Trojan progenitor Dardanos and ultimately transferred along with its protective powers to the city of Rome. Dardanos and his followers are said to have spent time on Samothrake, and Kanavoutzes suggests that the veneration of the Palladium formed the basis for the island's distinctive and famous ancient cult of the Great Gods.³⁰¹ Thus, backed by ancient Greek authority, Kanavoutzes implicitly proclaimed kinship between Greeks and Latins, propounded a Latin claim to share in the Greek classical inheritance and denounced other Greeks' disparaging views of the Latins, finding a place for his dedicatee's territory in this argument and affirming papal supremacy along the way. Given that the work was intended to curry favour with the Gattilusio, this programme presumably represents the kind of thing the author believed they wanted to hear, and thus perhaps offers insight into their uses for the classical tradition.

The apparently harmonious state of confessional and cultural relations which has been described seems to have characterised the Gattilusio lordships during the decades between their establishment and the Union of Florence, concluded in 1439. Ostensibly this formal resolution of the schism should have largely dissolved the problem of governing across the confessional divide, and the Gattilusio lords had themselves actively assisted earlier efforts towards Union, although there is no evidence of their participation in the process leading to the Council of Ferrara-Florence.³⁰² In reality, the settlement's failure to secure the assent of a large proportion of the Orthodox clergy and laity made it an inflammatory development.

²⁹⁸ Kanavoutzes, pp. 16–21, 24–9.

²⁹⁹ Kanavoutzes, pp. 21–4.

³⁰⁰ Kanavoutzes, pp. 34–62.

³⁰¹ Kanavoutzes, pp. 53–4, 62–75.

³⁰² See below, pp. 346–8.

By raising expectations on the Latin side for the amalgamation of ecclesiastical structures and for Greek conformity with Catholic requirements it threatened to overthrow working arrangements which had previously been developed between the two traditions. In an area such as Lesbos, where an enduring Orthodox hierarchy had coexisted with an implanted Catholic one, it also raised corresponding expectations among Greek Unionists that the Latin interlopers could now be removed from their sees, since the justification for the existence of an alternative establishment to serve the needs of the Catholic inhabitants had been dispelled. A first taste of this paradoxical impact was given by the prominent part played in the deliberations of the Council by Dorotheos, Orthodox Metropolitan of Mytilene. Although one of the leading advocates of compromise on the Greek side, following the conclusion of the Union he startled his colleagues by refusing Latin communion and demanding the dismantling of the Latin hierarchy in areas of Greek population.³⁰³ It is possible that his experience of living with a Latin regime which enjoyed legitimacy in Byzantine eyes and had seemingly had considerable success in avoiding acrimony with its Greek subjects had reinforced his belief in the feasibility of reconciliation. His insistence that the Union should mean the removal of his Latin counterparts showed that such a context could not negate the Union's capacity to disrupt accommodations that had hitherto prevailed.

The potential for trouble on Lesbos was aggravated by the fact that it became the scene for sharp practice aimed at frustrating Dorotheos's wish for the removal of the Latin hierarchy from his see. Indeed, the course taken by the papacy sought to achieve quite the reverse by displacing the practitioners of the Greek rite from the island's clerical leadership, beginning with the appointment of Leonardo of Chios as Dorotheos's successor, in defiance of the agreed procedure.³⁰⁴ At his own request, Leonardo became the head of a compact Latin ecclesiastical sphere in the Genoese Aegean with the assignation of the bishops of Chios and of Old and New Phokaia as suffragans to the Archbishop of Mytilene in 1449.³⁰⁵ This was followed in 1456 by the grant in perpetuity of the administration of the see

³⁰³ Sylvester Syropoulos, *Les 'Mémoires' du Grand Ecclésiarque de l'Eglise de Constantinople Sylvestre Syropoulos sur le concile de Florence (1438–1439)*, ed. Vitalien Laurent (Paris 1971), *Concilium Florentinum Documenta et Scriptores* 9, pp. 258, 362–6, 444, 482, 496, 506.

³⁰⁴ ASVat, CAOS 72, f. 29^v; ASVat, RL 410, ff. 272^v–4; Syropoulos, pp. 302–3; Calzamiglia, p. 64.

³⁰⁵ ASVat, RV 389, f. 209^{r-v}.

of Methymna to the Archbishop of Mytilene, on the death of the Greek incumbent Xanthopoulos.³⁰⁶ Thus once again a see in which the sole surviving prelate was a Greek metropolitan had been transferred on his death to Latin control.

Leonardo was himself a participant in the polemics that followed the Union of Florence, as befitted a leading Dominican intellectual. He went to Constantinople to assist Cardinal Isidore of Kiev in his mission to secure full implementation of the Union and was consequently a witness to the city's fall to the Ottomans; in his account of the siege he blamed Greek recalcitrance for the disaster.³⁰⁷ In the 1450s he wrote two tracts against George Scholarios, who had by then become the leader of Orthodox opposition to the Union and been enthroned as Patriarch Gennadios II of Constantinople (1454–6). These concerned the sources of doctrinal authority and the procession of the Holy Spirit.³⁰⁸ His *De Statu Hominis*, written within months of his consecration as archbishop, offers some insight, if not into actual confessional relations on Lesbos following the Union and his own irregular appointment, then at least into his aspirations for his new see. The tract is structured as a dialogue whose participants are Leonardo himself and two Chian Greek monks and former pupils of his, Constantine and Pankalos. After a chance reunion these two join the archbishop in a tour of south-eastern Lesbos before departing on pilgrimage for Jerusalem. Leonardo is said to have had brought his pupils the benefits of Italian learning; the emphasis on tutelage is reinforced by his designation in the dialogue as *Magister*, the teacher.³⁰⁹ Pankalos is a monk of Lesbos's own Greek monastery of Agia Sion, Constantine of the Orthodox bastion of Mount Athos, but during their travels they regularly join in liturgical observances with the archbishop.³¹⁰ In an interlude in the work the three men come to Agia Sion and join the multitude gathered from around Lesbos, other islands and the Anatolian mainland for the

³⁰⁶ ASVat, RV 443, ff. 111–4^v.

³⁰⁷ Leonardo of Chios, 'Historia Constantinopolitanae urbis a Mahumete II capta per modum epistole die 15 Augusti anno 1453 ad Nicolaum V Rom. Pont.', ed. Jacques-Paul Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus: Series Graeca*, 166 vols. (Paris 1857–83), vol. 159, coll. 923–44 at coll. 925–7, 943–4.

³⁰⁸ Leonardo of Chios, *De Emanatione Recte Fidei adversus Gennadium monachum Grecum Scolariū nominatum sedis Constantinopolitani Patriarcam intrusam*, Biblioteca del Seminario Vescovile, Albenga, MS Leonardo di Chio, ff. 128–39^v; *idem*, *Opuscula edita a Leonardo theologie professore ex Chio oriundo et in presentiarum Archiepiscopum Metellini ex Ordinis Praedicatorum assumpto*, *ibid.*, f. 148^v.

³⁰⁹ Leonardo, *De Statu Hominis*, f. 3^{r-v}.

³¹⁰ Leonardo, *De Statu Hominis*, ff. 37^v–8, 68, 73^v, 77, 107^v.

annual festival of this Orthodox pilgrimage site. They hear vespers following the Greek rite in the church and venerate its great icon of the Mother of God, spend the night outside with the rest of the assembled throng and perform matins there according to the Latin rite, before attending mass in the morning.³¹¹ The image is one of Uniate harmony, with the close coexistence of Latin and Greek rites and respectful interchange between their practitioners, while the participation of the Greek monks in Latin ceremonial and their status as pupils of an Italian Catholic teacher seem to signify hopes for closer harmonisation on a western pattern in future.

A distinctly less amicable impression of the atmosphere in the years after the Union is given by Leonardo's own request some years later to be assigned some suffragans, which he supported by stating that his situation as a metropolitan without bishops under him was the object of derision from Greek inhabitants of his province.³¹² Given the circumstances under which he had assumed his position, it is unsurprising that the nature of his office should have become a sore point between Leonardo and his Greek flock.

There is no direct evidence of the attitude of the lords of Mytilene to the papacy's abuse of power in suppressing the Greek hierarchy on Lesbos. As Latin lords they may readily be imagined to have approved of the extension of the Catholic order, and there is no evidence that they made any objection. Leonardo certainly became an ally of the Gattilusio, repeatedly conducting diplomatic missions to western Europe on their behalf, and indeed dying in the course of one such embassy.³¹³ However, it might also be expected that the unusually consensual foundation for government of the Greek population which the Gattilusio had enjoyed would have discouraged them from endorsing such provocative moves. The inflammation of sectarian antagonism would have made a particularly serious difference to a regime which had hitherto been able to benefit from the goodwill of its subjects.

In this context it is intriguing that the Hospitaller account of the fall of Mytilene refers to the involvement of a Greek metropolitan. This prelate is said to have joined Luchino Gattilusio in leading the defence of the 'Melanoudion', the lower fortress which bore the brunt of the initial Ottoman assault.³¹⁴ Since his see is not identified, implying that the writer

³¹¹ Leonardo, *De Statu Hominis*, ff. 37^v–8.

³¹² ASVat, RV 389, f. 209^{r-v}.

³¹³ See above, pp. 70, 72–3.

³¹⁴ Valentini, 'L'Egeo', p. 167 (no. 4).

felt his jurisdiction went without saying, it would seem natural to assume that he held office in Mytilene itself, or failing that elsewhere on Lesbos. However, since the Orthodox sees of both Mytilene and Methymna had been recently taken over by the Latins, there should in theory have been no Greek metropolitan still in office on the island. The most obvious explanation for his appearance is the re-emergence of parallel hierarchies, with the Greeks installing a new metropolitan unofficially, in defiance of the Latin appropriation of the metropolitan sees of Lesbos. However, the head of such a dissident establishment might reasonably be expected to be a focus for discontent against the Latins. Such a figure's most obvious practical recourse in the circumstances of 1462 would have been to seek to deliver the island into the hands of the Turks, as the Greeks of Lemnos had done in 1456.³¹⁵ In any event one would not expect to find him being trusted to take a leading role in the defence of Latin rule against the Turks, yet this is apparently what happened.

This raises the possibility that the Gattilusio lords had achieved one final success in their relations with the Greek population, tacitly approving the existence of a dissident hierarchy and dissociating themselves from the policy of the papacy in the eyes of their subjects, despite their own Latin background and close political collaboration with the Dominican archbishop. This possibility is not necessarily ruled out by the apparent lack of any attempt to obstruct that policy. During the last years of the Gattilusio regime, its acute need for aid from the West surely left no scope for its lords to jeopardise their reputation or the goodwill of the papacy by actively thwarting its wishes. During their final crisis the Gattilusio lords were reduced to an unprecedented state of dependence on those networks which were still able and willing to assist them, leaving them more in need than ever of the solidarity of Latin Christendom and its head.

³¹⁵ See above, pp. 69–70, 72–3, 125–6.

CHAPTER SIX

LATIN CHRISTENDOM: COMMON CAUSES AND COMPROMISES

The identity of the Gattilusio lords as Catholics was of basic importance in framing the conditions for their relationships with their Greek subjects and the Orthodox empire which had installed them in power. In this context it was a potential source of alienation, compromising their efforts to integrate their subjects into their own political structures and complicating the integration into the wider Byzantine sphere on which their authority was founded. Conversely, however, it formed the basis for their participation in a much larger network, the community of Catholic Christendom. Unlike the Latin regimes which had arisen out of the Fourth Crusade or the enclave established at Smyrna by the crusaders of the 1340s, the collective enterprises of that community did not play a formative role in creating the Gattilusio lordships. However, as well as forming a bond between their rulers and the Latin minority among their subjects, Catholicism was fundamental to the lordships' orientation in the context of the Aegean and the wider world. It offered the Gattilusio the benefits of solidarity while placing them under a burden of expectations as to their own behaviour. As the principal organising framework for efforts to check the rise of Turkish power, affiliation with this network counterpointed the lordships' ties with the most powerful and transformative force at work in the region.

Among the clergy the Catholic Church took the form of a centralised organisational structure, but in the world of lay politics it operated as an associative network. Membership placed rulers under expectations of deference, compliance and protectiveness towards ecclesiastical institutions, encouraged them to identify and cooperate with one another, and implicated them in a range of common interests and concerns. In the confessional frontier country of the Aegean basin, religious affiliation was a particularly significant element in social interactions and political alignments. However, the weakness of the imperial tradition in the West and the ineffectual and brief career of the Latin Empire of Constantinople had left Catholic Christendom in the region without the sharp political focus which Byzantine supremacy had given to Orthodox Christendom and Ottoman dominance would later give to Islam. This lack helped ensure

that there would be no era of Latin hegemony in the Aegean, akin to the Byzantine epoch which had been and the Ottoman one which was to come. The particular nature of Latin Christian society was thus a critical factor in the emergence and continuation of the diverse, fragmented Aegean world in which the Gattilusio lordships operated.

The authority of the papacy gave Latin Christendom a limited degree of central coordination and mobilisation for common endeavours. However, rather than forming a continuous structure, in the sphere of lay authority the network took practical effect largely through sporadic bursts of activity which depended on voluntary participation by individual rulers. In the eastern Mediterranean, confrontation with Orthodox Christianity and Islam led Catholic solidarity to take concrete political, diplomatic and military form in two enduring common enterprises, closely bound to one another: the crusade and the pursuit of Church Union.

Throughout the Latin West the ethos of political solidarity within Christendom was embodied in the crusade, a common cause whose theory embodied an ethos of Christian unity and cooperation against common enemies and whose effective practice demanded the suppression of conflict within Latin Christendom.¹ While the crusade tightened bonds within the Catholic world, the schism between the Churches of East and West sharpened the delineation of Latin Christian identity by narrowing its cultural horizons. Aspirations to end this division and recreate a united Christendom did not demand any serious revision of this definition, since on the Catholic side the prospective Union was generally understood as the absorption of the Christians of the East into a system of Church government based on Rome, rather than the restoration of the more widely-based model of ecclesiastical authority that had preceded the schism. The two causes had been intertwined since their eleventh-century origins. During the last century of Byzantium, emperors engaged in sustained efforts for Church Union with the aim of bringing the empire within the compass of Western Christian solidarity and thus enlisting the crusading energies of the Latins for its own defence.² The cause of Union did not form a broad social phenomenon in Latin Christendom as the crusade

¹ Tomaz Mastnak, *Crusading Peace: Christendom, the Islamic world and Western political order* (Berkeley, California and London 2002), pp. 34–54, 91–152.

² Deno J. Geanakoplos, 'Byzantium and the Crusades, 1261–1354', *A History of the Crusades*, ed. Kenneth M. Setton, 6 vols. (Madison, Wisconsin 1969–90), vol. 3, pp. 27–68 at pp. 52–68; *idem*, 'Byzantium and the Crusades, 1354–1453', *ibid.*, vol. 3, pp. 69–103; Donald M. Nicol, *The Last Centuries of Byzantium 1261–1453* (London 1972), pp. 48–57, 256–74, 351–9.

did, since active involvement was largely confined to senior clerics and the upper echelons of the political world. However, within the religiously divided Aegean, attitudes to the schism and its potential resolution were a critical element of international diplomacy and the politics of identity and loyalty. The fortunes of the Union project determined the parameters of the religious networks of Christendom, and active participants in it formed another network, drawn together by a cause from politically disparate regions and groups. The location of the Gattilusio lordships and their diverse affiliations straddling the religious divide brought them distinctive opportunities and placed them under particular pressures in their response to the collective projects of Christendom.

Incentives and Disincentives

As in the Holy Land in earlier times, crusading enterprises in the Aegean and adjacent regions involved both visiting western Europeans and Latins permanently established in the East. As in the case of the Genoese community, the environment in which the settlers were immersed differentiated their attitudes and interests from those still living in the western homeland. In this case the divergence was more marked, since a network like that of the Genoese was tied together by strong commercial and social bonds which this wider community lacked.

The factors which determined willingness to join in crusading against the Turks differed sharply between the two groups. For the westerners, most of whom did not have immediate material interests at stake in the East, the incentives were primarily ideological. Although religious motivations for crusading may not have retained the potency they had displayed in former centuries, their appeal remained widespread and vigorous. The crusade also drew additional strength from chivalric sentiments, even if this form of enthusiasm often failed to produce concrete action. Material disincentives revolved around the practical implications of a far-flung campaign, such as the escalating costs of crusading and the risks of neglecting troubles closer to home, rather than around concerns about the side-effects of a crusading enterprise.³

³ Norman Housley, *The Later Crusades, 1274–1500: from Lyons to Alcazar* (Oxford 1992), pp. 376–420; *idem*, *The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades, 1305–1378* (Oxford 1986), pp. 144–9, 199–240; Jacques Paviot, 'Burgundy and the Crusade', *Crusading in the Fifteenth Century: message and impact*, ed. Norman Housley (Basingstoke and New York 2004), pp. 70–80.

For Christian regimes such as the Gattilusio, whose territorial and commercial interests were concentrated in the theatre of conflict, a very different balance of considerations was involved. The same ideological influences bore upon Latins in the East as in the West. However, whereas the practical obstacles that stood between westerners and crusading in the East were largely absent, the material effects that crusading might have on their own environment and future prospects presented weighty considerations both in for and against their involvement. Since the crusading initiatives directed against the Anatolian Turks were prompted in large part by the need to defend the Latins in the East, the demands of their own security provided obvious incentives to participate. However, for the Gattilusio and their neighbours self-interest could also mandate maintaining amicable relations with their Muslim neighbours. The potential benefits of collective military action had to be balanced against the risk of Turkish retaliation.

Rulers such as the Gattilusio also had to consider the effect that their behaviour would have on wider Christian opinion. In spite of the reverses suffered by the crusading movement, its values retained great potency in the mindset of Catholic Europe. This created considerable social pressure to be seen to be furthering, or at least not hindering, the common cause of Christendom, which could translate into more material considerations. Conspicuous service to the crusade could enhance rulers' status and potentially increase the influence which they could wield with the many who took crusading duty seriously. Failure to show willing might have the opposite effect, undermining the goodwill on which a regime might depend in a time of crisis.

A reputation won from such service could be exploited to smooth all manner of diplomatic ends. Seeking a favour from the papacy regarding their personal confessors in 1425, the Gattilusio lords made a point of citing their service in the defence of Christendom to strengthen their case.⁴ However, the most obvious benefits lay in prospective help from the crusading movement itself. Whatever the risks of participating themselves, Aegean rulers might still benefit from a crusading initiative that weakened or distracted potential enemies. Appeals for support would have a better prospect if the Christian rulers of the region could claim that they had pulled their weight in past endeavours. Unlike the inhabitants of the

⁴ Aloysius L. Tautu, *Acta Martini P.P. V (1417–1431) e Regestis Vaticanis aliisque fontibus collegit notisque adornavit*, 2 vols. (Rome 1980), *CICO* 14, vol. 2, pp. 852–3 (no. 333).

crusader states in the Levant in previous centuries, the Christian rulers in the path of the Turks could not assume that their troubles would be the predominant outlet for the crusading energies of the West. Latin rulers in the thirteenth-century Aegean had been left largely bereft of crusading support, due in part to the formidable draw of the Holy Land.⁵ This most potent attraction had faded since the fall of the last Latin footholds in Palestine and Syria to the Mamluks, but ample scope remained for crusading activity outside the Aegean, whether in fresh campaigns against the Mamluks or in a range of other theatres from the Maghreb to the Baltic. In a competition for the attention of those wishing to strike a blow for Catholic Christendom, a reputation for commitment to that community was a significant asset. A similar logic applied on a regional level to leagues formed by Christian regimes for collective defence against the Turks. Rulers who held aloof could not be confident of receiving assistance from their neighbours if they came under attack themselves.

The need to engage outsiders with the cause of opposition to the Turks was also fundamental to the efforts made in this period to reunite the Eastern and Western Churches. The crusading movement had been characterised by a recurrent association with efforts to resolve the schism ever since the proposal of Pope Gregory VII (1073–85) in 1074 to lead an army to assist Byzantium against the Turks and secure the submission of the Eastern Church along the way.⁶ The first abortive settlement by which a Byzantine emperor sought to close the schism, the Union of Lyons concluded in 1274 at Michael VIII's initiative, had been a direct response to the threat of a new crusade aimed against the empire under the leadership of Charles of Anjou.⁷ The growing menace of the Turks in the fourteenth century indefinitely deferred any prospect of a renewed crusading threat to Byzantium, but the movement continued to be a spur to efforts at achieving Union. These were driven now by the increasingly desperate empire's need to convince Latin rulers that it deserved their assistance, a goal severely obstructed by the estrangement created by the schism and the conflicts arising from it. The importance of encouraging Western Christians to regard Byzantium as a part of the Christendom that they

⁵ Malcolm C. Barber, 'Western attitudes to Frankish Greece in the thirteenth century', *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204*, ed. Benjamin Arbel, Bernard Hamilton and David Jacoby (London 1989), pp. 111–28.

⁶ H. E. J. Cowdrey, 'Pope Gregory VII's "crusading" plans of 1074', *Outremer. Studies in the History of the Crusading Kingdom of Jerusalem presented to Joshua Prawer*, ed. B. Z. Kedar, H. C. Mayer and R. C. Smart (Jerusalem 1982), pp. 27–40.

⁷ Nicol, *Last Centuries*, pp. 47–57.

were obliged to defend led successive emperors to pursue a policy whose unpalatability to their subjects would otherwise have ruled it out.

Their family connections and enduring alliance with the Palaiologoi placed the Gattilusio lords in an advantageous position from which to influence the rulers of the empire. Besides personal religious convictions, there were self-interested reasons for them to promote the cause of Church Union. While Byzantium might be the principal beneficiary of any crusading efforts resulting from the settlement of the schism, any check imposed on the Turks could also be beneficial for other Christian rulers around the Aegean. Involvement in the project could also be another source of prestige which could be turned to their advantage.

The dramatic rise of the Ottomans raised the stakes of calculations balancing the benefits of crusading activity against its risks. It steadily increased the urgency of checking Turkish expansion before it became irresistible, but made the difficulty of doing so and the menace of retaliation ever more daunting. Neither participation in joint Christian action nor abstention from it offered any reliable prospect of safety. The particular circumstances of the Gattilusio were such as to render this dilemma especially sharp. Apart from Constantinople and its environs, no Christian domain survived so close to the centres of Ottoman power for so long. The island territories did retain the protection of the sea and the potency of Latin galleys against the essentially land-bound power of the Turks, whose naval activity was for the most part confined to the raiding excursions of smaller craft. Until Mehmed II's aggression of the 1450s the islands of the Aegean remained almost entirely beyond Turkish control.⁸ However, the continental enclaves of the Gattilusio at Ainos and Old Phokaia directly bordered Turkish territories, exposing them to attack by land. Even in such cases, the hostility of the Turks need not be swiftly fatal, despite their military ascendancy on land. This is illustrated by the survival of the Christian enclave at Smyrna for almost six decades, which rested largely

⁸ The Ottomans did take control of Skyros, Skiathos and Skopelos at some point before 1403, when they were handed back to Byzantium, and there are occasional indications of a Turkish foothold on another island, as on Samothrake in 1379, but in general the Turks do not seem to have attempted to establish any permanent hold on the islands. Even if such a conquest could be achieved it would have been acutely vulnerable to counter-attacks, given the superiority of Christian sea power. George T. Dennis, 'The Byzantine-Turkish treaty of 1403', *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 33 (1967), pp. 72–87, reprinted in *Byzantium and the Franks 1350–1420* (London 1982), VI, p. 79; Daniele da Chinazzo, *Cronica de la guerra da Veniciani a Zenovesi*, ed. Vittorio Lazzarini (Venice 1958), p. 217.

upon the military capacities of its defenders.⁹ The odds, however, did not favour such footholds if they were faced with concerted hostility, particularly where this was backed by the consolidated might of the Ottoman state. Even the greatest of the maritime powers could not hold a city as substantial as Thessalonike against the Ottomans in the 1420s.¹⁰

The case of Ainos was particularly acute. Throughout its more than seventy years under Gattilusio rule it directly bordered the Ottoman state. Indeed it neighboured the very core of the Ottomans' European possessions and the line of communications between Gallipoli and Adrianople, their capital until 1453. While its position on a small peninsula on the marshy delta of the Maritza strengthened its defensive position, the ease with which the Turks could have brought sustained force to bear against it would have made it very hard for the enclave to endure in the face of serious hostility. No other Latin territory of the time was quite so exposed to Ottoman might. The lords of Ainos are conspicuously absent from the record of Gattilusio participation in military efforts against the Ottomans, in contrast to their involvement in collective Christian efforts less offensive to their powerful neighbours.¹¹ Among island territories, those held by the Gattilusio were as vulnerable as any to Turkish raiders, thanks to their proximity to Anatolia and Ottoman Thrace, and in particular to Gallipoli, the principal base of the Ottoman fleet. The commercial connections between the Gattilusio lordships and their Turkish neighbours further heightened the risks of conflict. Profits from trade with Turkish territories would be imperilled by war with the Turkish rulers of the adjacent lands.¹² More serious harm might result from the interruption of food supplies from the continental interior: in the 1390s Bayezid I prohibited the usual export of Anatolian grain to the islands as a means of exerting pressure on their rulers.¹³

Such vulnerability need not have rendered the risks of participation more compelling than those of inaction, if the crusading movement itself could offer the prospect of a tangible and rapid reduction of the Turkish menace. However, the transience of the major expeditions rendered them largely ineffective for such a purpose. Whatever success they might

⁹ Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204–1571)*, 4 vols. (Philadelphia 1976–84), vol. 1, pp. 190–223, 233–40, 328, 341; Housley, *Avignon*, pp. 303–9.

¹⁰ Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 2, pp. 19–31.

¹¹ See above, pp. 50–1, 54; below, pp. 339–44.

¹² See above, pp. 206–10.

¹³ Doukas, *Ducas Istoria Turco-Bizantina (1341–1462)*, ed. Vasile Grecu (Bucharest 1958), p. 75.

achieve, the inevitable dispersal of their forces after a short period of campaigning would leave Aegean rulers alone to face the Turkish response that they had stirred up. The other main branch of the crusading effort in the Aegean, the leagues formed by the Christian rulers of the islands themselves, avoided this deficiency. Their predominantly defensive character also diminished their impact as a provocation to the Turks. They were therefore more closely attuned to the requirements of the rulers directly confronted with Muslim threats. However, the scale of their military resources was necessarily far smaller than that of expeditions from the West and they could prove difficult to assemble and to sustain, despite much well-meaning negotiation.

Crusading against the Turks

For regimes based in the Aegean, the need for careful calculation of the balance between benefit and risk was clearly greater with regard to military action against the Ottomans and other Anatolian Turks than to attacks on more distant Muslim powers, or to non-military expressions of Christian solidarity. This balance shifted over time, in response not only to the waxing and waning of the Turkish threat but to the changing focus of crusading activity in the region, the enemies it targeted and the allies it sought to assist, which in turn affected its geographical thrust and the balance between land and sea campaigns. Such variations had a considerable impact on what crusading could offer local regimes. The nature of the Gattilusio response to these undertakings altered in response to such considerations and to the changing situation and internal dynamics of the lordships themselves.

The intensity of crusading activity was also subject to sharp changes in tempo. Besides their brief duration, the effectiveness of crusading expeditions was severely impaired by their timing. Crusading against the Turks was essentially reactive, with the result that major offensives coincided not with periods of Turkish vulnerability, when great progress might have been made, but with periods of Turkish strength. Only when the threat reached a high pitch could westerners be stirred into launching a major expedition, overriding the allure of alternative theatres and the distractions of perennial conflict between Latin powers. This rhythm must have had a serious impact on the willingness of Christian rulers in the Aegean to commit themselves forcefully, as it intensified the dilemma they faced. The periods when powerful outside assistance improved the prospects of

imposing a reverse on threatening neighbours were precisely those when the risks of provoking them were at their most formidable.

When the first Gattilusio lordship was established the crusade against the Turks was on the cusp of a shift away from the pattern of activity which had characterised the preceding decades. The efforts of the 1330s and 1340s had been directed chiefly at halting seaborne attacks by the Turkish emirates of the Aegean against the Latin territories in the region, with a particular emphasis on the most active of the marauders, Umur of Aydin.¹⁴ They concentrated on destroying Turkish forces at sea and on stopping up the ports from which they launched their raids, with Smyrna as the focal point. This approach would clearly impinge with particular force upon local island rulers such as the Gattilusio, who were on the front line against this threat. However, the events of 1354 initiated a lasting realignment of crusading priorities. The onset of Turkish expansion into Europe after the fall of Gallipoli brought the Ottomans to the fore, a shift reinforced by the reduction of the threat from Aydin after Umur's death in 1348.¹⁵ Meanwhile, having assumed power in Constantinople John V launched a diplomatic initiative aimed at securing Latin aid in return for religious concessions.¹⁶ This began to bear fruit in 1358, when the papal legate Pierre Thomas was put in charge of a fleet with orders to defend the Latin territories in the region, but also to give military assistance to John V and promote the cause of Church Union. The ensuing sack of Lampsakos, on the Asian coast of the Dardanelles opposite Gallipoli, marked the beginning of an interlinked set of changes in the focus of anti-Turkish crusading.¹⁷ Its geographical centre of gravity moved northwards, initially to the region of the straits, Byzantium began to figure prominently among its intended beneficiaries and the Ottomans became the prime target of all major efforts.

Further movement in the same direction appeared with the expedition of Amadeo of Savoy, the first crusading enterprise known to have involved the Gattilusio lordships, which was entirely concerned with providing aid to Byzantium and the pursuit of Church Union. Francesco I's personal participation and prominent role in the fighting amounted to

¹⁴ See above, pp. 31–2.

¹⁵ Housley, *Later Crusades*, pp. 66–8.

¹⁶ Oskar Halecki, *Un Empereur de Byzance à Rome: vingt ans de travail pour l'union des églises et pour la défense de l'Empire d'Orient, 1355–1375* (Warsaw 1930), pp. 31–110.

¹⁷ Philippe de Mézières, *Life of St. Peter Thomas by Philippe de Mézières*, ed. Joachim Smet (Rome 1954), pp. 84–6.

the most conspicuous commitment of any Gattilusio lord to a crusading campaign. The shift in crusading attention away from maritime security in the Aegean had removed much of the appeal that earlier efforts might have had for island regimes in terms of direct impact on their interests. There is no indication that any other Aegean rulers contributed to Amadeo's enterprise. However, the Gattilusio regime's close affiliation to Byzantium offered compelling reasons for taking part, especially at a time when both the bond between Francesco and John V and John's interest in religious rapprochement remained strong.¹⁸ By throwing himself into Amadeo's expedition, Francesco could hope to bring succour to his ally, while by demonstrating the benefits of Latin support he could reinforce John's commitment to his favoured line of policy and strengthen the hand of its Byzantine supporters, most notably Demetrios Kydones. The prevailing climate of opinion at the imperial court was marked by serious doubts about the wisdom of cooperation with Latins, increasing the importance of such an object lesson in its benefits.¹⁹ This is underlined by the fact that in John V's absence Kydones felt obliged to deliver an oration arguing the case for accepting help from the Latin forces.²⁰

The fact that Amadeo's initial target was Gallipoli may also have encouraged Francesco. The port on the Dardanelles was not only the strategic linchpin of the Ottoman state but also the base from which it might most easily mount attacks on Lesbos or on Genoese commerce. It is even conceivable that Francesco hoped for territorial advantage. Only twelve years had passed since his own original expedition in the Aegean, supposedly aimed at seizing positions in the Chersonese.²¹ Even if all lands acquired were delivered to the emperor, as did in the event happen, Francesco might hope to be entrusted with administration of some part of them. At this stage in the rise of the Ottomans, the countervailing risks remained comparatively mild. The continuing limitations of Turkish power in the mid-fourteenth century also increased the long-term strategic benefits that could be hoped for from relatively modest achievements such as the

¹⁸ See above, pp. 41–3, below, pp. 345–6.

¹⁹ Nevra Necipoğlu, *Byzantium between the Ottomans and the Latins: politics and society in the late empire* (Cambridge 2009), pp. 123–6.

²⁰ Demetrios Kydones, 'Εγγραφή δὲ ἀποδημήσαντος ἐν Ῥώμῃ τοῦ Κυροῦ Ἰωαννοῦ τοῦ Παλαιολόγου τῆς Πατριαρχίας τοῦ Κυροῦ Φιλοθέου: Porro scripta est profecto Romam Imperatore Joanne Palaeologo, Patriarca Domno Philotheo', ed. Jacques-Paul Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus: Series Graeca*, 166 vols. (Paris 1857–83), vol. 154, coll. 961–1008.

²¹ Doukas, p. 67; above, p. 39.

capture of Smyrna or Gallipoli, which in later decades would have seemed inconsequential fleabites on the Ottoman colossus.

The confluence of forces in favour of crusading activity in the early years of the lordship of Mytilene was exceptional. From the 1370s the balance began to tilt against participation, with lasting effect. After 1371 the symbiotic relationship between the crusade and the Union project was disrupted as John V became disillusioned with the prospects for a Latin solution to the empire's woes, while at the same time becoming estranged from Francesco.²² Francesco did however remain actively engaged in collective efforts against the Turks in the vicinity of his own territories, as shown by the thanks he received from the pope in 1374 for his role in the defence of Smyrna.²³ Thereafter however, the receding prospects for Church Union, the War of Chioggia and the eruption of the papal schism in 1378 all helped to bring about an effective cessation in western crusading efforts until the 1390s.²⁴

When the growing Turkish threat prompted the formation of a new Christian league in 1388, it was a local, defensive affair, reflecting regional solidarity between the Latins of the East, which did not involve the Genoese commune, Venice or any other western European power.²⁵ This shift is suggestive of how changing preoccupations in the West had left these eastern regimes adrift, impelling them to make their own arrangements for collective action. While the nature of the league's membership reduced the forces potentially available, the Aegean rulers could at least hope to ensure that its activities would be governed by their own priorities. It was sufficiently successful to attract new members: in 1392 the Genoese of Pera joined the coalition, sending an emissary to Mytilene to conclude the terms.²⁶ While not committing themselves directly, in 1392 the Venetians proposed cooperating with the league's patrolling fleet.²⁷

²² See above, pp. 42–3, 99–100.

²³ ASVat, RV 270, f. 63^v. Whereas papal letters sent the previous year to solicit help for the Smyrna enclave had been directed to the Genoese of Chios and the Hospitallers as well as Francesco, the fact that he alone was singled out for this congratulation suggests that he had won particular distinction by conspicuous action against the Turks.

²⁴ Housley, *Later Crusades*, pp. 73–5.

²⁵ L. T. Belgrano, 'Seconda serie di documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera', *ASLSP* 13 (1877–84), pp. 931–1003 at pp. 953–65 (no. 8); above, pp. 48–9.

²⁶ L. T. Belgrano, 'Prima serie di documenti riguardanti la Colonia di Pera', *ASLSP* 13 (1877–84), pp. 97–336 at p. 173 (no. 38). It is possible that an earlier visit to Pera by Francesco II at the invitation of the civic authorities was related to negotiations for this agreement (*ibid.*, p. 169).

²⁷ Demetrios Kydones, *Démétrios Cydones Correspondance*, ed. Raymond-Joseph Loenertz, 2 vols. (Vatican 1956–60), vol. 2, pp. 446–9 (nos. 18–9).

The local solidarity embodied in the league was a practical means of strengthening the defence of the islands, compensating for the vulnerability inherent in political fragmentation. However, in the long term security could only be ensured by putting a stop to Ottoman expansion, and this required a large-scale offensive effort drawing on the resources of a wider Christendom. When such efforts resumed, their focus had once again shifted, due to the continuing Turkish advance into Europe, which had now left the straits far behind. The relief of beleaguered Constantinople was taken into consideration but the main concern was the threat to Hungary, and the seaborne element of the Crusade of Nikopolis was subsidiary to the main campaign on the Danube.²⁸ The defence of the Christian Aegean no longer figured among crusading priorities at all. Except in the event of it dealing a truly crippling blow to the Ottomans, an expedition fighting at a distance from their territories and largely concerned with the problems of others was less likely to produce real benefits for rulers such as the Gattilusio, while still being just as perilous if they provoked the Turks by taking part.

In the meantime, the increasing alignment between the Gattilusio family and the Byzantine faction least enthusiastic about Latin-backed resistance to the Turks, and the deepening antagonism between the Gattilusio and the authorities in Constantinople that accompanied it, had further undermined the role of the Byzantine connection as an incentive to action.²⁹ The acquisition of continental enclaves gave the family a great deal more to lose by antagonising the Turks, quite apart from the more general intimidating effect of the dramatically increased power of the Ottomans.³⁰

When the league joined forces with the Venetians to assist the broader Christian coalition of 1396, Francesco II of Mytilene played his part.³¹ However, his hesitancy when called upon to act in defence of Pera suggests a lack of resolution. Neither general Christian solidarity, specific fellow-feeling for other Genoese, his duty under the league agreement nor even the fact that he had seemingly already taken the field against the Ottomans had been enough to bring him to the rescue before the authorities in Pera formally insisted that he discharge his obligations. Even then,

²⁸ Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 1, pp. 341–7.

²⁹ See above, pp. 99–100.

³⁰ See below, pp. 364–6.

³¹ Sime Ljubic, *Monumenta spectantia historiam slavorum meridionalium*, 6 vols. (Zagreb 1874), vol. 4, pp. 378 (no. 521).

by setting conditions for his involvement he presumably hoped to avoid committing himself to the struggle, while avoiding the damage to his reputation that would result from an outright refusal.³² It may be that his wider participation in the Crusade of Nikopolis was shaped by similar calculations. Froissart's observation that the lords of Mytilene and Ainos enjoyed the favour of the Ottomans suggests that Francesco had something to lose by conspicuous involvement in hostilities.³³ This assertion is particularly significant given that it refers to the situation immediately after the crusade. This implies that Francesco had succeeded in keeping his involvement at a sufficiently innocuous level to avoid seriously alienating Bayezid, hardly the most affable member of the Ottoman dynasty. Francesco had displayed a willingness to support the crusading enterprise that would safeguard his good name in Christendom, but the circumstantial evidence raises considerable doubts as to the depth of his commitment and resolve.

The disaster at Nikopolis seem to have further reduced Francesco's enthusiasm for cooperation against the Ottomans, leading him to abstain from efforts to form a new Aegean league. When in 1398 Venice proposed a coalition which would unite the republic with the Duchy of the Archipelago, the Hospitallers and the Genoese of Chios, there was no mention of the Gattilusio.³⁴ When the scheme was revived in 1402 the lord of Mytilene was once again absent from the list of putative allies.³⁵ The inclusion of Chios shows that this omission cannot simply be attributed to hostility between Venetians and Genoese. The formation of defensive leagues was the element of Christian solidarity whose practical usefulness to the Christians of the Aegean was most apparent. Yet despite Francesco II's apparent success in preserving his relations with the Ottomans through the Crusade of Nikopolis, or perhaps because of it, the alteration of circumstances since 1388 seems to have made further involvement unpalatable to the Gattilusio. Francesco's embarrassment in 1396 may have contributed to his unwillingness to commit himself again

³² Belgrano, 'Seconda serie', pp. 965–7 (no. 9).

³³ Jean Froissart, *Oeuvres de Froissart*, ed. Joseph M. B. C. Kervyn de Lettenhove, 29 vols. (Brussels 1870), vol. 15, p. 347, vol. 16, p. 38.

³⁴ ASV, *SMisti* 44, ff. 61^v–2.

³⁵ ASV, *SMisti* 45, f. 139^v; Nicolai Iorga, 'Notes et extraits pour servir à l'histoire des Croisades au XV^e siècle', *Revue de l'Orient Latin* 4, (1896), pp. 226–320, 503–622, vol. 5 (1897), pp. 108–212, 311–88, vol. 6 (1898), pp. 50–143, 370–434, vol. 7 (1899), pp. 38–107, 375–429, vol. 8 (1900–1), pp. 1–115 at vol. 4, p. 247; Antonio Morosini, *Il Codice Morosini: il mondo visto da Venezia (1094–1433)*, ed. Andrea Nanetti (Spoleto 2010), pp. 239–40.

to such an agreement, whose obligations would constrict his ability to tailor his behaviour to the particular needs of the moment.

Francesco was however willing to contribute forces to Boucicault's expedition to succour Constantinople in 1399.³⁶ At some point during its long siege, vessels from the lordship of Mytilene are said to have brought food supplies to the imperial capital, and their crews to have taken part in the defence of the walls. This suggests continued solicitude for Byzantium, despite difficulties in relations, though the uncertain chronology of this intervention leaves its exact significance unclear.³⁷ French rule in Genoa had turned another key affiliation into a force impelling the Gattilusio to action.³⁸ The 1399 expedition clearly presented Francesco with a particularly irreconcilable contradiction between his fear of antagonising the Ottomans and the demands of the Christian cause.³⁹ The demand for him to show some solidarity with the cause was intensified by his personal acquaintance with Boucicault and the Frenchman's unstinting zeal for the crusade. Francesco's response to his dilemma presents the bizarre spectacle of a ruler committing men and resources to a military campaign while simultaneously providing intelligence on that campaign to its adversaries, and openly acknowledging to his ally that he was doing so.⁴⁰ His apparent calculation that supplying forces to attack the Ottomans would be a less provocative action than failing to warn them of an approaching enemy is particularly curious. Francesco's limited contribution to the enterprise can hardly have been driven by a straightforward desire that it should drive back the same Turks whom he had now forewarned. At the same time, his frank admission to Boucicault acquits him of simply betraying the crusaders. The contradiction becomes a little more comprehensible if both actions are regarded as the discharging of uncomfortable obligations

³⁶ See above, p. 39.

³⁷ Joan Bogdan, 'Ein Beitrag zur bulgarischen und serbischen Geschichtsschreibung', *Archiv für slavische Philologie* 13 (1891), pp. 481–543 at p. 542. The anonymous Bulgarian chronicle links this assistance with similar help provided by Venice, and more tangentially with shipments of food and arms from the Genoese Black Sea colonies. It may relate to the known appearance of Francesco II with the league fleet in 1396, although the chronicler does not mention the other league members in this context. Alternatively, it may belong to the years after 1399, when John VII had been left in charge of Constantinople during Manuel II's absence. Given Francesco's close alliance with John, and the likelihood that his relations with Manuel were correspondingly frosty, such an intervention would have been more likely while the younger emperor was in control (see above, pp. 47–8, 51, 53–4, 97–100).

³⁸ Cf. below, pp. 341–4.

³⁹ Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 1, pp. 370–1.

⁴⁰ *Le livre des fais du bon Messire Jehan le Maingre, dit Bouciquaut, Mareschal de France et Gouverneur de Jennes*, ed. Denis Lalande (Geneva 1985), pp. 135–6, 138.

imposed on Francesco by circumstance rather than as positive attempts to shape his environment. Still more than in 1396, it seems likely that Francesco's intervention had less to do with the practical effects that might be achieved than with influencing the perceptions of Latin Christendom at large and of Genoa's French overlords in particular.

The failure of any new expedition to take advantage of the repercussions of the Battle of Ankara, together with the peace concluded with Suleiman in 1403, removed any likelihood of collective action until after the conclusion of the Ottoman civil war in 1413.⁴¹ It was only around the end of that war that the prospect of a revived Ottoman naval threat had an appreciable effect on their Christian neighbours.⁴² In February 1414 the Knights of St. John began to agitate for a revival of the former league arrangements, to include, besides themselves, Mytilene, Chios, Cyprus, Venice and the Archipelago.⁴³ It was the Venetian lords of the Archipelago who displayed the most obvious enthusiasm for the Hospitaller proposal. In May 1414 Pietro Zeno, lord of Andros, went in person to exhort the Genoese authorities on Chios towards the formation of a league, an initiative which led them to write to the rulers of Lesbos, Rhodes, Crete and Negroponte proposing a further conference on Naxos.⁴⁴ In August 1415 Zeno was continuing to agitate for action and secured the apparent support of the Venetian government; nevertheless, in February 1416 the republic was still procrastinating regarding the league proposals, which had by then also drawn in Manuel II.⁴⁵ A short chronicle from Lesbos records visits by a vessel from Rhodes to Lesbos in March 1415 and by the lord of Phokaia to Rhodes in March 1416.⁴⁶ These may have been related to further negotiations for a league agreement. Jacopo of Mytilene evidently expressed his willingness in principle to participate, along with the other prospective allies, but the negotiations were still dragging on in January 1417, four years after they had begun, and there is no evidence that they ever came to a

⁴¹ See above, p. 53; below, pp. 374–80.

⁴² Anthony Luttrell and Elizabeth Zachariadou, *Sources for Turkish History from the Hospitallers' Rhodian Archive/Πηγές για την Τουρκική Ιστορία στα Αρχεία των Ιπποτών της Ρόδου* (Athens 2008), pp. 147, 149–50 (nos. 17, 19); below, p. 381.

⁴³ Luttrell and Zachariadou, p. 147 (no. 17).

⁴⁴ ASG, NA 603 (Giovanni Balbi 1), appendix F; below, p. 381n62.

⁴⁵ ASV, SS 6, ff. 84^v–8; Josephi Valentini, *Acta Albaniae Veneta: saeculorum XIV et XV*, 25 vols. (Rome 1967–79), vol. 7, pp. 220–2 (no. 1982); C. N. Sathas, *Μνημεία Ελληνικής Ιστορίας: Documents inédits relatifs à l'histoire de la Grèce au Moyen Age*, 9 vols. (Paris 1880–90), vol. 3, pp. 118–20 (nos. 671–2); Iorga, 'Notes', vol. 4, p. 558.

⁴⁶ Peter Schreiner, *Die Byzantinischen Kleinchroniken*, 3 vols. (Vienna 1975–9), CFHB 12, vol. 1, p. 223 (no. 31/2); cf. above, p. 189n4.

conclusion.⁴⁷ The fact that in 1415 Jacopo, the Genoese of Chios and even the Hospitallers sided with Mehmed I against Juneid of Smyrna suggests that the proposed league was a product less of a coherent anti-Ottoman policy than of a more diffuse wariness of Turkish aggression.⁴⁸ The Ottoman revival had not yet eclipsed all other threats in the manner that it had in Bayezid's time and would again in that of Mehmed II. It had certainly not reached a level which could jolt western Europe into action. The roll-call of prospective members included all those, apart from the Genoese of Pera, who had been involved with the leagues proposed or concluded between 1388 and 1402, and the Knights explicitly cited the precedent of these leagues when introducing the scheme. The Order's formative role and the prominent part played by Pietro Zeno underline the extent to which this too was an eastern initiative, representing interests which had diverged from the preoccupations of western European crusading since the later fourteenth century.

This abortive effort appears to have been the last time that the community of Christian maritime regimes in the Aegean made any formal attempt to band together against the Turkish threat. Here the escalation of Ottoman aggression under Murad II and Mehmed II drew a rather different response from that elicited by the previous escalation under Murad I and Bayezid. Where before there had been ambivalence and contradiction, outright passivity was now more prevalent. When petitioning the pope in 1425, Jacopo, Dorino and Palamede cited the service they had done for the defence of the faith at various times by providing galleys, galliots and ships at their own expense to fight the infidel at sea, but it is not clear on what occasion this might have occurred.⁴⁹ It may be that they were seeking to draw on moral credit amassed by their ancestors' actions rather than having any significant record of their own in this regard.

Western interest in action against the Ottomans followed the precedents of the fourteenth century more closely. It remained dormant for more than three decades after the Battle of Ankara, and as before it was only when the Turkish threat reached crisis point that it was possible to muster a collective response. When this came, in the shape of the Crusade of Varna of 1443–4, its chief preoccupations once again lay with the defence of Constantinople and of Hungary, with secondary efforts elsewhere in

⁴⁷ Valentini, *Acta*, vol. 8, pp. 120–2 (no. 2055).

⁴⁸ Doukas, pp. 143–7; below, pp. 380–1.

⁴⁹ Tautu, *Acta Martini V*, vol. 2, pp. 852–3 (no. 333).

the Balkans. By this time enthusiasm for any kind of joint action among the Latins in the Aegean, and the Genoese in particular, seems to have leached away almost entirely. In 1441–2 the Hospitallers were negotiating for a league with the Emperor John VIII; neither the Gattilusio nor any other interested parties are mentioned.⁵⁰ While the Venetians did make a contribution to the fleet dispatched to support the Crusade of Varna, there was no Genoese involvement.⁵¹ There is also no evidence of cooperation between the Genoese community and the crusading fleets dispatched to the Black Sea by the Duke of Burgundy, which remained active for a considerable time afterwards.⁵² On the contrary, the piratical activities of the Burgundians brought vigorous condemnation from Genoa and in 1447 the Gattilusio lords were reported to be clamouring for revenge for their depredations, and ready to pursue it themselves.⁵³ In Burgundian plans for a further expedition in the 1450s, only Tenedos was mentioned as a potential base in the northern Aegean.⁵⁴

In the context of Francesco II's caution in the 1390s the failure of the Gattilusio to risk a major contribution to an offensive against the Ottomans is not incongruous. Even so, their apparently total abstention from such a major effort marks a substantial divergence from Francesco's practice, a lapse in the policy of displaying commitment to the cause of Christendom by one means or another. It is also notable that they made no apparent effort to help an expedition aimed in large part at assisting Byzantium, given the evidence of renewed closeness at this time to their Byzantine relatives and in particular to Dorino's erstwhile son-in-law the Despot Constantine, who launched his own offensive against the Ottomans in the Greek peninsula in conjunction with the crusade.⁵⁵

⁵⁰ AOM 355 (*Libri Bullarum* 40), ff. 184^v, 254^v–5.

⁵¹ Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 2, pp. 84–6, 91–2.

⁵² Jehan Waurin, *Recueil des croniques et anchiennes istories de la Grant Bretagne, a present nomme Engleterre*, 6 vols., ed. William Hardy and Edward Hardy (London 1868–91), vol. 6, pp. 30–41, 44–51, 58–119; Colin Imber, *The Crusade of Varna, 1443–45* (Aldershot 2006), pp. 14–5, 18–21, 27, 30, 32–5; Jacques Paviot, *La politique navale des Ducs de Bourgogne 1384–1482* (Lille 1995), pp. 113–23.

⁵³ ASG, AS 1789 (*Litterarum* 13), f. 151^v (no. 457); L. T. Belgrano and C. Desimoni, 'Documenti ed estratti inediti o poco noti riguardanti la storia del commercio e della marina ligure', *ASLSP* 5 (1867), pp. 357–547 at p. 421 (no. 78); Jacques Paviot, '“Croisade” bourguignonne et intérêts génois en Mer Noire au milieu du XV^e siècle', *Studi di Storia medioevale e di Diplomatica* 12–13 (1992), pp. 135–62.

⁵⁴ Jules Finot, *Projet d'expédition contre les Turcs préparé par les Conseillers du duc de Bourgogne Philippe-le-Bon (Janvier 1457)* (Lille 1890), pp. 31–2.

⁵⁵ Laonikos Chalkokondyles, *Laonici Chalcocondylae Historiarum Demonstrationes*, ed. Eugenius Darkó, 2 vols. (Budapest 1922–7), vol. 2, pp. 91–2.

It is true that the special circumstances that had increased the potential diplomatic benefits of crusading activity in the 1390s did not apply. Far from being under the rule of foreign enthusiasts for the crusade, Genoa was holding aloof from this effort, while the Gattilusio lordships were not now subject to the obligations of a league agreement. The fact that others in the Latin East also abstained from participation in the crusade or in any initiative for collective defence is also likely to have reduced the general diplomatic pressure to join in. In practical terms, the experience of Nikopolis may have instilled considerable scepticism as to the prospects for victory. There is also evidence that in earlier years the Gattilusio lords had succeeded in gaining favour with Murad II, as they had with Bayezid, and if this was still the case it may help to explain their reluctance to antagonise him.⁵⁶ The fear of attack that nonetheless followed the crusade is indicated by the rumours of an imminent assault on Lesbos that were at large early in 1446.⁵⁷

After the disaster at Varna, crusading efforts against the Turks again lapsed, until the fall of Constantinople provoked a fresh outburst of activity, manifested in the Aegean through the expedition of Cardinal Trevisan's papal fleet in 1456. In their role in the crusading movement as in their relations with Genoa, the Ottoman encroachment of the 1450s had transformed the position of the Gattilusio lordships from potential suppliers of assistance to supplicants for it.⁵⁸ The perils of offending the Ottomans were now clearly greater than ever: their naval forces had attained an unprecedented potency, Mehmed II had displayed a novel appetite for maritime conquest and the Gattilusio had proved singularly unable to resist his attacks. On the other hand, the succession of Ottoman offensives and acts of extortion which had ravaged the family's fortunes during the past year can have left few illusions as to the prospects for peaceful coexistence. Furthermore, this was the first crusading expedition in almost a century to focus its attention on the Aegean, and specifically on the present and former territories of the Gattilusio. Its initial goal was none other than the defence and recovery of the Latin position in the Aegean islands, suiting it more perfectly to the immediate security interests of the

⁵⁶ Valentini, *Acta*, vol. 12, p. 259 (no. 3056); below, pp. 382–3.

⁵⁷ Ciriaco of Ancona, *Cyriac of Ancona: later travels*, ed. Edward Bodnar and Clive Foss, (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts 2003), pp. 236–8. It is just possible that such fears reflect an otherwise unattested involvement with the recent campaigns against the Ottomans, perhaps with Constantine's offensive, which would bring down retaliation on the Morea later the same year. Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, pp. 112–9.

⁵⁸ See above, pp. 138–43.

Gattilusio than any expedition in which they had been involved. Whereas Turkish expansion by land and the beginning of the contest for the straits had deflected crusading attention from the Aegean, the final victory of the Ottomans on the straits and the beginnings of their expansion by sea brought the region back to the forefront of concern.

However, for the Gattilusio and their Genoese neighbours, this shift had evidently come too late to elicit any vigorous response. It seems that Domenico Gattilusio and the Mahona of Chios both rejected Trevisan's exhortations to cease paying tribute and join forces with his fleet, although the papal forces were able to secure supplies on Lesbos and make use of the harbour of Mytilene.⁵⁹ It would therefore appear that even with the dissolution of their territories well underway, the Gattilusio still preferred to avoid blatant provocation. No matter how forlorn the hope of placating the Ottomans in the long term, maintaining a low profile apparently still seemed to Domenico a more realistic way of staving off the immediate threat than an open attempt to resist them by force of arms.

Whatever the strength of Domenico's concern to minimise the provocation offered to the Ottomans, his efforts were unsuccessful: he was blamed by Mehmed for the damage done by the crusade and the Ottoman attack on Methymna followed in July 1457. For the first time in their history a crusading force became directly involved in the defence of the Gattilusio lordships, although the extent to which they contributed to the discomfiture of the attackers is somewhat unclear. It appears that the papal galleys which had been assigned to defend Lesbos fled as the Turks approached, but returned to the area and seized the opportunity to attack as the Turks withdrew in disorder after being repulsed by the defenders of Methymna, capturing a substantial number of Ottoman vessels.⁶⁰ In any

⁵⁹ The available accounts of Domenico's reaction differ in their emphasis but are reasonably reconcilable. According to Kritovoulos he provided supplies to Trevisan's fleet and wished to cease tribute payments; it is unclear from the form of words whether he actually did so, although this is perhaps implied by an assertion that Domenico later offered to pay his arrears. Doukas, on the other hand, states that Domenico refused to repudiate his tributary obligations or to join the campaign, while the Genoese of Chios did likewise. Thus Kritovoulos, seeking to justify Mehmed's subsequent reprisals, emphasises Domenico's inclination to cast off tributary status in terms whose ambiguity may be deliberate obfuscation, while Doukas is explicit that no overt renunciation of the obligation resulted. Similarly, the former writer stresses the limited help provided by way of supply while the latter prefers to focus on the lack of actual military participation in the campaign. Michael Kritovoulos, *Critobuli Imbriotae Historiae*, ed. Diether Roderich Reinsch (Berlin and New York 1983), *CFHB* 22, pp. 115–6, 130; Doukas, p. 423.

⁶⁰ Kritovoulos naturally put the best face on events from the Ottoman perspective. According to his account Trevisan had detached twelve galleys of the papal fleet under one

case, the impact of the papal fleet was inevitably temporary, offering some vindication for Domenico's reluctance to commit himself actively to the campaign.

In spite of the diffidence of Domenico's response, the lack of direct benefit to the Gattilusio and the discouraging impact of Mehmed's retaliation,

Sergios (probably Sergio de Seripando, admiral of the Hospitallers) to guard the island, but these took flight as the Turks approached, only returning when the attackers had departed after extensive pillaging and an unsuccessful siege of Methymna, to face the reproach of the lord of Mytilene. The attack is also said to have prompted Domenico to resume his supposedly interrupted tribute payments, and to have frightened Chios and the Duchy of the Archipelago into doing likewise (Kritovoulos, pp. 129–31). The other sources carry a somewhat different emphasis, reporting that the Turks achieved nothing and suffered heavy losses in the failed siege of Methymna. The most florid account is the one written a few years later by Pope Pius II. He describes how, after the walls had been breached, the defenders were rallied by a woman and routed the Turks, who then suffered severely from the attacks of the papal fleet as they took to their ships and fled (Pope Pius II, *Enea Silvio Piccolomini, Papa Pio II: I Commentarii*, ed. Luigi Totaro, 2 vols. (Milan 1984), vol. 2, p. 1830; cf. Oberta Foglietta, *Uberti Folietae Clarorum Ligurum Elogia* (Rome 1573), pp. 97–8). Immediately contemporaneous Venetian reports mention the bursting of one or two great Ottoman bombards, possibly implying a link between this and the abandonment of the siege fifteen days after landing on Lesbos. One of these reports does offer corroboration of Pius II's claim of a naval clash. It mentions the fighting of three battles, and while it is not clear whether these were on land or sea the document also suggests that the Turkish fleet was defeated by fifteen Christian galleys (Zacharias Tsirpanlis, 'Οι "εὐπρεποι ἄνθρωποι", το παιδομάζωμα και οι επιχειρήσεις του παπικού στόλου στο Αιγαίο με ορμητήριο τη Ρόδο (1456–1458)', *Δωδώνη* 15/1 (1986), reprinted in *Η Ρόδος και οι Νοτιές Σπώραδες στai χρονιά των Ιωαννιτών Ιπποτών, 14^{ος}–16^{ος} αι.: Συλλογή ιστορικών μελετών* (Rhodes 1991), pp. 64–102 at pp. 95–6 (nos. 2–3)). The letters of Pope Calixtus, referring to the repulse of the Turks by the inhabitants of Lesbos, also allude to the capture of over thirty Turkish *fustas*, although this is not explicitly linked to the fighting at Lesbos (ASVat, *Armadio XXXIX*, 7, ff. 126^v, 132^v, 134; Matteo Sciambra, Giuseppe Valentini and Perrino Ignazio, *Il 'Liber Brevium' di Callisto III. La Crociata, l'Albania e Skanderbeg* (Palermo 1968), pp. 174, 178, 179 (nos. 308, 321, 322)). The sixteenth-century account of Stefano Magno, here apparently drawn at least in part from that of Pius II and chronologically confused, claims that many *fustas* were taken by Trevisan's vessels during the Ottoman repulse at Methymna (Stefano Magno, 'Annali Veneti', Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, MSS. 6214–7, 6239–40 at MS. 6215, f. 245). However, a letter from Trevisan himself, written over a month later, fails to mention explicitly his fleet's putative participation in the victory, saying only that he had ordered galleys to protect Lesbos. This casts some doubt on the interpretation offered here (Gelasio Caetani, *Epistolarium Honorati Caietani: lettere familiari del Cardinale Scarampo e corrispondenza della guerra Angioina (1450–1467)* (Sancasciano 1926), p. 54 (no. 958)).

It has been argued that the events described by Pius II have relate to an otherwise unknown Ottoman attack on the Gattilusio fortress of Kotzinos in Lemnos in 1456 rather than to the siege of Methymna (Walter Haberstumpf, 'I Gattilusio, signori di Mitilene e di Enos in Tracia, nei Commentarii di Aenea Silvio Piccolomini', *AALSL* 48 (Genoa 1992), pp. 425–35 at pp. 432–3). However, Pius clearly specifies that these events took place on Lesbos and makes an allusion to Sappho which would be incomprehensible in the context of any other island. Combined with the other accounts this leaves no serious room for doubt.

the experience of Trevisan's campaign did not extinguish the family's interest in future crusading enterprises. The intermittent appeals for help which had been directed to Genoa since the attack of 1450 were renewed in Niccolò Gattilusio's diplomatic initiative of 1459.⁶¹ Alongside the more typical appeals to Genoa, the papacy and the French crown, the approach to Duke Philip the Good of Burgundy, which saw Archbishop Leonardo visit the Burgundian court in person, is particularly striking.⁶² This initiative marks a considerable shift from the tension between the Gattilusio and Burgundian crusaders in the 1440s. With prospects for any lasting accommodation with the Ottomans looking bleak, the good offices of the duke and his like now represented a frail hope for survival. The escalating Turkish threat, now given concrete form by Mehmed's aggression, had driven the enthusiasm of the Gattilusio for encouraging the crusading efforts of others to new heights, even as it stifled their own potential contribution. This epitomises the contradictory nature of the pressures which crusading against the Ottomans exerted on the Gattilusio lordships, and the convoluted responses which these produced.

The Pursuit of Goodwill

The behavior of the Gattilusio lords during the crisis of the 1450s illustrates the dilemma posed by the call of Christian solidarity, at least when responding to that call entailed military action against the enemy directly threatening them. As has been suggested, their motives for participation in such cases may often have been more diplomatic than military. This supposition is reinforced by the enthusiasm with which they seized upon opportunities to display their commitment to Christendom that did not directly embroil them in violence against Muslim powers on their own doorstep. Such activities could have little or no material impact on their circumstances, but served to entrench their position within the Christian

⁶¹ A. Luxuro and G. Pinelli-Gentile, 'Documenti riguardanti alcuni dinasti dell'Arcipelago, pubblicati per saggio di studi paleografici', *Giornale Ligustico di archeologia, storia e belle arti* 1 (1874), pp. 84–90, 217–221, vol. 2 (1875), pp. 86–93, 292–7, vol. 3 (1876), pp. 313–6, vol. 5 (1878), pp. 345–70 at vol. 5, pp. 359–60 (nos. 51–2); Alfonso Assini, 'La "compera Metilini" e la difesa genovese del Gattilusio dopo la caduta di Costantinopoli', *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οι Γατελούζοι της Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 223–80 at pp. 275–8 (nos. 14–16); Pius II, *Commentarii*, vol. 1, pp. 444–5; see above, pp. 65–6, 70–3.

⁶² ADN, B2034, f. 186^{r-v}.

community while avoiding seriously compromising their relations with their Turkish neighbours.

A relatively undemanding example of such a policy may be discernible in the wake of Cardinal Trevisan's initial campaign. According to one of Calixtus III's letters in March 1457, whereas his fleet had brought Lemnos and Thasos under direct papal administration, Mytilene remained in the hands of its existing lord, but was now under papal sovereignty.⁶³ Particularly if it could be undertaken discreetly, such an act of submission could maximise the commitment of the papal legate to protecting Lesbos, as a territory now formally subject to the pope himself, while avoiding antagonising the Ottomans through participation in offensive action. As a means of winning papal approbation, it might go some way to offsetting disappointment at Domenico Gattilusio's failure to involve himself more actively in Trevisan's campaign.

Earlier events present more imposing evidence for the value set on such expedients. While by the 1390s the balance of material considerations was increasingly tilted against military participation, the potential for amassing moral credit and the influence it brought had increased, given heightened western attention to the struggle with the Turks. As has been mentioned, actions undertaken at this time in support of the crusading movement, but not in defiance of the Ottomans, amount to the most impressive evidence available for the scale of the resources of the lordships.⁶⁴ The first of these undertakings was their role in ransoming and otherwise assisting the captive leaders of the Crusade of Nikopolis. The vast sums committed vividly illustrate the willingness of the Gattilusio to place their resources in some sense at the service of crusading.⁶⁵ While Francesco and Niccolò could hope for eventual reimbursement, responsibility for which fell on the Count of Nevers and his father the Duke of Burgundy, the scale of the sums involved ensured that their capital would surely be tied up by this commitment for many years, and placed them at serious risk in the event of default. Both the capacity and the inclination to make such financial commitments and to take such risks to help those who had taken the cross against the Ottomans were present, but rather than being used to help finance the military effort this reserve of wealth remained available to finance the subsequent liberation of its leaders. The

⁶³ ASVat, *Armadio* XXXIX, 7, f. 62^v; Sciambra *et al.*, p. 123 (no. 164).

⁶⁴ See above, pp. 255–7.

⁶⁵ See above, pp. 50–1, 256–7.

opportunity to show solicitude for the more distinguished victims of the expedition's failure was seemingly regarded as a more deserving outlet for those resources than the opportunity to help it succeed.

Just as these efforts represent by far the greatest financial outlay recorded in the history of the Gattilusio lordships, so the events of 1403 represent the greatest attested display of their martial potential. The Gattilusio had pledged one galley to the Aegean league, with a second to be added *in extremis*, and where the size of their contribution to other military undertakings is specified it amounted to a single galley at most. Yet in 1403 their combined contribution to the fleet led by Boucicault against the King of Cyprus and the Mamluks was on a significantly larger scale, amounting to two galleys and two galliots. The burden on their resources was probably greater, since they appear to have maintained additional forces in the Aegean, which they were able to commit at short notice to John VII's planned attack on Thessalonike.⁶⁶ A crusading expedition had called forth this display of force, yet it was an expedition against a foe that posed no threat to the Gattilusio lordships, and one from which they had nothing discernible to gain in direct strategic terms. It is possible that the dynasty had some direct stake in the Genoese presence on Cyprus, whose protection was the prime objective of this campaign, but there is no evidence for this. The participation of the Gattilusio seems likely to have been in large part opportunistic, motivated by the desire to secure the approval of Genoa, its formidable governor and his king, and perhaps by the possibility of profit from plunder. It was a chance to compensate for the ambivalent showing of 1399, freed from the risks inherent in challenging a power far better placed to inflict vengeance on the lordships than the distant Sultan of Egypt.

The immediate context for these commitments, as for the peculiarly fierce contradictory pressures surrounding action against the Ottomans around this time, was clearly French rule in Genoa. Charles VI had assumed sovereignty over the city only months before the Nikopolis disaster, and appointed Boucicault as his governor there in 1401.⁶⁷ For the purpose of

⁶⁶ Lalande, p. 219; Ruy Gonzales de Clavijo, *Embajada a Tamorlán*, ed. Francesco López Estrada (Madrid 1943), pp. 25–8; above, pp. 53–5, 255–6.

⁶⁷ See above, p. 49. The assistance given by the Gattilusio to the captive crusaders included interceding with Bayezid on behalf of Enguerrand de Coucy, a third cousin of Francesco II, who was given special treatment on the grounds of ill-health at the lord of Mytilene's request. In 1394–5 de Coucy had commanded the campaigns to conquer Genoa mounted by Charles's brother Louis, Duke of Orleans, which had followed preliminary proposals to entrust the city either to the king or to the duke and had contributed to its

influencing the elite of fourteenth-century France with its preoccupation with chivalry, aiding the crusade and its French participants was probably the most potent tool the Gattilusio had available. Froissart explicitly asserts that the Gattilusio assisted the captive crusade leaders because of their desire to ingratiate themselves with the King of France and the Duke of Burgundy.⁶⁸ In so far as the Gattilusio continued to have interests in their city of origin these could be safeguarded by cultivating a good relationship with its new masters. Perhaps more importantly at a time of such danger, their goodwill would also increase the prospects for the resources of the Genoese commune or of its new overlord being deployed to protect the Gattilusio and their interests in the East if the need should arise. There may have been some suspicion that foreign rulers would be less likely than native Genoese to recognise or to value the advantages that the Gattilusio lordships brought to Genoa's interests in the East.⁶⁹

Besides their control of Genoese policy, there were other considerations making French goodwill particularly valuable at this time. The French could in themselves have been an important factor in Gattilusio hopes for future security. Charles VI was a putative leader of the larger crusade which had been intended to follow the Burgundian expedition and France remained the preeminent source of crusading manpower, while Boucicault was the most active and persistent crusader of these years.⁷⁰ The direction and prospects of any future crusading enterprise would be greatly influenced by their attitude. After the discouraging disaster on the Danube, sending influential witnesses home bearing glowing reports of the virtues of the lords of the Aegean might do some good in discouraging the rulers of the West from abandoning the Latin East to its fate.

Furthermore, it is striking that the attention lavished upon the crusade leaders by the Gattilusio coincided with John VII's proposal to sell his claim to the Byzantine throne to Charles VI. The terms of this arrangement were negotiated by Francesco II, representing his imperial son-in-law, and

eventual submission. Froissart, vol. 15, pp. 345, 347; William Miller, 'The Gattilusj of Lesbos (1355–1462)', *BZ* 22 (1913), pp. 406–47, reprinted in *Essays on the Latin Orient* (Cambridge 1921, reprinted Amsterdam 1964), pp. 313–53 at p. 320 n. 1; Eugène Jarry, *Les Origines de la Domination Française à Gênes (1392–1402)* (Paris 1896), pp. 58–155.

⁶⁸ Froissart, vol. 14, p. 41.

⁶⁹ Cf. Enrico Basso, 'De Boucicault à Francesco Sforza: persistence et changements dans la politique orientale des seigneurs étrangers de Gênes au XV^e siècle', *Le Partage du Monde: échanges et Colonisation dans la Méditerranée Médiévale*, ed. Michel Balard and Alain Ducellier (Paris 1998), pp. 63–77.

⁷⁰ J. J. N. Palmer, *England, France and Christendom 1377–99* (London 1972), pp. 198–205.

by the Count of Nevers and Henri de Bar on behalf of the French king, during their stay at Mytilene with the other crusade leaders after their release.⁷¹ Clearly gaining the goodwill of the intermediaries who would present the proposal to Charles could only increase the likelihood of its being well received. Francesco's agreement to act for John in this matter implies that he looked favourably on the deal. In addition to money and a French estate for John, the deal was conditional on the king or a prince of his family leading an army to campaign against the Turks. Such a substantial military enterprise clearly had considerable potential to benefit the Christian position in the East. Giving an added incentive for the French king to revive his own thoughts of a crusade would have seemed particularly urgent at a time when these had faltered in the face of renewed conflict with England, compounded by the demoralizing effect of the disaster at Nikopolis.⁷² For the Gattilusio, John VII's offer to turn over his claim to the throne in return must have been a decidedly more ambivalent prospect, but the particular circumstances of the time would have enhanced its advantages and diminished the damage it could do to their interests. If John, having failed to assert his claim successfully, was now eager to cash it in before Bayezid's armies rendered it worthless, Francesco could no longer hope to see his son-in-law enthroned in Constantinople. Having antagonised Manuel by his alignment with John, Francesco could probably expect little direct benefit in the short term from his Byzantine connections, even if the empire should somehow survive the continuing siege of its capital.⁷³ By contrast, if a new ruler could be installed in the imperial city who was well-disposed towards him, he would stand to profit personally from the arrangement. Charles VI's position as lord of Genoa would also hopefully lead him to wield whatever power he gained in the East to the benefit of Genoese commercial interests and against those of the community's competitors. Collusion in such a revival of a Latin Empire in Constantinople might have serious consequences for Francesco's relationship with his Greek subjects, but the apparently imminent dissolution of Byzantium at the hands of the Ottomans may have seemed to

⁷¹ Spyridon P. Lampros, 'Ιωάννου Ζ' Παλαιολόγου ἐγγώρησις τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς βυζαντιακῆς αὐτοκρατορίας δικαιωμάτων εἰς τὸν βασιλέα τῆς Γαλλίας Κάρολον ς', *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 10 (1913), pp. 248–57 at pp. 248–51; above, p. 51.

⁷² Palmer, pp. 180–207.

⁷³ Ignatius of Smolensk, 'Journey to Constantinople', ed. George P. Majeska, *Russian Travelers to Constantinople in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries* (Washington D.C. 1984), pp. 48–113 at pp. 102–3.

diminish the lasting value of the empire's endorsement relative to other considerations.

There were also more general benefits in giving the most powerful monarch in western Europe a more direct stake in the survival of the Christian East. Should the French king succeed in laying hands on Constantinople and turn his considerable resources to the task of retaining it, the prospects for staving off the Turks could well be improved. The more deeply France could be embroiled in the Aegean, the better would be the prospects for survival of the rulers threatened by the Ottoman advance; the higher the standing of a particular such ruler with the French, the more effectively he would be able to turn such a commitment to his own advantage. A precedent for such calculations may be seen in the efforts of the papacy in the 1270s to entangle the interests of the French royal dynasty in the defence of the Holy Land by encouraging the acquisition of the Kingdom of Jerusalem by Charles of Anjou.⁷⁴

In the event, the pact was apparently never ratified. Nevertheless, the willingness of the Gattilusio to contribute such large sums on behalf of the prisoners is less startling in the light of such possibilities. The ransom effort offered a rare opportunity to resolve the contradictions and dilemmas that plagued the Gattilusio and their counterparts in the Aegean in their involvement with the crusade, at a time when these were more acute than ever. It enabled them to secure diplomatic leverage in the West on a scale comparable with that which could be won by making a major military contribution to the crusade itself, and to make use of this in promoting fresh crusading endeavours. At the same time it avoided any of the risks which were implicit in conspicuous military participation; indeed, if anything it was likely to win them favour with an Ottoman sultan presumably wishing to secure his ransom money as soon as possible. The zest with which they entered into it, and likewise their heavy commitment some years later to a naval campaign with little conceivable scope to enhance their security, contrasts with their diffidence towards other crusading activities at this time and later. This balance of priorities reflects the extent to which the Gattilusio lords' involvement with the crusade was driven by the desire to preserve or enhance their standing in a community and shape its policies, rather than by the hope of doing direct damage to an enemy.

⁷⁴ Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: a history* (London 1987, 2nd ed. 2005), p. 203.

Church Union

Further opportunities for the Gattilusio lords to distinguish themselves in service to Christendom in ways that did not entail direct conflict with their neighbours were offered by recurrent efforts to achieve Church Union. While their affiliations with Byzantium, Genoa and the Turks all played a major part in shaping the lordships' involvement in crusading, their role in this other great collective Christian enterprise was entirely conditioned by their connections with Byzantium. This bond provided them with opportunities for exerting influence on Byzantine policy that other Catholic regimes in the region lacked. Furthermore, the Gattilusio regime's establishment had been entwined with the rise to power of an emperor eager to pursue rapprochement with the West. The potential usefulness of a Latin dynasty so closely aligned with the Palaiologoi in furthering this cause brought the new Gattilusio regime to the attention of the papacy far more rapidly than any actual or potential contribution to crusading. In 1356, following John V's first overtures to the papacy, Francesco Gattilusio was one of a number of influential Greek and Latin figures who received a letter from Pope Innocent VI (1352–62). This alluded to letters the Pope had received from the recipients' regarding John's initiative and their efforts in encouraging it, and urged Francesco and the others to assist the papal emissaries who had been sent in response to negotiate with John.⁷⁵ Over the following years Francesco remained engaged in efforts to take advantage of John's favourable inclinations. In 1367 Pope Urban V wrote to thank him for his role in the talks which had arisen out of Amadeo of Savoy's expedition.⁷⁶ This period of activity reached its climax in 1369, when Francesco accompanied John on his journey to Rome to make his submission to the Pope and stood as one of the witnesses to the emperor's confession of faith.⁷⁷ In 1374, as the papacy strove to convince John to follow up on this personal commitment by bringing his subjects to acknowledge its supremacy as well, Francesco was among a group of Eastern notables who were asked to support the mission of papal

⁷⁵ Aloysius L. Tautu, *Acta Innocentii PP. VI (1352–1362) e Regestis Vaticanis aliisque fontibus collegit* (Rome 1961), *CICO* 10, pp. 173–5 (nos. 92, 92a).

⁷⁶ Aloysius L. Tautu, *Acta Urbani PP. V (1362–1370) e Regestis Vaticanis aliisque fontibus collegit* (Rome 1964), *CICO* 11, p. 211 (no. 131a).

⁷⁷ Odoricus Raynaldus, *Annales Ecclesiastici ab anno quo desinit Caes. Card. Baronius MCXXXIV Continuati ab Odorico Raynaldo Tarvisino Congreg. Oratorii Presbytero*, 22 vols. (Cologne 1694–1727), vol. 16, pp. 478–9; Tautu, *Acta Urbani V*, pp. 287–90 (no. 168); Halecki, pp. 190, 195–6.

emissaries.⁷⁸ It is likely that as a recent entrant into the political and social world of the Aegean, Francesco's enthusiasm for the submission of Byzantium to the Latin dispensation was more fervent and unambiguous than that of his successors would be. This, combined with his initially cordial relationship with John V, his friendship with a leading Byzantine advocate of Union in Demetrios Kydones and the emperor's own pro-Union line of policy amounted to a confluence of conditions favouring vigorous pursuit of the cause, one which, as in the case of the crusade, would not recur.

After the first two decades of Francesco I's rule in Mytilene the family's hitherto prominent role in the Union project fades from the record. This can readily be accounted for by the apparent deterioration in Francesco's relationship with John and the latter's disillusionment with his policy of rapprochement with the West.⁷⁹ Subsequently, the relations between the Gattilusio and the Palaiologoi were dominated by Francesco II's firm alignment with John VII.⁸⁰ Since the young emperor displayed no interest in the possibility of Union, and arguably even acted as a focus for hostility to it among the Byzantine elite, this effectively ruled out further Gattilusio activity in favour of it while he and Francesco lived.⁸¹ Even had the family's relations with Manuel II been better, the senior emperor's scepticism about the notion of Union and the ecclesiastical upheaval in the West ensured that there would be no serious efforts during his reign in any case.

However, in the 1430s the renewed escalation of the Ottoman threat, the accession of John VIII and the resolution of the papal schism prompted the resumption of serious negotiations between East and West. Yet there is no firm evidence that Dorino of Mytilene or Palamede of Ainos reprised their grandfather's role as promoters of these efforts. This is in spite of their apparently amicable relations with the Palaiologoi during these years, which would presumably have created opportunities for them to play a meaningful part, and the prominence of Metropolitan Dorotheos of Mytilene among the Orthodox advocates of agreement with the Latins at the Council of Ferrara-Florence.⁸² George Scholarios's letter praising

⁷⁸ ASVat, RV 270, f. 49.

⁷⁹ See above, pp. 99–100.

⁸⁰ See above, pp. 47–8, 51, 53–4, 97–100.

⁸¹ Thierry Ganchou, 'Autour de Jean VII: luttes dynastiques, interventions étrangères et résistance orthodoxe à Byzance', *Coloniser au Moyen Âge*, ed. Michel Balard and Alain Ducellier (Paris 1995), pp. 367–81 at pp. 374–81; Necipoğlu, pp. 119–26.

⁸² See above, pp. 63–4, 314.

Dorino I Gattilusio was written while negotiations leading to the Council were underway and Scholarios alludes to them in the letter, but gives no direct indication of Gattilusio participation.⁸³

Having become more acclimatised to the religious *status quo* of the Aegean, it is possible that these third-generation lords felt a less pressing sense of duty to resolve the schism than the newcomer Francesco I. They may have had a keener sense of the potential of a controversial Union agreement to disrupt the *modus vivendi* they had developed with their Greek subjects.⁸⁴ Whereas the family's personal connections at the summit of the Orthodox world had put Francesco I at the forefront of efforts for Union, deepening familiarity with that world at a humbler level may have undercut his descendants' inclination to follow in his footsteps. Another possible influence on their behaviour may have been the potential displeasure of the Ottomans, who were naturally hostile to any prospect of rapprochement between the Christians of East and West. However, the events of the following years suggest a willingness to neglect Ottoman preferences on Dorino Gattilusio's part, and the state of his relations with Murad II at this time remains opaque.⁸⁵

It is also just conceivable that the Gattilusio failed to engage with the papal efforts for Union owing to Conciliarist sympathies. Mytilene was one of the ports of call for the mission sent to Constantinople in 1437 by the Council of Basle, whose leaders were seeking to assert the superiority of Church councils to the authority of the papacy. The emissaries tried unsuccessfully to convince John VIII and the Byzantine delegation to return with them to the West for Union negotiations, rather than accompanying the rival papal mission sent to bring the emperor's party to the breakaway council convened by Pope Eugenius IV (1431–47) at Ferrara.⁸⁶ In their report to the council after the failure of their mission the Basle ambassadors recorded the acts of generosity shown to them in the course of their travels. The only individuals encountered on the seaborne element of the

⁸³ George Scholarios, *Oeuvres complètes de Georges Scholarios*, ed. Louis Petit, Xenophon Siderides and Martin Jugie, 8 vols. (Paris 1928–36), vol. 4, pp. 412–3 (no. 4).

⁸⁴ See above, pp. 313–6.

⁸⁵ See above, pp. 103–4; below, pp. 386–7.

⁸⁶ Gustav Beckmann, 'Aus dem Nachlass der Bischöfe von Lübeck, Viseu, Parma und Lausanne, Gesandter des Basler Konzils nach Avignon und Konstantinopel Februar 1437 bis Februar 1438', *Concilium Basiliense. Studien und Quellen zur Geschichte des Concils von Basel*, ed. Johannes Haller, Gustav Beckmann, Rudolf Wackernagel, Giulio Coggiola, Hermann Herre and Gabriel Pélouse, 8 vols. (Basle 1896–1936), vol. 5, pp. 175–362 at pp. 310, 342 (no. 49).

journey who were singled out for such recognition were the Archbishop of Messina, the Emperor John VIII and the Patriarch of Constantinople, and Dorino Gattilusio. The lord of Mytilene was commended for the supplies he provided, supposedly out of goodwill to the council.⁸⁷ This response may simply have been a product of Genoese solidarity. The delegation's galleys had been chartered in Liguria; after their arrival at Constantinople they faced the threat of attack from the papal contingent's Venetian galleys, and received military support and an enthusiastic popular welcome from the inhabitants of Pera.⁸⁸ Certainly the Gattilusio did not take any discernible role in the Basle diplomatic efforts.⁸⁹ However, even in the absence of active involvement it is not impossible that ambivalence over the internal divisions of the Catholic Church contributed to their apparent disengagement from the process leading to the Union of Florence. In the absence of positive evidence, the attitude of the later Gattilusio lords towards the Union project, an enterprise with such scope for raising their diplomatic profile, remains enigmatic.

The Attitudes of Others

The supposition that the Gattilusio lords involved themselves in collective Christian undertakings in large part out of the desire to influence the perceptions of others raises the issue of the standing they actually enjoyed in Latin Christendom. Their reputation would have been shaped both by their own actions and, less controllably, by their affiliations with other networks. Clearly, close dealings with the Turks were likely to be detrimental to their reputation, while they could also suffer from guilt by association with groups whose commitment to Christian solidarity was in doubt.

One indication of the degree to which a regime was regarded by others as a dutiful element of the Christian community lies in the readiness with which it was envisaged as a likely contributor to future cooperative efforts. The lordship of Mytilene did not feature in plans for collective

⁸⁷ Beckmann, p. 356 (no. 49).

⁸⁸ Beckmann, p. 311 (no. 49); Eugenio Cecconi, *Studi storici sul Concilio di Firenze* (Florence 1869), pp. 505–6, 511–2 (no. 178).

⁸⁹ The Gattilusio lords were not among the Byzantine and Latin dignitaries of the Eastern Mediterranean for whom the emissaries from Basle carried letters. Beckmann, pp. 358–9 (no. 50).

defence which emerged during its early years.⁹⁰ While the Genoese had been noticeably unenthusiastic about the anti-Turkish leagues of recent decades, there is nothing very remarkable in the omission of the Gattilusio from consideration.⁹¹ Unlike later pacts and proposals, none of the mid-fourteenth century leagues included any of the smaller Venetian or Genoese regimes of the Aegean as partners in their own right. The prominent inclusion of Francesco I among those with whom the pope corresponded regarding the Union project shows that the Gattilusio figured favourably in the calculations of papal policy as early as 1356.⁹² However, Francesco's involvement in Amadeo of Savoy's crusade, the ensuing negotiations and John V's visit to Rome clearly raised his profile and burnished his credentials as a champion of Christian causes, gaining further praise from the pope in 1367.⁹³ He was among the numerous Christian rulers invited in November 1372 to the conference which Pope Gregory XI (1370–8) was attempting to convene at Thebes to discuss the Turkish problem.⁹⁴ This was followed in March 1373 by a papal exhortation to Francesco, along with the Order of St. John and the Mahona of Chios, to assist in the defence of Smyrna, and thanks for his active response the following year.⁹⁵ The period in which active Gattilusio support for collective Christian undertakings was at its most vigorous and unambiguous seemingly won Francesco I a markedly favourable reputation, at least as far as the papal Curia was concerned.

⁹⁰ The league which underpinned the activities of Pierre Thomas had been negotiated in 1357, uniting Venice, the Order of St. John and the Kingdom of Cyprus (George Martin Thomas, *Diplomatarium Veneto-Levantinum: sive acta et diplomata res venetas, Graecas atque Levantis illustrantia*, 2 vols. (Venice 1880–99, reprinted New York 1966), vol. 2, pp. 35–7 (no. 19). After the expiry of its five-year term, negotiations for a new league in 1362 initially encompassed Genoa, Venice and, in a reflection of John V's overtures to the West, Byzantium; Cyprus, the Hospitallers and the Emperor as Trebizond were also seen as potential partners (Freddy Thiriet, 'Una proposta di lega antiturca tra Venezia, Genova e Bisanzio nel 1363' *Archivio Storico Italiano* 113 (1955), pp. 321–34 at pp. 331–4).

⁹¹ During this period Genoa had supplied ships which were paid for by others, but the commune had seldom if ever made contributions at its own expense to crusading expeditions or leagues against the Anatolian Turks. There had been tension and violent clashes in 1346 between Simone Vignoso's Genoese fleet and crusading forces in the Aegean. Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 1, pp. 190–1, 202–3, 205–8.

⁹² Tautu, *Acta Innocentii VI*, pp. 173–5 (nos. 92, 92a).

⁹³ ASVat, RV 249, f. 2^v.

⁹⁴ ASVat, RV 268, ff. 85^v–6; Guillaume Mollat, *Lettres secrètes et curiales du pape Grégoire XI intéressant les pays autres que la France*, 3 vols (Paris 1962–5), vol. 1, p. 161 (no. 1166); Raymond-Joseph Loenertz, 'Athènes et Néopatras: regestes et notices pour servir à l'histoire des duchés catalans (1311–1394)', *Byzantina et Franco-Graeca*, 2 vols. (Rome 1970–8), vol. 2, pp. 183–393 at pp. 371–2 (no. 176).

⁹⁵ ASVat, RV 269, f. 28; RV 270, f. 63^v; Mollat, vol. 1, p. 215 (no. 1524).

Less evidence is available for the impact on western perceptions of the more complex and contradictory line of policy followed by Francesco II in the difficult circumstances that confronted him. One view from the West is offered by Froissart's account of the Gattilusio lords' help to the captive crusade leaders. While testifying to the help they gave, his observation that they were able to exert an effective influence thanks to their friendship with Bayezid reflects a perception which cannot have been beneficial to their reputation.⁹⁶ His interpretation of their motivations in terms of self-interest is further testimony to this jaundiced view.⁹⁷

The omission of the Gattilusio from the 1398 and 1402 league plans suggests that they were no longer seen as likely participants in collective defence.⁹⁸ However, despite such indications of ambivalence, when the Knights of St. John floated the idea of a new league in 1414, the wording of their proposal implies that it was the rulers of Mytilene and Chios who first leapt to mind as the Order's partners in previous leagues.⁹⁹ This is all the more notable given that the Hospitallers' relations with the Gattilusio and the Mahona had been considerably strained by events only a year earlier. In February 1413 the Knights complained that the crew of a galliot from the Order's castle of St. Peter at Bodrum had been imprisoned and tortured in Mytilene after seizing a Turkish galliot nearby.¹⁰⁰ This has been explained as the product of a desire to placate the Turks, in which case the incident would seem particularly incongruous with the Knights' subsequent attitude.¹⁰¹ However, the action is more likely to have been a response to a spate of apparently indiscriminate Hospitaller piracy emanating from Bodrum, whose victims were Genoese as well as Turkish and which seems to have generated considerable tension between the Order and its neighbours. It seems likely that the galliot crew seized on Lesbos were identical with the perpetrators of recent attacks on Genoese vessels.¹⁰²

⁹⁶ Froissart, vol. 15, p. 347, vol. 16, p. 38.

⁹⁷ Froissart, vol. 14, p. 41.

⁹⁸ See above, pp. 331–2.

⁹⁹ Luttrell and Zachariadou, p. 147 (no. 17).

¹⁰⁰ Luttrell and Zachariadou, pp. 143–4 (no. 13).

¹⁰¹ E.g. Miller, 'Gattilusj', p. 325; Luttrell and Zachariadou, p. 115.

¹⁰² On the same date as their letter to Jacopo Gattilusio decrying this attack, the authorities on Rhodes also responded to a complaint from the government of Chios regarding the seizure of the cargo of a Genoese or Chian *grippo* by a Hospitaller galliot from Bodrum. While denying all knowledge and pledging action against the perpetrators, the Order's letter also alluded to supposed rumours that the culprits were in fact from Mytilene (Luttrell and Zachariadou, pp. 144–5 (no. 14)). This effort to shift the blame onto the Gattilusio is probably to be understood in part as retaliation for Jacopo's action. The previous month

This followed on from other outbursts of strife between the two groups in the preceding years.¹⁰³

The emphasis on Chios and Mytilene as leading potential partners despite such ructions may reflect a particular sense of local defensive solidarity between the Order and its Genoese neighbours. This could have been promoted by their territorial proximity to each other, their shared uncomfortable closeness to Anatolia and their common suspicion of the Venetians.¹⁰⁴ Some sentiment of this kind seems to be discernible from Hospitaller documents of the same period, in which the re-emergence of sea-borne threats from Turkish rulers is construed specifically in terms of a menace to Chios and Lesbos along with the Order's own islands.¹⁰⁵ Within the broad community of Latin societies that might cooperate against the Turks, within the narrower circle of eastern regimes involved in the league schemes of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, the Gattilusio and their Genoese neighbours were apparently seen as members of a tight cluster of local solidarity uniting them with the most consistent exponents of Christian military resistance. The kind of strife manifested in 1412–3 is perhaps to be seen as the product of a period of reduced Turkish threat, which had eroded the habit of defensive cooperation within this group, a development perhaps reversed by the revival of that danger from 1413. In any case it is not unlikely that their immediate neighbours, familiar with the difficulties faced by those in close proximity to Turkish power, should have taken a more sympathetic attitude to the ambiguities of Gattilusio policy than westerners like Froissart and his informants, who as distant observers or occasional visitors could safely demand unambiguous beligerence without needing to concern themselves with its consequences. After all, even the Knights themselves saw fit to reach an accommodation with Mehmed I in 1415.¹⁰⁶ Here as in the case of their relationships within

reports had come from Chios of the capture by a galliot from Bodrum of some Turkish barques from Theologo despite the state of peace prevailing between its rulers and the Order, while the seizure of two barques from Chios had also been alleged (Luttrell and Zachariadou, pp. 140–2, 144–5 (nos. 10–1, 14)). The month before that the Hospitallers had complained of the seizure of goods belonging to one of the Order's officers at Chios, reinforcing the impression of an atmosphere of tension and reprisal (AOM 339 (*Libri Bullarum* 24), f. 267^v).

¹⁰³ AOM 333 (*Libri Bullarum* 18), f. 128^v; AOM 339 (*Libri Bullarum* 24), ff. 226–7.

¹⁰⁴ Anthony Luttrell, 'Venice and the Knights Hospitallers of Rhodes in the fourteenth century', *Papers of the British School at Rome* 26 (1958), pp. 195–212, reprinted in *The Hospitallers in Cyprus, Rhodes, Greece and the West 1291–1440* (London 1970), V.

¹⁰⁵ Luttrell and Zachariadou, pp. 149–50, 154–6 (nos. 19, 26).

¹⁰⁶ See above, pp. 58–9.

the Genoese community, shared perceptions and interests were likely to bring a closer meeting of minds between the Gattilusio lords and their Aegean neighbours than with associates in the distant West.¹⁰⁷

If the ambivalence of Francesco II around the time of the Crusade of Nikopolis had opened him to some censorious comment in the West, the apparent inaction of the Gattilusio lords when western attention again focused on conflict with the Turks in the mid-fifteenth century cannot have improved the family's standing. Indications that their relations with the Ottomans were at times quite cordial cannot have helped matters.¹⁰⁸ By that time perceptions of them would also have been coloured by the deepening suspicion that the Genoese in general were prone to treacherous collaboration with the Turks.¹⁰⁹ Any such doubts about their loyalty to Christendom would become all the more dangerous for the Gattilusio once they found themselves in unprecedented need of crusading assistance in the crisis that began in 1455.

Nonetheless, in the mid-fifteenth century the Gattilusio lords do seem to have enjoyed enough papal goodwill to secure favourable responses to their petitions to the Curia. In 1425 they sought licence from the pope to employ mendicants of their own choice as confessors, with the authority to assign penance even in cases normally reserved to the See of Rome. The outcome of this request is unknown.¹¹⁰ However, in 1440 Eugenius IV did grant Dorino I free choice of mendicants as confessors for himself and his wife and for the service of his chapel of St. John the Evangelist, and the exemption of the chapel from archiepiscopal authority.¹¹¹ Most significantly, in June 1456 Calixtus III came down firmly on Domenico Gattilusio's side in his dispute with the vicar of the Dominican convent at Mytilene, dismissing the incumbent, appointing Domenico's nominee to succeed him and making all future appointments to the post subject to the lord of Mytilene's approval.¹¹² On the same day he assigned to Archbishop Leonardo the authority to excommunicate pirates preying on the territories of the lord of Mytilene.¹¹³ The timing of these

¹⁰⁷ See above, pp. 129–32, 149–52, 184–5.

¹⁰⁸ Valentini, *Acta*, vol. 12, p. 259 (no. 3056); below, p. 383.

¹⁰⁹ Jacques Paviot, 'Gênes et les Turcs (1444, 1453): sa défense contre les accusations d'une entente', *SG* 9 (1989), pp. 129–37; below, pp. 362–3.

¹¹⁰ Cf. above, pp. 290, 322.

¹¹¹ Aloysius L. Tautu, *Acta Eugenii Papae IV (1431–1447) e Regestis Vaticanis aliisque fontibus collegit notisque illustravit* (Rome 1990), *CICO* 15, p. 422 (nos. 905–6).

¹¹² ASVat, *RV* 443, ff. 113^v–4^v.

¹¹³ ASVat, *RV* 443, f. 113^{r-v}.

interventions, shortly before the departure of Calixtus's fleet for the Aegean, suggests that they may have been intended in part to encourage cooperation with the expedition. As in the case of the Genoese commune in the 1420s, such solicitousness may reflect doubts over the reliability of the lordships and the desire to shore up their support.¹¹⁴

Besides whatever doubts hung over the commitment of the Gattilusio to the Christian cause, there were particular reasons for concern arising from the origins and loyalties of the papal forces, which were liable to cause friction with the Genoese. Whatever the impact of Trevisan's own Venetian identity, the most significant difficulties are likely to have come from the prominence in his fleet of Catalan crews and commanders, at a time when Genoa was embroiled in a war with King Alfonso V of Aragon. Many of them may indeed have recently taken part in that conflict. Pope Calixtus III himself, originally Alfonso de Borja, was a native of the Aragonese lands and a former Bishop of Valencia, who had served King Alfonso as his secretary and on diplomatic missions.¹¹⁵ His main hope of enlisting naval support beyond his own resources lay with the King of Aragon, and he initially appointed Pedro de Urrea, the Archbishop of Tarragona, to lead his fleet against the Ottomans. Urrea and his two principal subordinates, Antonio Olzina and Antonio de Frescobaldi, were later dismissed after employing the papal forces entrusted to them in Alfonso's service against the Genoese and Venetians, leading to Trevisan's appointment. The fleet's departure for the Aegean was held back by the need to wait for galleys which had been promised by Alfonso but long delayed owing to the king's own military activities. It is likely that many of the ships that eventually arrived in the Aegean had come straight from Alfonso's service, and a large proportion of the fleet's commanders and crews were certainly Catalans or other subjects of the King of Aragon.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ See above, p. 150.

¹¹⁵ Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 2, p. 162.

¹¹⁶ ASVat, RV 442, f. 291^{r-v}; ASVat, *Armadio* XXIX, 7, ff. 5-6^v, 8^v-10, 20^v-1, 24^v, 25^v, 27^v-8^v, 33-4^v, 37-8^v, 45^{r-v}, 48^{r-v}; Sciambra *et al.*, pp. 70-2, 74-7, 80-2, 86-7, 89-90 (nos. 2-4, 7, 9, 17, 19-23, 31, 33, 39, 57, 59, 64, 66); Ludwig von Pastor, *Geschichte der Päpste im Zeitalter der Renaissance bis zur Wahl Pius II.: Martin V. Eugen IV. Nikolaus V. Kalixtus III.*, (Freiburg im Breisgau 1926), *Geschichte der Päpste seit dem Ausgang des Mittelalters* 1, pp. 856-7 (no. 76); Raynaldus, vol. 18, pp. 456-9; Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 2, pp. 166-7, 184-7; Pio Paschini, 'La flotta di Callisto III (1455-1458)', *Archivio della Reale Società Romana di Storia Patria* 53-5 (1930-2), pp. 177-254 at pp. 180-2, 192-206, 212-7. The size and composition of the fleet which campaigned in the Aegean is unclear. Papal letters indicate that the fleet gathered under Trevisan at the mouth of the Tiber in summer 1456 amounted to 16 galleys, while Alfonso's promised contribution was to be another 15, at least some of which did

Despite his dismissal Urrea did reach the Aegean, where in August 1456, still styled as papal legate and captain-general of the papal fleet, he borrowed money from the Order of St. John to pay his galley crews.¹¹⁷ Antonio Olzina was to be found in command of a galley at Mytilene in July 1457, where he bought some slaves from Domenico Gattilusio, employing as intermediaries and guarantors some Catalan or Aragonese officers of the papal fleet.¹¹⁸ To make matters worse, the Hospitallers, who might otherwise have acted as a mediating influence, were antagonised around this time by Genoese attacks on their shipping, perhaps related to the war against the Catalans, including an attack on the Order's admiral Sergio de Seripando by Giuliano Gattilusio.¹¹⁹ In authorizing Leonardo to excommunicate pirates, Calixtus may have had the discipline of the papal forces themselves in mind. In any case, the potential for tension between the Gattilusio and their Genoese subjects and the traditional enemies of their community is evident, although Olzina's commercial dealings and the alleged collusion of the lord of Mytilene with Catalan pirates before 1462 does raise the possibility that the Gattilusio were on better terms with Catalans than might be expected.¹²⁰ Doukas records that at Lesbos the papal fleet was joined by a number of Catalan and other pirate vessels.¹²¹ However it is unclear whether they were based there or simply made their rendezvous at the island. It is possible that at least some of the 'Catalan

supposedly join the papal force before it set out. Urrea had commanded 16 galleys, which he had put to use on his king's behalf and which Trevisan was told would be joining him before his departure for the Aegean. Assessments of the fleet's numbers after arrival in the Aegean depend on narrative sources, which give differing figures. A short chronicle from Patmos puts the size of the force at Rhodes in December 1456 at 14 galleys, Chalkokondyles at 10 galleys, Kritovoulos at 30 galleys and 2 ships, while Doukas gives 11 galleys on arrival in the Aegean, rising to 40 vessels after reinforcement at Lesbos (Schreiner, *Kleinchroniken*, vol. 1, pp. 665–6 (no. 106/4); Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, p. 191; Doukas, p. 423; Kritovoulos, p. 115). Urrea and Olzina's presence in the Aegean suggests that their contingent did in the end join Trevisan's, lending persuasiveness to the larger total figures given by Kritovoulos and Doukas. Tsirpanlis, 'Εύρεποι άνθρωποι', pp. 71–3, 76, 78–9; Paschini, pp. 214–6.

¹¹⁷ Iacomo Bosio, *Dell'istoria della Sacra Religione et illustrissima Militia di San Giovanni Gerosolimitano*, 3 vols. (Rome 1594), vol. 2, p. 192.

¹¹⁸ Ausilia Roccatagliata, 'Mitilene, 1454–60', *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: atti rogati a Pera e Mitilene* (Genoa 1982), II, pp. 94–5 (no. 42). Olzina is also attested in a papal letter of the following month as being in charge of two galleys (ASVat, *Armadio* XXXIX, 7, f. 121^{r-v}; Sciambra *et al.*, p. 164 (no. 294)). These references, and that to Urrea above, show that Setton is incorrect in stating that they never sailed against the Turks (Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 2, p. 166).

¹¹⁹ AOM 365 (*Libri Bullarum* 50), f. 266; AOM 367 (*Libri Bullarum* 52), ff. 190^v–1.

¹²⁰ Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, p. 273.

¹²¹ Doukas, p. 423.

pirates' mentioned by Doukas were actually Urrea's forces, the historian's terminology reflecting a Genoese perspective on their recent activities.

Difficult relations with the Gattilusio lords and doubts about their reliability may well have taken effect in the way the papal forces dealt with the islands they captured. Trevisan showed a conspicuous lack of interest in reinstating Gattilusio rule in the territories which the family had so recently lost, an approach replicated in Rome. The recaptured islands were garrisoned by the papal forces themselves, and on the fleet's withdrawal they were entrusted to the keeping of the Order of St. John.¹²² Early in 1459 Pius II announced the establishment of a new military order, the Knights of Our Lady of Bethlehem, to defend the Christians of the Aegean from a headquarters at Lemnos, evidently as a solution to the longer-term requirements of the islands' defence. This order's foundation was rendered a dead letter by the rapid Ottoman recovery.¹²³ At no stage does there seem to have been any suggestion that the islands' former rulers might be reinstated. This cannot be explained simply in terms of a reluctance to let the fleet's gains pass from the hands of the papacy itself or of sworn warriors of the Catholic Church. That much is clear from a papal offer to grant the islands to the Genoese *Casa di San Giorgio*, which the latter rejected in June 1459, despite concern at the fact that both Venetians and Catalans had expressed an interest in acquiring them.¹²⁴ This approach to the *Casa* also indicates that the failure to return the islands to the Gattilusio cannot be attributed to a general suspicion of Genoese unreliability in the face of the Ottomans, or to the Catalan or Venetian loyalties of popes and commanders. Thus it seems that the treatment of the Gattilusio was due to considerations specific to the family. Added to what was perhaps an already questionable reputation before 1455, their failure to mount any vigorous opposition to the original Ottoman takeover of their territories may have suggested to Trevisan and successive popes that the Gattilusio lords' will to resist was inadequate. Their ability to do so effectively with the resources available to them may also have been in doubt. The lack of enthusiasm they had shown in response to Trevisan's own campaign

¹²² Roberto Valentini, 'L'Egeo dopo la caduta di Costantinopoli nelle relazioni dei gran maestri di Rodi', *Bullettino dell'Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo e Archivio Muratoriano* 51 (1936), pp. 137–68 at pp. 165, 168 (no. 4).

¹²³ Raynaldus, vol. 19, p. 15; Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 2, p. 203.

¹²⁴ P. Amadeo Vigna, *Codice diplomatico delle colonie Tauro-Liguri durante la signoria dell'Ufficio di S. Giorgio (MCCCCLIII–MCCCCLXXV)*, 2 vols. (Genoa 1868–71) (*ASLSP* 6, 7/1), vol. 6, pp. 937–8 (no. 453).

would have compounded the problem. The family's exclusion from their former possessions may therefore be an illustration of the dangers of failing to maintain an adequate reputation as contributors to Christian defence, and thus of the advantages of the kind of efforts made by Gattilusio lords in earlier decades to burnish their credentials in that regard.¹²⁵

The Gattilusio embodied in a particularly intense form the contradictions with which the crusade confronted the Christian rulers of the Aegean. While all such rulers had far more to lose from Ottoman hegemony than the Christians of the west, and thus more to gain from concerted military action, their individual vulnerability deterred them from committing themselves to any such effort. Given the limitations of their own resources, even if they threw all their strength into an enterprise against the Ottomans the impact they could have on its success or failure would be very limited, and hardly worth the increased likelihood of retaliation. In the early years of their regime the involvement of the Gattilusio with collective Christian enterprises corresponded with the prospects for positive benefit from their success. However, with the passage of time their attachment to the crusade as a functional mechanism for improving their security was undermined by the redirection of crusading efforts and by the growth of Ottoman power and of their own vulnerability. Collective Christian efforts did however retain a hold on them as an expression of solidarity with Christendom. Their hopes for the crusade rested on the participation of others and it was the political effect on other Christians rather than the military effect on the Turks that chiefly governed the commitment of the Gattilusio to the causes of Latin Christendom. Until and unless security could be won for them by outside forces, the crusade remained more of an obligation than an opportunity, a duty to be discharged as circumspectly, defensively and inoffensively as possible. Nevertheless, the Gattilusio did manage for a time to maintain a remarkable balance between solidarity within Christendom and positive engagement with the Turks. While the Aegean world contained both

¹²⁵ The possibility must however be acknowledged that the Gattilusio themselves showed little interest in regaining the islands. They may have preferred to concentrate their diminished resources on holding Lesbos, last and largest of their territories, and have feared that resuming responsibilities for lands taken from the Ottomans by force would provoke redoubled Turkish aggression. Both the costs of defence and the fear of attracting Ottoman hostility against their existing possessions were cited by the Protectors of the *Casa* in refusing the pope's offer.

unbending crusaders such as the Hospitallers and unabashed Ottoman clients such as Giovanni Adorno, there were few so deeply involved in the crusade as the Gattilusio who also enjoyed such favour with the Turks, and few so friendly with the Ottomans who gained such prominence in the common enterprises of Christendom. In this their regime may once more be said to have been unusually typical of the place and time to which it belonged.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE TURKS: SECURITY AND SUBMISSION

The Ottoman Turks formed the newest of the major forces whose influence encompassed the Gattilusio. Whereas the importance of Byzantium, Genoa and the crusading movement in the affairs of the Aegean dated back long before the Fourth Crusade, the Turks had become an established presence on its shores only in the late thirteenth century, while the explosive transformation of the region by the Ottomans corresponded almost exactly to the period of Gattilusio rule. It is the process of Ottoman expansion which chiefly distinguishes the later period in the life of the fragmented Aegean to which the Gattilusio lordships belong from the decades following the Fourth Crusade. Of all the networks in which the Gattilusio played a part, their relationship with the Turks was the one subject to greatest change over the decades, as the balance of power among the continental Muslim powers swung violently and the ambitions of the maturing Ottoman state developed. The Ottoman polity had begun as a loose-knit warband whose leader was severely dependent on the goodwill of followers large and small; during the period of Gattilusio rule it was transformed into a centralised autocratic empire.¹ In this it differed markedly from the other major networks with which the Gattilusio were entangled, which either had always been or were increasingly becoming diffuse, associative structures. The Ottomans' success in defying the fragmentary norms of the Aegean world, to which Latin, Byzantine and Slavic contenders since 1204 had all succumbed, enabled them to transform the dynamics of that world and initiate a new era of political integration. The interactions of the Gattilusio with the Ottomans constitute a test case of the extent to which rulers closely attuned to the multi-faceted world of the Aegean could adapt to the rise of a power so fundamentally and fatally antithetical to it.

The establishment of the Gattilusio lordships and the critical turning-point in the emergence of Ottoman power were intertwined, both being

¹ Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: the construction of the Ottoman State* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London 1995), pp. 122–54; Daniel Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge 2002), pp. 27–54.

prompted directly or indirectly by the earthquake of 1354. Their ready access to the militarily vulnerable and ideologically appealing hunting grounds of the Balkans enabled the Ottomans to transform themselves from one among many similar Anatolian emirates into a power capable of overwhelming all their Turkish competitors and uniting the forces of Turkish Anatolia, a process which in turn strengthened them against their Christian adversaries. This process of mutually reinforcing expansion on both sides of the Aegean reached a climax in the reign of Mehmed II. The capture of Constantinople and the subsequent extirpation of the surviving remnants of the Byzantine world set the seal on the Ottoman conquest of the bulk of the Balkans and Anatolia and their state's evolution into an empire. The destruction of the Gattilusio lordships formed a part of the wave of annexations on various fronts which followed the fall of Constantinople and encapsulated the transition from one phase of expansion to another. The formation of the Ottoman Empire was thus the grand narrative within which the story of the Gattilusio lordships was played out and which sealed the fate of the world which they exemplified. In the course of this process the entanglement of the Gattilusio in the networks of influence of their Islamic neighbours was deepened and reshaped by the consolidation of military and economic power in the hands of the Ottomans.

Forces of Attraction and Repulsion

The exceptional strength, organisational centralism and aggressive expansionism of the Ottomans set them apart from the other networks of power with which the Gattilusio lordships were most closely connected, by introducing more potent pressures against integration. Whereas the likelihood of those other authorities coercing the Gattilusio, making exorbitant material demands or interfering in their internal affairs was small, the Ottomans possessed both the power and inclination to do so, creating a compelling incentive to avoid being too deeply drawn into their orbit. Thus while in other cases the forces of attraction were left to work relatively unimpeded, where the Turks were concerned they had to compete with strong countervailing urges to escape domination, heightened by religious antagonism.

Conversely, the nature of the pressures in favour of engagement with the Ottomans or with other Muslim powers were clearly distinguished from those applying to Christian networks. The latter could variously

attract the lordships through the impetus of cultural and religious loyalty, political legitimation, familial affiliation and mutual defence. Where the Turks were concerned the allure of solidarity was absent; in its place was the negative pressure of military power which jeopardised Gattilusio territories and their trade. However, this was accompanied by more positive incentives, chiefly the commercial opportunities in the gift of Turkish rulers, perhaps accompanied by the possibility of cooperation against common enemies. It is clear that the Gattilusio lords made positive efforts over the decades to cultivate good relations with Muslim neighbours rather than simply bowing to demands for submission as and when this was unavoidable. This means of pursuing survival and advantage formed an uneasy counterpart to their participation in common Christian defensive efforts, while reflecting similarly ambivalent calculations on the part of Byzantium and smoothly fitting in with the attitudes and practices of the Genoese community.

As was natural for an imperial power in the Islamic tradition, the characteristic feature of the network of Ottoman influence which extended beyond the territories and people under their direct control was the payment of tribute. This provided a concrete form for the acknowledgement of Ottoman supremacy, satisfied religious requirements for the treatment of infidels and provided a mechanism for the indirect exploitation of revenues. Tribute could be extracted from rulers whom the Ottoman state was not able or not yet at liberty to conquer. This brought them many of the benefits of direct rule and laid the groundwork for the future establishment of that control by sapping the resources of tributaries, undermining their prestige and morale and establishing habits of submission and obedience.² On occasion, the maintenance of tributaries might be considered preferable to direct rule, saving the expenses of military occupation and administration and avoiding the harm which conquest might inflict on the wealth-generating capacities of particularly productive groups. The obvious examples of this sort of community were the Latin traders, whose commercial skills and networks maximised the proceeds of their enterprises, potentially bringing greater revenues to the Ottoman state through indirect exploitation than it would be able to generate if it took charge directly. The weight which such considerations could

² Halil Inalcik, 'Ottoman methods of conquest', *Studia Islamica*, 2 (1954), pp. 104–29, reprinted in *The Ottoman Empire: conquest, organization and economy* (London 1978), I, pp. 103–7; John Fine, *The Late Medieval Balkans: a critical survey from the late twelfth century to the Ottoman conquest* (Ann Arbor 1987), pp. 608–9.

carry with the Ottomans is illustrated by the example of the Ragusan republic, which the Ottomans allowed to survive as a tributary state for centuries after their conquest of the surrounding area.³ However, the case of the Genoese ultimately tested the limits of the Ottoman willingness to leave their tributaries in place, and the Gattilusio were among the principal victims.

Latins might also be drawn into the Ottoman network as providers of services, selling military, commercial or other skills and resources. A state as powerful and successful as that of the Ottomans had a great deal to offer those who supplied its requirements. Some individual Latins became fully integrated into the Ottoman system as servants of the sultan, such as the Genoese Maneo, who was admiral of Gallipoli in 1441.⁴ Others engaged with the Ottomans in a more limited fashion while participating simultaneously in Christian networks. The usefulness of Latin business acumen encouraged the Ottomans to farm out sources of revenues such as tax collection and the exploitation of mineral deposits to Italians, especially the Genoese. Their maritime capabilities also enabled Latins to make advantageous deals for the provision of naval assistance or the transport of troops, at times when the Ottomans found their own resources wanting. These opportunities were seized upon by entrepreneurs whose fortunes relied on close collaboration with the Turks, exemplified by Genoese merchant princes such as Giovanni Adorno and Francesco Draperio.⁵

The Genoese were indeed the Latin group most prominent for their engagement with the Ottomans in the period before the fall of Constantinople. The commune had established relations with the Ottoman emirate at a very early stage and it tended to enjoy better terms with them than did most Christian powers. Besides the frequency with which Genoese individuals entered Ottoman service, the Genoese were the object of considerable criticism in the Christian world for collusion with Turkish forces. The willingness of Genoese captains to provide them with transport across

³ Robin Harris, *Dubrovnik: a history* (London 2003), pp. 77–122; Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1916* (Cambridge 1994), pp. 256–65, 510–2.

⁴ ASV, DC 2/18 (*Diversorum Locorum* 1441–2), f. 19^v.

⁵ Doukas, *Ducas Istoria Turco-Bizantina* (1341–1462), ed. Vasile Grecu (Bucharest 1958), pp. 209–11, 225–7, 405–11; Enrico Basso, 'Genovesi e Turchi nell'Egeo medievale: Murad II e la "Societas Folie Nove"', *Quaderni Medievale* 36 (1993), pp. 31–52, reprinted in *Genova: un impero sul mare*, (Cagliari 1994), pp. 63–84; Giustina Olgiati, 'Il commercio dell'allume nei domini dei Gattilusio nel XV secolo', *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οι Γατελούζοι της Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 373–398 at pp. 373–86.

the straits at critical moments and the alleged collusion of the Genoese of Pera with the besiegers of Constantinople in 1453 were particular targets for denunciation.⁶ It was natural that mercantile communities should be foremost among the Christian groups from outside Turkish territory who were attracted into the Ottoman network. Besides their particular usefulness to the Turks, the interests of maritime, commercial groups were potentially complementary with those of largely land-bound territorial rulers, whereas the interests of each type of power tended to clash with foreign powers of their own type.

The compliant attitude of so many Genoese towards the Ottomans need not imply a substantially greater collective sympathy with them than was present among comparable Latin groups, and the commune and its citizens at times contributed to undertakings against the Turks. The regularity of cooperation with the Ottomans may be attributed in large part to the weakness of communal control and the importance of individual initiative in Genoese affairs. This reduced the scope for collective self-interest or ideological commitments dictating opposition to the Ottomans to counteract individual self-interest impelling towards cooperation. The strong centralised government of Venice could more effectively enforce policies such as blockades of the straits against Ottoman traffic, whereas those Genoese who were tempted by the rewards of working with the Ottomans could usually avoid any meaningful restraint from the commune.⁷ The willingness of the Gattilusio to engage positively with the Ottomans, even while participating at times in undertakings against them, was therefore characteristic of the community from which they came. Their travails after 1453 were likewise in keeping with the experience of their compatriots, as the former amicability of relations with the Ottomans faltered and Genoa's colonial domains were steadily dismantled. Like the Genoese colonies and commercial interests in the Black Sea, the Gattilusio lordships fell victim to the dwindling martial strength of the Genoese commune and to their geographical situation within a sphere

⁶ Pope Pius II, *Der Briefwechsel des Eneas Silvius Piccolomini*, ed. Rudolf Wolkan (Vienna 1909), pp. 562–79 (no. 192); *idem, Opera quae extant omnia*, ed. Marcus Hopper (Basle 1551, reprinted Frankfurt 1967), p. 398; Kate Fleet, 'The treaty of 1387 between Murad I and the Genoese', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies University of London* 56 (1993), pp. 13–33 at pp. 21–3; Basso, 'Genovesi e Turchi', pp. 38–49; Jacques Paviot, 'Gênes et les Turcs (1444, 1453): sa défense contre les accusations d'une entente', *SG* 9 (1989), pp. 129–37.

⁷ See above, pp. 129–32.

which the Ottomans now sought to dominate completely. This negated the impact of any goodwill accumulated over the preceding decades.

While strategic geography was a critical factor in shaping the collective relationship of the Gattilusio lordships with the Turks, it also led to variations in the way in which Turkish power impinged on lordships. The key distinction was that between insular and continental holdings. If the Italian republics and their colonial offshoots may be considered intrinsically maritime powers and the Turks fundamentally terrestrial, the islands under Latin rule lay fully within their own sphere while their enclaves on continental coasts were protrusions into the world where the Turks held sway. All the factors which served to draw Latin rulers into a Turkish sphere of influence operated more forcefully there than on the islands, and continental commitments served to draw island rulers more deeply into Turkish networks.

The pressures encouraging the Gattilusio to come to an accommodation with the Ottomans specifically bore most forcefully upon the lordship of Ainos. Besides the lordship's acute exposure to Ottoman military power, the Thracian coast and the basin of the Maritza, which together with the adjacent islands formed the natural hinterland of Ainos, were under consistent Ottoman control throughout the period of Gattilusio rule.⁸ More than any other Latin domain of the period, its fate rested in the hands of the Ottomans, who could influence it both negatively through threats to the city or its trade and positively through the deepening of economic ties. The importance of the Thracian hinterland both as a source for goods exported through Ainos and a market for its own produce, notably salt, deepened the dependence of the city's welfare on the goodwill of its continental neighbours.⁹ The interest of the lords of Ainos in ensuring the smooth continuation of such trade must have combined with the vulnerability of the lordship to produce particularly firm ties to the Ottomans. It is notable that before the 1450s there is no evidence of any military or piratical action against the Ottomans emanating from the lordship of Ainos, with the exception of the dubious testimony of the sixteenth-century Barberini Chronicle that Mustafa and Juneid received support from Ainos against Murad II.¹⁰ This contrasts with the behaviour of the lordship of Mytilene and with the involvement of Ainos

⁸ See above, p. 325.

⁹ See above, pp. 206–10.

¹⁰ *Χρονικὸν περὶ τῶν Τούρκων σουλτάνων*, ed. Georgios Zoras (Athens 1958), p. 58.

in conflict with other groups.¹¹ The corresponding absence from the record of any mention of Turkish attacks against Ainos before the eventual conquest of the lordship in 1456, and its lengthy survival in such close proximity to the centres of Ottoman power, render it an illustration of Ottoman willingness to indulge the survival of Christian rulers.

Similar pressures applied with regard to Old Phokaia. They must have impinged on the senior lordship, given their proximity and economic links, and the fact that apart from the few years when Dorino Gattilusio held Old Phokaia as a distinct lordship it was directly subject to Mytilene. In addition to its potential for profit, the food production of Anatolia was also a potentially critical source of supply for the islands, Lesbos included. Here again the combination of military vulnerability and commercial interest impelled engagement with Muslim neighbours. However, in contrast to the case of Ainos this did not necessarily mean engagement with the Ottomans, since for the majority of the life-span of the lordship of Mytilene other Muslim rulers continued to contest control of western Anatolia. The political upheavals of Anatolia hindered the consolidation and deepening of links with any one power. However, much of the essential character of the interaction remained the same regardless of shifting political circumstances. Christian maritime powers commanding powerful fleets but little strength on land confronted Muslim continental powers possessing powerful armies but little commercial expertise and a naval capacity normally limited to raiding. Apart from the Christian occupation of the port of Smyrna between 1344 and 1402 and the establishment of a Hospitaller enclave at Bodrum in the early fifteenth century, the territorial balance also remained unchanged from the early fourteenth century until the 1450s.¹² The islands remained under Christian control and the continent in Turkish hands, but with the enclave of Phokaia as an enduring exception to this demarcation.

As a result, considerable continuity was possible despite the numerous changes of regime on both sides of the divide. Doukas claims that an agreement guaranteeing peace and unmolested trade between Phokaia and its Turkish neighbours and imposing an annual tribute of 15,000 silver coins had been contracted between Saruchan and the Zaccaria or Cattaneo,

¹¹ See above, pp. 54–7.

¹² Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204–1571)*, 4 vols. (Philadelphia 1976–84), vol. 1, pp. 190–223, 239–40, 247; Joseph Delaville le Roulx, *Les Hospitaliers à Rhodes (1310–1421)* (Paris 1913, reprinted London 1974), pp. 287–90.

and that it was still in force at the time of writing, over 150 years later.¹³ Whether or not the continuity was as straightforward as Doukas suggests, relations between the successive rulers of Phokaia and their respective Turkish neighbours appear to have been as peaceful as those enjoyed by Ainos, in contrast to the perennially embattled enclave at Smyrna. The Ottomans were the inheritors of a long-standing accommodation cutting across the religious and geographical boundaries, which lasted until Mehmed II seized both Old and New Phokaia in 1455. This illustrates how structures of interaction could endure amidst the political instability of the fragmented Aegean but prove unable to make the transition to the new age heralded by the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople.

Turkish Division and Unification

The engagement of the Gattilusio with the Turks was not confined to the question of how they approached a monolithic Ottoman superpower. From Francesco I's establishment in Mytilene until the 1420s, with a brief interruption during the reign of Bayezid, the power of Ottoman rulers within the Aegean world was opposed by other Muslim powers. The other emirates established during the Turkish conquest of western Anatolia, the Mongol conqueror Timur, the Smyrniote warlord Juneid, rebellious sects and rivals within their own dynasty all contested Ottoman supremacy. These presented rulers such as the Gattilusio with a choice of competing powers with whom they might engage, enabling them to negotiate for their support and exercise preferences for continuity or change, for a balance of power or a partnership with a single dominant power.

During its early decades the lordship of Mytilene confronted a Turkish world in western Anatolia which retained the shape which had arisen out of the collapse of Byzantine power in the coastal plain. There is limited evidence of peaceful interaction between the lordship of Mytilene and the Anatolian Turks before the first Ottoman conquest of the region, though some trade in slaves is attested.¹⁴ When describing the obligation of the lordship of Mytilene to patrol the surrounding waters and warn the neighbouring Turks of Catalan raiders, on pain of paying the cost of damages done, Doukas says that this had been an obligation of the

¹³ Doukas, p. 207.

¹⁴ See above, pp. 212–3.

inhabitants of Lesbos 'from the beginning' ('ἐξ ἀρχῆς').¹⁵ It is unclear what is meant by this and therefore whether this was an arrangement first contracted by the Ottomans or whether they had inherited a commitment extracted by their predecessors in the region, as in the case of the tribute obligations of Phokaia.¹⁶

Evidence of conflict is rather clearer. One or more of the emirates had apparently attacked Lesbos before 1372, but the threat they posed to their island neighbours was not as great as that of the Ottomans would become in later decades.¹⁷ For his part, Francesco's robust approach towards his Turkish neighbours is first visible in his instigation of John V's arrest of the emir aiding him in his campaign against John Kalothetos in 1357.¹⁸ It also appears that he took direct military action against the emirates, in the light of Gregory XI's commendation of his efforts in defence of the Christian enclave at Smyrna.¹⁹ His opponents there are unknown but probably to be identified with the emirate of Aydin, the immediate neighbour of the Christians of Smyrna. The impression therefore emerges that Francesco was engaged in significant offensive and defensive warfare against the Anatolian emirates during these years, in addition to his participation in Amadeo of Savoy's capture of Gallipoli from the Ottomans in 1366. In eulogising him Kydones described how Turks, Syrians, and Egyptians had been so terrorised by Francesco's attacks that they paid him tribute.²⁰ While rhetorical embellishment is likely, this image of Francesco's relations with Muslim powers is more reminiscent of the activities of Martino Zaccaria, who in the 1320s had harried the Turks of the Anatolian shore and extracted tribute from them, than of the more circumspect approach of subsequent lords of Mytilene.²¹ Whether or not such hostilities were the norm, it seems likely that they were more prevalent during this

¹⁵ Doukas, pp. 415–7.

¹⁶ The stretch of coast involved is described as running from Assos to the River Kaikos. Doukas elsewhere describes Assos as marking the northern frontier of the emirate of Saruchan, and this may suggest that that emirate originally imposed the obligation, although the Kaikos was not far enough south for this area to correspond to the entire coastline of Saruchan. Doukas, pp. 33–5.

¹⁷ See below, p. 369.

¹⁸ See above, pp. 40–1.

¹⁹ ASVat, RV 270, f. 63^v; above, p. 329.

²⁰ Demetrios Kydones, *Démétrius Cydones Correspondance*, ed. Raymond-Joseph Loenertz, 2 vols. (Vatican 1956–60), vol. 2, pp. 190–2 (no. 273).

²¹ Nikephoros Gregoras, *Nicephori Gregorae Historiae Byzantinae*, ed. Immanuel Bekker and Ludwig Schopen, 3 vols. (Bonn 1829–55), CSHB 12, 14, 15, vol. 1, pp. 438–9; Paul Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydin, Byzance et l'Occident: recherches sur 'La geste de Umur Pacha'* (Paris 1957), pp. 53–4.

period than they would become during the years of Ottoman supremacy on the Anatolian littoral. There had been little time for the development of mutually beneficial relationships straddling the cultural divide, while the emirates could also offer less impressive incentives and threaten less intimidating recriminations than the more formidable Ottoman regime which displaced them.

During the later years of Francesco I and the reign of Francesco II the circumstances shaping the relationship of the Gattilusio with their continental neighbours altered dramatically. Their acquisition of continental ports at Ainos and Old Phokaia expanded the family's opportunities to profit from the import and export trades of Turkish territories in Thrace and western Anatolia, while at the same time leaving them more exposed to Turkish reprisals. Meanwhile, the unification of the entire western coastal plain of Anatolia under Ottoman rule abruptly brought to the eastern Aegean the same transformation which had been underway in the north since 1354. However aggressive they might be at times, the political fragmentation of the Turks had hitherto placed them in a situation comparable with that of their divided Christian neighbours, rendering them more manageable. Individual rulers controlled only a fraction of the territories and resources on their side of the divide between Christian and Muslim, land and sea. All were liable to be hamstrung in their confrontations with one another by rivalry with their own co-religionists. Each could shift their economic and military favours from one partner to another and thus minimise the damage of a rupture in relations or extract better terms from their partners. The transformation of this field for diplomatic manoeuvre into a political monopoly on the Muslim side left the Christians alone afflicted by the exigencies of fragmentation. The range of means that had been available to them for the pursuit of commercial interests on the continent was drastically reduced to dependence on a single asset, the goodwill of the Ottoman sultan. While this development was to be temporarily reversed in the wake of the Battle of Ankara in 1402, it set the pattern for what would follow as Ottoman power revived. The Ottomans actively exploited their advantages by manipulating Latin trade in their territories in a manner exceeding anything attempted by their predecessors.²² There now existed a huge, coherent and sophisticated Turkish political system which could encompass and shape the maritime

²² Kate Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade in the Early Islamic State: the merchants of Genoa and Turkey* (Cambridge 1999), pp. 68–70.

domains of the Aegean, with great powers of both attraction and coercion at its disposal. Unless the strength of the Ottomans could somehow be broken, only an accommodation with them could safeguard the prosperity, and perhaps the survival, of their island neighbours.

The extent to which this shift in the balance of power was accompanied by an escalation of the military threat to the islands is unclear. Bayezid's ferocious offensives in Anatolia and the Balkans were not accompanied by a clear challenge for domination of the sea of the sort that would be mounted by Mehmed II when Ottoman power again reached a similar pitch. However, even those who could not exert durable power across the sea could traverse it for the purpose of raiding. When Gregory XI issued invitations in 1372 to numerous eastern Christian rulers to meet at Thebes to discuss the Turkish threat, the letter dispatched to Francesco of Mytilene diverged from the standard form in saying that the infidel 'ferociter terram tuam et alias partes Christianorum obsidet impugnat et invadit'.²³ It is not specified which Turkish group or groups were responsible for these attacks. However, according to the later testimony of Chalkokondyles, the lord of Mytilene was compelled to pay tribute by Ottoman attacks launched against Lesbos in the reign of Murad I, including an unsuccessful siege of Methymna.²⁴ If correct, this would indicate a serious increase in the pressure which the Ottomans could now exert on the Gattilusio even in their island stronghold.

Further pressure was exerted on the island rulers by Murad's successor Bayezid, who added economic warfare to the Ottoman repertoire through his grain embargo, imposed in 1394 and maintained until his downfall in 1402.²⁵ This policy graphically illustrates the impact of Murad

²³ ASVat, RV 268, f. 85^v-6; Guillaume Mollat, *Lettres secrètes et curiales du pape Grégoire XI intéressant les pays autres que la France*, 3 vols. (Paris 1962-65) at vol. 1, p. 161 (no. 1166); Raymond-Joseph Loenertz, 'Athènes et Néopatras: regestes et notices pour servir à l'histoire des duchés catalans (1311-1394)', *Byzantina et Franco-Graeca*, 2 vols. (Rome 1970-8), vol. 2, pp. 183-393 at pp. 371-2 (no. 176). The letters sent to Venice and the Emperor John V alluded to the existence of threats to their own territories (ASVat, RV 268, f. 86-7, 88^v-9). However, the only other letters to mention attacks on the recipient as a present reality were that sent to the Duchy of Athens and Thebes, whose complaints of recent Ottoman assaults prompted the summoning of this conference, and possibly also those to the Duchy's immediate neighbours Corinth and Boudonitza (ASVat, RV 268, f. 85^v-9, 94^v-5^v).

²⁴ Laonikos Chalkokondyles, *Laonici Chalcocondylae Historiarum Demonstrationes*, ed. Eugenius Darkó, 2 vols. (Budapest 1922-7), p. 268.

²⁵ Doukas, p. 75; Hippolyte Noiret, *Documents inédits pour servir à l'histoire de la domination vénitienne en Crète, de 1380 à 1485* (Paris 1892), pp. 36, 46, 74, 110-1; Kate Fleet, 'Ottoman grain exports from western Anatolia at the end of the fourteenth century', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 40/3 (1997), pp. 283-94.

and Bayezid's rapid conquest of their Turkish rivals on the Christians of the eastern Aegean. The drastic rise in grain prices in the region in the 1390s and their swift collapse when the embargo was broken after the Battle of Ankara are indicative of the far-reaching impact of this interruption of supply from a major exporting region.²⁶ The effect of the ban on the islands along the Anatolian shore must have been especially acute, since under normal circumstances the adjacent mainland was the obvious source for whatever cereal imports they required. Indeed, these islands are singled out by Doukas as the particular object of Bayezid's policy.²⁷ Just how severe the impact upon them was is unclear, as is the extent to which such a sweeping measure could be used to exert pressure on particular rulers. It would only provide an incentive for them to make concessions to the Ottomans if this led to a resumption of exports. Yet allowing such exemptions from the ban to compliant rulers had the potential to undermine it altogether, enabling defiant regimes to gain indirect access to Anatolian grain.

Whatever the roles played by these different methods in influencing the behaviour of the Gattilusio, it is clear that by the later 1390s they had been convinced of the necessity of conceding certain Ottoman demands. Besides the monetary tribute referred to by Chalkokondyles, the obligations for which the Gattilusio had become liable included providing advance warning of hostile fleets, leading to the tortuous, contradictory position adopted by Francesco II towards Boucicault's expedition in 1399.²⁸ This requirement to patrol and warn of seaborne threats, mentioned

²⁶ Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, 'Prix et marchés des céréales en Roumanie (1343–1405)', *Nuova Rivista Storica* 61 (1977), pp. 291–305, reprinted in *Romania and the Turks (c. 1300–c. 1500)* (London 1985), IX, pp. 298–9, 303–6.

²⁷ This interpretation may be the result of preoccupation with the fortunes of his own native region, which unsurprisingly occupies a prominent position in his history. The embargo was an indiscriminate weapon with the potential to harm many of the Christian powers of the East. Grain from Phokaia served markets from Genoa to Constantinople and Cyprus (see above, p. 209), while the exports of Theologo and Palatia (Ephesos and Miletos) were of considerable importance to Venice (Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade: Venetian Crete and the emirates of Menteshe and Aydin (1300–1415)* (Venice 1983), pp. 163–4, 187–9, 195–200, 211–6, 219–39 (nos. 1, 3, 6, 8–10); Jacques Heers, *Gênes au XV^e Siècle: activité économique et problèmes sociaux* (Paris 1961), pp. 341–4). It is therefore hard to discern whether Bayezid had a particular target or group of targets in mind, and it seems likely that his initiative was directed quite indiscriminately against the Christian marketiers and consumers of the Anatolian crop, any of whom were realistic objects of his aggressive intentions. The fact remains that Lesbos, Chios, Rhodes and their attendant territories were especially susceptible to the resultant hardships.

²⁸ *Le livre des fais du bon Messire Jehan le Maingre, dit Bouciquaut, Mareschal de France et Gouverneur de Jennes*, ed. Denis Lalande (Geneva 1985), pp. 135–8; above, pp. 51, 332–3.

again in the 1450s, is the only regular military or naval service attested as part of the tributary obligations of the Gattilusio lords, whether in the fourteenth or the fifteenth century.²⁹ When in 1462 Niccolò II made a last-ditch effort to negotiate his retention in power in exchange for submitting to increased obligations, his offer was that he would pay the sultan half his revenues and do military service on demand.³⁰ This indicates that he had not hitherto been subject to such a requirement.

Such a situation contrasts markedly with the obligation on the Ottomans' Christian tributaries in the Balkans to provide auxiliary contingents for Ottoman armies, typically being required to lead these forces in person or send a family member to do so.³¹ It is however in keeping with the position of other island tributaries such as the Mahona of Chios or the Dukes of the Archipelago. The Ottomans made use of the naval capacities of the islanders against their Turkish rivals on specific occasions, on the basis of negotiated deals.³² However, they did not apparently compel them to fight on land, nor, except in the imposition of obligations to patrol, did they use the tribute system as a regular source of naval power. This may reflect the lack of a permanent and powerful Ottoman navy before the time of Mehmed II. On land the preponderant power of the sultan's Muslim forces must have underpinned the reliability of Christian tributary contingents and reduced the likelihood of disaster if they should prove treacherous. At sea, where Latin Christian forces were dominant in both quantity and quality, while the sultans' own naval resources were still fluctuating and brittle, it would have been much less safe for an Ottoman fleet to go into battle trusting to the loyalty of tributary auxiliaries.

The efforts of the Gattilusio to placate the Ottomans in this period may have been prompted by aggression and coercion, but they apparently went beyond acceding to direct demands to include deliberate cultivation of goodwill. The means by which this was pursued are unknown, but Froissart's asserts that Francesco II enjoyed Bayezid's favour, and this finds corroboration in Francesco's ability to secure special treatment for Enguerrand de Coucy. This suggests that he had secured some kind of place within the Ottoman system, and a more favourable one than that

²⁹ Doukas, pp. 415–7.

³⁰ Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, p. 272.

³¹ Fine, pp. 382, 407, 412, 419–22, 426, 499–500, 505–10, 521–2, 528, 556, 560, 608; Donald M. Nicol, *The Last Centuries of Byzantium 1261–1453* (London 1972), pp. 275–7, 289–93, 297.

³² See above, pp. 58–60.

of a mere cowed tributary.³³ It is not clear how long the Gattilusio succeeded in maintaining this status, but the fact that it is attested shortly after Francesco's own participation in the Crusade of Nikopolis is remarkable. So is his evident belief that he could send forces against the Ottomans once again in 1399 without wrecking his relationship with the sultan. Had he not believed this, he would hardly have sought to balance his contribution to the expedition with a warning of its approach.

Besides his relationship with the sultan himself, Francesco II seems to have developed understandings with local representatives of Ottoman power. In 1394 Antonio Leardo, an envoy of the *podestà* of Pera, negotiated a seven-year peace treaty between the captain of the Christian garrison of the port of Smyrna and the Turkish *subaşı* who controlled the acropolis, who may be identified as Juneid's father Ibrahim. Under this settlement the captain agreed to release the two sons of the *subaşı* whom he had in his custody, while the *subaşı* would deposit treasure worth 10,000 ducats on Chios as surety. In the event of the *subaşı* failing to fulfill his commitment, the captain would have the right to redress from Leardo and from the lord of Mytilene; conversely, should the captain contravene the agreement, the same pair would be entitled to seek redress on the *subaşı*'s behalf.³⁴ The central role of the *podestà* of Pera's representative indicates that there was some Genoese interest in securing a settlement. However, the fact that it was soon wrecked when the *podestà* of Chios refused to accept custody of the *subaşı*'s deposit suggests that support for the deal was not universal among the Genoese. As the broker of the deal, Leardo's acceptance of liabilities and rights on the *subaşı*'s behalf is fairly unremarkable. However, the willingness of Francesco II Gattilusio to take responsibility for the conduct of this Ottoman governor is striking, as is the willingness of the *subaşı* to trust Francesco to assert his rights against other Latins. It is hard to account for this except in the context of a cordial relationship between the two.

Further evidence of Ottoman goodwill towards the Gattilusio, and of the benefits that might accrue from it, may be provided by an incident relating to Bayezid's grain embargo. Naturally, those afflicted by the ban sought to substitute the supplies which were now unavailable to

³³ Jean Froissart, *Oeuvres de Froissart*, ed. Joseph M. B. C. Kervyn de Lettenhove, 29 vols. (Brussels 1870), vol. 15, pp. 345, 347, vol. 16, p. 38.

³⁴ Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade*, pp. 161–9 (nos. 4–7); *eadem*, 'Turkish-Latin relations at the end of the fourteenth century', *Acta Orientalia Academia Scientiarum Hungaricae* 49 (1996), pp. 131–7.

them. In 1398 the *podestà* of Chios Francesco Giustiniani sent Domenico Giustiniani with two galleys to buy grain at Mytilene, where he negotiated the purchase of 200 *modioi*.³⁵ The document specifies that this grain originated from 'Turchia'. This indicates that seven or eight years after the imposition of the ban and more than four years before its collapse, Anatolian grain was reaching the markets of Mytilene, where grain was evidently abundant enough at this time to permit its re-export.³⁶ This may simply reflect the inevitably imperfect application of Bayezid's prohibition, although this had evidently not enabled Chios to satisfy its requirements directly from the mainland. A more intriguing possibility is that Francesco II Gattilusio had been able to circumvent the ban through his influence with the sultan or with his subordinates in western Anatolia. In this context it is notable that one of the merchants who sold the grain was Morruale Doria, Francesco II's relative by marriage and a sometime representative of Niccolò of Ainos, while the other was Giuliano Gattilusio, a member of a branch of the Gattilusio *albergo* that was closely associated with the lords of Mytilene.³⁷ These two would therefore have been in an exceptionally good position to benefit from whatever personal advantages Francesco enjoyed in dealing with the Turks, and may well have been acting on his behalf. If Francesco was able to secure an exemption from the grain embargo, however restricted and unofficial this may have been, this would be compelling evidence of the favour he had secured with the rulers of the Ottoman state.

If they regarded their apparent friendship with the new hegemon as sustainable, the Gattilusio must have felt particularly intense pressure to avoid causing offence, sharing none of the resolve which others may have drawn from a conviction that Ottoman triumph would bring their ruin. From this perspective their apparent ambivalence about military action against the Ottomans is less striking than the degree to which they continued to nonetheless continued to take part.³⁸ This willingness to risk enraging a power which seemed to be on the cusp of overwhelming dominance of the region implies a degree of scepticism about the long-term viability of their relationship with the Ottomans. The consequences

³⁵ Domenico Gioffrè, 'Atti rogati in Chio nella seconda metà del XIV secolo', *Bulletin de l'Institut Historique Belge de Rome* 34 (1962), pp. 319–404 at pp. 401–3.

³⁶ The lordship of Mytilene was also in a position to supply grain to Constantinople during this period. Joan Bogdan, 'Ein Beitrag zur bulgarischen und serbischen Geschichtsschreibung', *Archiv für slavische Philologie* 13 (1891), pp. 481–543 at p. 542; above, p. 332.

³⁷ See above, pp. 165–6, 168, 170n151, 175, 197, 200–1.

³⁸ See above, pp. 329–34.

for the Gattiluso of the eventual attainment of that Ottoman hegemony suggest that they would have been right to entertain such doubts, but Bayezid's supremacy was cut short too soon for any firm conclusions to be drawn about his ultimate intentions for his new island tributaries.

Ottoman Crisis and Recovery

Whatever calculations the Gattiluso had made during the explosive burst of Ottoman expansion directed by Bayezid, the aftermath of the Battle of Ankara in 1402 demanded a new approach to the lordships' relations with their Muslim neighbours. The prospect of incipient political unification which the Ottomans had presented receded abruptly, but it did not give place to a simple reassertion of the fragmentation which had preceded their rise. While many of the dispossessed emirs or their heirs swiftly reestablished themselves in their old territories, they did so initially under the patronage of Timur. In the months following the battle, it must have seemed highly plausible that Ottoman supremacy would be replaced by that of the conqueror from Samarkand. Meanwhile, the Ottomans retained control of almost all of their European territories and much of Anatolia, albeit divided between Bayezid's sons. Hence, while the destruction or permanent disintegration of the Ottoman state seemed possible, it was clear that if one claimant could eliminate his rivals a swift re-assertion of Ottoman dominance was also a realistic prospect.

The result was an extremely volatile and unpredictable situation in which the Christian rulers of the region, individually and collectively, faced a perplexing array of options. Having been given a foretaste of what the dominance of a single Muslim power might mean, they could seek to prevent any return to that situation by supporting weaker rulers against stronger ones in order to further and prolong the state of division. Alternatively, they might accept the likelihood that the consolidation of the region under a single Islamic ruler would soon resume, or at least concede that there was little they could do to alter the outcome, and seek to align themselves with the contender they thought most likely to triumph. Besides such strategic calculations, the frenetic struggle for Bayezid's inheritance offered the possibility of making overtures to multiple contenders, reducing the risks of backing the wrong one and enabling concessions to be extracted from each.

The available evidence suggests that Francesco II of Mytilene initially formed part of a connection opposed to Suleiman, the son of Bayezid who

took control of the Ottoman territories in Europe after the battle, and who to begin with enjoyed the strongest position among the Ottoman princes.³⁹ In December 1402, the Venetian government replied to an embassy from Suleiman urging Manuel II's swift return to Constantinople. They reassured Suleiman that Manuel was already on his way, and on arrival would put a stop to the intrigues of John VII and the Genoese.⁴⁰ It is not specified what these objectionable plans or actions were, but while it was natural for Venice to be suspicious of the activities of the Genoese, and Manuel of those of his nephew, the message implies that Suleiman shared their concern. This implies that the machinations in question were prejudicial to his interests. It is likely that any scheme concocted by John VII in collusion with the Genoese would have involved his father-in-law Francesco II Gattilusio, his closest Genoese connection and perennial accomplice. There may have been a third party to this combination. Suleiman had escaped from the battlefield with the help of the Serbian prince Stefan Lazarević, a tributary of Bayezid who had led a contingent to fight for his overlord against Timur.⁴¹ Both men quickly crossed the straits to Europe and Stefan stopped for a time in Pera and Constantinople. Despite his assistance in securing Suleiman's escape, from this point onwards Stefan was the target of immediate and sustained hostility from Suleiman, to which he responded in kind.⁴² It may not be coincidental that while on the Bosphorus Stefan had entered into some kind of understanding with John VII and Francesco Gattilusio. John awarded Stefan the title of despot over his territories, and arranged for him to marry Francesco's daughter Helena. Stefan then sailed from Constantinople to Lesbos to conclude the marriage.⁴³

³⁹ Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, 'Süleyman çelebi in Rumili and the Ottoman chronicles', *Der Islam: Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur des islamischen Orients* 60/2 (1983), pp. 268–96; Dimitris J. Kastritsis, *The Sons of Bayezid: empire building and representation in the Ottoman civil war of 1402–1413* (Leiden and Boston 2007), pp. 41–4, 50–1.

⁴⁰ ASV SMisti 46, f. 57^v; Nicolai Iorga, 'Notes et extraits pour servir à l'histoire des Croisades au XV^e siècle', *Revue de l'Orient Latin* 4, (1896), pp. 226–320, 503–622, vol. 5 (1897), pp. 108–212, 311–88, vol. 6 (1898), pp. 50–143, 370–434, vol. 7 (1899), pp. 38–107, 375–429, vol. 8 (1900–1), pp. 1–115 at vol. 4, pp. 257–8.

⁴¹ Doukas, pp. 93, 97; Maria M. Alexandrescu-Dersca, *La Campagne de Timour en Anatolie (1402)* (Bucharest 1942, reprinted London 1977), pp. 77–8.

⁴² Kastritsis, pp. 57–9, 124–6, 149–53.

⁴³ ASG, *SGCanc* (Sala 34) 590/1307 (*Pera Syndicamenta* 1403), f. 16; Iorga, 'Notes', vol. 4, p. 93; Alexandrescu-Dersca, pp. 132–3 (no. 3); Konstantin 'Filosof', *Zivot Stefana Lazarevića, Despota Srpskoga*, ed. Gordana Jovanović (Belgrade 2007), pp. 43–4; Ljubomir Stojanović, *Stari srpski rodoslavi i letopisi* (Sremski Karlovci 1927), p. 200, 218.

If John and his allies were plotting against Suleiman, it is reasonable to suppose that this would entail an alliance with one of his rivals. There is a considerable amount of evidence for dealings with the most powerful and dangerous contender for the Ottoman inheritance, Timur himself. In 1401–2, John VII and the Genoese had aligned themselves with Timur against the overweening power of Bayezid, offering him tribute and pledging to block Ottoman troop movements across the straits; Timur's standard was reportedly flown over Pera.⁴⁴ The disaster suffered by the Ottomans, the division of their forces between competing claimants and the prospect of Timur succeeding to their preeminence created a new political reality, superseding the calculations that had encouraged this alliance. This realignment undercut the incentives for cooperation with Timur against the common enemy, although increasing the importance of placating him. It also opened the prospect of advantageous settlements with the Ottoman contenders. However, it seems that the first recourse of John VII and the Genoese in the immediate aftermath of Ankara was further engagement with Timur. They responded to a call from him with an embassy in early September 1402, which included Byzantine and Genoese representatives but no Venetians. This apparently led to the conclusion of treaties involving the payment of tribute, while Timur was also reported to have demanded ships to ferry his forces across to Europe in pursuit of the Ottomans, and to have offered to lend John VII 5,000 soldiers to wage war against Suleiman.⁴⁵ In this context Suleiman's alarm at the schemes of John VII and the Genoese is unsurprising. If Stefan Lazarević's alliance with John and with Francesco Gattilusio involved him in this alignment with Timur, Suleiman's hostility to him is also readily explicable.

⁴⁴ Alexandrescu-Dersca, pp. 39–40, 52, 83–4, 123–4, 135–7 (nos. 1, 4–5); Giorgio and Giovanni Stella, *Annales Genuenses*, ed. Giovanna Petti Balbi (Bologna 1975), *RIS* n.s. 17/2, p. 260; Ruy Gonzales de Clavijo, *Embajada a Tamorlán*, ed. Francesco López Estrada (Madrid 1943), p. 93; John W. Barker, *Manuel II Palaeologus (1391–1425): A Study in Late Byzantine Statesmanship* (New Brunswick, New Jersey 1969), pp. 504–7.

⁴⁵ Alexandrescu-Dersca, pp. 86–7, 132, 138 (nos. 3, 6); Chalkokondyles, vol. 1, p. 149; Sheref ed-Din, *Histoire de Timurbec, connu sous le nom du grand Tamerlan, empereur des Mogoles et Tartares: en forme de journal historique de ses victoires et conquêtes dans l'Asie et dans l'Europe*, tr. Petit de la Croix, 4 vols. (Paris 1722), vol. 4, pp. 37–9; Barker, *Manuel*, pp. 507–8. Note that Barker is incorrect in stating that the report of Giovanni Cornaro refers to a demand from Timur that John VII should give him galleys and hand over Gallipoli, a place which Byzantium had not held for over a quarter of a century. The reference is actually to an offer from Suleiman to give his galleys, Gallipoli and other territories to the emperor in exchange for peace. Alexandrescu-Dersca, p. 127 (no. 2).

There is also direct evidence that Francesco sought during these months to deepen his relationship with the conqueror of Bayezid and incipient hegemon of Anatolia. As Timur's armies approached, both Old and New Phokaia sent embassies bearing gifts. This was a natural act of self-preservation in the face of such a fearful menace, and the emissaries succeeded in securing peace agreements. However, when a force commanded by Timur's grandson subsequently came close to Phokaia, Francesco took an initiative of his own, going in person to greet the Mongol commander and feast with him. At this meeting he received a 'σκήπτρον', which Doukas describes as a 'σημείον ἀγάπης', a symbol of friendship.⁴⁶ The word 'σκήπτρον' may denote a sceptre, a staff or a standard. The usual significance of such items is their connotation of authority. Francesco's receipt of such a token from Timur's dynasty raises the strong suspicion that he was actually accepting a grant of political power. This would probably have covered part or all of his existing possessions, amounting to an acknowledgement that he held them by Timur's permission. It was Timur's normal practice to give the rulers he reinstated or who submitted to him certificates of appointment, often accompanied by symbols of authority including robes, swords, belts and headgear. These proclaimed both his endorsement of their rule and their recognition of his supremacy.⁴⁷ While no sceptres or standards are specifically attested among the tokens known to have been awarded, such an action would therefore fit an established pattern of behaviour.

Any such gesture, if generally known, could have had considerable implications for Francesco's relations with Byzantium, from which he held his territories, but if it was indeed undertaken as part of a joint venture with John VII the latter would naturally have taken an accommodating view of it. In any case, in seeking to strengthen his links with the house of Timur, Francesco was applying to the new situation the same approach which the Gattilusio had taken towards the Ottomans in the recent past and would again in the future. It went beyond mere compliance with demands, encompassing positive initiatives aimed at cultivating a congenial personal relationship with a dominant ruler. Such an approach to Timur implies that Francesco thought it likely that he would succeed to the supremacy of the Ottomans, and was eager to associate

⁴⁶ Doukas, pp. 107–9; Sheref ed-Din, vol. 4, pp. 56–7; Alexandrescu-Dersca, pp. 90, 138 (no. 6).

⁴⁷ Kastritsis, pp. 45, 48–9, 84.

himself with the new hegemon. Such thinking might readily lie at the root of a combination directed against the Ottomans and particularly against Suleiman, the front-runner in the struggle for the succession. From Francesco's perspective, Timur's goodwill could have additional benefits with regard to the returning emirs of the Aegean littoral. These rulers might well be expected to set about shoring up their newly restored authority over their Turkish subordinates through a bout of holy war against convenient Christian targets. Timur, as the patron and overlord of these emirs, might offer protection from such threats to those who won his friendship. This logic would not have applied in the same way to Francesco's uncle Niccolò of Ainos, whose lordship was sheltered from the menace of Timur as long as the Mongol forces remained confined to Asia, but acutely exposed to attack from Suleiman. If he were implicated in his nephew's line of policy the consequences for Niccolò could have been grave, but nothing is known of how he responded to the new environment.

In the case of John VII and the Genoese communal authorities, the interest in a tightened alliance with Timur and further cooperation against the Ottomans which they displayed in the summer and autumn of 1402 was seemingly short-lived, since early in 1403 they participated in a peace treaty with Suleiman. By this agreement the Ottoman prince granted a variety of concessions to the Christian powers of the region in exchange for ending hostilities and thus allowing him a free hand to eliminate his rivals.⁴⁸ The main beneficiaries were Venice and Byzantium. The empire was represented by John VII since Manuel, Suleiman's preferred partner, had not yet returned from the West. However, Genoa, Chios, Rhodes and the Duchy of the Archipelago were also parties to the treaty. Uniquely among the significant maritime rulers of the Aegean, the Gattilusio lords were not included and did not even receive such minor concessions as the release from tribute obligations and return of prisoners granted to Chios and the Archipelago.

One possible explanation for this lies in the treaty's description of its Christian signatories as 'lo imperador e...tuta la liga'.⁴⁹ The league referred to may be that mooted in 1398 and 1402, although this is not known to have been concluded.⁵⁰ In this case, the only signatory of this

⁴⁸ George T. Dennis, 'The Byzantine-Turkish treaty of 1403', *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 33 (1967), pp. 72–87, reprinted in *Byzantium and the Franks 1350–1420* (London 1982), VI; Zachariadou, 'Süleyman', pp. 274–83.

⁴⁹ Dennis, 'Treaty', p. 79.

⁵⁰ See above, pp. 331–2.

treaty not to be a member of that league would seemingly have been the emperor, who was explicitly singled out here alongside the league members and evidently regarded as a special case. Suleiman did make guarantees regarding Stefan Lazarević and the Marquis of Boudonitz, neither of them members of the putative league nor signatories to the peace treaty, pledging to accord them the same status they held in his father's time. This was presumably at the behest of their respective allies, John VII and Venice.⁵¹ John VII, Genoa or Chios might have wielded similar influence on behalf of the Gattilusio, but both the marquis and the Serbian prince were distinguished by the fact that they had already been attacked by Suleiman since his return to Europe.⁵² The minimal guarantees made for them were presumably a direct response to this, intended to prevent any further hostilities. Since the Gattilusio lords had seemingly suffered no such attacks, there would have been less pressure for equivalent promises. More substantial benefits were only available to the parties to the treaty, namely the emperor and the members of the league, who could trade on their existing belligerent status to require concessions in exchange for peace. In a sense, the Gattilusio may therefore have suffered as a result of the relationship they had cultivated with Bayezid. Having distanced themselves from collective opposition to the Ottomans, they were now denied the limited gains which other rulers secured from Ottoman weakness through collective bargaining.

However, in the case of Mytilene an alternative explanation lies in the relationship established more recently with the new hegemon of Anatolia. Having made a positive personal commitment to Timur, entering into such an accommodation with his enemies could well have been regarded as treachery. Timur was still in Anatolia at the time, and given the exposed position of Old Phokaia and the Mongol ruler's military power and reputation for extreme savagery, recently exemplified in his destruction of the Christian enclave at Smyrna, this would have been a daunting risk to take.⁵³ John VII and the Genoese of Pera had made their own undertakings to Timur, but they were at least sheltered from reprisals by the barrier of the straits and by Suleiman's forces guarding the European shore, reassurances that were unavailable to Francesco.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Zachariadou, 'Süleyman', pp. 274–5, 279, 281–2; Kastritsis, pp. 58, 175.

⁵² Zachariadou, 'Süleyman', pp. 281–2, 289–90; Kastritsis, pp. 57–9.

⁵³ Doukas, pp. 103–7; Sheref ed-Din, vol. 4, pp. 47–53; Alexandrescu-Dersca, pp. 88–90.

⁵⁴ Sheref ed-Din does allude to an embassy by an individual whom he names 'Soba' and describes as the king of Chios, who came to Anatolia in person at some point after

Francesco's engagement with Timur did not lead to a lasting reorientation of Gattilusio affiliations, since within a few months the conqueror's forces had withdrawn from Anatolia, never to return, and his death followed in 1405.⁵⁵ With the most novel, volatile and potentially transformative element removed from Turkish politics, the contest over the legacy of Bayezid was left to his sons and to the various emirs seeking to preserve their regained power and autonomy. Any role played by the Gattilusio in the Ottoman civil wars that occupied the decade after Ankara has left no trace in the sources. The only episode illuminating their relations with the Ottomans during this period was the occasion in 1407 when an ultimatum from an Ottoman ruler proved a sufficient inducement for the lord of Mytilene to release Muslim merchants and pilgrims taken captive by a pirate vessel.⁵⁶ It is not specified which of the Ottoman contenders was involved, but it was most probably Suleiman, in the light of his preeminent position at that time. The fact that the Ottomans were able to intimidate the Gattilusio so successfully, even in the depths of their internecine struggles, is suggestive of the degree to which the impact of Bayezid's ascendancy had survived his downfall.

Positive evidence of the involvement of the Gattilusio lords in Turkish politics appears again following the restoration of Ottoman unity by Mehmed I in 1413. This interaction is dominated by the career of Juneid and his conflicts with his local rivals and with successive Ottoman sultans. Their responses to these events reveal certain commonalities of approach between the rulers of the islands along the Anatolian coast: Lesbos, Chios and Rhodes. Despite the dramatic contrasts between the interests and attitudes of the Hospitallers and those of the Genoese where the Turks were concerned, the island rulers displayed considerable unanimity and consistency in their support for the Ottomans against Juneid.⁵⁷ At a time when

the tribute agreements with Old and New Phokaia, pledging to pay Timur tribute and to be his servant. If this was indeed a representative of the government of Chios it would suggest that the Mahona had taken a similar initiative to that of Francesco Gattilusio in establishing a tighter bond with Timur, and hence that similar pressures ought to have discouraged them from making peace with Timur's enemy. However, the fact that this individual is presented as wielding individual princely authority and the absence of any reference elsewhere in this source to Francesco's visit suggests that the Persian historian may have confused Chios with Lesbos. Sheref ed-Din, vol. 4, pp. 58–9.

⁵⁵ Sheref ed-Din, vol. 4, pp. 80–2, 220–9; Tilman Nagel, *Timur der Eroberer und die islamische Welt des späten Mittelalters* (Munich 1993), pp. 356–7, 413–9.

⁵⁶ Mikel de Epalza, 'Dos textos moriscos bilingües (arabe y castellano) de viajes a Oriente (1395 y 1407–1412)', *Hesperis Tamuda* 20–1 (1982–3), pp. 25–112 at pp. 95–7.

⁵⁷ See above, pp. 58–60.

Ottoman power was rapidly reviving but still somewhat fragile, they preferred to connive at its restoration rather than aid the resistance of a local ruler of more limited resources. Doukas explains the widespread support for Mehmed I's campaign in terms of the extent of his military strength and the preference of the rulers involved for his amiable disposition over the devious and aggressive character of Juneid.⁵⁸ Doukas's narration of Juneid's career conveys his qualities of courage, energy, resourcefulness, military skill, bellicosity, cunning and duplicity: characteristics unlikely to endear him to those whose lands were within his reach.⁵⁹

The implication of Doukas's account is that Mehmed's power made him a more dangerous potential enemy than the emir of Smyrna, while his personality meant that his enmity could be more easily and reliably avoided by cultivating a relationship with him. Support for the first proposition is offered by a letter of 1414 from the Grand Master of the Knights of St. John which indicates that Mehmed was already regarded as a major threat by sea and specifically identifies Lesbos and Chios as likely targets of raids.⁶⁰ When in April 1415 Mehmed asked the Hospitallers for two galleys to help in the fight against Juneid and his other Turkish enemies the Order had prevaricated, but made preparations to assist him if necessary.⁶¹ The events which followed Mehmed's campaign against Juneid offered some vindication for the approach taken by the Gattilusio and the others who had joined forces with the Ottomans: the Duchy of the Archipelago was ravaged by Mehmed's fleet as punishment for Duke Jacopo I Crispo's failure to come with the other island rulers to acclaim the sultan.⁶²

⁵⁸ Doukas, p. 143.

⁵⁹ The impression that he posed a significant threat receives some corroboration from other sources. In January 1413 the Hospitallers offered to help the Genoese of Chios secure mediation to end their current war with Juneid. (Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade*, pp. 168–9 (no. 8)). However, in August 1413 peaceful contacts were in evidence (*ibid.*, p. 170 (no. 9)).

⁶⁰ Luttrell and Zachariadou, pp. 149–50 (no. 19). Luttrell and Zachariadou's commentary (p. 119) presents the document as reporting the impact of actual raids that had already occurred, but it is clear from the text that the allusion is to possible future harm that might yet be averted.

⁶¹ Luttrella and Zachariadou, pp. 150–1 (no. 20).

⁶² Doukas, p. 147. This frostier attitude to the Ottomans may be related to the enthusiasm shown by another of the lords of the Archipelago, Pietro Zeno of Andros, for the contemporaneous proposals for a new Christian league (see above, pp. 333–4). It is also notable that Duke Jacopo I had evidently returned to war with Suleiman at some point after the general treaty of 1403, since in 1408 he had recently made peace and was making arrangements for the return of captives, ships and goods seized by Suleiman during the conflict. ASG, NA 603 (Giovanni Balbi 1), no. 53.

Alignment against Juneid clearly became self-reinforcing. A Hospitaller document from May 1422, shortly after Juneid's second return from Europe, remarked on the capture of Theologo and other territories in Anatolia by Juneid, and warned of his preparation of large numbers of raiding craft for attacks on the islands. It explained his hostility as a result of the previous intervention of the Knights themselves and their neighbours in Chios and Mytilene against him.⁶³ Nevertheless, whatever their preferences the Gattilusio may have been inclined to hedge their bets and maintain contacts with those on both sides of such a conflict. While Jacopo Gattilusio reputedly contributed ships to assist Murad's campaign, during the same crisis Juneid's ambassador to Venetian Crete was able to take passage on a passing vessel of Mytilene to return to his master.⁶⁴

Thus it seems that specific calculations of advantage in relation to individual Turkish rulers, rather than systematic efforts to shape the political balance of Anatolia for long-term gain, were the guiding force behind the policy of the Gattilusio and the other islanders. Certainly there is little sign here of a policy based on pursuit of a balance of power, which would have encouraged support for the weaker party in order to prevent the overweening growth of the stronger. The formation of Christian coalitions in response to the Turkish threat bears a superficial resemblance to such a policy, but this reaction was underpinned by their common religious identity and the religious divide separating them from the Turks. Their attitude to conflicting Muslim Turkish powers affords an insight into their strategic outlook in cases where alignments were not shaped by such loyalties. The tendency of the Gattilusio lords and others to side with the strongest power of the moment in these cases indicates that they did not recognise, or were not much influenced by, the concept of shaping their political environment by the cultivation of a balance of power.⁶⁵

In the short term there were sound motives for the approach taken. The revival of Ottoman strength could simultaneously and without contradiction encourage both preparations for collective defence against them and efforts to placate them in the hope that such precautions would not be necessary. In addition, during these years they had not yet fully recovered from the impact of Timur's onslaught and the civil wars. Their relative

⁶³ Luttrell and Zachariadou, pp. 154–6.

⁶⁴ Josephi Valentini, *Acta Albaniae Veneta: saeculorum XIV et XV*, 25 vols. (Rome 1967–79), vol. 12, pp. 136–8 (no. 2958); Iorga, 'Notes', vol. 5, pp. 175–6.

⁶⁵ Cf. Michael Sheehan, *The Balance of Power: history and theory* (London 2000), pp. 24–36, 53–75.

weakness would have increased the value they placed on allies, increasing the gains that rulers such as the Gattilusio could hope to derive from cultivating their friendship. Doukas offers support for this view, attributing Mehmed I's tactful treatment of the Grand Master of the Hospitallers to a sense of caution resulting from the recent tribulations of the Ottoman state.⁶⁶ The price the Ottomans were willing to pay for Latin assistance could be alluring, as shown by the rich reward reaped by Giovanni Adorno for his alliance with Murad II against Mustafa in 1422.⁶⁷ At this time relations with the Ottomans could still be conducted in a reciprocal fashion in which they offered concessions as well as demanding them.

Gattilusio assistance against Juneid and whatever other efforts the family made to win Ottoman approval during these years seem to have had an impact. In 1426 Niccolò Crispo, lord of Andros and brother of the Duke of the Archipelago, informed the Venetian government that his peace negotiations with Murad II were being mediated by his relative by marriage the lord of Mytilene, 'qui est amicus dicti Teucris'.⁶⁸ As with Bayezid, the Gattilusio had evidently succeeded in ingratiating themselves with this sultan.

How far this relationship entailed the kind of obligations that had been imposed by Bayezid is uncertain. Clearly the survival of the continental holdings of the Gattilusio lords had to be regarded as contingent on the sultan's permission and secured by tribute. If the testimony of Doukas is accepted, the tributary status of Phokaia to one Turkish ruler or another had been continuous since a time long before Gattilusio rule was established there.⁶⁹ Even in the 1403 treaty, where other tribute obligations including those of Chios and the Genoese Black Sea colonies were dissolved in their entirety, that of New Phokaia was only reduced by 500 ducats, with no mention of Old Phokaia.⁷⁰ Part of the reward Murad granted Giovanni Adorno was the 'introitus portarum Folie Veteris', worth about 25,000 aspers per year, that is about 735 Venetian ducats.⁷¹ The terminology suggests that this was a commercial tax appropriated

⁶⁶ Doukas, p. 145.

⁶⁷ Basso, 'Genovesi e Turchi', pp. 50–2; Doukas, pp. 209–11, 227.

⁶⁸ Valentini, *Acta*, vol. 12, p. 259 (no. 3056).

⁶⁹ Doukas, p. 207; above, pp. 365–6.

⁷⁰ Dennis, 'Treaty', pp. 78–82.

⁷¹ Basso, 'Genovesi e Turchi', pp. 50–2; Doukas, pp. 209–11, 227; Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade*, pp. 142–4; cf. Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, 'La part des Turcs dans les revenus des colonies latines de Roumanie', *Coloniser au Moyen Âge*, ed. Michel Balard and Alain Ducellier (Paris 1995), pp. 348–53 at pp. 349–50.

by the Turks rather than a fixed annual payment.⁷² Certainly in 1345 the neighbouring Turkish ruler was receiving a *commerchium* from merchants trading in Byzantine Phokaia, and such an arrangement may have persisted under Gattilusio rule.⁷³ The implications of this for Old Phokaia's value to the Gattilusio would have been considerable, since the proceeds of taxing the port's trade must have been one of the main benefits of possessing it. During the later years of Gattilusio rule in Old Phokaia the port's tribute was farmed or granted by the Ottomans to Francesco Draperio, who followed in Adorno's footsteps as *appaltator* of New Phokaia and a favoured client of the sultan. His representatives received 4,333 ducats from this source in six years from 1445 to 1451, suggesting that these payments remained at very much the same level as in the 1420s.⁷⁴

Ainos likewise was probably tributary throughout the period of Gattilusio rule. Kritovoulos states that it had paid tribute to the Ottomans ever since they first subjugated Thrace and Macedonia, and in contrast to the Anatolian littoral their authority over that region had not subsequently been interrupted.⁷⁵ In 1433 Bertrandon de la Brocquiere visited Ainos and described its lord as a tributary of the sultan, while in 1437 the report on Church organisation to the Council of Basle asserted that he was 'semper in servitute Turcorum'.⁷⁶ As for the specific nature of the lordship's obligations, Kritovoulos refers to the extraction of a two-thirds share in the lordship's revenues from its salt pans and other sources during the 1450s.⁷⁷ Describing the same period, Tursun Beg asserts that the lord of Ainos was granted a share of Ottoman revenues accruing from sources such as the salt produced in the area.⁷⁸ These two accounts may reflect differing perspectives on the same reality: that the income of the

⁷² Cf. Geo Pistarino, *Chio dei genovesi nel tempo di Cristoforo Colombo* (Rome 1995), p. 155.

⁷³ ASV, DC 29/8 (*Memoriali* 1345–7), ff. 77v–8.

⁷⁴ ASG, NA 764 (Bernardo de Ferrari 1), no. II/14 (187).

⁷⁵ Michael Kritovoulos, *Critobuli Imbriotae Historiae*, ed. Diether Roderich Reinsch (Berlin and New York 1983), CFHB 22, p. 105.

⁷⁶ Bertrandon de la Brocquiere, *Le Voyage d'Outremer de Bertrandon de la Brocquiere, premier écuyer trenchant et conseiller de Philippe le Bon, Duc de Bourgogne*, ed. Ch. Scherfer and Henri Cordier (Paris 1892), pp. 173–4; Spyridon P. Lampros, 'Υπόμνημα περί τῶν ἐλληνικῶν χωρῶν καὶ ἐκκλησιῶν κατὰ τὸν δέκατον πέμπτον αἰῶνα', *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 7 (1910), pp. 360–71 at p. 366.

⁷⁷ Kritovoulos, p. 105.

⁷⁸ Tursun Beg, *The History of Mehmed the Conqueror by Tursun Beg*, tr. Halil Inalcik and Rhoads Murphy (Minneapolis and Chicago 1978), pp. 37–8; Zachariadou, 'Part des Turcs', pp. 348–9.

lordship of Ainos was divided proportionally between its Gattilusio lord and the Ottomans.

Such an arrangement, like that in Old Phokaia, would differ markedly from the obligations which were imposed on the island territories of the Gattilusio in the 1450s, which conform to the most common form of tribute imposed by the Ottomans, entailing a fixed annual payment. However, it reflects a pattern found in similar enclaves such as Thessalonike, where particular taxes or a proportion of revenues accrued to the Turks in addition to fixed payments.⁷⁹ It suggests that the coastal enclaves were more deeply integrated into the Ottoman system than was the norm for tributary territories, with some degree of direct administrative penetration of the lordships. Considering their exposure to Turkish military power such an intimate entanglement in the Ottoman network is readily comprehensible. In describing its heavy tribute obligation Kritovoulos remarks by way of explanation that the Ottomans could have taken Ainos whenever they wished.⁸⁰

The lordship of Mytilene probably became an Ottoman tributary near the end of the fourteenth century, during the reign of Murad I according to Chalkokondyles.⁸¹ However, after Bayezid's defeat at Ankara there is no evidence for the payment of tribute for Lesbos, nor for any of the other Gattilusio island territories, until the Ottoman attack in 1450 drove the lords of Mytilene to accept such an obligation.⁸² It seems reasonable to suppose that the obligation lapsed after Ankara, although there is no record of a formal abolition of the sort granted to Chios and other signatories of the 1403 treaty with Suleiman. While the Gattilusio were liable to tribute payments for their continental territories, where their holdings most clearly fell within the grasp of what remained an essentially land-bound power, their islands may well have escaped from such bonds during the first half of the fifteenth century. If true, this would reflect the way in which such enclaves served as points of mutual attraction, tying the maritime and continental spheres more closely together in both economic and political terms.

⁷⁹ Doukas, pp. 411–3; Zachariadou, 'Part des Turcs', pp. 348–50; Dennis, 'Treaty', p. 80; Inalcik and Quataert, p. 67.

⁸⁰ Kritovoulos, p. 105.

⁸¹ Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, p. 268; above, p. 369.

⁸² Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, p. 267.

Failure to Endure

The apparent success of the Gattilusio in renewing amicable relations with the reunited Ottoman state ushered in what was probably the most peaceful phase of their relations with their Turkish neighbours, in which hopes for a congenial and lasting *modus vivendi* might plausibly have been entertained. Yet in spite of their apparent facility for ingratiating themselves with the Ottomans, the Gattilusio were among their first targets when they turned their attention to sea-borne expansion. The first indication of impending trouble dates from March 1446, when a letter written from Lesbos by Ciriaco of Ancona alluded to recent rumours, now dispelled, of an imminent Turkish attack on the island.⁸³ If such a prospect was regarded as likely, relations must have worsened since the apparently cordial conditions reported in 1426. Unfortunately, there is a dearth of direct evidence for Gattilusio dealings with the Ottomans during this period.

It is possible that Dorino of Mytilene had been careless in his attitude towards the Turks, a hypothesis given some substance by the implications of his relations with Byzantium. During the earlier flowering of Ottoman power under Bayezid, the Gattilusio were bound to the Palaiologoi chiefly through Francesco II's close alliance with John VII, who along with his father was more favourably inclined towards the Ottomans than their rival Manuel II.⁸⁴ This had reduced the potential for the Byzantine connections of the Gattilusio lords to poison their relations with the Turks. In Dorino's time, the manner in which the family's Byzantine affiliations were cultivated and exploited suggests a lack of concern for Ottoman sensitivities. In 1438 Pero Tafur, predicting the failure of the scheme backed by Dorino and John VIII Palaiologos to install Alexander Komnenos on the throne of Trebizond, remarked that the enterprise was being undertaken in defiance of the wishes of the sultan.⁸⁵ The marriage alliance forged in 1441 between Dorino, through his daughter Caterina, and the vigorously anti-Ottoman despot Constantine was a far from tactful gesture with regard to the Ottomans, fraught with potential for future ructions.⁸⁶ This

⁸³ Ciriaco of Ancona, *Cyriac of Ancona: later travels*, ed. Edward Bodnar and Clive Foss, (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts 2003), pp. 236–8.

⁸⁴ Barker, *Manuel*, pp. 26–30, 69–72, 78–9.

⁸⁵ Pero Tafur, *Andanças e Viajes de Pero Tafur por Diversas Partes del Mundo Avidos (1435–1439)*, ed. José María Ramos (Madrid 1934), p. 121.

⁸⁶ George Sphrantzes, *Georgii Sphrantzae Chronicon*, ed. Riccardo Maisano (Rome 1990), *CFHB* 29, pp. 88–9.

risk was soon highlighted by the attack on Constantine at Lemnos which led to Caterina's death.⁸⁷ While this severed the marital bond linking Constantine and Dorino, their alliance may have endured. Such indiscretions may betray a degree of complacency about the family's relationship with an increasingly confident and ambitious Turkish power.

Any misconceptions about the safety of the family's position after this scare would have been abruptly dispelled in 1450, with the devastating assault on Lesbos by the forces of Murad II. While the lord of Mytilene agreed to pay tribute and secured assurances of goodwill from Mehmed II on his accession in February 1451, the fact that Dorino appealed to Genoa for help against the Turks only a few months later suggests that he was not among those beguiled by the young sultan's promises.⁸⁸ Though Mehmed was willing to grant new territories to the Gattilusio after the fall of Constantinople, his policy turned abruptly to the succession of encroachments that overwhelmed the family's territories outside Lesbos in 1455–7 and then after a brief lull extinguished their regime in 1462.⁸⁹

The demise of the Gattilusio lordships was a product of their failure to pursue successfully one of the two available avenues for survival in a world where fragmentation and multiple overlapping systems were giving way to unity and the predominance of a single system. One option was to make the transition from participating in, contributing to and being supported by a number of different networks to focusing all their efforts on securing the indulgence of a single hegemon. The other was to use their own resources and what remained of their other connections to survive the hostility of this dominant power. All the Christian regimes of the Aegean ultimately failed to surmount the challenges posed by the Ottomans, but some managed to stave off dissolution far longer than others, and among the islanders the Gattilusio were the first to succumb. Among the nearest neighbours of the Gattilusio, the Mahona of Chios and the Hospitallers of Rhodes were able to survive for several more decades through a combination of appeasement and force of arms, the Mahona

⁸⁷ ASV, *SMar* 1, f. 121^v; Sphrantzes, pp. 90–1; Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, pp. 80–1; Iorga, 'Notes', vol. 7, pp. 75–6.

⁸⁸ Doukas, p. 291; A. Luxuro and G. Pinelli-Gentile, 'Documenti riguardanti alcuni dinasti dell'Arcipelago, pubblicati per saggio di studi paleografici', *Giornale Ligustico di archeologia, storia e belle arti* 1 (1874), pp. 84–90, 217–221, vol. 2 (1875), pp. 86–93, 292–7, vol. 3 (1876), pp. 313–6, vol. 5 (1878), pp. 345–70 at vol. 5, pp. 350–2 (no. 39).

⁸⁹ See above, pp. 68–75.

relying predominantly on the former and the Order on the latter.⁹⁰ The Gattilusio lordships failed to extend their lifespan significantly through either method. This failure is the more striking considering the degree of success the Gattilusio had enjoyed in the past in cultivating Ottoman goodwill.

For the Gattilusio, avoiding complete absorption into the Turkish sphere by force of arms was always going to be extremely difficult once the Ottomans had become a major naval power, as they did with the naval expansion initiated by Mehmed II in the early 1450s.⁹¹ The continental enclaves were virtually indefensible, while their islands were within convenient striking distance of Gallipoli. With their limited resources, and lacking a regime as intensely militarised as that of the Order of St. John, their prospects of facing down successive Turkish onslaughts by themselves were poor. If their own means were insufficient to withstand the Ottomans alone, the networks from which they had long drawn strength were now of little help. Byzantium had been eliminated in 1453 and in any case had never had much to offer the Gattilusio in military terms. The crusading movement in the form of Trevisan's papal fleet intervened in the northern Aegean in force and with some success in the immediate aftermath of the Gattilusio losses of 1455–6, but this brought the lord of Mytilene little concrete benefit to set against the retaliation it drew upon him.⁹² The only active manifestation of Christian military solidarity with the Gattilusio reported thereafter was the 70 soldiers from Rhodes who came to defend Mytilene in 1462.⁹³ Only Genoa continued to offer the prospect of serious assistance, but its faltering strength and troubles closer to home diminished its capacity to help.⁹⁴ The Gattilusio had always been characterised by their enthusiastic employment of the opportunities which the Aegean world offered small rulers to draw strength from multiple associations and affiliations. Now all of the networks to

⁹⁰ Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 2, pp. 346–63; Nicolas Vatin, *L'Ordre de Saint-Jean-de-Jérusalem, l'empire ottoman et la Méditerranée orientale entre les deux sièges de Rhodes (1480–1522)* (Paris 1994), pp. 147–328; Philip Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese and their Administration of the Island 1346–1566: described in contemporary documents and official dispatches*, 3 vols. (Cambridge 1958), vol. 1, pp. 201–51, 263–4, 273–89, 309–31, 338–69.

⁹¹ Kritovoulos, pp. 38–40; Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire 1300–1481* (Istanbul 1990), pp. 148, 170.

⁹² See above, pp. 71–2, 336–8.

⁹³ Benedetto, Archbishop of Mytilene, 'Leonardi Chiensis [sic] de Lesbo a Turcis capta epistola Pio Papae II missa', *Chroniques Greco-Romanes, inédites ou peu connues*, ed. Carl Hopf (Berlin 1873), pp. 359–66 at p. 361.

⁹⁴ See above, pp. 70, 72–4, 138–43.

which they had made major commitments and drawn major benefits were defunct or debilitated, with the single exception of the Ottomans, whose power now exceeded that which any other group in the region had enjoyed since the heyday of Byzantium. In such an unbalanced situation, a framework for survival and success developed in the era of fragmentation could no longer remain viable.

However, while the escalating strength of the Ottomans, the faltering of the support available to the Gattilusio from other networks and the exposed position of their lordships would surely have led to their eventual demise once the Ottomans put serious effort into bringing it about, in the event their defences were seldom put to the test. Not only was Lesbos alone among the family's possessions in surviving a major Ottoman assault during these years, it was apparently also the only one to mount any serious resistance. Thasos was handed over to Mehmed on demand by Domenico of Mytilene.⁹⁵ The leading citizens of Ainos surrendered without a fight in the absence of their lord Dorino, while the dependent territories of Imbros and Samothrake presented a similar lack of resistance despite Dorino's presence on the latter island.⁹⁶ The annexation of Old Phokaia seems to have been swift and perfunctory, whether or not it took place without any resistance at all like the surrender of New Phokaia two months earlier.⁹⁷ The many fortifications built or strengthened by the Gattilusio over the years proved to be of little use in this time of need, in the absence of any resolve to defend them. On Lemnos the population not only failed to resist the Ottomans but invited them to take the island, having risen in revolt against Niccolò Gattilusio and defeated a small expedition from Lesbos. This expedition had been ordered only to extricate Niccolò if the rebels proved obdurate and confronted them in contravention of its orders, indicating that Domenico of Mytilene had no intention of attempting to fight for possession of Lemnos.⁹⁸

Only on Lesbos itself did the Ottomans face significant opposition and even there the repulse of the 1457 attack on Methymna was the

⁹⁵ Doukas, p. 413.

⁹⁶ Kritovoulos, pp. 101–7; Doukas, p. 419; Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, p. 225; Aşikpaşazade, *Vom Hirtenzelt zur Hohen Pforte: Frühzeit und Aufstieg des Osmanenreiches nach der Chronik "Denkwürdigkeiten und Zeitläufte des Hauses 'Osman'" vom Derwisch Ahmed, genannt 'Asik-Pasa-Sohn*, tr. Richard F. Kreutel (Graz 1959), pp. 202–4.

⁹⁷ Doukas, pp. 417–9.

⁹⁸ Doukas, pp. 419–21.

sole recorded victory.⁹⁹ In 1462 the defences of Mytilene were apparently strong enough to offer a real chance of successful resistance. The scale of the resources allocated to the campaign by Mehmed are testament to the seriousness with which he regarded the task.¹⁰⁰ According to the Hospitaller account, he was sufficiently impressed by the strength of the city's fortifications to postpone his assault for several days, possibly in the hope that treachery would do his work for him.¹⁰¹ Benedetto claims that the city was well enough provisioned to endure a siege for a year.¹⁰² Ultimately the strength of the defences was not fully tested, as the fall of the Melanoudion precipitated Niccolò Gattilusio's decision to capitulate rather than attempt to withstand an Ottoman attack on the main citadel, while the other garrisons on the island subsequently surrendered on his orders.¹⁰³

This paucity of resistance requires some explanation. The pusillanimity of individual lords may be held in part to blame. Dorino of Ainos appears not to have raised a finger in defence of the lands which he had seized. When Niccolò overthrew and murdered his brother Domenico, he justified his action on the grounds that Domenico was planning to surrender Lesbos to the Turks.¹⁰⁴ While clearly self-serving, it is possible that there was some truth behind this claim. Whereas Domenico had lobbied vigorously for help from Genoa and the West in the months between the start of the dissolution of the Gattilusio lordships in 1455 and the arrival of the papal fleet in the autumn of 1456, thereafter no further evidence of appeals from him has been identified. Having seen Calixtus III's crusade come and go with mixed results and with no comparable aid on the horizon, it is conceivable that by the time of his downfall in late 1458 he had despaired of the long-term survival of his lordship and was considering

⁹⁹ ASVat, *Armadio* XXXIX, 7, ff. 126^{r-v}, 132^v, 134; Matteo Sciambra, Giuseppe Valentini, Ignazio Parrino, *Il 'Liber Brevium' di Callisto III. La Crociata, l'Albania e Skanderbeg* (Palermo 1968), pp. 174, 178, 179 (nos. 308, 321, 322); Pope Pius II, *Enea Silvio Piccolomini, Papa Pio II: I Commentarii*, ed. Luigi Totaro, 2 vols. (Milan 1984), vol. 2, p. 1830; Kritovoulos, pp. 129–31; Doukas, p. 423; Oberto Foglieta, *Uberti Folietae Clarorum Liguorum Elogia* (Rome 1573), pp. 97–8; above, pp. 337–8.

¹⁰⁰ See above, p. 74.

¹⁰¹ Roberto Valentini, 'L'Egeo dopo la caduta di Costantinopoli nelle relazioni dei gran maestri di Rodi', *Bullettino dell'Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo e Archivio Muratoriano* 51 (1936), pp. 137–68 at p. 167 (no. 4).

¹⁰² Archbishop Benedetto, p. 363.

¹⁰³ Valentini, 'L'Egeo', p. 167 (no. 4); Archbishop Benedetto, pp. 362–4; Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, pp. 272–3; Kritovoulos, pp. 171–2.

¹⁰⁴ Pius II, *Commentarii*, vol. 2, p. 1830.

cutting his losses by selling his island to the sultan rather than lose it outright. By contrast, in early 1459 the immediate aftermath of Niccolò's coup saw a renewed diplomatic campaign for assistance, suggesting a redoubled determination to resist the Turks with Western help.¹⁰⁵ In the end, however, despite his efforts to prepare for defence Niccolò readily capitulated when the fighting at Mytilene began to go against him. It is clear that the subjects of the Gattilusio lords also lacked resolution in opposing the Ottomans. It may be significant that with Constantinople gone, the imperial mandate which had served to legitimise Gattilusio rule in the eyes of their Greek subjects lost much of its force. In that case the relatively defiant reaction on Lesbos may have been connected with the fact that it was the longest-established of the family's holdings, where loyalty to the ruling family would probably have been more deeply ingrained among the Greek population than elsewhere. It may also be significant that it probably had a denser population of Latins, whose loyalty and determination to resist might be reckoned more reliable. The traditional congeniality between the Ottomans and the Genoese does however raise some doubts about this supposition.

The case of Lemnos has been presented as a clear instance of Greek preference for Ottoman rule over that of the Latins.¹⁰⁶ In fact it suggests a more complicated picture. Only months after delivering their island to the Ottomans, some of the island's inhabitants led by George Diplovatatzes assisted its capture by the fleet of Cardinal Lodovico Trevisan.¹⁰⁷ They thereby placed themselves under the direct rule of the papacy, to Orthodox anti-Latin sentiment surely the most unpalatable sovereign imaginable. At the same time another prominent Greek, the former governor of Imbros George Dromokaïtes, was plotting to deliver Lemnos, along with Imbros, to another Latin power, the Venetian republic.¹⁰⁸ Not

¹⁰⁵ Luxuro and Pinelli-Gentile, vol. 5, pp. 359–61 (nos. 53–4); Pius II, *Commentarii*, vol. 1, pp. 444–5; ADN, B2034, f. 186^{r-v}; Alfonso Assini, 'La "compera Metilini" e la difesa genovese del Gattilusio dopo la caduta di Costantinopoli', *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οι Γατελούζοι της Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 223–80 at pp. 275–80 (nos. 14–18).

¹⁰⁶ Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, 'Changing masters in the Aegean', *The Greek Islands and the Sea: proceedings of the first international colloquium held at the Hellenic Institute, Royal Holloway, University of London, 21–22 September 2001*, ed. Julian Chrysostomides, Charalambos Dendrinou and Jonathan Harris (Camberley 2004), pp. 199–212 at p. 208.

¹⁰⁷ C. N. Sathas, *Μνημεία Ελληνικής Ιστορίας: Documents inédits relatifs à l'histoire de la Grèce au Moyen Age*, 9 vols. (Paris 1880–90), vol. 9, pp. xxxi–xxxii; Kritovoulos, p. 115.

¹⁰⁸ Valentini, *Acta*, vol. 23, pp. 177, 187–8 (nos. 6470, 6479–80); Catherine Asdracha, 'Inscriptions de la Thrace orientale et de l'île d'Imbros (XII^e–XV^{es}.)', *Αρχαιολογικόν Δελτίον*

long afterwards, another uprising by the islanders ousted the papal garrison, now entrusted to the care of the Knights of St. John, and restored Ottoman control.¹⁰⁹ This profusion of actual and proposed transfers of allegiance within such a short period suggests either that factional divisions among the island's leaders were being played out through the enlistment of opposing outside powers, or that the inhabitants were simply siding with whichever power appeared strongest at a given moment. Whatever the case, it is clear that no straightforward hostility to Latin rule as such can explain the islanders' behaviour. Niccolò Gattilusio may reasonably be regarded as the victim of the collapse of the lordship of Ainos and the tribulations of that of Mytilene over the previous months. In the midst of such events, it must have seemed very likely that Lemnos too would very soon fall into Ottoman hands. In that case the best recourse available to the inhabitants was to secure the favour of those who would surely soon be their rulers by pre-empting the inevitable and bringing this development about themselves. Clearly they were not influenced by loyalty to the dynasty, but having come so recently under its rule this is hardly surprising. In other places, subjects with a longer history of Gattilusio rule may have felt a stronger attachment to it, but the apparent irresistibility of the Ottoman advance so soon after the fall of Constantinople must have had a considerable effect on their willingness to oppose it. In the case of Lesbos itself, while the various accounts of the fall of Mytilene include allegations of treachery, there is no suggestion that Greeks were involved in subversion. This is particularly compelling given that all of these accounts were produced by Latins or pro-Union Greeks.¹¹⁰

The disastrous internal politics of the Gattilusio family offer the most persuasive means of accounting for the lack of morale displayed by them and their subjects during these years. The illegitimacy of Dorino's seizure of the lordship of Ainos against his father's will can hardly have strengthened his hold on the loyalty of his subjects, although the refusal of the leading figures in the lordship to support the claims of his sister-in-law and nephews indicates that he was the preferred candidate.¹¹¹ In the lordship of Mytilene the rupture between Domenico and Niccolò Gattilusio

43/1 (1988), pp. 251–86 at pp. 44–5 (nos. 279–81); Ausilia Roccatagliata, *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: atti rogati a Chio (1453–1454, 1470–1471)* (Genoa 1982), pp. 108–10 (no. 72).

¹⁰⁹ Kritovoulos, pp. 133–6.

¹¹⁰ Cf. above, pp. 313–7.

¹¹¹ Kritovoulos, pp. 101–3.

and their father's senior official Battista Gattilusio in 1450 implies a degree of internal tension.¹¹² The overthrow and murder of Domenico by his brother Niccolò in 1458 must have had ample potential to produce further strife if there were supporters of Domenico who remained active and resentful.¹¹³

Such dissension may have played a significant part in the last moments of the lordship of Mytilene. According to the account of Archbishop Benedetto, it was the panic and indiscipline of the demoralised defenders after the fall of the Melanoudion which prompted Niccolò's decision that his position was untenable.¹¹⁴ However, the Hospitaller account alludes to his awareness of a 'conspiratio' among the inhabitants as a major factor contributing to his decision. It suggests that the fall of the Melanoudion resulted from the treachery of its commander, Luchino Gattilusio, even claiming that Luchino was left to administer the island in conjunction with its Ottoman governor.¹¹⁵ The continuation of Doukas gives a similar view, claiming that Luchino, together with the vicar of Mytilene, informed the Turks of the weak points in the defences, and after the fall of the Melanoudion convinced Niccolò to surrender.¹¹⁶ The roots of the 'cruenta factio' in Mytilene remain a matter for speculation, but the apparently venomous atmosphere of politics within the Gattilusio family itself during the 1450s offers the most credible explanation, particularly since it was leading members of the dynasty and their regime who were specifically accused of treachery. As in the case of Ainos, the failure of the family to maintain cohesion seems to have played a critical role in destroying the senior Gattilusio lordship.

The Impetus for Conquest

The wave of aggression against the maritime regimes which led to the swift dissolution of the Gattilusio lordships marked a new departure in Ottoman policy. Apart from their brief acquisition of Skyros, Skiathos and

¹¹² See above, pp. 198–9.

¹¹³ Doukas, pp. 433–5; Kritovoulos, pp. 168–9; Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, p. 268, 275; Pius II, *Commentarii*, vol. 2, p. 1830; Agostino Giustiniani, *Annali della Repubblica di Genova*, ed. C. G. B. Spotorno, 2 vols. (Genoa 1854), vol. 2, p. 384.

¹¹⁴ Archbishop Benedetto, pp. 363–4.

¹¹⁵ Valentini, 'L'Egeo', p. 167 (no. 4).

¹¹⁶ Doukas, pp. 435–7.

Skopelos and perhaps Samothrake in the later fourteenth century, they had not previously held any major islands and had apparently never made any serious effort at expansion in this sphere.¹¹⁷ Meanwhile they had for decades indulged the unmolested survival of Ainos and the two Phokaïas as tributary enclaves. The speed with which their approach changed must be explained in part by the temptation presented by the internal political upheavals of the Gattilusio lordships. The death of Dorino of Mytilene, the succession dispute in Ainos and the rebellion on Lemnos clearly all played a significant role in prompting successive Ottoman demands and attacks.¹¹⁸ Nevertheless, the vulnerabilities of the Gattilusio cannot shoulder all the blame for attracting Mehmed's predatory attention. The Ottomans displayed an attentive readiness to exploit any opportunity for further encroachments, and in doing so to extract not only financial but territorial gains, as the conditions set on the confirmation of Domenico as Dorino's successor illustrate with particular clarity.

It has been contended that the Gattilusio were the victims of an Ottoman policy of extinguishing all remnants of Byzantium after the fall of Constantinople.¹¹⁹ However, Ottoman behaviour does not seem to accord with any such systematic programme of annihilation. In the immediate aftermath of the fall of Constantinople Mehmed had been willing not only to confirm the existing holdings of the Gattilusio but even to extend them by granting them the remaining island territories of Byzantium in exchange for tribute payments.¹²⁰ Kritovoulos even claims that Mehmed seriously considered granting the request of Dorino of Ainos to restore Samothrake and Imbros to him shortly after their capture in 1456, and

¹¹⁷ See above, pp. 108, 324n8.

¹¹⁸ Doukas, pp. 413, 421; Kritovoulos, pp. 101–3; Thierry Ganchou, 'Hélène Notara Gatlousaina d'Ainos et le Sankt Peterburg Bibl. Pub. Gr. 243', *REB* 56 (1998), pp. 141–68.

¹¹⁹ Halil Inalcik, 'The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades, 1451–1522', *A History of the Crusades*, ed. Kenneth M. Setton, 6 vols. (Madison, Wisconsin 1969–90), vol. 6, pp. 311–54 at p. 316.

¹²⁰ These acquisitions did not go uncontested. In 1454 the Venetians unsuccessfully lobbied Mehmed for the cession of Lemnos and the other Byzantine islands. Skyros, following disagreements among its inhabitants as to whether to seek the sovereignty of Venice, the Genoese of Chios or the Gattilusio, was seized by the Venetians after some vacillation, as were its neighbours Skiathos and Skopelos. Mehmed, however, clearly approved Gattilusio possession of the island and the Venetians foresaw that the lord of Mytilene might appeal for his rights at the Ottoman court. Doukas, pp. 411–3; Valentini, *Acta*, vol. 22, pp. 171–9, 184, 265, 297 (nos. 6114, 6120, 6202, 6232); Assini, pp. 259–61 (no. 4); Stefano Magno, *Annali Veneti*, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna, MSS. 6214–6217, 6239–6340 at MS 6215, ff. 197v–8; extracts published by Carl Hopf, 'Estratti degli Annali Veneti', *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes, inédites ou peu connues* (Berlin 1873), pp. 179–209 at pp. 198–9.

even to grant him Lemnos as well, having taken it from Niccolò Gattilusio around the same time. This would have left Ainos itself as the only concrete prize of the sultan's recent offensives.¹²¹ Similarly, having been willing after repeated invasions to leave Demetrios and Thomas Palaiologos in control of parts of the Morea rather than eliminating them altogether, Mehmed subsequently gave Demetrios authority over Ainos, Samothrake, Thasos, Lemnos and Imbros.¹²² The impression given is not of an unwavering intent to conquer but of a more diffuse kind of aggressive drive, prone to vacillation. For all that the overall thrust of Ottoman action steadily consumed these domains, at times the sultan was willing to follow a forward step with an immediate backward one and the end result is suggestive more of a recurrent response to circumstances than a calculated and systematic policy.

If there was no absolute dogmatic hostility to the retention of these territories under tributary rule, the Ottoman disinclination to continue such an arrangement with the Gattilusio may have been connected with the failure of the Gattilusio to perform the part of supplicants with sufficient diligence. Efforts to appease the Ottomans might even prove counter-productive if they were not punctiliously sustained. If tributaries were seen as betraying the commitments they had made, their behaviour became a greater affront to Ottoman pride and authority than the defiance of those who had never accepted obligations toward the sultan. Tursun Beg describes Palamede as a supposed Ottoman ally who behaved like an enemy.¹²³ The Ottomans and their historians certainly

¹²¹ Kritovoulos, p.107. Stefano Magno reports an alternative version of Dorino's fate in which he was restored to his position in Ainos for his lifetime, albeit under the eye of an Ottoman *subaşı*. Magno, MS. 6216, ff. 92v–3.

¹²² Kritovoulos, pp. 136, 150; Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, pp. 169–76, 202–11, 213–6; Sphrantzes, p. 172; Konstantin Mihailović, *Memoirs of a Janissary*, ed. and tr. Benjamin Stolz, commentary by Svat Soucek (Ann Arbor 1975), pp. 114–5; Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 2, pp. 146–9, 196–200, 209–12, 219–28; Denis A. Zakythinos, *Le despotat grec de Morée*, 2 vols. (Athens 1932–53, 2nd ed. London 1975), vol. 1, pp. 256–74. While Demetrios resided in Adrianople under the eye of the Ottoman authorities, not in the lands that had been awarded to him, this would not entirely have excluded the possibility of trouble arising from a Palaiologan regime in the former Gattilusio territories. Since Lemnos had previously been held by Demetrios as an appanage, he is likely to have retained personal connections and loyalties among the inhabitants of the islands, as illustrated by his friendship with Kritovoulos, which might form the foundation of a local power base. Nikolaos Oikonomides (ed.), *Actes de Dionysiou* (Paris 1968), AA 4, pp. 135–54, 157–9 (nos. 25–26, 28); Paul Lemerle, André Guillou, Denise Papachrysanthou and Nicolas Svoronos, *Actes de Lavra*, 4 vols (Paris 1970–82), AA 5, 8, 10, 11, vol. 3, pp. 180–3 (no. 167).

¹²³ Tursun Beg, pp. 37–8.

claimed provocation for some of their attacks, accusing the lords of Mytilene and Ainos of colluding with pirates and sheltering escaped slaves.¹²⁴ The 1457 attack on Lesbos was prompted by Domenico's perceived alignment with Trevisan's fleet, and Kritovoulos mentions recalcitrance over tribute payments as contributing to this offensive and that of 1462.¹²⁵ However, whatever the truth of the allegations made, it is unlikely that disputes over escaped slaves were any kind of novelty, and association with piracy harming Ottoman subjects is attested in earlier decades.¹²⁶ Such difficulties would surely have been a persistent feature of relations with any tributary neighbour, although old irritants which had formerly been ignored could have become a more compelling spur to action after the advent of the supremely confident and belligerent government of Mehmed II. Doukas's assertion that the Gattilusio refused to halt tribute payments even at the time when Trevisan's fleet arrived, when circumstances would seem to have been at their most propitious for such a move, casts doubt on Kritovoulos's claims in that regard.¹²⁷ Benedetto Dei presents an alternative motivation for the final assault on Lesbos, attributing it to the violation of an agreement not to produce alum there.¹²⁸ This would link the attack to a developing Ottoman aspiration to gain tighter control of alum production, which may also have contributed to the seizure of the two Phokaïas and perhaps influenced the previous non-production agreement reached by the Draperio cartel.¹²⁹ Thus there are various ways in which the behaviour of the Gattilusio lords may have damaged their prospects for survival as long-term clients of the Ottomans. However, given the likelihood that the best-attested grievances were of long standing, the novelty and persistence of the Ottoman inclination towards aggression against the Gattilusio implies some additional factor at work.

¹²⁴ Aşikpaşazade, pp. 202–4; Tursun Beg, pp. 37–8; Kritovoulos, pp. 129–30, 168–9; Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, pp. 268, 271–3.

¹²⁵ Kritovoulos, pp. 129–30, 168–9.

¹²⁶ Julian Chrysostomides, *Monumenta Peloponnesiaca: Documents for the history of the Peloponnese in the 14th and 15th centuries* (Camberley 1995), pp. 137–41 (no. 68); George Martin Thomas, *Diplomatarium Veneto-Levantinum: sive acta et diplomata res Venetas, Graecas atque Levantis illustrantia*, 2 vols. (Venice 1880–99, reprinted New York 1966), vol. 2, pp. 222–3 (no. 134); ASG, NA 847 (Tommaso de Recco 1), unnumbered document dated 9 Dec 1448.

¹²⁷ Doukas, p. 423; above, p. 337.

¹²⁸ Benedetto Dei, *La Cronica dall'anno 1400 all'anno 1500*, ed. Roberto Barducci (Florence 1985), p. 161; above, pp. 182–3.

¹²⁹ See above, pp. 181–3.

The root of this inclination lies most probably in the element which had always particularly imperilled the Gattilusio in their dealings with the Ottomans: the location of their territories. The straits had always been the geographical fulcrum of both the strength and the vulnerability of the Ottomans and maintaining the links from land to land had always been a critical concern of theirs. However, during the 1450s they became preoccupied with achieving a goal which had hitherto been beyond their grasp, that of controlling the links from sea to sea. Where the rival Italian powers had striven fruitlessly for decades to control the passage through the straits on both axes, the Ottomans would succeed. This was part of a broader development, their emergence as a great naval power capable of dominating the surrounding waters, treating the sea not simply as the conduit for transient raiding expeditions but as strategic space over which they could exert some degree of control. Besides the straits themselves, the area most critical to these efforts was the north-eastern Aegean, the region through which Ottoman fleets exiting the Dardanelles to strike at Latin targets and Latin fleets challenging Ottoman control of the choke-point had to pass. Having taken Constantinople and Pera and built artillery fortresses covering the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, Mehmed's natural next objective at sea would be to secure the very area in which the domains of the Gattilusio lay.¹³⁰

Like most empires, the Ottomans maintained relationships of tribute, overlordship and clientage which extended their power beyond the limits of their direct control, and as with most empires such arrangements were normally made on the periphery of their territories. As their power expanded, tributary territories tended to be absorbed into the state itself while the rulers beyond, on what was now the frontier, became tributaries in their turn.¹³¹ The collapse in the fortunes of the Gattilusio in their relations with the Turks came because of the drastic transformation of their position in these concentric rings of power which occurred when the Ottomans became serious naval contenders. Hitherto, wherever the Ottoman state met the coast it had found its frontier, with the exception of the vital and vulnerable lines of communication across the straits.

¹³⁰ The period in which Mehmed set about imposing his power in the Aegean also saw him capitalise on his new dominance of the straits to subjugate and ultimately destroy the Genoese possessions in the Black Sea. Franz Babinger, *Mehmed the Conqueror and his Time*, tr. Ralph Manheim, ed. William C. Hickman (Princeton, New Jersey 1978), pp. 119, 180–1, 343–5.

¹³¹ Fine, pp. 607–10; Inalcik, 'Ottoman methods', pp. 103–7.

Consequently islands, and even the coastal enclaves of maritime powers, lay by definition on the periphery, no matter how deep within the Ottoman core the adjacent continental hinterland might be. When the Ottomans began to challenge for control of the sea, the Gattilusio territories abruptly shifted from the edge of the Ottoman world to the centre. This transition deprived them of the opportunity to survive by the means which were still for a time available to islands lying further from the Dardanelles, which remained on the edge of the slowly expanding shell of Ottoman naval hegemony. Whatever the shifting circumstances or the fluctuating policies of the sultans, the new strategic logic of their position ensured that aggression against the Gattilusio would be a recurrent theme.

The reign of Mehmed II constituted a transitional period in the history of the Ottoman state, in which one phase of expansion reached its climax while another began, developments symbolised by his preferred titles of 'Sultan of the two lands' and 'Khakhan of the two seas'.¹³² These years saw the completion of the Ottomans' conquest of the surviving vestiges of Byzantium and the effective conclusion of their struggle to gain control of the Balkans and Anatolia, the two terrestrial quadrants of the old Byzantine world, the region of which the Bosphorus and Dardanelles formed the hub. They also saw the beginning of their struggle to control that region's two maritime quadrants, namely the Black Sea on one side and the Aegean and adjacent parts of the Mediterranean on the other, which required the Italian maritime empires in the East to be subdued. The destruction of the Gattilusio lordships lay at the nexus of these transitions. On the one hand Phokaia and Ainos were the last continental enclaves set within the core territories of the Ottoman state to fall under its control, while the lordship of Mytilene ended as the last relic of Byzantine territorial authority. On the other the insular territories of the Gattilusio were the first significant islands to be conquered. The phase of Ottoman expansion which had begun when the earthquake of 1354 opened a new world of opportunities for both Francesco Gattilusio and Orhan ended with the overthrow of the eventual successors of the former by those of the latter.

¹³² Inalcik and Quataert, pp. 273–4.

CONCLUSION

The principal contributors to the development of the Gattilusio lordships were the interactions between a long-established and formerly overwhelmingly dominant network whose dramatic decline had created the fragmented Aegean world, two others created by more recent interlopers which embodied the forces which had brought that world into being, and a fourth whose emergence and development brought that world to an end with the establishment of a new hegemony. These constitute a representative sample of the major elements at play within the Aegean world during this period, excepting only the continental powers of the Balkans, with whom the Gattilusio engaged only briefly. The Gattilusio lordships were deeply entangled with each of them, exemplifying the compatibility between such diverse affiliations which the environment of the late medieval Aegean promoted, while erecting their own small network of power from the components which that environment offered. In each case the Gattilusio lordships displayed characteristics which rendered them distinctively revealing of the operation of a particular network's apparatus for integrating components of the fragmented Aegean into its own structures and deriving advantage from them.

In Byzantium, this period saw a continuing shift away from the autocratic organisational methods which had typified the empire in earlier eras, in which subordinates were integrated into a formal hierarchy of offices and dignities, exchanging service for status and salaries founded on taxation. As both foreigners and imperial relatives, as Latin client rulers over whom the empire wielded particularly little ostensible power but whose allegiance proved particularly durable, the Gattilusio exemplified the increasing importance in imperial government of family relationships, the delegation of territorial authority and the alienation of resources and responsibilities into private hands. Through the continued legitimising capacity of imperial ideology, Byzantium durably secured formal sovereignty and occasional material assistance. This outcome displays the tenacity with which the empire remained able to extract benefits from the exploitation of its ideological apparatus and from the enlistment of dangerous outsiders, methods which had always been characteristic of it, though also the extent to which its depleted strength had reduced its capacity for the direct assertion of power.

The Genoese community exemplified the potential of diffuse associations to transcend the weakness of official organisational structures. The Gattilusio lordships, beyond the reach of formal Genoese authority and increasingly detached from the metropolis, illustrate through their continued solidarity with the community the efficacy of the bonds of common interest that united the Genoese overseas through economic integration and defensive cooperation, in a manner not greatly dependent on the strength of their direct connections with the metropolis. This most materialistic of the networks into which the Gattilusio were incorporated derived the most conspicuous and consistent material dividends from its relationship with them. At the same time, the lordships' eventual fate is expressive of the limitations of a loose-knit network based on such principles in an environment less conducive to their operation than the fragmented Aegean.

The community of Latin Christendom was the network which had done most to create the political division and diversity of the Aegean world by shattering its former unity, and then to sustain that state of affairs by opposing the efforts of others to reunite it. The Gattilusio lords possessed particularly strong motivations and opportunities for participation in the undertakings of crusade and Church Union, combined with pressing disincentives from provoking the Turks, exemplifying the dilemmas of the Christian powers. Their behaviour illustrates the paradoxical dynamics of a network whose most potent integrating force, the immediacy and intensity of the Muslim military threat at a given moment, was simultaneously the force which most strongly deterred involvement, producing responses which sought to gain maximum credibility as members of the network for a minimum of perilous contribution.

While the Gattilusio lords for a time enjoyed friendly relations with the Ottomans, this cannot be regarded as incorporation into any kind of associative network but must rather be seen as affiliation to a centralised organising power, albeit at times of a cordial and at least partially voluntary kind. Whereas Byzantium increasingly manifested a tendency towards diffuse associative structures, while the Genoese community and Latin Christendom had always been characterised by them, the Ottomans succeeded in defying and overturning the prevailing trends, both accomplishing sustained territorial expansion and integrating the areas under their authority into an increasingly coherent and tightly organised state. The lengthy survival of the Gattilusio lordships and their ability

to ingratiate themselves with the Ottomans attests to the continuing viability of small domains operating within the norms of the Aegean world and the scope for them to achieve some gains even in their dealings with such a forbidding partner. This capacity rested to a large extent on the principal limitation of the Ottomans' hegemonic drive, their limited power and aspirations at sea, and when this ceased to apply the Gattilusio lordships proved particularly vulnerable.

The operation of the Gattilusio lordships themselves, through their informal and contingent familial structures and the divergence between the economic connections of different components, was expressive of the same tendencies to local distinctiveness and associative forms of authority which typified the larger networks in which they participated. The divergence of interests between different components of a given network arising from geographical dispersal is observable in the Genoese community or in Latin Christendom through the differing pressures acting on those in western Europe and those in the eastern Mediterranean. The same phenomenon is discernible on a smaller scale within the Gattilusio lordships. It seems to be reflected in the differing situations of islands and of continental ports with regard to Turkish power, and in the disparity between the lordship of Mytilene's tight connections with Genoese Chios and the apparently greater openness of Ainos to dealings with the Venetians.

Such variations between territories were shaped not only by geography and external links but by the varying balance of Latin and Greek elements within them. The society and governmental structures which developed under the rule of the Gattilusio embodied the interaction and partial synthesis of Byzantine and western elements on an unusually equal footing, an internal circumstance which was in mutually reinforcing interaction with the lordships' external bonds with the empire. The circumstances which in general underlay Latin regimes in the formerly Byzantine world, of coercive foundation, Catholic ecclesiastical supremacy, the concentration of power in the hands of an immigrant minority, and antipathy between the Byzantine ideological tradition and the new rulers' appeal to their subjects' loyalty, were here absent or present in a sharply attenuated form. This in one sense rendered the lordships exceptional, placing them at one extreme of the range of composite societies which developed in the Aegean. In another it rendered them peculiarly expressive of the incentive for political authorities in a region characterised by culturally

and religiously divided societies to engage with their subjects across communal divides, and make their rule acceptable to those from backgrounds unlike their own.

Thus the Gattilusio lordships stand as exemplars of the tendencies within individual networks which were most in keeping with the characteristic features of the region as a whole in this period. Their history presents an Aegean world in which acute fragmentation and heterogeneity was inextricably bound up with intense and diverse interconnection, which it rendered both highly feasible and highly advantageous. In this era the political geography of the Aegean echoed its physical geography, forming a world of political islands and political archipelagos. The dynamics of this world favoured a multiplicity of direct connections between individual players, small and large, over the cohesion of consistent hierarchical structures in which dominant centres shaped the destinies of their dependents.

By drawing on what a range of different networks had to offer, ideologically, economically, diplomatically and militarily, small polities such as the Gattilusio lordships could transcend the limitations of their own resources, and the limitations of what integration into any one network could provide. This was a product of the differing character of those networks. No other partner could supply the ideological underpinnings for rule over a largely Greek and Orthodox population which Byzantium offered. None but Venice could match the commercial expertise and connections which membership of the Genoese community offered, or followed political priorities so much shaped by the commercial interests of its adherents. The wider community of Latin Christendom offered unique means of winning prestige and moral credit applicable all across western Europe and could mobilise unparalleled combinations of military force to oppose the Turkish threat. The Turks themselves controlled access to an increasingly preponderant proportion of the region's economic opportunities, while Ottoman military power constituted a fundamental fact of life for the region's inhabitants which demanded a response. Besides the ideological and sentimental motives for advancing a given cause and winning approbation in a given milieu, which in the case of the Gattilusio would have been a significant consideration with regard to Genoa and Latin Christendom and probably in time also Byzantium, active engagement with each network offered individuals and local regimes means of self-advancement available nowhere else. For each such small player in the flux of the Aegean the precise range of possible connections available and the balance of considerations impelling or restraining pursuit of them differed, but the potential benefits of diverse affiliations represented

a general rule. It was a structural fact of an environment where power and access to resources were not merely fragmented, but in the hands of a range of groups whose cultural backgrounds, religious loyalties, political institutions and social and economic structures were exceptionally varied for such a limited space.

Diverse affiliations did carry certain disadvantages. They widened the range of unwelcome conflicts in which a regime might become implicated, as in the case of the Gattilusio lordships' entanglement in Milan's war with Venice in the 1430s. Competing pressures from different networks could obfuscate policy towards a third party. They might clash directly with one another: the simultaneous pursuit of Ottoman favour and of credit in the eyes of Latin Christendom amounted to a particularly strenuous balancing act. The looseness of adherence to any one power or association that was implicit in close connection with others might weaken the commitment of a given network to assist in time of need. However, the harmful impact of such contradictions and ambiguities was fairly limited until the escalation of the Ottoman threat under Mehmed II transformed the lordships' situation, though this was at least in part due to adept management.

With the significant exception of their relations with the Ottomans, the advantages of the principal affiliations pursued by the Gattilusio lordships were not offset by the kind of strong disincentives that might arise from the overbearing demands of a strong organisational power. There is no evidence of the extraction of revenues from the lordships by outside powers besides the sultans, and little of constraints on the lordships' freedom of action. This in part reflects another advantage of a regime based on diverse affiliations, which avoided excessive dependence on any one power. It also reflects the loose, associative character that was distinctive of the Christian networks to which the Gattilusio lordships belonged. This was not a universal paradigm in the Aegean, even before the rise of the Ottomans: Venice in particular consistently exercised a stringent grip on the territories under its direct rule throughout the period, while other powers were in a position to exert a relatively heavy hand at one time or another. It was however a typical and characteristic quality of the nature of power in a region and period whose great range of polities were mostly marked by a disinclination or incapacity for sustained centralised organisation on a grand scale.

The associative quality of these large networks of power was also a major contributor to the feasibility of wide-ranging affiliations. The limited capacity of loose-knit structures to compel obedience diminished their scope to secure an exclusive relationship with smaller polities,

enabling the latter to exploit opportunities that other connections could offer them. From the point of view of these wider networks and their collective interests there were of course significant dangers in the existence of strong bonds between their members and other authorities and communities. Most obviously, solidarity within Latin Christendom and reconciliation between the Catholic and Orthodox spheres were at odds with the interests of the Ottomans and other Islamic regimes, as these facilitated military combinations against them. Conversely, good relations with the Turks undermined Christian cooperation by placing Christian authorities under obligations to Muslim powers, entangling them in economic activities which gave them an increased interest in avoiding provocation, and increasing their real or apparent scope for gaining security through accommodation with the Ottomans rather than collective resistance, pressures which are discernible in the case of the Gattilusio lordships. Such considerations might also pertain on a smaller scale to the rivalry between Venetians and Genoese. Genoese affiliation had some scope to work indirectly to the detriment of commitment to Latin Christendom, given the relatively cordial relations the Genoese enjoyed with the Ottomans and the extent of their economic interests in Turkish territory. As a result of this effect, those same Ottoman connections among its members could have a harmful impact on the Genoese community by damaging its reputation in the Christian world, a concern which in their own more specific case seems to have exerted a considerable influence on the Gattilusio lords. Latin Christian identity among the adherents of Byzantium potentially threatened the religious and cultural coherence of the empire's network of influence, as through the introduction of Catholic Church structures to the Gattilusio territories and the Latin aggrandisement in Lesbos after the Union of Florence. Association with such Latin clients could expose the empire's rulers to unpopularity and internal opposition. Besides such difficulties arising from affiliations spanning the major fault-lines between Christian and Muslim, Catholic and Orthodox, Venetian and Genoese, more incidental clashes in policy towards third parties were a perennial possibility, such as when the Genoese and Byzantine affiliations of the Gattilusio worked against one another in their dealings with the Empire of Trebizond. Such incentives for networks to restrict the bonds which their adherents could form elsewhere meant that the limitations of their capacity to do so were important in enabling diverse interconnection in the Aegean world.

However, the failure of individual networks to obstruct such connections elsewhere was by no means simply the result of incapacity. The

benefits they could derive from the access to opportunities and resources which their members gained through affiliation with other networks were of fundamental importance. For Byzantium the Genoese identity of the Gattilusio lords defused their own community's potential for aggression against the empire's island territories and put Italian maritime capabilities at the service of upholding imperial sovereignty, while their ready access to Latin naval muscle also made them valuable from the personal perspective of individual contenders for power in the empire. The bonds created both through Genoa's French connections and through the credit gained by the Gattilusio lords' own involvement with the crusading movement also had potential benefits, reflected in John VII's employment of them as interlocutors with Boucicault and other crusading leaders. For Genoa, the Gattilusio relationship with Byzantium delivered control of commercially significant territories into the hands of its citizens without significant cost, with all the resultant benefits in terms of secure preferential access to economic opportunities, obstruction of Latin competitors and the periodic employment of those territories' resources for common goals. Less certainly, the Gattilusio lords' relationship with the Ottomans may have smoothed Genoese access to resources such as the Anatolian grain acquired during Bayezid's embargo. From the perspective of Latin Christendom at large, their distinguished Byzantine connections aided the pursuit of Church Union, at least in the time of Francesco I Gattilusio and John V Palaiologos, while even their links with the Ottomans could have compensations when disaster struck, facilitating the succour of the leaders of the Crusade of Nikopolis. Even the Ottomans, the power best able to demand unswerving obedience and to secure objectives without assistance, benefited from their access to Latin naval resources and perhaps from their commercial connections and acumen, as they certainly did from those of other Genoese. In a divided region whose societies and regimes were of such varied character, the independent affiliations of individuals, groups and small regimes with a particular network of power offered conduits through which another network to which they belonged could gain access to skills, resources or ideological capital which it did not possess itself, access which the central power structure of that network or other elements within it might be unable to gain, or gain as easily, on their own account.

All such calculations depended heavily on the preservation of a system which denied supremacy to any individual power. This Aegean system had rebuffed a series of attempts to lay claim to the Byzantine inheritance and bring a return to hegemonic organisation. The relatively

weak forces for positive integration which marked the loose, associative structures characteristic of the region were offset by a corresponding lack of negative pressures. Conversely, a strong centralising power both generated potent incentives for lesser players to escape integration, and by providing a common enemy potentially strengthened and mobilised other existing networks and alliances in opposition. Such countervailing effects would tend to grow more compelling as the power in question extended its hegemony. In the case of the Ottomans, the religious divide intensified the pressures encouraging Christian powers to escape their grip, while religious solidarity and the existing ideology and institutions of religious war in the Catholic world offered a vehicle for combinations against them. Despite this, the Ottomans prevailed where a succession of Christian aspirants to dominance had failed. In this they were aided by the intrinsic vulnerabilities of a world characterised by chronic division and multifarious informal and equivocal associations. Rivalries and contradictions between political and economic interests and between long-term and short-term benefits all diminished the scope for sustained or proactive cooperation against them. This was already constrained by the scarcity of large, tightly integrated Christian political structures in the region; tellingly, Venice, the principal example of such a structure, weathered the transition to Ottoman dominance much more successfully than other polities, conducting a very long and bitterly contested fighting retreat. The region's capacity for supporting the kind of organisational system which had been exploded in 1204, amply demonstrated through many centuries before that turning-point, was a perennial possibility awaiting fulfilment by a power capable of overcoming its own tendencies to fragmentation.

The Gattilusio lordships owed their creation to the exigencies of an emperor whom their founder helped to install in Constantinople, a product of the starkly diminished reach and the increasingly diffuse power-structure of the polity that had once tightly bound together the Aegean basin and a fluctuating range of lands beyond it. They flourished by means well suited to an Aegean world created by the deposition of imperial Constantinople from its age-old supremacy, a world whose defining characteristics were fundamentally at odds with the kind of political and economic integration which that city had formerly embodied. They perished when the reassertion of the old pattern of Constantinopolitan empire in new hands eclipsed the Aegean world whose qualities they exemplified.

APPENDIX ONE

OLD PHOKAIA

There exist a number of historiographical problems regarding the history of late medieval Old Phokaia, of which the most basic concern its identity. The town currently known as Foça (Phokaia) or Eski Foça (Old Phokaia) is located at the western extremity of the peninsula north of the mouth of the River Gediz (Hermos). Yeni Foça (New Phokaia) lies on the same peninsula's north side, considerably closer to the main landmass. There has been some debate as to whether these correspond directly to the medieval settlements bearing the equivalent names, and it has been argued that the names have in fact at some point been reversed.¹ More recent analysis has dismissed this proposition and reasserted the identity of the modern towns with their medieval namesakes, though only on the basis of circumstantial evidence.² In fact this point can be demonstrated directly from a contemporary source, an Anconitan *portolan* dated to between 1435 and 1444. This describes the approaches to each port, placing New Phokaia at the end of an inlet between two capes, which is in turn within a larger gulf, while referring to a group of four small islands located just off Old Phokaia.³ This description corresponds unambiguously to the situation of the homonymous modern towns. This is unsurprising in the light of the fact that the principal alum deposits in the region are to be found not on the peninsula itself, though a secondary deposit does exist there, but some distance inland, north-east of its base.⁴ Founded to afford greater convenience and security to those exploiting the alum mines, the establishment of New Phokaia is only comprehensible if it gave significantly better access to the principal sites of extraction than the old town.⁵

There has been a widespread supposition in past scholarship that the Gattilusio lords held Old Phokaia through an *appalto* or similar concession from the Mahona of Chios.⁶ This seems to originate with the assertions of Carl Hopf. After its capture

¹ Paolo Stringa, *Genova e la Liguria nel Mediterraneo: insediamento e culture urbane* (Genoa 1982), pp. 291–3.

² Geo Pistarino, 'Notazioni su Focea', *Atti dell'Accademia Ligure di Scienze e Lettere* 48 (1992), pp. 631–8 at pp. 631–2.

³ Nicolai Iorga, *Notes et Extraits pour servir à l'histoire des Croisades au XV^e siècle*, 6 vols. (Bucharest 1915), vol. 4, pp. 20–1 (no. 16).

⁴ Mümtaz Çolak, Valérie Thirion-Merle, Francine Blondé and Maurice Picon, 'Les régions productrices d'alun en Turquie aux époques antique, médiévale et moderne: gisements, produits et transports', *L'alun de Méditerranée*, ed. Philippe Borgard, Jean-Pierre Brun and Maurice Picon (Naples and Aix-en-Provence 2005), pp. 59–68 at p. 65, fig. 2.

⁵ Doukas, *Ducas Istoria Turco-Bizantina (1341–1462)*, ed. and tr. Vasile Grecu (Bucharest 1958), pp. 205–7.

⁶ E.g. William Miller, 'The Gattilusj of Lesbos (1355–1462)', *BZ* 22 (1913), reprinted in *Essays on the Latin Orient* (Cambridge 1921, reprinted Amsterdam 1964), pp. 313–53 at p. 322;

by the Genoese in 1346 the port had passed back into Byzantine control at the time of Leo Tsyvos's revolt and attack on Chios in 1347. It was thereafter held under nominal imperial authority by the Kalothetos family.⁷ According to Hopf it was then definitively restored to Genoese control by Pietro Recanelli in 1358.⁸ This claim is however unsupported by any known source: Hopf cites Gregoras at this point, but the passage in question makes no mention of such an event.⁹ It is evident that if any such conquest did occur it was swiftly reversed. This is established by an order from the Patriarch of Constantinople to the Metropolitan of Smyrna in April 1363, which makes clear that Old Phokaia was still in the hands of the Kalothetoi at that time.¹⁰ This reality is reflected by a silence in the Genoese documents in contexts where one might reasonably expect Old Phokaia to have been mentioned if it was indeed under Genoese control, such as a Chian document of 1362 referring to the possibility of the loss of New Phokaia, but making no reference to the old town.¹¹

The agreements renewing the territorial concessions of the New Mahona of Chios in 1373, 1385, 1413 and 1436 did confer upon them the Genoese commune's right to govern Chios, New Phokaia and Old Phokaia.¹² However, as legal documents prescribing claimed rights, these need not have corresponded to the facts on the ground. Genoa and the Mahona had presumably never relinquished their claim to the two Phokaias deriving from the annexation of 1346, even while one or both were governed by the Kalothetoi.

The next indication of Old Phokaia's practical situation after 1363 is the reference to its capture by Venetian forces in 1379, during the War of Chioggia.¹³ This

Pistarino, 'Notazioni', p. 635; David Jacoby, 'Production et commerce de l'alun oriental en Méditerranée, XI^e–XV^e siècles', *L'alun de Méditerranée*, ed. Philippe Borgard, Jean-Pierre Brun and Maurice Picon (Naples and Aix-en-Provence 2005), pp. 219–67 at pp. 236–7.

⁷ John Kantakouzenos, *Ioannis Cantacuzeni imperatoris historiarum libri IV*, ed. Ludwig Schopen, 3 vols. (Bonn 1828–32), *CSHB* 7, 8, 9, vol. 3, pp. 83–5; Franz Tinnefeld, 'Kaiser Ioannes V. Palaiologos und der Gouverneur von Phokaia 1356–1358: ein Beispiel für den Verfall der byzantinischen Zentralgewalt um die Mitte des 14. Jahrhunderts', *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi* 1 (1981), pp. 259–71 at p. 269 n. 63.

⁸ Carl Hopf, 'Giustiniani (Familie aus Genua)', *Allgemeine Encyclopädie der Wissenschaften und Künste, von genannten Schriftstellern*, ed. J. S. Ersch and J. G. Gruber, 167 vols. (Leipzig 1818–89), section 1, vol. 68, pp. 308–41 at p. 316; *idem*, *Les Giustiniani, Dynastes de Chios*, tr. Etienne A. Vlasto (Paris 1888), pp. 40–3, 107–8.

⁹ Nikephoros Gregoras, *Nicephori Gregorae Historiae Byzantinae*, ed. Immanuel Bekker and Ludwig Schopen, 3 vols. (Bonn 1829–55), *CSHB* 12, 14, 15, vol. 3, pp. 559–63; cf. Tinnefeld, p. 269 n. 63. Michel Balard has established that New Phokaia had been restored to Genoese control around July 1349, but leaves the status of the old town unresolved. Michel Balard, *La Romanie Génoise (XI^e–début du XV^e siècle)*, 2 vols. (Rome 1978), vol. 1, pp. 125–6.

¹⁰ See below, p. 411.

¹¹ Philip Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese and their Administration of the Island 1346–1566: described in contemporary documents and official dispatches*, 3 vols. (Cambridge 1958), vol. 2, pp. 63–79.

¹² Argenti, vol. 2, pp. 102–22, 127–39, 218–27, 235–47.

¹³ Francesco Bonaini, 'Regesto e documenti di storia perugina, ad illustrazione delle precedenti cronache, dall'anno 1223 all'anno 1540', *Archivio Storico Italiano* 16/2 (1851), pp. 477–630 at pp. 554–5.

may be taken to indicate that it was by then in Genoese hands, whether those of the Mahona, of the Gattilusio or of some other individual. However, since Venice was also at war with the Byzantine supporters of Andronikos IV, who was allied with the Genoese, they might have attacked Old Phokaia even if it was still under Byzantine rule. The friction between John V and the effectively autonomous John Kalothetos had led to open fighting in 1357, and the patriarchal document of 1363 suggests continuing antagonism towards the regime in Constantinople.¹⁴ It characterises the hostility of Kalothetos, which was regarded as an impediment to the Metropolitan of Smyrna's residence in Old Phokaia, as 'τυραννικὴν', that is relating to illegitimate or rebellious power. If the Kalothetoi remained at odds with John V it is not implausible that they should have sided with his opponent Andronikos, despite the conflicting territorial claims and history of antagonism that lay between them and the Genoese.

In 1382 a number of Venetians reported to the authorities in Ragusa regarding the piratical activities of the inhabitants of Tenedos. The islanders were at that time defying the Venetian government under the leadership of Zanachi Mudazzo and allegedly attacking Venetian ships as well as those of other peoples, including the Anconitans. According to this report Tenedos was being supplied with food by the Turks of Phokaia.¹⁵ This may indicate that Old Phokaia was at this time not in the hands of any Byzantine or Latin regime but in those of Turks, probably subject to the neighbouring emir of Saruchan, who had perhaps taken control after the Venetian sack of 1379. However, according to Gregoras the pirates operating from John Kalothetos's Old Phokaia around 1357 had included foreigners and semi-barbarians.¹⁶ This could mean Latins, Turks or both. Clearer evidence of Turkish use of the port comes from 1363, when Turkish pirates chartered a Venetian ship at Gallipoli to carry Bulgarian slaves and merchandise to Phokaia for sale to other Turks.¹⁷ Given such precedents, the Turks of Phokaia mentioned in 1382 could have been traders or pirates continuing to operate from a town still under non-Turkish rulers. At any rate, given the anti-Genoese nature of the revolt of Tenedos which these Turks were assisting, it seems unlikely that it was any Genoese regime that controlled the port at this time.

Thus there is no firm evidence for the status of Old Phokaia between 1363, when it was still held by the Kalothetos family, and 1402, by which time it was under the control of Francesco II of Mytilene.¹⁸ This leaves open the possibility that it had come to the Gattilusio without passing through the hands of other Genoese in the interim. Such an acquisition could have come through a grant from an imperial government which had finally regained effective control of the

¹⁴ See above, pp. 40–1.

¹⁵ Bariša Krekić, *Dubrovnik (Raguse) et le Levant au Moyen Age* (Paris 1961), pp. 43, 222–3 (no. 360); cf. Rafaino Caresini, *Raphayni de Caresinis Cancellarii Venetiarum Cronica AA. 1343–1388*, ed. Ester Pastorello (Bologna 1922), *RIS* n.s. 12/2, p. 61.

¹⁶ Gregoras, vol. 3, p. 560.

¹⁷ ASV, *Commemoriali* 7, f. 51 (no. 229). This document dates from August 1363; it does not specify whether the old or the new town was involved. Given that the Kalothetoi were still in charge of Old Phokaia in April, it is likely that they remained in control there at this time.

¹⁸ Doukas, pp. 107–9.

port, or could have taken the form of forcible seizure by the Gattilusio, perhaps with the blessing of the authorities in Constantinople. In 1384 the Despot of the Morea Theodore Palaiologos conferred Monemvasia on Pietro Grimani, the Venetian castellan of Coron, probably as a means of ousting the locally dominant Mamonas family, who were defying imperial authority.¹⁹ With their nearby base on Lesbos and existing relationship with Byzantium, it would have been natural to employ the Gattilusio in a similar expedient to unseat the Kalothetoi, another recalcitrant local family and one which had successfully withstood the military power of the emperor. If Old Phokaia had in fact passed into Turkish hands, the imperial government would presumably have been all the more willing to see it acquired instead by a regime under Byzantine sovereignty.

The contention that Gattilusio rule in Old Phokaia had no Genoese foundations receives some support from documents regarding the fiscal and judicial rights of the Genoese commune over the territories of the Mahona. These, dating from 1395, 1396, 1404 and 1405, include New Phokaia along with Chios but make no mention of the old town.²⁰ It is also notable that the coins issued by Dorino Gattilusio as lord of Old Phokaia and the inscription he erected there bear the same combination of Gattilusio and Byzantine symbols as their equivalents from other Gattilusio territories, with no allusion to the Genoese commune or the Mahona of Chios.²¹ With no trace of any involvement of the Mahona or the commune in the government or exploitation of Old Phokaia, nor of any public acknowledgement of their asserted rights there by the Gattilusio, it must be supposed that Genoese institutions played little or no part in the establishment and legitimization of the Gattilusio regime there.

The absence of evidence for any controversy between the Gattilusio and the Mahona over possession of the town suggests that some kind of accommodation must have been reached between them, but this seems likely to have been more a matter of the Mahona's recognition of a *fait accompli* than anything else. Gattilusio rule would after all keep Old Phokaia in reliably friendly hands, while in New Phokaia the Mahona and its *appaltatores* already controlled the best base for exploitation of the alum mines. Even if some customs revenues were lost, there was no great incentive for the Chian authorities to poison relations by challenging the Gattilusio position.²²

¹⁹ Julian Chrysostomides, *Monumenta Peloponnesiaca: documents for the history of the Peloponnese in the 14th and 15th centuries* (Camberley 1995), p. 47 (no. 22); Manuel II Palaiologos, *Funeral Oration on his Brother Theodore*, ed. Julian Chrysostomides (Thessalonike 1985), pp. 142–3, n. 69.

²⁰ Argenti, vol. 2, pp. 141–59, 160–6, 169–71.

²¹ F. W. Hasluck, 'Monuments of the Gattalusi', *Archive of the British School of Archaeology* 15 (1908–9), pp. 248–69 at p. 258; Giuseppe Lunardi, *Le Monete delle Colonie Genovesi* (Genoa 1980) (ASLSP 94/1 (n.s. 20/1)), pp. 133–6; S. Kofopoulos and A. Mazarakis, 'I Gattilusio: Revisioni Genealogiche e Numismatiche', *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οι Γατελούζοι της Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 399–434 at pp. 430–2.

²² At least part of the customs revenue of Old Phokaia seems in any case to have been appropriated by the Turks. See above, pp. 383–4.

The situation of the Orthodox Church in Old Phokaia under Gattilusio rule is uncertain, but clearly much affected by the upheavals of the preceding decades. In August 1347, in the wake of the seizure of the harbour of Smyrna by crusaders and of Chios and the two Phokaia by the Genoese, the Metropolitan of Philadelphia was mandated as exarch to oversee patriarchal possessions in Smyrna, Old Phokaia and New Phokaia, probably in response to the disruption of existing administrative arrangements by the Latin conquests.²³ An adjustment of this expedient in 1354 retained the existing arrangement with regard to Old Phokaia, while giving the Metropolitan of Philadelphia full episcopal powers over the other sees.²⁴ This presumably reflects the fact that Old Phokaia had reverted to Byzantine rule under Leo Tsyvos and then the Kalothetos family, potentially enabling a bishop to take up his post there, whereas the other ports had remained or returned under Latin control.

By 1363 there was a Metropolitan of Smyrna in office, but he was unable to resume his seat in a city divided between Latins and Turks. As a result, it was clearly expected that he would normally reside in Old Phokaia, as a town within his province under Orthodox rule, but he faced likely obstruction from the Kalothetos regime, now at odds with the emperor. The patriarch had to threaten him with expulsion from office in an attempt to convince him to leave the comforts of Thessalonike and travel to his province.²⁵ By 1387 the Metropolitan of Smyrna was in residence in Old Phokaia. When in that year the Metropolitan of Ephesos sought the transfer of Klazomenai and of both Phokaia from the province of Smyrna to his own, he was given Klazomenai and New Phokaia but Old Phokaia was retained by the Metropolitan of Smyrna, whose effective seat it had become.²⁶ Given the uncertainty regarding the status of Old Phokaia in the later fourteenth century, it is unclear whether it was the Kalothetoi, the Gattilusio or some other authority who had given him a favourable reception, but on the basis of the situation prevailing on Lesbos it seems reasonable to suppose that this arrangement continued into the period of Gattilusio rule.²⁷

²³ Franz Miklosich and Joseph Müller, *Acta et Diplomata Graeca Medii Aevi: Sacra et Profana, Collecta et Edit*, 7 vols. (Vienna 1968), vol. 1, pp. 256–7 (no. 110); Venance Grumel, Vitalien Laurent and Jean Darrouzès, *Les Regestes des Actes du Patriarcat de Constantinople*, 7 vols. (Paris 1932–91), *Les Actes des Patriarches* 1, vol. 5, p. 229 (no. 2282). In the years following the conquest the Metropolitan of Smyrna was certainly on bad terms with the Latins controlling the port, who accused him of inciting the Turks against them. Michel le Quien, *Oriens Christianus in quatuor Patriarchatus digestus*, 3 vols. (Paris 1740), vol. 1, col. 746.

²⁴ Miklosich and Müller, vol. 1, pp. 334–5 (no. 149); Grumel *et al.*, vol. 5, p. 296 (no. 2360).

²⁵ Miklosich and Müller, vol. 1, pp. 445–8 (no. 193); Grumel *et al.*, vol. 5, pp. 380–2 (no. 2455).

²⁶ Miklosich and Müller, vol. 2, pp. 103–6 (no. 397); Grumel *et al.*, vol. 6, pp. 122–4 (no. 2826).

²⁷ See above, pp. 293–7.

APPENDIX TWO

TERRITORIAL ACQUISITIONS IN THE NORTHERN AEGEAN

Whereas the chronology of the establishment of the original Gattilusio lordship on Lesbos is clear and at least some of the considerations surrounding it can be discerned from the surviving sources, the circumstances of the family's subsequent territorial acquisitions are fraught with uncertainties and historiographical confusion. The distinctive case of Old Phokaia is dealt with elsewhere.¹ The other elements of the lordships' expansion, all located along the northern Aegean littoral, are assessed here.

The first attested extension of Gattilusio rule beyond Lesbos was the acquisition of what became the family's second most prominent possession, the Thracian port of Ainos. An inscription attests that this had taken place by 1382, and in 1384 Francesco I's brother Niccolò was identified as lord of Ainos.² The only explanation of how this took place comes from the much later testimony of Laonikos Chalkokondyles, who claims that the Gattilusio were invited to take charge by some of the inhabitants, who were engaged in a dispute with their Byzantine governor.³ This event is said to have occurred when the empire's rulers were fighting amongst themselves, presumably meaning the dynastic conflicts of 1376–81.⁴ The

¹ See above, pp. 407–10.

² Catherine Asdracha, 'Inscriptions de la Thrace Orientale et de l'île d'Imbros (XII^e–XV^{es.})', *Archaiologikon Δελτίον* 43/1 (1988), pp. 251–86 at pp. 259–60 (no. 29), plate IIIA; A. Luxuro and G. Pinelli-Gentile, 'Documenti riguardanti alcuni dinasti dell'Arcipelago, pubblicati per saggio di studi paleografici', *Giornale Ligustico di archeologia, storia e belle arti* 1 (1874), pp. 84–90, 217–221, vol. 2 (1875), pp. 86–93, 292–7, vol. 3 (1876), pp. 313–6, vol. 5 (1878), pp. 345–70 at vol. 1, pp. 86–7 (no. 3).

³ Laonikos Chalkokondyles, *Laonici Chalcocondylae Historiarum Demonstrationes*, ed. Eugenius Darkó, 2 vols. (Budapest 1922–7), vol. 2, p. 269. It may be that Chalkokondyles is incorrect and that Andronikos in fact granted Ainos to the Gattilusio during his reign from 1376 to 1379, just as he awarded Tenedos to Genoa and Gallipoli to the Ottomans as recompense for their role in assisting his coup. It is also conceivable that Ainos was in fact forcibly seized by the Gattilusio in a straightforward act of aggression. However, the fact that Francesco became angry, or affected to do so, when the matter was raised by Kydones suggests that he could claim some sort of legitimate grounds for possession of the town, and thus take offence at the fact that the emperor challenged his family's right to it. This reaction could be compatible either with an imperial grant or with the popular invitation described by Chalkokondyles. In the absence of any contradictory evidence, Chalkokondyles's version of events must be preferred.

⁴ Since there is no evidence currently available regarding the status of Ainos between 1356 and 1382 (see below, p. 414), one cannot definitively rule out the possibility that Chalkokondyles refers here to Andronikos's first rebellion in 1373 or even to the conflict between John V and Matthew Kantakouzenos in 1356–7, in both of which Thrace was the scene of the fighting. However, these brief clashes would seem somewhat less consistent with the severity of the fighting, 'ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον', alluded to by Chalkokondyles. The chronological

dispute Chalkokondyles describes between the governor and population of Ainos may have been related to the wider civil war, in which case the Gattilusio were perhaps chosen to intervene because of their alignment in that struggle. In this case it was presumably partisans of Andronikos IV who called them in, probably after he had been ousted from Constantinople in 1379 and was conducting a civil war with Genoese support from Pera. Alternatively it could have been a purely local controversy, for which redress could not be secured from the central government owing to the political turmoil afflicting the empire.

It may be significant in this regard that the last testimony to the situation in Ainos before its acquisition by the Gattilusio relates to its forcible seizure in 1356 by John Livadarios or Limpidarios, a servant of the port's appanage-holder Nikephoros Orsini.⁵ In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it is possible that Ainos had remained in the interim in the hands of a dissident regime, of Byzantine origin but disobedient to the authorities in Constantinople, in a comparable fashion to the rule of the Kalothetos family in Old Phokaia. That Anatolian port may well have passed into Gattilusio hands without passing through those of the imperial government, and the same possibility arises in the case of Ainos.⁶ Such a course of events would be readily compatible with Francesco's angry reaction to John V's remonstrance. He might well contend that the emperor could not reasonably demand the surrender of a territory which had been beyond the control of Constantinople for over twenty years, and which Francesco's family had acquired through its own exertions and the support of the inhabitants.

It is likely that John V for some time continued to refuse to acknowledge Gattilusio rule in Ainos, but that it was in due course legitimised. The surviving letter protocols do not accord any title of territorial authority to Niccolò of Ainos at all, characterising him simply as 'in' or 'relating to' Ainos, 'εἰς τὸν Αἴνον', whereas Francesco II is called the 'αὐθέντης' of Mytilene. This may indicate that when these formulae were drawn up, at some point between 1384 and 1403,

indications regarding Kydones's fraught embassy to Mytilene concerning Ainos also strongly suggest that the reference is to the troubles of 1376–81, since the town's recent acquisition by the Gattilusio would constitute the most obvious reason for it becoming a bone of contention between John V and Francesco I (Demetrios Kydones, *Démétrius Cydones Correspondance*, ed. Raymond-Joseph Loenertz, 2 vols. (Vatican 1956–60), vol. 2, pp. 203–4, n. 1 (no. 220)). An account in the Genoese *Compera Magna Pacis* belonging to Niccolò I Gattilusio, opened at some time in the period 1377–9, fails to identify him as lord of Ainos, unlike all of his accounts opened in later years (ASG, *CM* 691, f. 225^v; above, p. 158). This indicates that he did not yet hold that position at the time of opening, giving a *terminus post quem* of 1377 for his assumption of the lordship, although this does not preclude the possibility that Ainos had been acquired by the family earlier but had not yet been assigned to Niccolò.

⁵ John Kantakouzenos, *Ioannis Cantacuzeni Imperatoris Historiarum Libri IV*, ed. Ludwig Schopen, 3 vols. (Bonn 1828–32), *Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae* 7, 8, 9, vol. 3, pp. 315–7; Thierry Ganchou, 'Autonomie locale et relations avec les Latins à Byzance au XIV^e siècle: Iôannès Limpidarios/Libadarios, Ainos et les Draperio de Pera, *Chemins d'outre-mer: études d'histoire sur la Méditerranée médiévale offertes à Michel Balard*, ed. Damien Coulon, Catherine Otten-Froux, Paule Pagès and Dominique Valérian (Paris 2004), pp. 353–74.

⁶ See above, pp. 407–10.

Niccolò's position there was not yet officially recognised, although the fact that Ainos was mentioned at all implies that his control was acknowledged *de facto*.⁷ However, a letter of 1400 from Patriarch Matthew I (1397–1410) to Niccolò addressed him as 'ἄρχων' of Ainos.⁸ The application of such a title of territorial authority suggests that Niccolò's position in Ainos had by this time been accepted by the imperial court.

The chronology and circumstances of the acquisition of new island territories in the northern Aegean from Byzantium are still less clear. An inscription of 1431 identifies Palamede Gattilusio of Ainos as lord of Samothrake.⁹ The latest indication of the island's status before this comes from 1379, when at least part of it was apparently in Turkish hands.¹⁰ The arrival of Gattilusio authority on Thasos is attested by the inscription set up by Oberto Grimaldi in 1434 bearing the arms of the Gattilusio alongside his own, and by the Basle report of 1437.¹¹

⁷ Spyridon P. Lampros, *Catalogue of the Greek Manuscripts on Mount Athos*, 2 vols. (Cambridge 1895–1900), vol. 2, pp. 304–5 (no. 41).

⁸ Franz Miklosich and Joseph Müller, *Acta et Diplomata Graeca Medii Aevi: Sacra et Profana, Collecta et Edit*, 6 vols. (Vienna 1968), vol. 2, pp. 338–9 (no. 540); Venance Grumel, Vitalien Laurent and Jean Darrouzès, *Les Regestes des Actes du Patriarcat de Constantinople*, 7 vols. (Paris 1932–91), *Les Actes des Patriarches* 1, vol. 6, p. 350 (no. 3095).

⁹ Catherine Asdracha and Charalambos Bakirtzis, 'Inscriptions Byzantines de Thrace (VIII^e–XV^e siècles): édition et commentaire historique', *Αρχαιολογικόν Δελτίον* 35/1 (1980), pp. 241–82 at pp. 271–3 (no. 30), plate 76b. Two years later Palamede's authority over Samothrake was also attested by Bertrandon de la Brocquiere, *Le Voyage d'Outremer de Bertrandon de la Brocquiere, premier écuyer trenchant et conseiller de Philippe le Bon, Duc de Bourgogne*, ed. Ch. Schefer and Henri Cordier (Paris 1892), pp. 173–4.

¹⁰ Daniele da Chinazzo, *Cronica de la guerra da Veniciani a Zenovesi*, ed. Vittorio Lazarini (Venice 1958), p. 217.

¹¹ Alexander Conze, *Reise auf den Inseln des Thrakischen Meeres* (Hannover 1860), plate 3, no. 4; Spyridon P. Lampros, 'Υπόμνημα περί τῶν ἐλληνικῶν χωρῶν καὶ ἐκκλησιῶν κατὰ τὸν δέκατον πέμπτου αἰῶνα', *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 7 (1910), pp. 360–71 at p. 366; above, pp. 278–9. The year 1419 has sometimes been quoted as a *terminus ante quem* for the Gattilusio acquisition of Thasos (E.g. Ermanno Armao, *In giro per il mar Egeo con Vincenzo Coronelli. Note di topologia, toponomastica e storia medievale dinasti e famiglie italiane in Levante* (Florence 1951), p. 49; Paolo Stringa, *Genova e la Liguria nel Mediterraneo: insediamento e culture urbane* (Genoa 1982), p. 330; cf. William Miller, 'The Gattilusj of Lesbos (1355–1462)', *BZ* 22 (1913), pp. 406–47, reprinted in *Essays on the Latin Orient* (Cambridge 1921, reprinted Amsterdam 1964), pp. 313–53 at p. 330). This is apparently based on the remark in the Greek translation of Buondelmonti's description of the Aegean islands that Thasos, along with Ainos, was under Gattilusio rule, and on the fact that the author visited the north-eastern Aegean in 1419, when his presence is attested on Imbros, before completing his account the following year (Cristoforo Buondelmonti, *Description des Iles de l'Archipel par Christophe Buondelmonti: version grecque par un anonyme*, ed. Emile Legrand (Paris 1897), pp. xxv–xxi, 91–2). However, the references to the Gattilusio are absent from the original Latin text, indicating that they were interpolated into the later Greek translation (Cristoforo Buondelmonti, *Christoph. Bonelmontii, Florentini, Liber Insularum Archipelagi*, ed. G. R. L. de Sinner (Leipzig and Berlin 1824), pp. 126–7). The Greek version presents the heading of the work in such a corrupt form as to give the author the wrong surname. This is apparently the result of it having been translated from an inaccurate copy of the Latin text produced by a western scribe unfamiliar with Greek, the language in which this heading had been written even in the Latin version (Buondelmonti, ed. Legrand,

It had evidently been acquired at some point after Giorgio Gattilusio's defeat in 1414.¹²

Imbros and Lemnos came into the hands of the Gattilusio by grants made by Mehmed II after the fall of Constantinople, which in the case of Lemnos may have amounted to the recognition of a *fait accompli*, established by the Gattilusio in the immediate wake of the city's fall.¹³ They had hitherto remained in Byzantine hands. In the last months before Mehmed II's assault on the imperial capital, Constantine XI is reported to have offered Lemnos both to Alfonso V of Aragon and to Giovanni Giustiniani Longo in return for help against the Ottomans.¹⁴ As late as January 1454 a Venetian embassy was ordered to seek the cession of certain formerly Byzantine islands which were now in the gift of the Ottomans, principally Lemnos.¹⁵ Evidently, however, none of these proposals came into effect. The earliest indication of Gattilusio rule in Imbros is an inscription bearing both Gattilusio and Palaiologos emblems which was erected in the castle at Kastro on Imbros by John Laskaris Rontakenos, identifying him as the servant of Palamede Gattilusio.¹⁶

pp. xxvi–xxvii). This indicates that the translation into Greek was not carried out by Buondelmonti himself, nor by anyone in contact with him. In the absence of any other indications of its specific date, it is therefore worthless as chronological evidence on this point.

A Greek inscription of 1416 has also been cited as evidence of Gattilusio rule at that date (Charalambos Bakirtzis, 'Trois inscriptions de Kastro (Thasos)', *Bulletin de Correspondence Hellénique Supplement* 5 (1979), pp. 455–66 at pp. 455–6). However, nothing in its imagery or text provides any connection to the Gattilusio, and Bakirtzis offers no justification for the supposition that it was erected under their rule besides reference to the Greek version of Buondelmonti.

¹² See above, pp. 57–8, 101.

¹³ Doukas, *Ducas Istoria Turco-Bizantina* (1341–1462), ed. Vasile Grecu (Bucharest 1958), pp. 411–3; Michael Kritovoulos, *Critobuli Imbriotae Historiae*, ed. Diether Roderich Reinsch (Berlin and New York 1983), *Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae* 22, pp. 85–7; Stefano Magno, *Annali Veneti*, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna, MSS. 6214–6217, 6239–6340 at MS. 6215, ff. 244^v–5.

¹⁴ George Sphrantzes, *Georgii Sphrantzae Chronicon*, ed. Riccardo Maisano (Rome 1990), *Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae* 29, pp. 142–3; Doukas, p. 331; Kritovoulos, p. 40.

¹⁵ Josephi Valentini, *Acta Albaniae Veneta: saeculorum XIV et XV*, 25 vols. (Rome 1967–79), vol. 22, pp. 171–9.

¹⁶ Asdracha, 'Thrace', pp. 282–4 (no. 46), plate 118b. Asdracha tentatively reads the date of this inscription as 6961 (1 Sep 1452–31 Aug 1453) (Asdracha, 'Thrace', pp. 282–4 (no. 46), plate 118b). However, this appears to be based on a misunderstanding of the letter form used for the final numeral, which might be interpreted as an *alpha*, but which comparison with other inscriptions of the Palaiologan period shows to be clearly a *delta*, giving the date 6964 (1455–6). This reading is the one adopted by Conze and by Curtis and Kirchhof (Conze, p. 82, plate 3, no. 11; Ernest Curtis and Adolf Kirchhof, *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum*, 4 vols. (Berlin 1828–77), vol. 4, p. 499 (no. 9443)).

The Gattilusio acquisition of Imbros has also been dated by a number of scholars to 1436, supposedly on the basis of an inscription from the castle at Kastro bearing their emblems and that date (Armao, p. 58; Stringa, p. 299; Geo Pistarino, 'La difesa genovese dell'Egeo nord-orientale nel tempo dei Gattilusio (1355–1462)', *Le Stelle e le Strisce: studi americani e militari in onore di Raimondo Luraghi*, 2 vols. (Milan 1998), vol. 2, pp. 51–64 at pp. 61–2). No transcription, reproduction or reference to a publication of this inscription is offered by these authors, and no such inscription appears in the surveys of Conze or

This was the same man who is attested in 1444 and again in 1454/5 as governor of Samothrake on behalf of Palamede.¹⁷

In the case of Lemnos, however, there is some evidence that the Gattilusio had previously received a foothold there from Byzantium. According to the sixteenth-century Venetian chronicler Stefano Magno, the Gattilusio of Mytilene also acquired a castle on Lemnos at some point before the fall of Constantinople, which was probably Kotzinos.¹⁸ Magno states that the castle was acquired 'per rason di dota', but does not specify which of the marriages between the Gattilusio and the Palaiologoi was responsible for this transfer of property. The most obvious marriage that might have brought such a dowry to the lordship of Mytilene would be that of Francesco I, since the other marriages with the Palaiologoi involved imperial grooms and Gattilusio brides. However, John V is attested as ordering work on the fortifications of Kotzinos and Palaiokastro, and seeking financial help from the Grand Lavra to pay for it, in a document probably dating to 1361. This would indicate that the castle remained under direct imperial control.¹⁹ One explanation

Asdracha. However, Pistarino and Stringa's descriptions are apparently derived from that of Armao, who in fact gives the original Anno Mundi date as 6964, before rendering it into Anno Domini as 1436! It therefore seems that this is in fact the inscription of Rontakenos published by Conze, by Asdracha and by Curtis and Kirchhof, which is indeed from Kastrotro and was formerly located in the castle there, and that a simple error has substituted 1436 for 1456 and produced this confusion. There is therefore no compelling reason not to suppose that the Gattilusio originally acquired Imbros from the Ottomans rather than from Byzantium.

¹⁷ Conze, plate 3, no. 11; Ciriaco of Ancona, *Cyriac of Ancona: later travels*, ed. Edward Bodnar and Clive Foss, (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts 2003), p. 100; Asdracha and Bakirtzis, pp. 278–80 (no. 33), plate 78b.

¹⁸ Magno, MS 6215, f. 197^v, extracts published by Carl Hopf, 'Estratti degli Annali Veneti', *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes, inédites ou peu connues* (Berlin 1873), pp. 179–209 at p. 199. This castle is not identified by Magno, who left a blank space in his text for the name. However, he later asserts that when the Gattilusio, having acquired the rest of Lemnos after the fall of Constantinople, then lost it to the Ottomans in 1456, they were able to retain the unnamed castle. They continued to do so after the island's capture by the papal forces of Cardinal Trevisan, who held a second castle whose name is likewise omitted. The Gattilusio castle remained under the authority of Niccolò Gattilusio, who had formerly governed the whole island (Magno, MS. 6215, ff. 244^v–5, MS. 6216, f. 35^{r-v}). In his account of the subsequent restoration of Lemnos to Ottoman control, Kritovoulos describes the fall of two Latin garrisons on the island. One was at Palaiokastro, under a commander who answered to the Grand Master of the Hospitallers, who had been entrusted with the defence of the papal fleet's conquests after its departure from the Aegean; the other was at Kotzinos. Palaiokastro may therefore be identified as Magno's papal castle and Kotzinos as his Gattilusio castle. However, some doubt is cast on this interpretation by the fact that Kritovoulos identifies the Latin commander at Kotzinos as a Calabrian and says that after his surrender he departed for Euboea, details which would seem more consonant with his being part of the papal or Hospitaller forces than a servant of the Gattilusio. Kritovoulos, pp. 133–6.

¹⁹ Paul Lemerle, André Guillou, Denise Papachrysanthou and Nicolas Svoronos, *Actes de Lavra*, 4 vols (Paris 1970–82), *Archives de l'Athos* 5, 8, 10, 11, vol. 3, pp. 212–3 (Appendix 14). In 1430 a church in the castle of Kotzinos and another in the lower town were included among the properties of the monastery of Dionysiou confirmed by Demetrios Palaiologos

which has been advanced is that it was acquired by Dorino of Mytilene in 1440 on the occasion of the death of his sister Eirene, having been assigned to her as a widow's portion on the death of her husband, the Emperor John VII.²⁰ A conceivable alternative explanation is that Kotzinos had previously been in the hands of the Notaras family, and passed to the Gattilusio as the dowry of Helena Notaras, wife of Palamede Gattilusio. This would have brought it into the hands of the Gattilusio of Ainos, whereas it was their relatives in Mytilene who held it by 1453. However, it might in the meantime have passed to the lord of Mytilene through the marriage of Palamede's daughter to Francesco III, son of Dorino, who died soon afterwards.²¹

as ruler of Lemnos under an 'appanage', while in a later act he freed the monastery from tax charged on a house which it owned in the lower town. These acts and similar ones of earlier date do not however necessarily rule out Gattilusio possession of the castle at that time, since it could have been held as a private property, subject to the jurisdiction of the normal Byzantine authorities on the island. Nicolas Oikonomides, *Actes de Dionysiou* (Paris 1968), AA 4, pp. 135–52, 157–9 (nos. 25, 28).

²⁰ Miller says that this was 'doubtless' the means of acquisition (Miller, 'Gattilusj', p. 329). His conjecture is presumably based on Hopf's note in a genealogical table that Eirene held Kotzinos as a widow (Carl Hopf, 'Dynastes génois de l'Archipel', *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes inédites ou peu connues* (Berlin 1873), pp. 502–25 at p. 502). However, Hopf cites no source, while Miller cites none besides Magno, whose testimony does not in fact supply these details. Regarding Eirene, also known as Eugenia, cf. Polymnia Katsone, 'Ο γάμος του αυτοκράτορα Ιωάννη Ζ' με την Ευγενία Gattiluzi (1396/1397)' *Βυζαντιακά* 11 (1991), pp. 181–201; Nicolas Oikonomides, 'Συμείωμα για τον Ανδρόνικο Ε' Παλαιολόγο (1390)', *Θησαυρίσματα* 5 (1968), pp. 23–31 at p. 28 n. 15; John W. Barker, *Manuel II Palaeologus (1391–1425): A Study in Late Byzantine Statesmanship* (New Brunswick, New Jersey 1969), *Manuel*, pp. 462–6.

²¹ See above, p. 192.

APPENDIX THREE

THE ALUM OF MARONEIA

Among the various alum deposits exploited by the Genoese in the late medieval eastern Mediterranean, particular ambiguity surrounds the status and location of the mines identified with the port of Maroneia on the Thracian coast. Recent research suggests that the alum exported from Maroneia was extracted around modern Sapes, identifying this location with the alum mining site of Chapsylar, active in the sixteenth century and described by the traveller Pierre Belon in 1553.¹ Following Belon's erroneous equation of names, this site had previously been identified with Kypsella (Ipsala), on the east bank of the Maritza north of Ainos.² However, from his topographical description it is clear that Chapsylar actually lay in the mountains some distance west of the Maritza and not far from Komotini, placing it squarely in the hinterland of Maroneia.³ The productivity of the alum mines in this region in the Ottoman period was considerable, peaking at about 11,760 *kantars* a year.⁴

It is likely that by the mid-fifteenth century the Gattilusio lords held rights over the exploitation of these mines. In the early fifteenth century Giovanni Adorno, *podestà* of New Phokaia, possessed interests in the alum trade at Maroneia as well as at New Phokaia, Chios, and Scorpiata in north-western Anatolia.⁵ It was presumably these interests that led him to solicit the grant of the nearby port of Peritheorion as part of his reward for military assistance to Murad II.⁶ In the contract concluded in 1437 for the sale of alum to two Florentine merchants, the Genoese contractors who made the sale are described as 'appaltatorum aluminum

¹ Chryssa Karadima-Matsa, Francine Blondé and Maurice Picon, 'L'alun de Macédoine', *L'alun de Méditerranée*, ed. Philippe Borgard, Jean-Pierre Brun and Maurice Picon (Naples and Aix-en-Provence 2005), pp. 69–75 at pp. 71–3.

² E.g. David Jacoby, 'Production et commerce de l'alun oriental en Méditerranée, XI^e–XV^e siècles', *L'alun de Méditerranée*, ed. Philippe Borgard, Jean-Pierre Brun and Maurice Picon (Naples and Aix-en-Provence 2005), pp. 219–67 at pp. 241, 263.

³ Pierre Belon, *Voyage au Levant: les observations de Pierre Belon du Mans de plusieurs singularités et choses mémorables, trouvées en Grèce, Turquie, Judée, Egypte, Arabie et autres pays étranges* (1553), ed. Alexandra Merle (Paris 2001), pp. 195–7.

⁴ Suraiya Faruqi, 'Alum production and alum trade in the Ottoman Empire (about 1560–1830)', *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 71 (1979), pp. 153–75 at pp. 159–60, 163.

⁵ ASG, NA 627 (Niccolò Garumbero 1), unnumbered document dated 1 Mar 1424.

⁶ Enrico Basso, 'Genovesi e Turchi nell'Egeo medievale: Murad II e la "Societas Folie Nove"', *Quaderni Medievale* 36 (1993), pp. 31–52, reprinted in *Genova: un impero sul mare*, (Cagliari 1994), pp. 63–84 at pp. 50–2; Doukas, *Ducas Istoria Turco-Bizantina (1341–1462)*, ed. Vasile Grecu (Bucharest 1958), pp. 209–11, 227.

totius Thurcie, Grece et totius insule Mitheleni et Marronie partis Grece'.⁷ The fact that Maroneia is specifically singled out and not simply assumed to be included within 'Grecia' indicates that it was not covered by the concession from the Ottomans by which the Genoese were entitled to exploit other deposits in the Balkans and Anatolia. The likely implication of this is that it was a concession from a different authority. The form of words suggests that there were two categories of alum concession at issue here: those of Turkey and Greece, in the gift of the sultan, and those of Mytilene and Maroneia, in the gift of the Gattilusio. This division corresponds with references in the document to the Ottoman sultan and the lord of Mytilene as the two individuals whose repudiation of their agreements with the *appaltatores* would invalidate the contract. No other ruler is mentioned under this clause, suggesting that if Maroneia's alum concession was not part of the Ottoman *appalto* it must have been under Gattilusio authority.

Maroneia was evidently included along with the other mines under Genoese control in the great cartel created in 1449 and dominated by Francesco Draperio.⁸ Prior to this a concession there had apparently been in the hands of Draperio himself, who also held the *appalto* of Greece and Turkey. However, it seems likely that his holdings in Maroneia remained distinct from the larger *appalto*, since in 1452 Draperio, in severe financial difficulties, surrendered many of his rights to income from alum concessions and other sources, but excepted his alum interests in Maroneia and in the Turkish emirate of Karaman.⁹ This continuing separation of rights to the resources of Maroneia from the Ottoman concession covering the rest of the Balkans reinforces the supposition that the deposits of Maroneia, like those of Karaman, were in the gift of an authority other than the Ottoman sultan, most likely the Gattilusio lords.

It is not clear what the basis of this control was. Maroneia itself was apparently under Ottoman control in this period. In 1444, during planning for the Crusade of Varna, it was one of the ports in the northern Aegean, along with Thessalonike, Gallipoli and Panidos, which Venice hoped to conquer and retain.¹⁰ It has been suggested that the territory governed by the lord of Ainos extended over the deposits in the hinterland of Maroneia, thus encompassing a broad belt of land extending at least forty miles or so westward from Ainos itself.¹¹ However, there is no indication in other sources that the mainland possessions of the lords of Ainos extended beyond that port and its immediate environs, while some imply that they did not. Visiting Ainos, Ciriaco of Ancona described his host Palamede as ruler of that city and of Samothrake, a characterisation which would not sit easily

⁷ Joseph Müller, *Documenti sulle Relazioni delle Città Toscane coll'Oriente Cristiano e coi Turchi, fino all'anno MDXXXI* (Florence 1879), pp. 169–72 (no. 119); above, p. 181.

⁸ See above, pp. 181–3.

⁹ ASG, NA 764 (Bernardo de Ferrari 1), nos. II/14 (187), II/17 (365); Giustina Olgiati, 'Il commercio dell'allume nei domini dei Gattilusio nel XV secolo', *Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου, Οι Γατελούζοι της Λέσβου 9 Σεπτεμβρίου 1994 Μυτιλήνη*, ed. Andreas Mazarakis (Athens 1996), pp. 373–398 at pp. 382–3.

¹⁰ ASV, SS 16, f. 104^{r-v}.

¹¹ Jacoby, 'Production', pp. 240–1.

with the possession of such a large continental domain.¹² Kritovoulos's detailed account of the lordship's fall to the Ottomans relates the capture of the city itself and of its island dependencies but makes no mention of other territories further west. He states that Mehmed II, having advanced from Constantinople via Kypsella, departed for Adrianople after securing the surrender of Ainos, while his naval forces proceeded to secure the islands. In the course of his narration of these events, Kritovoulos describes the desirable economic position of Ainos in terms of its favourable situation for trade and the produce of the Maritza delta adjoining it, saying nothing of the alum deposits or other resources of the adjoining lands to the west as one might expect had they also belonged to the lordship.¹³

It therefore seems more probable that the rights over the alum of Maroneia held by the Gattilusio lords derived not from territorial dominance but from some sort of concession from the Ottomans, without whose well-compensated indulgence such an industry could not have operated in any case. If this is correct, this position must have been acquired by the Gattilusio before the creation of the consolidated *appalto* of Greece and Turkey and retained by them thereafter, so that it was not simply included within that larger concession. They must then at some point before 1437 have subcontracted it to *appaltatores*, as indicated by the contract with the Florentines.¹⁴

The concession may have pertained to the lordship of Ainos, but seems more likely to have belonged to the lords of Mytilene, whose acquisition of Thasos provided them with a possible base of operations nearby. Dorino of Mytilene was, as has been mentioned, the only ruler besides the Ottoman sultan mentioned in the 1437 contract, which says nothing about the lord of Ainos. This supposition would also sit more readily with Kritovoulos's failure to mention income from alum among the latter's revenues. Furthermore, it would go further towards explaining Belon's peculiar remark that at the time of his visit in 1553 Thracian alum was marketed under the name of 'alun de Metelin'.¹⁵ If these deposits had once been exploited in the name of the lord of Mytilene, their product could reasonably have been assimilated in common parlance to that of the more important deposits which he controlled in his principal island lordship, and which may for a time have been covered by the same *appalto*.

¹² Ciriaco of Ancona, *Cyriac of Ancona: later travels*, ed. Edward Bodnar and Clive Foss, (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts 2003), p. 104.

¹³ Michael Kritovoulos, *Critobuli Imbriotae Historiae*, ed. Diether Roderich Reinsch (Berlin and New York 1983), *CFHB* 22, pp. 101–7.

¹⁴ Marie-Louise Heers states that the Gattilusio acted as intermediaries to secure the concession of alum deposits under Ottoman control for their Genoese compatriots, but without clearly citing a source. It is conceivable that this assertion relates to an arrangement such as this. Marie-Louise Heers, 'Les Génois et le commerce de l'alun à la fin du Moyen Age', *Revue d'Histoire Economique et Sociale* 32 (1954), pp. 31–53 at p. 32.

¹⁵ Belon, p. 197.

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- *Pera Massaria*
- *Pera Syndicamenta*

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